U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARD IRAN:
STRUCTURES, ACTORS, AND POLICY COMMUNITIES

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by
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for

Baqiyatallah Al-Azam
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“All praise is due to God, who guided us to this; for we would not have found the way had God not guided us” (The Holy Quran, 7:43).

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“O God, bring me out of the darkness of illusions and honor me with the light of comprehension. O God, open to us the doors of your mercy and shower us with the treasures of your knowledge, O the Most Merciful” (Mafatihul Jinan).
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACILS</td>
<td>American Center for International Labor Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBG</td>
<td>Broadcasting Board of Governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANVAS</td>
<td>Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPE</td>
<td>Center for International Private Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRL</td>
<td>U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVC</td>
<td>Digital Video-Conferencing</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Foreign Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBB</td>
<td>International Broadcasting Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIP</td>
<td>U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISOG</td>
<td>Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBN</td>
<td>Middle East Broadcasting Networks</td>
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<td>MEPI</td>
<td>Middle East Partnership Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>MKO</td>
<td>Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDIIA</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>OIA</td>
<td>Office of Iranian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PART</td>
<td>Program Assessment Rating Tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFE/RL</td>
<td>Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<td>VOA PNN</td>
<td>Voice of America Persian News Network</td>
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an in depth study of the structures, actors, and policy communities associated with U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran. Since 2006, the U.S. government has spent more than $200 million for its Iran-related public diplomacy via State Department “democracy promotion” programs, National Endowment for Democracy, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. These initiatives promoted regime change in Iran, ignoring a substantial majority of Iran’s population opposed to U.S.-sponsored interventions. The study finds U.S. public diplomacy as it relates to Iran fits with the two-way asymmetrical model of public relations.

The dissertation identifies 182 individuals who participated in the Iran policy debate between January 2008 and January 2009. Based on the policy recommendations these members of the Iran issue network propose, the study uncovers the existence of the following four policy communities: Punitive Nonengagement, Hawkish Engagement, Strategic Engagement, and Fundamental Change. While regime change is the ultimate objective of both the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities, only the latter believes that negotiation is a useful tactic in gaining compliance from Iran. Both, however, view Iran as a major threat to U.S. and Israeli interests and see no role for Iran in solving regional challenges.

The Strategic Engagement policy community does not share this abysmal appraisal of Iran; rather, its members see meaningful cooperation between the United States and Iran on key regional issues as viable if their relationship is based on mutual respect. The Fundamental Change policy community finds the underlying assumptions of U.S. Iran policy vitally flawed and believes that all policy options short of an overhaul of U.S. international behavior lack ethical and legal legitimacy. Both the Strategic Engagement and Fundamental Change policy communities argue America should cease its pursuit of regime change in Iran and abide by its obligations under the Algiers Accord.
Public diplomacy recommendations proposed by the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement communities correlate with policies adopted by the Bush administration, with those of the former doing so more readily. The Obama administration is expected to adopt policies resembling the recommendations of the Hawkish Engagement policy community.
1. INTRODUCTION

In the Cold War climate of the 1950s, the United States initiated an active propaganda policy in the Middle East to incorporate the region into a global anti-Soviet alliance.\(^1\) In this, Iran was a major target of U.S. propaganda due to its strategic location near the Soviet border and its vast petroleum resources.\(^2\) The CIA-directed propaganda campaign to dismantle the nationalist government of Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953 is a stark example of such activities. According to Donald Wilber, the principal planner of the 1953 coup d’État, the CIA orchestrated “a massive propaganda campaign against Mosaddeq and his government but with Mosaddeq himself as the principal target.”\(^3\) In the words of Algar, “the return of the Shah inaugurated the intense period of a quarter of a century of unprecedented massacre and repression, and the intense exploitation of the resources of the Iranian people.”\(^4\)

In the years after the 1979 Islamic revolution, the United States has continued to employ propaganda, again as means of regime change. These propaganda efforts, which the U.S. government calls public diplomacy, have been reinvigorated in the context of the post-9/11 United States global propaganda activities to win the hearts and minds of the people in the Muslim world. Moreover, ever since the Bush Administration placed Iran in the axis of evil and in the aftermath of the pre-emptive war in Iraq, there has been the looming possibility of a military strike against Iran. Thus, in this juncture of time, it is important to closely attend to issues about U.S.-Iran relations.\(^5\) Despite the importance of U.S. public diplomacy efforts

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\(^5\) Appendix A gives a brief chronology of U.S.-Iran relations.
toward Iran, no study to date has focused on the subject. As a first step to fill this gap, this dissertation attempts to provide an in depth study of post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy policy toward Iran and the policy communities associated with it.

To achieve a more comprehensive analysis of U.S. public diplomacy policy toward Iran, it is necessary to go beyond a mere narration of U.S. policy and to include an examination of the “issue network” that participates in the Iran policy debate. Coupling the analysis of the American public diplomacy policy toward Iran with the study of the Iran issue network, the present study provides a unique understanding of the policy options available to U.S. policy makers. An issue network denotes “a specific type of public-private linkage, involving a great many actors” who are interested in a particular policy debate and who actively participate in “the communication of criticism of policy and generate ideas for new policy initiatives.” These actors include, but are not limited to, independent public policy institutes (i.e., think tanks), academic research centers, government research units, government officials, public relations consultants, and lobbyists. More generally, issue networks are referred to as policy networks

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9 Ibid.

linking “heterogeneous communities of policy actors into intricate webs of common benefit-seeking actions.”\textsuperscript{11}

Sabatier asserts that the analytical value of a network approach to policy research “lies in the fact that it conceptualizes policy making as a process involving a diversity of actors who are mutually interdependent.”\textsuperscript{12} He further explains that such an approach allows the researcher to go beyond “a formal description of policy making”\textsuperscript{13} and takes into account the role of state and societal actors. Thus, a network approach synthesizes state-centric and society-centered approaches to policy making. In addition to evaluating the influence of a variety of actors, a network approach takes into account the interdependent relationship among policy actors. On the same note, Wasserman and Faust assert that “the fundamental difference between a social network explanation and a non-network explanation of a process is the inclusion of concepts and information on relationships among units in a study.”\textsuperscript{14}

Raab and Kenis note that in the late 1980s policy researchers began to give importance to the role of networks in the policy making process.\textsuperscript{15} This research agenda was marked by a theoretical and empirical focus on “how networks between public, private, and non-profit actors shape processes of policy making and governance.”\textsuperscript{16} Policy network analysis grew more in

\textsuperscript{12} Paul A. Sabatier, \textit{Theories of the Policy Process} (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 146.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 187-88.
popularity since the beginning of the 1990s “due to the growing insight that public policies emerged from the interaction of public and private actors.”  

Policy researchers and political scientists have used different terminology for concepts similar to issue networks that denote how government interacts with other state and non-state actors in policy making. For example, Ripley and Franklin use the term “iron triangle” and propose that policy making is a product of the interaction among Congressional subcommittees, relevant agency in charge, and the benefit interest group. Similarly, Freeman and Steven introduce the concept of subgovernment and maintain that policy develops through the interaction of “clusters of individuals that effectively make most of the routine decisions in a given substantive area of policy.” These include Congressional members and their staff, a few bureaucrats, and representatives of interest groups. Heclo rejects these narrow conceptualizations of policy making process and maintains that by “looking for the few who are powerful, we tend to overlook the many whose webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise of power.”

The two concepts of epistemic communities and policy communities are also used in the policy research literature. Epistemic communities are knowledge-based networks of policy actors. Of all the variants of policy networks, policy communities are the most closed and elitist in nature. Marsh and Rhodes propose that policy networks can vary along a continuum

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18 Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1980).
20 Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," 102.
23 Hass, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination."
between issue networks and policy communities. Rhodes distinguishes between the two concepts as follows:

A policy community has the following characteristics: a limited number of participants with some groups consciously excluded; frequent and high-quality interaction between all members of the community on all matters related to the policy issues; consistency in values, membership, and policy outcomes which persist over time; consensus, with the ideology, values, and broad policy preferences shared by all participants; and exchange relationships based on all members of the policy community controlling some resources. There is a balance of power, not necessarily one in which all members equally benefit but one in which all members see themselves as in a positive-sum game. The structures of the participating groups are hierarchical so leaders can guarantee compliant members.

Issue networks, according to Rhodes, stand in contrast to the cohesive and closed policy communities:

Issue networks are characterized by many participants; fluctuating interaction and access for the various members; the absence of consensus and the presence of conflict; interaction based on consultation rather than negotiation and bargaining; an unequal power relationship in which many participants may have few resources, little access, and no alternative.

As this study concentrates on the composition of the Iran issue network based on policy recommendations, Rhodes’ consensus criterion seems most appropriate for delimitating policy communities. In other words, those in the Iran issue network who share “ideology, values, and broad policy preferences” are considered to be a policy community. Here, my conceptualization of the influence of the issue network on government policies does not necessarily involve a direct causal relationship between the two. Instead, I concur with those scholars that understand the influence of the issue network in terms of “their ability to set the terms of debate, define

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26 Ibid.
problems and shape policy perception.”27 Abelson believes that studying the dynamics of an issue network in addition to the actual policies of the government renders it possible to better identify key organizations and individuals who are influential in the policy formation process.28 While such studies “may not enable scholars to make definitive conclusions about which participants in a policy community were the most influential,” they “can offer useful insights into whose views generated the most support.”29 This approach gives a deeper understanding of the nature of policy making and allows the researcher to compare the recommendations of policy community members to the actual policies the government implements.

In line with such an approach, I advance the following six research questions to examine U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran and the issue network that is actively involved in this debate.

RQ1: Which individuals and organizations participate in the Iran policy debate and are thus part of the Iran issue network?

RQ2: What policy recommendations do the members of the Iran issue network propose?

RQ3: Which of these policy recommendations come under the category of public diplomacy policies?

RQ4: Based on Iran policy recommendations and the relationships among network members, what policy communities can be identified within the Iran issue network?

29 Ibid., 54.
RQ5: What are the policies that the various offices within the U.S. government have formulated with regard to its public diplomacy towards Iran, and which of these have been implemented? What role do non-state actors play in advancing these policies?

RQ 6: Which policy communities from the Iran issue network correlate with the various components of the U.S. government in their policy preferences?

Despite more than six years of intensive public diplomacy, poll after poll suggests that the favorability of the United States and its policies is in decline internationally. The Pew Research Center for People and the Press reported in 2006 that discontent with American unilateralism was widespread in European and Muslim nations, and that the war in Iraq had undermined America’s credibility abroad.\(^{30}\) Other scholars have also documented the prevalence of negative views of Americans among the youth in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries, including some traditional U.S. allies such as South Korea and Mexico.\(^{31}\) In her study, DeFleur demonstrates how “consistently negative portrayals of Americans in [U.S. produced] entertainment products viewed abroad” cultivate anti-American attitudes.\(^{32}\)

A September 2004 Department of Defense report on U.S. strategic communication in the Middle East made what many felt were startling observations with regard to the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy. The report asserted that “the overwhelming majority” of Arabs and Muslims are in “soft opposition” to the U.S. government’s foreign policies.\(^{33}\) American public

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\(^{32}\) Ibid.

diplomacy is “in crisis,” asserted the report, “and it must be transformed with a strength of purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security.”  

Scholars take two distinct approaches when criticizing the effectiveness and legitimacy of U.S. public diplomacy activities. A group of public diplomacy critics view the phenomenon as an image-building activity and propose that tactical, skills-based, or administrative changes will improve the effectiveness of the endeavor. The proposed changes under this rubric of scholarship include systematic assessment of the effectiveness of public diplomacy campaigns and increases in the budget for foreign public opinion polling.

There is another group of scholars who challenge the dominant framework that continues to drive current public diplomacy initiatives and insist that short of major structural changes public diplomacy lacks ethical legitimacy and will prove ineffective in achieving substantive international support for U.S. foreign policies. According to these scholars, “current public

diplomacy efforts being implemented in the Middle East embody the one-way flow of communication of early development campaigns” with the emphasis “on massaging the minds of the public, on building an image, and shifting public opinion about the United States.”

Scholars use different terminology for a public diplomacy approach that incorporates such structural changes. Among these are new public diplomacy, dialogue-based public diplomacy, culture-centered public diplomacy, network-oriented public diplomacy, and multistakeholder diplomacy. This alternative approach “builds on a vision for peaceful coexistence of nations and seeks to minimize global security threats in the world through the process of mutual dialogue.”

In line with the latter group of scholars, the present dissertation takes a critical approach to evaluating U.S. public diplomacy activities targeting Iran. Thus, the study’s seventh research question asks:

RQ7: Do the current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran fit with the two-way symmetrical model, which is in line with the new public diplomacy paradigm?

I address this question by examining the direction and purpose of the current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran. Based on the body of scholarship on the subject, I also advance the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran do not employ the two-way symmetrical model.

In qualitative research “research questions state what you want to learn. Research hypotheses, in contrast, are a statement of your tentative answers to these questions, what you think is going on; these answers are normally implications of your theory or experience.”\(^46\) Furthermore, “many qualitative researchers explicitly state their ideas about what is going on as part of the process of theorizing and data analysis.”\(^47\) As will be discussed shortly, previous research generally finds that the U.S. public diplomacy efforts have comprised one-way asymmetrical communications.

**Chapter Outline**

After this introduction, the second chapter gives a review of the literature on the topics of propaganda, public diplomacy, and history of U.S. public diplomacy. The third chapter presents the theoretical frameworks for evaluating U.S. public diplomacy and consists of the theories of new public diplomacy and two-way symmetrical public relations. The fourth chapter is a discussion of the methodology the study employs. Chapter five addresses the study’s first four research questions about the composition of the Iran issue network, their policy recommendations about Iran in general and public diplomacy in particular, and the policy communities that emerge based on these policy recommendations. Chapter six tackles the study’s fifth and sixth research questions about U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran and the policy


\(^{47}\) Ibid.
communities that correlate with the U.S. government in their policy preferences. The concluding chapter addresses the dissertation’s final research question about the presence of a two-way symmetrical model in U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran based on a synthesis of the information presented in the previous chapters.
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Propaganda

It is first necessary to define propaganda and public diplomacy and place the terms in their historical context. Propaganda is not a new phenomenon. “Image cultivation, propaganda, and activities that we would now label as public diplomacy are nearly as old as diplomacy itself.” Since World War I, the U.S. government has systematically used public diplomacy at times of national crisis. Although the term propaganda has negative connotations in popular belief, it is a communication process closely related to persuasion that does not necessarily have to have a negative manipulative purpose. The most literal meaning of propaganda is to “disseminate” or “promote” certain perspectives and ideas. The objective of the endeavor is to reinforce, replace, or modify the attitudes and behaviors of an audience.

The First World War marked the birth of “professional image cultivation.” Taylor contends that, in Western countries, propaganda acquired pejorative meaning “largely as a result of the excesses of the First World War (1914-1918).” Before 1914, propaganda meant “the propagation of ideas or of information on which ideas could be formed.” The term originated from the name of an institution in the Roman Catholic Church established by Pope Gregory XV.

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51 Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion.
54 Ibid.
in 1622. To counter the effects of the Protestant reformation, the Pope established the *Sacra Congregatio Christiano Nomini Propaganda*, or more commonly known as the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* (Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith). The objective of this congregation was to bring men and women to a voluntary, not forced, acceptance of the Roman Catholic Church’s doctrines.\(^5^5\)

The excesses of World War I propaganda campaigns led to the view that human beings are greatly vulnerable to manipulation by propaganda messages. As the events of World War I were assessed, many scholars and public intellectuals described concerns about the public being misled by unethical communication practices. Lippmann’s writings are prime examples of this view of propaganda and public opinion. Lippmann in *Public Opinion* argued that mass communication gives governments the opportunity for mass persuasion.\(^5^6\) In this seminal work, Lippmann showed how government officials use symbols that appeal to popular stereotypes to create pseudo-environments and to manufacture consent.

Early propaganda analysts focused on studying how and with what motive institutions, media, and officials used messages to shape public opinion. Driven by their belief that mass communication has a powerful potential to distribute messages that would alter audience attitudes and behaviors, these critics wanted to educate the public about propaganda and to help people detect deceptive claims and faulty reasoning.

Lasswell, who is often called the father of propaganda studies in the United States, was the first to systematically analyze propaganda.\(^5^7\) He described propaganda as “the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols … or, so to speak, more concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumors, reports, pictures, and other forms of social

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\(^{5^5}\) Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*.


communication.” His analysis of the propaganda techniques used during World War I led to a classification of the components and objectives of propaganda messages. He identified the following four primary purposes for propaganda, each of which had its own rhetorical features: 1) the identification of a foreign country as the enemy, 2) the promotion of domestic support for the war effort, 3) the creation of an evil image of the enemy (Satanism), and 4) the demoralization of the enemy.

Propaganda identifies the enemy by emphasizing the need for mobilization against the enemy in a time of crisis, blaming the enemy for putting the target society in the role of aggressor, exposing a record of lawlessness, violence, and malice, and suggesting that the war was vindication for those transgressions. To achieve domestic support, propagandists appeal to a common history, use a religious vocabulary, vilify the enemy as an obstacle to peace and security, appeal to collective egotism, describe the war as one of beliefs, emphasize profitability, and appeal to interest groups.

Lasswell found that dichotomization of good and evil was a prime feature of the Satanism metaphor. The propagandist claims that the enemy is the embodiment of evil while the home country is the embodiment of good. The propagandist attempts to demoralize the enemy by asserting that the war is unethical and by challenging the confidence of enemy forces in the enemy government. What Lasswell called the propaganda of diversion also concentrates on enemy losses.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, established in 1937 with the aim to study all forms of foreign and domestic propaganda, gave the following typology of propaganda techniques: (a) the use of name calling to condemn a person or group, (b) the use of glittering generalities to
bring about the acceptance of an idea or action, (c) the use of transfers or symbols to achieve compliance to ideas or actions that are compared to something favorable, (d) the use of testimonials, (e) the use of plain folks techniques or the promotion of an idea or action because of its widespread acceptance by average people, (f) the use of card stacking or the selective use of the best or worst arguments to advance or refute a position, and (g) the use of the bandwagon technique.60

Based on their study of propaganda messages, Hummel and Huntress gave a nine-part typology of deceptive rhetorical techniques that propagandists use to manipulate emotions.61 Propagandists use satirical humor and shocking images or stories to denigrate the enemy and to incite dislike for the enemy. They selectively use facts or half truths. They use ad hominem arguments to attack a cause based on unpleasant characteristics of individuals advocating that cause. Ad populum arguments praise the audience for some admirable trait (e.g., patriotism), without defining or explaining what the trait was or why they embodied it. The bandwagon device is used to bring about conformity to normative beliefs and ideas. Snob appeal and home folks are two similar strategies that use testimonials from prominent people or lay people to “prove” support for an idea or behavior. Begging the question is another strategy that involves discussing an idea or issue as though it were decided when it was not. The last strategy involves the use of affective language to incite emotion in propagandistic messages in the form of name calling and glittering generalities.

Overall, Hummel and Huntress believed that the analysis of propaganda should include an analysis of the event, an explanation of the aims of the message, a distinction between the facts propagandists used and the judgments they made, an examination of the logical fallacies

inherent in propagandistic rhetorical devices, and an examination of the audience response to propaganda messages.  

Earlier, Doob too had articulated a need for evaluating the outcome of propaganda. Doob found that appeals to nationalism and the use of connotatively laden symbols were key components of propaganda. Using psychology theories, Doob aimed to show how these techniques function. He believed that propaganda does not have direct effects on people’s attitudes and behaviors. Instead, he suggested, propaganda’s effect is moderated by individuals’ existing attitudes. An important part of Doob’s idea is that propaganda messages activate relevant existing attitudes, which are culturally biased. Thus, repeated propaganda messages do not necessarily mean that people will change their attitudes and behavior. For example when an audience receives a testimony from a prestigious source, their attitudes associated with the message and the source are activated. Doob also emphasized the power of normative pressure for changing attitudes because attitudes are based on social norms. Doob concluded that mass dissemination of propaganda could result in the perception that the message is socially accepted. In sum, Doob hypothesized that propaganda is a process of activating attitudes related to a stimulus through continued media coverage and consumption.

Lowenthal and Guterman contended that propagandists use emotional appeals, such as the listing of grievances and inciting distrust of the enemy, to bring about agitation and social change. Schramm analyzed propaganda in Britain and Germany during World War II by looking at the development of organizations intended to propagandize the people of each country.

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62 Ibid.  
in favor of the war.65 He found cultural differences in the two countries’ approach to propaganda. For example, the cultural contempt for government propaganda in England prompted the government to use the media covertly. The basic tactic of the British government, he concluded, was to maintain the appearance of objectivity in the propaganda. Schramm suggested that the use of opinion leaders is an effective means of propaganda.

Lee advocated an indirect-effect approach to propaganda effects and rejected the large-effects perspective of earlier critical researchers.66 He distinguished between formal and informal and direct and indirect channels of communication, each of which had a different usage and affected individuals differently. Lee asserted that news is a valid vehicle for propaganda because it gives the appearance of an event as significant. Lee further explained that the silencing of opposing opinions assists in making the propagandists’ stance more accessible in the public’s mind.

Lee gave the following typology of propaganda tactics. The “hot potato” technique is used to blame, embarrass, and demand an answer from individuals or groups for something beyond their control. Stalling is used to diminish enemy vigor, interest, or support before an attack. Least-of-evils tactic is used to make an unattractive option appear to be the only solution, or the least distasteful solution. Scapegoating is used to put the blame for a problem on individuals or groups that are typically subject to bias or dislike. Shift-of-scene and change-of-page are two similar tactics both of which involve the shifting attention from an aspect of an attack, a competition, or conflict when the results have been unsatisfactory. Big tent is the process of attacking a group by stereotyping and demonizing them as a whole.67

67 Ibid.
Berlson and De Grazia studied propaganda by quantifying the total allotment of broadcast time and accounting for whether the coverage was compulsory or voluntary. They also used content analysis to analyze the consistency of mass disseminated messages.

Ellul discounted the viability of content analysis, experimental research, and the use of public opinion polls for studying the qualitative aspects of propaganda and its long-term effects. He favored the use of historical and critical research, proposing a sociological view of propaganda that encompasses all the persuasive elements of culture. He defined propaganda as “a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization.” Ellul also provided a typology of propaganda consisting of political vs. sociological propaganda and agitation vs. integration propaganda. Unlike political propaganda, which advocates particular policies or issues, sociological propaganda aims to instill a particular life style or ideology over the long term. According to Ellul, propaganda, as a campaign, must be total such that it employs all available means including the mass media, arts, personal contacts, educational methods, and diplomacy. As Mowlana says, starting with the first Gulf War, total propaganda has become “a prerequisite for the conduct of modern international warfare.” As a result, “mobilization of world public opinion and manipulation of public support have shifted from the national level and those directly involved with the conflict to the global level.”


69 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda, the Formation of Men's Attitudes (New York: Knopf, 1965).

70 Ibid., 61.


72 Ibid.
According to Ellul, agitative propaganda attempts to rouse and excite an audience to action and thus deliberately seeks change.\footnote{Ellul, \textit{Propaganda, the Formation of Men’s Attitudes}.} On the other hand, integrative propaganda attempts to make the audience passive and unchallenging. Each type of propaganda is useful for achieving specific political goals. During a war, for example, a state may use agitative propaganda to rouse the people to anger and thus rally them for war against the enemy. At the same time, integrative propaganda may be used to make the audience receptive to the state’s policies and reduce the likelihood of opposition.

Modern propaganda, according to Mowlana, is more often sociological in nature, compared to the blatantly propagandistic approach of informational activities during the First World War.\footnote{Hamid Mowlana, \textit{Global Information and World Communication: New Frontiers in International Relations}, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997).} In the interim years between the First and Second World Wars, “governments enlisted the cooperation of communication and political scientists” to develop “analytical frameworks” for future applications of propaganda.\footnote{Ibid., 9.} This “structural and sociological strategy,” which, Mowlana maintains, has become more pronounced in recent decades and continues to the present, “is multidimensional – political, economic, and cultural.”\footnote{Ibid.} Mowlana’s conceptualization of sociological propaganda is similar to that of Ellul. He states,

The aim of propaganda is no longer to change adherence to a certain doctrine. It does not normally address the individual’s intelligence, for intellectual persuasion is long and uncertain, and the transition to action more so. Rather, it tries to make the individual cling irrationally to a process of action because action makes propaganda’s effect irreversible.\footnote{Ibid.}

In defining propaganda, some scholars focus on its deliberate nature and its goal of advancing the interests of the propagandist. Jowett and O’Donnell define propaganda as “the
deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.” 78 Similarly, Nelson defines propaganda as “a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media channels.” 79

As such, propaganda only considers the intent and interest of the source of the message; that is the propagandist. In other words, it is a manipulative technique to make the audience think, believe, and act in such a way that benefits the propagandist. It is an attempt to reproduce the ideology, or the perspective, of the propagandist in the target audience. Welch also maintains that modern propaganda is “the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly.” 80

Jowett and O’Donnell contend that it is important to analyze propaganda as a communication process that takes into consideration such elements as source, receiver, channel, and message. 81 They emphasize that in most government-directed propaganda campaigns the mass media are subject to manipulation. Radio, television, and film have been repeatedly used to further a specific intent and to bring about the desired response. Consequently, control of the media has been crucial in times of crisis and war. With limited information available to the

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81 Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion.
public, people become more likely to accept propaganda messages as the truth. As such, propaganda is different from the free and open exchange of ideas.

Propaganda can take three forms with respect to its source and information flow: white, black, and gray. White propaganda comes from an identifiable source and the information in the message tends to be accurate. Black propaganda, on the other hand, is attributed to a false source and is often deceptive. Since the success of this kind of propaganda depends on the audience’s acceptance of the source, the attributed source has to have high credibility. The higher perceived credibility of the source increases the likely success of the propaganda. In gray propaganda, the source is not necessarily identified and the accuracy of the information is uncertain.

Nelson and Izadi suggest that while propaganda does not necessarily have to be deceptive and untruthful, propaganda does not have a commitment to truth. Thus, when necessary, a propagandist uses lies as in black propaganda. At other times, he or she disguises the source of the message, as in gray propaganda. At other times, the propagandist gives only a selective version of truth, as in white propaganda. Therefore, propaganda’s preoccupation is with efficiency and not truthfulness. Cunningham refers to the same concept as an “instrumentalized” approach to truth. With such a utilitarian ethical approach, credibility rather than truth gains significance when judging the efficacy of public diplomatic discourse. As a result, public diplomacy initiatives that rely on selective truths to propagate policies do not fulfill the ethical standard of truthfulness. Similarly, Seib proposes that, in public diplomacy

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82 Ibid.
84 Ellul, Propaganda, the Formation of Men's Attitudes.
messages, “the framing of truth through various mechanisms of emphasis must be done [in such a way as] to avoid distortion.”

According to Black, a main feature of propagandistic messages that hinders an open-minded approach to truth is their “finalistic, or fixed view of people, institutions, and situations divided into broad, all inclusive categories of in-groups (friends) and outgroups (enemies), beliefs and disbeliefs, and situations to be accepted or rejected in toto.” Similarly, Switzer, McNamara, and Ryan contend that binary language and the tendency to define the world in terms of opposites provide the sociocultural foundation of ideology.

Scholars including Said, Sardar, Karim, Macfie, and Little consider Orientalism as the dominant ideology that underlies Western attitudes toward the “Middle East.” Orientalism is a highly influential, if evidently problematic, Western discourse, wherein the Orient is characterized as the “Other,” effectively a world with a culture of dehumanized inferiority. Said argues that Orientalist discourse is intimately connected with the political and economic interests of Western powers in dominating the Middle East. Orientalism is a pervasive (although not universal) discourse that diminishes the cultural values of the Orient and can serve to justify their economic and political subordination.

94 Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945.
95 Said, Orientalism.
An important characteristic of Orientalist discourse is its reliance on binary language. According to Said, Orientalism, as a style of thought, is a dichotomous Western worldview based on “an ontological and epistemological distinction,” manifested in a socially constructed “Other,” between the so-called Orient and the West. Sardar says that such a dichotomy is “the life force of Western self-identification.” In addition to using a dichotomous language, Orientalism uses an essentialist discourse, universalizing certain traits and characteristics of the Islamic World. Said is critical of the numerous writers, novelists, journalists, philosophers, political theorists, historians, economists, and imperial administrators, who have accepted this dichotomized Oriental/Occidental distinction as the foundation for their work concerning the Orient. For him, the defining characteristic of their work is an exoticism, an anti-modern characterization, and a judgment of societal inferiority.

In defining Orientalism, Said indicates that it underlies the foreign policy mindset that informs Western relations with the Middle East. In this sense public diplomacy is judged to be inextricably informed with Orientalist assumptions. This style of thought in turn serves to legitimate Western domination over the region. Orientalism, in essence, concerns power relations. This idea is based on Foucault’s notion that knowledge produces and reinvigorates power. With Orientalism, the West minimizes competing worldviews. For example, notions such as development, reform, and representative democracy are all defined according to peculiarly Western values, which are assumed to be universalizable.

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96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., 2.
98 Sardar, Orientalism, 13.
99 Said, Orientalism.
McAlister traces the nature of Western representations of the Middle East from 1945 to 2000 and finds that stereotypical depictions were consistently present among elites. Mass-mediated Orientalist representations in film and other venues transferred the same perspective to the public. In his study of *The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957*, Vaughan shows how the United States and British propagandists viewed their relations with the Arab world in Orientalist terms. This view was most stark in the case of Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These presuppositions and prejudices would appear to influence the elite U.S. media and policymakers even today. For Said, the reason is simple, “The Middle East experts who advise [U.S.] policymakers are imbued with Orientalism, almost to a person.” These findings, nonetheless, should not deny the diversity of viewpoints presented during policy debates in Washington.

Adib-Moghaddam, concurring with Said, finds the Orientalist portrayal of Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution a case in point. “Suddenly, for many in the ‘West’ and in Iran itself, the country was more Semitic than Aryan, more Iran than Persia, more Oriental than Indo-European, more black than white, more Third World than emerging economy, more Eastern than Western.” Journalistic and expert misrepresentations of Iran have fueled the Orientalist prejudices of the country after the revolution. McAlister contends that the threat of “Islam” and “terrorism” has supplied the cultural logic of U.S. foreign policy since the events of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Although Iran is not an Arab country, according to McAlister, “Anti-

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105 Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*.
Iranian sentiment in the United States drew heavily on the stereotyped representations of the Arab Middle East that had become so prevalent in the 1970s, particularly the image of ‘Arab terrorism.’  Likewise, in their study of three elite U.S. newspapers’ editorial coverage of Iran’s nuclear program, Izadi and Saghaye-Biria show how journalistic misrepresentation of Iran is rooted in Orientalist constructions of Islam as a threat indicative of cultural untrustworthiness.

Adib-Moghaddam criticizes the “ideological, unscholarly, and polemical” approach to what he calls “Iranian pop studies” in the West and proposes the need for critical Iranian studies. He believes that the scarcity of a critical approach to Iranian studies is not due to a lack of demand:

Rather it is because many think-tank pundits, journalists, political activists, writers, and others who are not ‘regulated’ by academic standards have cashed in on the Iran business, giving their consumers the self-assurance that they have understood Iran, that they know the history, diverse peoples, powerful revolutions, indeed the collective reality of its 70 million inhabitants – without at the same time intimating to the reader that a great deal in their analysis is based on one-dimensional empirical material, aestheticized narration or anecdotal journalistic description.

Public Diplomacy

As will be discussed shortly, public diplomacy shares many features with propaganda. The most neutral definition of public diplomacy is “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies.” The U.S. Advisory Committee on Public Diplomacy defined the public diplomacy function as the “systematic projection of national goals and ideals through the use of all available resources.”

108 Ibid., 214.
110 Adib-Moghaddam, Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic, 7.
111 Ibid., 16.
112 Ibid.
Commission on Public Diplomacy, a bipartisan panel created by Congress in 1948, stated that the core goal of public diplomacy is “to advocate policies.”\textsuperscript{114} The Commission defined public diplomacy as the process of “informing, engaging and influencing foreign publics so that they may, in turn, encourage their governments to support key U.S. policies.”\textsuperscript{115} Occasionally, as in the case of Cuba (and Iran), public diplomacy aims to bring about regime change in hostile countries.\textsuperscript{116}

Christopher Ross, a Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and a Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria and Algeria, views public diplomacy as similar to diplomatic efforts, only involving different parties. While traditional diplomacy involves “exchanges” between the representatives of two governments, public diplomacy involves the promotion of a country’s national interests through engaging with non-governmental parties in other countries. Ross believes that public diplomacy is not as “manipulative” as propaganda.\textsuperscript{117} He also claims that public diplomacy is about telling the truth while propaganda involves some degree of disseminating lies.

While arguing that the negative connotations of propaganda are not universal across time and geographical space, Joe Duffey, USIA’s director before that organization was integrated into the State Department in 1999, also stresses that public diplomacy involves the engagement of foreign citizens. He suggests that the most important aspect of public diplomacy is its “attempt to get over the heads or around the diplomats and official spokesmen of countries and sometimes


\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{117} Stephen Hess and Marvin L. Kalb, \textit{The Media and the War on Terrorism} (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 224.
around the press to speak directly to the public in other countries and to provide an interpretation and explanation of U.S. values and policies.”¹¹⁸

This definition of public diplomacy resembles Kernell’s theory of “going public.”¹¹⁹ The presidential practice of going public, as defined by Kernell, is “a strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing to the American public for support.”¹²⁰ Within such a framework, public diplomacy represents instances of America’s going public at a global scale. The U.S. administration attempts to bypass the governments of other countries and appeal directly to international audiences for support.

Some propose that Edmund Gullion, the director of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at Tuft University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, coined the term public diplomacy in 1965.¹²¹ Cull, however, notes Gullion’s denial of this, while acknowledging that Gullion popularized the term through promoting its practice and study.¹²² According to Cull, the term public diplomacy itself is in some ways propaganda.¹²³ By using more neutral phrasing, Cull explains, the U.S. government wanted to avoid the pejoratives associated with propaganda to describe the activities of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and its sponsored international broadcasting. Similarly, Fitzhugh Green, a USIA veteran, agrees that public diplomacy is “a euphemism for the word modern Americans abhor – propaganda.”¹²⁴

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 225.
¹²⁰ Ibid., 324.
Thomas Dine, a former president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, defines propaganda as “information with a purpose” and thus views public diplomacy as propagandistic in nature.  

Nye sees public diplomacy as the expression of “soft power” – a persuasive power based on its attractive appeal designed to realize public acquiescence. This conceptualization is similar to Ellul’s concept of integration propaganda, which also has the goal of achieving public acquiescence. America’s soft power is “its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them.” Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of “ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants.” For great powers to control the political environment, it is now increasingly necessary to broaden their sources of power beyond military resources to soft power, what Mowlana refers to as “intangible” sources of power.

American exceptionalism is very much the essence of describing public diplomacy in terms of soft power and has been a main justification for America’s aggressive and active public diplomacy, including its use of the mass media. American exceptionalism indicates that the United States’ moral superiority, its unique democratic and revolutionary origins, its political system, social organization, cultural and religious heritage, as well as its values serve to legitimize its policies. America, as the city on the hill, is thus positioned on the moral high ground with respect to other countries and powers around the world and therefore has a duty to

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127 Ellul, Propaganda, the Formation of Men’s Attitudes.  
129 Ibid.  
spread American style thought, democratic ideals and values, and political systems to the rest of the world.

Fitzpatrick maintains that conceptualizing public diplomacy as soft power has ethical shortcomings. American cultural policies (as public diplomacy tools) emanate from hegemonic assumptions that for many critics amount to cultural imperialism. The use of mass media as means of cultural transfer can be analyzed as an element of United States’ support and promotion of modernization projects as tools for containing the encroachment of communism or anti-U.S. Islamism in Third World countries. Modernization theory attributes developmental failures of societies to internal factors such as traditional social values and organizations (which in itself is an Orientalist viewpoint). In contrast, dependency theory explains underdevelopment by referring to unequal relations between developed and underdeveloped societies.

In the years after World War II, the question of development in the Third World became a major issue in economics as many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America declared national independence. Rostow formulated five stages of economic growth starting with the traditional society and ending with a mass consumption society. Rostow’s thesis rested on the idea of a uniform mode of development, one that imitated the historical developmental patterns of Western industrialized nations. Similar approaches to development appeared in other social sciences including communications. Elasmar asserts that American social scientists articulated a sense of modernization whereby world economic inequities would be ameliorated if developing countries changed their traditional way of life and acquired the more developed nations’

technologies and values.¹³⁶ According to Elasmar, the U.S. government funded and supported this thesis as the basis for development strategies.

American mass media scholars such as Daniel Lerner¹³⁷ and Wilbur Schramm¹³⁸ viewed the mass media as ideal channels for promoting Western-oriented modernization to Third World countries. Lerner and Schramm both viewed the mass media as useful tools for modernization because, they argued, media provide people with the information they need for development, give them the motivation to change, and teach them techniques necessary for successful change. Based on this perspective, the flow of entertainment products such as film, music, and television encouraged an internalization of the superiority of the Western style of modernization over the socialist and communist forms. These entertainment-oriented media were designed to show the prosperous life that modernization promised.

The failed reality of such a model of development made other social scientists reconsider modernization theory. These scholars replaced the optimistic theory of modernization with dependency theory. This “contra-discourse,” as Boyd-Barrett calls it, aims to show how Western powers use their monopoly of Third World markets, partly achieved through the free flow of information, to further their interests at the expense of the interests of Third World countries.¹³⁹ American intellectuals frustrated with the war in Vietnam and the domestic turmoil in the 1960s joined the forces of anti-capitalism. This new thinking among a number of scholars criticized the U.S. federal government for playing a controlling and one-sided role in the development of

weaker economies of the world.\textsuperscript{140} Scholars promoting cultural dependency theory (also called cultural imperialism) see media imperialism as the new mode of domination for reinforcing the dependency of Third World countries and inevitably (if unintentionally) hindering their development.\textsuperscript{141}

Mowlana proposes a model of international media dependency, in which the degree of a country’s dependency or autonomy is measured according to the two dimensions of technology and communication. The technology axis involves technological hardware versus software, and the communication axis involves production versus distribution. The less developed countries of the Third World are often dependent on Western countries – and mainly the United States – for the production of cultural products. According to Mowlana, breaking this pattern of dependency is almost impossible due to Third World countries’ technological reliance on Western countries with regard to production hardware (e.g., studios, printing plants, etc.) and software (e.g., actual content, performance rights, management, etc.) as well as distribution hardware (e.g., transmitters, satellites, etc.) and software (e.g., publicity, marketing, etc.).\textsuperscript{142} Consequently, media dependency is not restricted to cultural content; rather, it involves conditions of multiple dependencies in the flow of information from center countries to those in the periphery,\textsuperscript{143} to use Galtung’s terminology\textsuperscript{144}

Critics of modernization theory and the free flow of information use two ways to support their thesis. A group of critics apply pre-World War II historical trends to show the similarities

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
between the approaches of the colonial powers and the efforts of the United States. In both cases, critics argue, efforts have revolved around the idea of transforming the cultures of developing countries to make them resemble the cultures of the more powerful country. These dissenters allege that the United States is conspiring to create a friendly cultural climate for the promotion of its economic interests. Using historical evidence, these theorists frame modernization in terms similar to the colonialism of pre-World War II era. Critics also question the objectives of American social scientists who promoted the idea of modernization. The fact that these social scientists were ardently collecting data about the effects of modernization endeavors is perceived as evidence of collusion with the United States government.145

A review of the multi-faceted ways in which imperialism has historically changed the cultural environment of the Third World shows the workings of cultural imperialism more clearly. Sreberny-Mohammadi gives a synopsis of historical cultural contacts that had important implications for relations of power with regard to the following elements: map-making and nation-building, the missionary exportation of religion, education, administration, language, tourism and travel, dress code, and many other aspects of life such as patterns of child rearing and family life, etc.146 Sreberny-Mohammadi attempts to show that cultural imperialism was long at work before the advent of media technologies. Arguably, the significance of media technologies to cultural imperialism, especially television, however, lies in their unparalleled acceleration of culture transfer. Mass media facilitates cultural domination to work from afar.

The historical styles of cultural transfer were means for legitimating colonial acquisition of new territory. Most colonial powers asserted that they had the right to exercise dominion over

people to spread a social gospel that would uplift them from their barbaric modes of life. This is in essence an early form of modernization theory. As Maier notes, “empires have justified their supra-ethnic domination by invoking allegedly universal values or cultural supremacy, and have diffused these public goods by cultural diplomacy and exchanges.”

Lindenfeld suggests that, historically, when indigenous people began “to associate missionary work with foreign imperialism,” they tended to show resistance to cultural change. He also found that when people did not actively resist missionary work, they “mixed and merged the new and the old in their lives” in extremely varied ways. He distinguishes between inculturation and acculturation as two modes of responding to cultural imperialism. Inculturation involves the selective acceptance of a narrow range of foreign cultural elements while holding to one’s native cultural heritage. Acculturation, on the other hand, denotes the adoption of the foreign lifestyle and culture while keeping some of one’s indigenous cultural practices.

While colonial powers used suppression and coercion to wipe out or subjugate native cultures, the new imperial era of late nineteenth century was marked by less brutal means of cultural transfer. Technological advances and formal education attracted many native people to European style of life and thinking. Consequently, one could argue that starting with this period cultural imperialism expanded the means for realizing hegemony in its addition of persuasion to more obvious forms of coercion. Native elites could be educated to function

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149 Ibid.: 330.
according to the undeniably seductive models of Western behavior while being detached from their own cultural contexts.

Another group of cultural imperialism scholars focus on the empirical evidence that shows the one-sided and monopolistic character of information flow from the United States to developing countries. Nordenstreng and Varis’ 1974 UNESCO report is a seminal work that shows how American cultural products have permeated not only Third World markets but also the cultural landscape of European countries.\(^{151}\)

According to Mulcahy, the flood of American cultural products in Canada has also caused significant concern.\(^{152}\) In his study of Canadian contentions with U.S. cultural imperialism, Mulcahy argues that “the omnipresence of American entertainment products has prompted a near-crisis mentality among some Canadians about the survivability of a national way of life that is not an American derivative.”\(^{153}\) American entertainment industries have significant influence in Canadian markets for movies (80-90 percent of those screened), music (70 percent due to a 30 percent quota for domestic music), books (70 percent), and magazines (80 percent).\(^{154}\) In addition, American broadcasters have a near total monopoly of primetime English language television drama. American domination of Canadian cultural experience explains why Canada has exempted cultural industries from the provisions of its free trade agreements with the United States.\(^{155}\)

Yet, the near monopolistic and one-way flow of cultural products from the United States to the rest of the world has not been successful in creating a positive image of the United States


\(^{153}\) Ibid.: 267.

\(^{154}\) Ibid.

\(^{155}\) Ibid.: 270.
globally. This may be partly due to the mainly entertainment orientation of these products. As DeFleur found in her study, “the negative portrayals of Americans in [U.S. produced] entertainment products viewed abroad” cultivate anti-American attitudes among youth in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries.\(^{156}\) Also, as was noted earlier, world publics display opposition to U.S. foreign policies,\(^{157}\) which may in fact be contrary to the values that the United States espouses. More importantly, information dominance does not remove the likelihood of resistance from the audience. This is especially the case in today’s communication environment in which new communication technologies have opened unparalleled opportunities for the dissemination of diverse voices.

Parmar and Ferguson believe that soft power is inherently complementary to hard power.\(^{158}\) Parmar in particular asserts that the issue of U.S. post-9/11 public diplomacy must be seen in the context of the “imperial and expansionist character of American world power.”\(^{159}\) Such a view entails a Gramscian perspective of hegemonic power, according to which soft power facilitates the realization of U.S. imperial activities and attempts to promote United States’ total world domination.\(^{160}\) Accordingly, public diplomacy as practiced by the United States’ foreign policy elite is seen as the persuasive apparatus of the state facilitating the realization of American transnational interests.\(^{161}\)

\(^{156}\) DeFleur, "U.S. Media Teach Negative and Flawed Beliefs about Americans to Youths in Twelve Countries: Implications for Future Foreign Affairs," 108.


\(^{160}\) Antonio Gramsci (1891 – 1937) was an Italian philosopher and political theorist. He was imprisoned by Benito Mussolini’s Fascist government in 1928 and spent the rest of his life in prison.

\(^{161}\) Parmar, "Responding to Anti-Americanism: The Politics of Public Diplomacy."
Maier too argues that soft power “cannot really function as power unless it accompanies hard power.”\textsuperscript{162} He continues:

It [i.e., soft power] thrives under the hothouse of the military supremacy catalogued by the enthusiasts of military might, and without the aircraft carriers, transport planes, laser technology, the influence garnered over the years by Jackson Pollock, Van Cliburn, Bruce Springsteen, McKenzie, and McDonalds, or even American scientific laboratories, would appear merely beneficial. This would be reason enough to support and treasure it, but not endow it with an autonomous force in assuring hegemony or empire.\textsuperscript{163}

According to Gramsci, the ruling groups in democratic societies gain dominance through a double process of coercion and persuasion.\textsuperscript{164} In Hall’s words, drawing on Gramsci’s terminology:

“Hegemony” exists when a ruling class (or rather, an alliance of ruling class fractions, a “historical bloc”) is able not only to coerce a subordinate class to conform to its interests, but exerts a “total social authority” over those classes and the social formation as a whole. “Hegemony” is in operation when the dominant class fractions not only dominate but direct – lead: when they not only possess the power to coerce but actively organize so as to command and win the consent of the subordinated classes to their continuing sway.\textsuperscript{165}

In its most powerful realization, hegemony does not coerce the people to accept grudgingly the center’s superiority, but to have its values accepted readily as superior to those of the indigenous system.

The coercive apparatus of the state includes legislation, the military, the police and the prison system. The persuasive forces of the civil society include such social foundations as the family, the church, the educational system, and the media. The agents of civil society ensure that the masses of the population “spontaneously” consent to the general direction imposed upon

\textsuperscript{162} Maier, \textit{Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors}, 75.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
social life by the ruling group. The persuasive forces of civil society sustain a hegemonic order by perpetuating a dominant ideology that furthers the interests of the ruling groups. Here, ideology is defined as “the ways in which the meaning conveyed by symbolic forms serves to establish and sustain relations of power.” Each society’s dominant ideology operates as its criterion for common sense and rational understanding. The dominant ideology also tends to reject the beliefs and values that undermine the colonized society’s worldview. In this conceptualization of power, private organizations of the ruling class (e.g., foundations and think tanks) wield a significant amount of power in the processes of policy formation and implementation.

The three major American foundations Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie, for example, play an instrumental role in promoting Americanism and fighting anti-Americanism by actively constructing international networks of philanthropies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities, think tanks, international financial institutions, and governments. According to Parmar, “their efforts to combat the opponents of globalization and of U.S. foreign policy must be seen in light of their attempts to build an ‘Americanized’ global civil society in which their American-style politics, their neoliberal economics, and their free world ideology predominate.”

A Gramscian view of power renders it necessary to examine influential actors from both inside and outside government that participate in the policy-making process and the

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171 Ibid., 189.
implementation phase of policies. Parmar believes think tanks such as institutes of foreign affairs play an important role in defining the value system of hegemonic projects and in actively aiding the state in mobilizing public opinion in support of such projects. In his study of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations, Parmar finds that, in the years prior to 1945, these think tanks played an instrumental role in redefining the Anglo-American role in world politics and promoted the transnational hegemonic projects of Anglo-American cooperation, globalism, and internationalism.

According to Parmar, “large-scale anti-Americanism may be, to U.S. foreign policy elite – White House, National Security Council, Pentagon, the State Department, and assorted foreign affairs think tanks and policy advisory groups – a price that, up to now, is considered reasonably low and worth paying.” Anti-Americanism is seen not as an American problem but as a foreign problem that has not resulted in any serious opposition to U.S. foreign policies at the state and elite levels. Parmar notes that only a few neo-conservative think tanks, including the Working Group on Anti-Americanism of the American Enterprise Institute and the Princeton Project on National Security, have openly entertained this idea. Parmar concludes that public diplomacy “is designed to mollify public opinion, Congress, media critics, and the political opposition, rather than represent a serious attempt to solve the problem, which would require modification or abandonment of U.S. policies.”

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173 Parmar, "Institutes of International Affairs: Their Role in Foreign Policy-Making, Opinion Mobilization and Unofficial Diplomacy."
174 Ibid.
Chambers and Goidel contend that a general lack of concern for public opinion in foreign policy matters is a feature of the current U.S. administration. The Bush presidency uses “public opinion to legitimize foreign policy decisions already taken, and toward that end will seek to lead and shape it if required.” As an example, the Bush administration tried to solicit public support for the Iraq war when the decision to invade Iraq had already been taken. Also, “the decisions to abrogate the ABM Treaty and to remove the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol on global warming seem to have been made with little heed to public opinion.” Given the broad consensus in the literature that American diplomatic initiatives are meant to serve its interests as a superpower, what are the prospects for a successful public diplomacy based on a symmetrical dialogue?

History of Public Diplomacy

U.S. Public Diplomacy from World War I to 9-11

Public diplomacy has been a tool of foreign policy in the United States since World War I when President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information, headed by George Creel. The goal of this organization, otherwise known as the Creel Committee, was to popularize America’s war aims throughout the world. More fundamentally, as the title of Creel’s book (How We Advertised America; The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of

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179 Ibid., 32.
180 Ibid.
181 Tuch, Communicating with the World.
the Globe) shows, the agency aimed to spread Americanism throughout the world. President Roosevelt established the Office of War Information at the outset of the Second World War and launched Voice of America in February 1942. Later, the U.S. government established Radio Liberation and Radio Free Europe. These radio networks targeted the citizens of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as the people of more friendly countries in Western Europe and elsewhere. Today, the U.S. government sponsors the following stations as well: Radio Farda (for Iran), Radio/TV Marti (for Cuba), Radio Free Asia, and Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa (both in Arabic). These stations are all under the supervision of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and financed through congressional appropriations.

While international broadcasting is used to directly influence the general public abroad, cultural and educational programs are used to affect “the elite audiences believed to have influence on public opinion.” Educational and exchange programs have been an important element of American public diplomacy since 1946 and are now administered by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Programs include the Fulbright Exchange Program, the International Visitors Program, Citizen Exchange Programs, English-Language Programs, and Cultural Programs.

In his study of American cultural diplomacy and its exchange programs between 1938 and 1978, Mulcahy documents how American cultural diplomacy originated with the political

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aim of countering Nazi and communist cultural activities. As Mulcahy notes, “The basis for exchanges is the assumption that those who participate will come away with a better sense of American society and institutions.” He stresses on the sensitive nature of cultural exchanges and believes that such activities “must not seek to manipulate public opinion nor to pander to the most recent policy ‘line.’” Mulcahy is critical of the continuing practice of subordinating genuine mutual understanding to “short-term political considerations.” He suggests that cultural exchange programs must focus more on mutuality and less on “telling America’s story to the world:”

An emphasis on the mutuality involved in a cultural exchange would also counter characterizations of such programs as “cultural imperialism.” The goal is not the Americanization of other nations but the internationalization of communications about education and culture. This is a process in which the United States has as much to learn as it has to teach.

By influencing a society’s elites and opinion leaders, U.S. public diplomacy capitalizes on the two-step flow theory of media effects in addition to the direct effects it may have on the general public through international broadcasting. According to Lazarfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, opinion leaders usually mediate between the mass media and the less active sections of the population. While scholars are increasingly arguing for maximal mass media effects,

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188 Ibid.: 25.
they also contend that interpersonally obtained information on political issues is also an important factor in the formation of political attitudes.\textsuperscript{193}

United States’ public diplomacy approach during World War I, World War II (with the founding of Voice of America/VOA), and the Cold War proved to be one largely of crisis management.\textsuperscript{194} After World War II, many in Congress, especially Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), questioned the need for an international broadcasting organization in peacetime. To engage in propaganda, they thought, was to contradict America’s democratic principles.\textsuperscript{195} It was the increase in Cold War tensions and the belief that the United States was losing the war of ideas to the Soviet Union’s more sophisticated propaganda apparatus that convinced Congress of the necessity and legitimacy of the VOA.\textsuperscript{196}

The controversial \textit{United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948}, also known as the \textit{Smith-Mundt Act}, legalized propaganda but forbid its use for domestic purposes.\textsuperscript{197} The State Department was to carry information and educational exchange programs with the aim of promoting a better understanding of the United States among foreign publics and increasing mutual understanding between Americans and people of other countries.

In 1950, President Truman launched the Campaign of Truth to combat Communist propaganda. In 1953, Eisenhower supervised the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA). While the CIA was given responsibility to carry out covert propaganda, the

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\textsuperscript{193} Mutz, \textit{Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political Attitudes}.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
USIA was to manage public communication programs such as international broadcasting and the programs of U.S. information posts in foreign countries. The USIA, nevertheless, did at times engage in covert public diplomacy activities as well.

The USIA mission was altered several times as a result of changing administrations. Generally speaking, the one central goal that spawned all administrations was the use of public diplomacy for promoting the acceptance of American foreign policy. U.S. information programs were to convince the people of the world that the objectives and the actions of the United States were in harmony with the aspirations of foreign publics.

To fulfill these objectives, the USIA established a press and publication service and a motion picture and television service. The USIA was given the responsibility for operating the Voice of America and for U.S. libraries and information centers abroad.

The USIA promoted two broad dichotomized themes: anti-communism and positive themes about the United States. The emphasis was on creating a distinction between us and them. To show the evil nature of communism, the USIA concentrated on communism’s ideological contradictions, forced labor camps, absence of freedom, and lack of consumer goods in the Soviet Union and its communist surrogates. On the positive theme of American ideology and the virtues of capitalism, the USIA publicized U.S. economic and technical assistance programs, scientific and technological advances, and the virtues of free trade unions.

The emergence of the Cold War also institutionalized cultural transfer as an important element of U.S. foreign policy. After 1945, a group of U.S. diplomats and scholars insisted that in the fight against communism the United States needed to take an aggressive approach to

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198 Wang, "Telling the American Story to the World: The Purpose of U.S. Public Diplomacy in Historical Perspective."
199 Osgood, "Propaganda."
200 Tuch, Communicating with the World.
winning the hearts and minds of foreign publics. A prime feature of American public diplomacy was cultural propaganda, to sell the American way of life, celebrate democratic values and practices, and advocate consumer capitalism.\textsuperscript{201} The emergence of transnational cultural industries and media enterprises in the post World War II period set in motion a perpetual one-way flow of cultural products to the Third World. These initiatives capitalized on what Nye calls soft power.\textsuperscript{202} As mentioned, soft power refers to a country’s ability to attract on the basis of the appeal of its cultural, social, and political values and ideas.\textsuperscript{203} In this, the VOA was one of the prime weapons of influence. U.S. public diplomacy programs were in essence publicizing the idea of the American dream vs. the bleak world of Soviet communism. Hollywood movies, music, and other mass-produced cultural goods were other means to do so. The U.S. government has proactively supported the export of Hollywood films “with trade negotiations and removing barriers to trade.”\textsuperscript{204} As Wasko notes, in protecting its global and domestic business, the film industry “receives considerable support and assistance from the U.S. government.”\textsuperscript{205}

U.S. public diplomacy did not solely depend on its VOA broadcasting as the only means to reach the mainstream public of target countries with ideological messages. The USIA also pursued “media control projects.” These projects were designed to influence the indigenous news media by planting news, placing programs on local television channels, and using personal contacts to influence the perspective of foreign journalists. Personal contacts were also used to influence influential opinion leaders. In this way, the USIA engaged in covert or black propaganda by obscuring the source of its messages. In addition to relying on the corroboration

\textsuperscript{201} Gienow-Hecht, "Cultural Imperialism." Osgood, "Propaganda."
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 213.
of foreign journalists, the USIA utilized the help of private cooperation. Private cooperation involved the use of American nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and ordinary citizens in the publicity campaign to cultivate a positive image for the United States.206

Other than the USIA’s mostly overt public diplomacy programs, CIA’s clandestine psychological warfare operations were important to United States’ Cold War public diplomacy strategy. The United States made an attempt to directly target the USSR public and the people of its surrogate countries through CIA-operated Radio Free Europe (launched in 1950) and Radio Liberation (launched in 1953 and renamed Radio Liberty in 1964). Their goal was to provide counterpropaganda to anti-U.S. messages in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A number of foundations were purported as the source of these broadcasting stations to disguise the fact that the actually CIA ran them.207

Besides its radio programming, the CIA sponsored numerous covert public diplomacy initiatives, including subsidizing non-communist labor unions, journalists, political parties, politicians, and student groups. In Western Europe, the agency helped produce dozens of magazines, organized many international conferences, sponsored the publication of numerous books, etc. These activities were done under the guise of the CIA-sponsored Congress for Cultural Freedom.208 The CIA also carried out a number of covert operations to manipulate political developments in countries such as Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, and Iraq.209 In Iran, in particular, the CIA sponsored a successful coup against the democratically elected government

206 Osgood, "Propaganda.
209 Osgood, "Propaganda."
of Mohammad Mosaddeq. CIA-sponsored black propaganda was central to the success of the coup.210

According to Snow, a distinct historical pattern has emerged in which the U.S. government repeatedly views public diplomacy as appeals made during a national crisis or wartime that are dismantled at conflict’s end.211 Congress abolished Woodrow Wilson’s Creel Committee within months of the completion of World War I. Truman’s Office of War Information was shut down after World War II, just as the USIA was dissolved following the Cold War. Both the legislative and the executive branches of the U.S. government considered public diplomacy a low priority after the Cold War. The Clinton Administration cut funds for public diplomacy and reduced cultural exchange programs. In 1999, Congress abolished the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and transferred its public diplomacy functions to the Department of State. It was the advent of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that once again brought public diplomacy to the forefront of America’s foreign policy.212

**United States’ Post-9/11 Public Diplomacy**

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, many inside and outside the U.S. government asked for the revival of the public diplomacy efforts.213 U.S. government officials, members of Congress, foreign policy experts and academicians rediscovered public diplomacy through many studies, journal articles and op-ed pieces. Snow believes that, today, public

diplomacy is more significant than ever partly because of the changes in global communications that have given rise to a global audience.214

Zaharna notes that after 9/11, “in the rush to get America’s message out, officials relied on the same approach, tools, and mindset in fighting terrorism that had earlier been used to fight communism.”215 In October 2, 2001, Colin Powell appointed Charlotte Beers, former chairperson of the advertising agency J. Walter Thompson and head of global public relations powerhouse Ogilvy and Mathers, as the new Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy. Defending his choice of an advertising guru for selling America’s image abroad, Powell said, “She got me to buy Uncle Ben’s rice. So there is nothing wrong with getting somebody who knows how to sell something.”216

During her tenure, Beers directed two public diplomacy campaigns: a 15-page booklet entitled The Network of Terrorism and an international advertising campaign entitled “Shared Values,” which included six television commercials or “mini-documentaries,” as the State Department called them. The booklet showed photos of the victims of September 11 terrorist attacks and presented negative comments about Osamah Bin Ladin and his propaganda messages that attacked the United States. The booklet also featured a map of Al Qaeda’s global terrorist network, showing 45 countries in which it has operated. The Network of Terrorism was printed in 36 languages and was widely circulated to send a message to the world that terrorism is a serious global threat and requires an international campaign to end it.217

In 2002, Beers unveiled America’s first advertising campaign entitled “Shared Values.” The mini-documentaries, which ran from November to December 2002, aired at several regional television stations and aimed to convince the Muslim world that the War on Terrorism was not a war on Islam. The Council of American Muslims for Understanding endorsed the campaign. Beers had earlier established the council in May 2002 as a non-governmental organization for “creating positive dialogue between the U.S. and the Islamic countries. Malik Hassan, its chairman, defined it as ‘government-funded, not government founded.’”218 The concealment of the actual source of the commercials (i.e., the U.S. government) makes them examples of gray propaganda in which the message is attributed to a supposedly independent source to increase its credibility.

The videos depicted Muslims living happily in the United States while proclaiming the shared values of tolerance, religious freedom, community service, and education. Heider’s balance theory explains why the campaign emphasized shared values.219 Balance theory highlights the persuasiveness of messages that are based on the similarity between the source and the target audience. According to this theory, people are motivated to have consistent attitudes toward other people and attitudinal objects in general. “People tend to like others who exhibit signs of similarity because it is reinforcing to their own self-concept and helps them to predict and understand similar others.”220 The theory also predicts that people would exhibit positive attitudes toward a stimulus that is similar to a liked other and dissimilar to a disliked other.221

221 Ibid.
an analysis of the propagandistic properties of the Shared Values initiative, Plaisance concludes that the Shared Values campaign had serious ethical shortcomings.\textsuperscript{222} He bases his criticism on the campaign’s selective utilization of truth and its treatment of Muslim audiences as means to serve broader policy objectives.

Although the Shared Values commercials received substantial negative media attention, Fullerton and Kendrick contend that the advertisements may have been effective.\textsuperscript{223} Using an experimental design, Kendrick and Fullerton assessed the attitudinal reactions of various international students at Regents College in London, England. Measuring participants’ pre-test and post-test attitudes toward the U.S. government and the American people and their perceptions of how Muslims are treated in America, the authors suggest, “the SVI commercials were most effective against their intended target audience – Muslims and women.”\textsuperscript{224}

Pintak, however, questions the validity of Fullerton and Kendrick’s findings, given that the commercials did not target international audiences but, instead, people living in Islamic countries.\textsuperscript{225} Also, Christie, Clark, and Zwarun’s experimental study shows very low source credibility among the target audience, which may have significantly undermined the persuasiveness of the messages.\textsuperscript{226} According to Christie et al., for five out of six credibility scale items, Muslims found the commercials significantly less credible than non-Muslims did.

\textsuperscript{222} Plaisance, "The Propaganda War on Terrorism: An Analysis of the United States' "Shared Values" Public-Diplomacy Campaign after September 11, 2001."
\textsuperscript{223} Jami A. Fullerton and Alice Kendrick, Advertising's War on Terrorism: The Story of the U.S. State Department's Shared Values Initiative (Spokane, WA: Marquette Books, 2006).
On the bias item, both Muslims and non-Muslims found the commercials not credible, and they viewed the commercials as forms of government propaganda.

Only four countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Kuwait – were willing to broadcast the advertisements on their state-run television channels. Several countries in the Middle East, including Egypt and Jordan, refused to air the programs. In an interview on PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer on January 21, 2003, Beers explained these countries’ reluctance to air the ads: “It’s probably based on the point that they consider it propaganda.” The State Department abandoned its $15 million campaign just a few months before U.S. invaded Iraq. On February 27, 2003, Under Secretary Beers appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She described the gap between America’s self-image and Muslims’ view of America as “frighteningly wide.” The next week, Beers resigned her post for health reasons.

“America’s public diplomacy initiative had clearly backfired.” It seems plausible to conclude that the propagandistic approach of the Shared Values campaign and its emphasis on image building were counterproductive. The subsequent Under Secretaries of State for Public Diplomacy (Margaret Tutwiler, Karen Hughes, and James Glassman) pursued policies that proved as ineffective in changing the hearts and minds of the people in the Middle East. Despite more than seven years of intensive public diplomacy, poll after poll suggests that international publics especially those in the Middle East hold persistently negative views of the United States and its policies.

In addition to the Shared Values Initiative and The Network of Terrorism, the public diplomacy response included Radio Sawa, a pop music and news station targeting Arab youth,

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228 Zaharna, The Network Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy, 1.
Radio Sawa (March 2002); an Arabic youth magazine, *Hi* (July 2003); and an Arabic language television satellite network, Alhurra (February 2004).²³⁰

In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission, a non-partisan body created by Congress in 2002, evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of these public diplomacy initiatives as part of its investigation of the different aspects of the government’s response to the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. On the subject of public diplomacy, the 9/11 Commission recommended that United States should “identify what it stands for and communicate that message clearly.”²³¹ The Commission suggested increased funding for the Broadcasting Board of Governors.²³² In addition, the Commission recommended that the United States should rebuild its scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people overseas.²³³ The Commission stated that extremist religious schools in the Muslim world teach hatred to young people and recommended support for secular education in Muslim countries.²³⁴

In December 2005, the Commission issued another report assessing the Congress and federal government’s response to the recommendations it made the previous year. The Commission assigned letter grades to actions taken and not taken to implement the 41 recommendations in its 2004 report. Grades for public diplomacy recommendations were as follows: Public diplomacy efforts received a grade of C for defining the U.S. message and a grade of B for international broadcasting. Scholarship, exchange, and library programs and efforts supporting secular education in Muslim countries received grades of D.²³⁵

²³² Ibid., 337.
²³³ Ibid.
²³⁴ Ibid., 378.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This dissertation examines the conceptual framework that is promoted as the basis of a “new public diplomacy,” with particular reference to U.S.-Iranian relations. Clearly, this dictates examining two questions: what is meant by a new public diplomacy, and what would characterize two-way symmetrical dialogue.

For public diplomacy to move beyond propaganda, Snow is among those who assert it has to incorporate two-way communication.236 Melissen too has such a vision for the new public diplomacy practice.237 He states, “public diplomacy is similar to propaganda in that it tries to persuade people what to think, but it is fundamentally different from [propaganda] in the sense that public diplomacy also listens to what people have to say.”238 However, he suggests that the U.S. government’s approaches to public diplomacy have not yet fostered genuine dialogue. One way public diplomacy can encourage dialogue is by adopting two-way symmetrical public relations rather than concentrating on image management.239 Public relations scholars stress the importance of nurturing long-term relationships with stakeholders through two-way communication strategies with a symmetrical perspective as a viable framework for ethical public diplomacy.240 Fitzpatrick “questions the moral appropriateness and acceptability, as well as the practical implications, of public diplomacy philosophies and practices motivated and directed by the self-interested desire to gain power over those to whom public diplomacy efforts are directed.”241 She states that two-way symmetrical public diplomacy maximizes the

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238 Ibid., 18.
240 Fitzpatrick, "The Ethics of “Soft Power:” Examining the Moral Dimensions of U.S. Public Diplomacy”.
241 Ibid., 1.
realization of the sponsoring nation’s self-interest while respecting the rights of its global stakeholders. In addition, Kohut believes that the effectiveness of U.S. communication efforts rests on major policy initiatives that take into account the interests of global publics.242

The New Public Diplomacy Debate

In the last few years, policy experts and public diplomacy scholars have carefully scrutinized U.S. public diplomacy efforts to find out whether improved structures and methods could help the United States to develop a more successful public diplomacy strategy. Some experts believe that the United States government can improve its public diplomacy operations to help win the war on terrorism.243 Others call public diplomacy “the holy grail of American foreign policy” and insist that “other countries are not going to buy what the United States is selling.”244 According to these critics, “It’s not the packaging that others dislike. It’s the product.”245 Such a view is suggestive of the limits of America’s soft power. Other scholars assert that “short of major policy initiatives, there appear to be limits on how much U.S. communication efforts in the region can achieve.”246 Critics having this view suggest the need for congruency between action and image.

In addition to these criticisms, scholars call for a transformation in how public diplomacy is practiced. Zaharna, for example, suggests that the problem with the current U.S. public

245 Ibid.
246 Kohut, "How the United States is Perceived in the Arab and Muslim Worlds: Testimony of Andrew Kohut, United States House of Representatives International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations."
diplomacy structure is its emphasis on information dissemination and the control of communication environment.\textsuperscript{247} She proposes that “network is the new model of persuasion in the international arena and will define America’s effectiveness as a new paradigm of public diplomacy.”\textsuperscript{248} Similarly, other scholars assert that developments in the field have brought about a “new” public diplomacy, which is fundamentally different from propaganda.\textsuperscript{249}

Gilboa indicates that new public diplomacy is not a mere state activity, but rather an interdependent activity of state and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, private educational institutions, labor unions, and political parties.\textsuperscript{250} In addition, it is a form of soft power that utilizes two-way communication techniques, strategic public diplomacy, information management, nation-branding and online image management. According to Gilboa, new public diplomacy is “a communication system designed to create a dialogue with both foes and allies.”\textsuperscript{251}

An additional component of the new public diplomacy is “the blurring of traditional distinctions between international and domestic information activities.”\textsuperscript{252} According to Melissen, due to the revolutionary changes in the communication technology and the forces of globalization, it is increasingly challenging to separate communication aimed at homeland audiences and public diplomacy messages aimed at foreign publics.\textsuperscript{253} Thus, with the line

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delineating public affairs from public diplomacy fading, new public diplomacy has become more challenging.

At times, the government intentionally cultivates the blowback of its international public diplomacy messages. One instance of such an operation in action, according to the *New York Times* is the Bush administration’s “multimillion-dollar covert campaign to plant paid propaganda in the Iraqi news media and pay friendly Iraqi journalists monthly stipends.”254 In this, the U.S. military employed the services of the Washington-based Lincoln Group public relations firm, to whom it submitted pentagon-drafted articles for translation into Arabic and placement in Iraqi press or with Iraqi advertising agencies without mentioning their authorship. “Western press and frequently those self-styled ‘objective’ observers of Iraq are often critics of how we, the people of Iraq, are proceeding down the path in determining what is best for our nation,” one such article opened, according to the *New York Times*.255 What appears to be the voice of an independent Iraqi columnist then reverberates to the domestic media to soften opposition to the war effort.

Melissen identifies the most important distinction between traditional and new public diplomacy to be the direction of communication.256 While, traditionally, diplomacy, in general, and public diplomacy, in particular, was seen in a “hierarchical state-centric model” of international relations, new public diplomacy operates in a “network environment” in which the public is actively participating in the give and take of messages.257 This is an indication for the need of an instrumental public diplomacy role for non-state actors such as NGOs.

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255 Ibid.
257 Ibid., 12.
According to Hocking, in a hierarchical model, “the foreign ministry and the national diplomatic system over which it presides act as gatekeepers, monitoring interactions between domestic and international policy environments.” Hocking maintains that the United States has approached post-September-11 public diplomacy with this “top-down” mentality. This is evident in the prescriptions given for improved public diplomacy: allocation of more resources and better coordination. Similarly, Snow suggests that the U.S. government has traditionally approached public diplomacy as a “two-track process,” employing a one-way track of information dissemination while arguing that the effort is mutually beneficial in outcome. The network model of public diplomacy requires a movement beyond the one-way dissemination of information to foreign publics toward a more dialogic engagement with the target populations.

Two-Way Symmetrical Public Diplomacy

For more than 25 years, public relations scholars have continued to debate the importance of two-way communication and balance of interests for building strong relationships between an organization and its publics. In this process they have developed symmetrical models for successful public relations. Furthermore, as Signitzer and Coombs observe in their comparative study of public diplomacy and public relations, the objectives of both are conceptually similar. Therefore, it appears useful for scholars of new public diplomacy to examine relevant public relations literature.

Like public diplomacy, public relations has been undergoing a fundamental redefinition in the past few decades as public relations scholars are stressing the importance of nurturing long-term relationships with stakeholders through two-way communication strategies with a

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symmetrical perspective. Many of the elements of new public diplomacy are, in this sense, congruent with elements of “excellent” public relations.261

Ledingham makes the case that relationship management should act as the general theory of public relations.262 J. Grunig, L. Grunig, and Ehling believe that the establishment of quality relationships is the basis for excellence in the field, which could be done through reconciling the organization’s goals with the expectations of its strategic stakeholders.263 As Melissen notes, “A lesson that public diplomacy can take on board from the sometimes misunderstood field of PR is that the strength of firm relationships largely determines the receipt and success of individual messages and overall attitudes.”264

To theoretically conceptualize public relations practices, Grunig and Hunt gave a four-model typology of public relations practices: press agentry/publicity, public information, two-way asymmetrical and two-way symmetrical.265 These models were conceptualized based on the two main variables of direction and purpose of communication. The direction variable consists of one-way and two-way communication. In models with a one-way direction of communication, public relations is about disseminating information. In two-way models, public relations is about exchanging information. As Yun puts it, “one-way means disseminating information, whereas two-way means an exchange of information.”266 The purpose variable is whether communication effects result in a balance of interest (i.e., have symmetry or asymmetry). In Yun’s words, “symmetry refers to communication effects on both sides and and,

265 Grunig and Hunt, Managing Public Relations.
thus, collaboration or cooperation, whereas *asymmetry* means one-sided effects and, thus, advocacy.\textsuperscript{267} The two underlying variables of direction and purpose determine the communication goal of public relations: control versus adaptation. Also, they determine the communication role public relations serves: advocacy and dissemination versus mediation. Furthermore, the two variables show whether and how organizations use research.

The press agentry model is descriptive of public relations programs “aimed solely at attaining favorable publicity for an organization in the mass media, often in a misleading way.”\textsuperscript{268} The goal of public relations in the public information model is to disseminate accurate but only favorable information aimed at changing the behavior of the public. The two-way asymmetrical model is aimed at persuasion and is typical of organizations that use social science research for developing messages that appeal to their stakeholders’ attitudes. All the asymmetrical models are aimed at changing the behavior of the publics but not those of the organization. The two-way symmetrical model is based on research and attempts to manage conflict through negotiation with strategic publics.\textsuperscript{269}

Edward Bernays, a nephew of Sigmund Freud, was a leading advocate of the use of psychology and other social sciences in the public relations industry.\textsuperscript{270} In his 1928 book *Propaganda*, Bernays promoted an asymmetrical approach to public relations that is founded on social scientific theories: “If we understand the mechanism and motives of the group mind, is it not possible to control and regiment the masses according to our will without their knowing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{267} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{269} Ibid.: 143-45.
\end{itemize}
What Bernays called the “engineering of consent” stands in stark contrast to the ethically sound two-way symmetrical approach. 

In 1985, James E. Grunig headed a six-member team to study the characteristics of excellent public relations programs. Based on an expansive review of theories from public relations, management, sociology, psychology, marketing, communication, anthropology, philosophy, and feminist studies, the team arrived at a new theory of excellence in public relations “to explain how and why communication makes organizations more effective.”

“Excellent public relations,” according to Larisa A. Grunig, James E. Grunig, and David M. Dozier, “is managerial, strategic, symmetrical, diverse, and ethical.” The two-way symmetrical model of communication is one of the key defining characteristics of excellent public relations departments. Such a model thrives when the dominant coalition’s “worldview for public relations in the organization reflects the two-way symmetrical model” and the organization has a “symmetrical system of internal communication.”

Critics of the four models developed by Grunig and Hunt have said that the conceptualization was too simplistic “to capture the complexity and multiplicity of the public relations environment.” Cancel et al. proposed that an advocacy to accommodation continuum would more accurately describe the practice of public relations. Earlier, Murphy had

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271 Bernays, Propaganda, 71.
272 ———, ed. The Engineering of Consent.
275 Ibid., 9.
argued for a mixed motive approach to public relations. Similar to Grunig’s theory of two-way symmetrical public relations, Murphy suggested that game theory gives “equal centrality to sender-receiver reflexivity;” however, it also proposes “a continuum of conflict-cooperation.”

She further asserted that Grunig’s two-way symmetrical model is similar to “games of pure cooperation,” which are hard to find in the real world. Murphy proposed that, in reality, public relations is practiced based on mixed motives: “a sliding scale of cooperation and competition in which organizational needs must of necessity be balanced against the needs of constituents, but never lose their primacy.”

In reply to these critiques, J. Grunig and L. Grunig said that the two-way symmetrical model is not congruent with pure accommodation, in Cancel et al.’s terms, or pure coordination, in Murphy’s terms. Later, L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier clarified on their conceptualization of symmetry: “Total accommodation of the public’s interest would be as asymmetrical as unbridled advocacy of the organization’s interests.” The two-way symmetrical model, according to L. Grunig et al., is in fact equivalent with the mixed motive model proposed by Murphy and better serves the interests of the organization when compared with asymmetrical models. Cameron, Cropp, and Reber softened their criticism of the “excellence” theory:

The excellence theory offers a compelling model for public relations to achieve a higher calling for as a profession. The theory moves practitioners from a role as persuasive hired guns or mere communication technicians serving as in-house reporters towards a role as managers using research and dialogue to build healthy relationships with publics.

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278 Ibid., 117.
279 Ibid., 122.
280 Ibid., 127.
281 Grunig and Grunig, "Models of Public Relations and Communication."
282 Grunig, Grunig, and Dozier, Excellent Public Relations and Effective Organizations: A Study of Communication Management in Three Countries, 314.
Excellence theory may quite often lead to more ethical and more effective public relations performance, particularly over longer term. Cameron and other proponents of the contingency theory of accommodation in public relations argue, however, that the theory must be elaborated upon and qualified to become a more mature and comprehensive theory.283

Responding to critics’ suggestions for a continuum, J. Grunig and L. Grunig modified the original four discrete models into the two continua of craft and professional public relations.284 They indicate public relations practices are variants of “craft” and “professional” forms of public relations.285 The craft public relations continuum is marked by the two extremes of propaganda and journalism, both of which are one-way communication models. The two-way communication models are also placed along a continuum, with pure asymmetry at one end and pure symmetry at the other. It is the centrality of two-way communication that distinguishes professional public relations with the practice of public relations as a craft.

![Craft Public Relations Continuum](image)

Craft Public Relations

I-----------------------------I-------------------------------------I-----------------------------I
Propaganda                  Press Agentry                   Public Information               Journalism

Professional Public Relations

I-----------------------------I-------------------------------------I-----------------------------I
Pure Asymmetry          Two-way Asymmetrical    Two-way symmetrical    Pure Symmetry

(Excellent public relations)

Figure 1. Four models of public relations placed on two continua286

In essence, a dialogue-centered paradigm of public diplomacy calls for a shift from craft public relations to professional public relations, with an emphasis on symmetrical practices.

Nelson and Izadi suggest that as public diplomacy approaches the symmetrical end of

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285 Ibid.
286 Ibid., 313.
professional public relations, it strengthens its ethical legitimacy. Therefore, a new public diplomacy is to be distinguished from the old to the degree to which it engages in two-way symmetrical relations rather than one-way propaganda.

**Theoretical Underpinnings of Dialogue and Symmetry**

The dialogic models of professional public relations are moves beyond the one-way models of communication management, in which the primary goal is to disseminate information about the organization’s activities and decisions in order to reduce uncertainty in the environment. The information model of communication management is epitomized by Lasswell’s famous formula: “Who says what to whom with what effect.” Shannon and Weaver’s Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver model of communication is also indicative of the public information approach. The two models of rhetorical dialogue and relationship management are departures from the one-way, sender-centered approach to communication management.

Heath identifies rhetoric as the essence of public relations and referred to this process as “enactment of meanings.” He asserts, “rhetoric is a dialogue of opinions, counter opinions, meanings, and counter meanings – the process by which interests are asserted, negotiated, and constrained.” Persuasion is central to the rhetorical perspective, which “treats persuasion as

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292 Ibid.
an interactive, dialogic process whereby points of views are contested in public." Based on this view, persuasion is not equivalent with "linear influence," instead it is based on argument and counterargument. Heath contends that persuasion as rhetorical dialogue would result in zones of meaning whereby organizations and their publics arrive at shared understanding of problems through debate and argumentation.

Issues management is one way organizations attempt to harmonize their actions with their stakeholders’ needs and expectations. Heath defines issues management as “the management of organizational and community resources through the public policy process to advance organizational interests and rights by striking a mutual balance with those of stakeholders.”

Issues management comprises of the four steps of issues identification, scanning, monitoring, and analysis. According to Heath and Nelson, issues management has the two goals of adjusting the organization to the public and helping the public understand the complexity and requirements of the organization. Through issues management, organizations aim to meet or exceed the expectations of key publics and build mutually beneficial relationships. Heath maintains that issues management is not just beneficial for large corporations. It is a management tool that is also applicable to nonprofit organizations, governmental agencies, and activist groups.

According to Heath, issues management and normative two-way symmetrical public relations are “companion efforts to achieve similar ends but with different means.” Nelson proposes that

293 Ibid.
294 Ibid.: 143-44.
295 Ibid.
298 Heath, Strategic Issues Management: Organizations and Public Policy Challenges, 3.
299 Ibid., 7.
issues management “presupposes a willingness for organizations to not only seek to change others but also be prepared to reform internal policies and practices as well.”

J. E. Grunig and L. A. Grunig indicate that the rhetorical approach to persuasion is compatible with the two-way symmetrical model of public relations since both parties have a chance to persuade the other. Similarly, Riordan finds it necessary for public diplomacy to adopt a dialogue-based paradigm in which the parties of dialogue arrive at shared meanings. Such a paradigm, he asserts, “recognizes that no one has a monopoly of truth or virtue, that other ideas may be valid and that the outcome may be different from the initial message being promoted.” Genuine dialogue, he notes, is the means for achieving credibility with foreign publics.

Grunig says that problems of public relations cannot be solved merely through image management. “Public relations must be concerned both with and symbolic relationships and not with symbolic relationships alone.” He states that these behavioral relationships are based on several key components: “dynamic vs. static, open vs. closed, the degree to which both organization and public are satisfied with the relationship, distribution of power in the relationship, and mutuality of understanding, agreement, and consensus, trust and credibility, and the concept of reciprocity” Therefore, the problem with the public information and press agentry models lies in their preoccupation with symbolic relationships while ignoring behavioral relationships.

301 Grunig and Grunig, "Models of Public Relations and Communication."
302 Riordan, "Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy Paradigm."
303 Ibid., 189.
304 Grunig and Hunt, Managing Public Relations.
305 Ibid., 123.
306 Ibid., 135.
In addition to symbolic relationships (as in mediated messages), public diplomacy should concern actual behavioral relationships.\textsuperscript{307} Hence, not only should the communication of messages involve dialogue, but also the consequences of such messaging should take into consideration the views of the other party. Thus, for the United States to engage in two-way symmetrical public diplomacy, it has to consider the feedback it gets from other countries when making its policies.

Central to Grunig’s relationship management model is the concept of symmetry or balance of interests between an organization and its publics. Grunig’s approach to public relations is based on. A system is “a set of interacting units with relationships among them.”\textsuperscript{308} Grunig and Huang propose a model of stages and forms of relationships.\textsuperscript{309} The two-way symmetrical model is viewed as an open system, in which practitioners get input from the organization’s environment to bring about changes in the organization, as well as its environment.

In this model, Grunig and Huang identify the symmetrical and asymmetrical public relations practices as relationship maintenance strategies.\textsuperscript{310} With a symmetrical worldview, an organization is more likely to use symmetrical relationship maintenance strategies, approaching the pure symmetry end of the continuum, where Grunig places the two-way symmetrical model. In contrast, an organization with an asymmetrical worldview is more likely to use asymmetrical


\textsuperscript{310} Ibid.
strategies, approaching the asymmetrical extreme of the continuum, where Grunig places the two-way asymmetrical model. The two-way symmetrical model of public relations is in essence the same as new public diplomacy.

Nelson and Izadi too contend that adopting the ethical standards of commitment to truth and two-way symmetrical public diplomacy (or otherwise called new public diplomacy) is vital to an effective public diplomacy strategy.311 To this, they add the ethical standard of “values-based leadership.” Such leaders listen to their constituents, respect their opinions, and practice the art of inclusion. While there may be nuances to leadership styles based on different circumstances and cultures, values-based leaders are exemplified by courage, integrity, authenticity, vision, and passion.

These structural changes are not premised on ethical grounds only. Realignments in the post-Cold War political environment, the proliferation of new media, and the resulting possibility for more public participation in international relations have made Cold War public diplomacy strategies obsolete and ineffective.312 With advances in new media and the globalization of information technology, it is no longer possible for the United States to achieve information dominance.313 Black propaganda, or deceptive public diplomacy, has become increasingly ineffective. For black propaganda to be effective, it has to be seen as a semblance of the truth and not rumor or official dissembling. Moreover, what might have become public knowledge

after a long time can now become evident almost immediately. Also, an image-oriented public diplomacy will best work in closed societies. Thus, a major obstacle to U.S. public diplomacy program is its emphasis on image building rather than emphasis on genuine dialogue and symmetrical relationships.314

4. METHODOLOGY

This dissertation uses the case study method and William Domhoff’s membership network analysis\textsuperscript{315} in addressing the study’s seven research questions. Case study is the intensive study of a single case, which is often defined as a single instance of an event or phenomenon, to shed light on a specific problem or question. Case studies are used extensively in the various fields of the social sciences because researchers want to have a holistic and meaningful understanding of complex social, political, and historical phenomena.

Gerring differentiates between the study of a single case (the case study) and that of a sample of cases (the cross-case study).\textsuperscript{316} He defines a case as a phenomenon that has both a spatial and a temporal boundary and that could be any social or political unit. In the present study, the case comprises post-9/11 U.S. public diplomacy policies toward Iran and the issue network associated with it.

Bennett and Elman find it important to note that the unit of analysis is not the event or the phenomenon itself but rather a well-defined aspect of that event or phenomenon.\textsuperscript{317} Thus, the investigator has to decide which aspects of any historical happening, or social or political phenomena to focus on. Selecting a single instance of a phenomenon, nevertheless, does not mean that the researcher makes a single theoretically relevant observation. That is because, as Bennett and Elman note, each case has a potentially large number of observations on the dependent and independent variables of interest.

\textsuperscript{317} Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods," \textit{Annual Review of Political Science} 9 (2006).
Yin maintains that case studies are the preferred method of analysis when the researcher is interested in questions of how and why, when the researcher has limited control over the events under study, and when the focus is on real life contemporary phenomena.\textsuperscript{318} Orum also asserts that the intensive analysis of a single case is a viable research strategy due to five advantages: 1) The researcher can probe the particular question in great depth, 2) the researcher can study the context surrounding the case comprehensively, 3) the researcher can study the case multi-dimensionally or holistically, 4) the researcher can study the case in isolation from other cases, and 5) the researcher can understand a phenomenon in greater depth by studying a single typical case or a single deviant case.\textsuperscript{319}

An important strength of case studies lies in the possibility for high conceptual validity.\textsuperscript{320} When measuring such complex social concepts such as democracy, statistical large-N studies have no choice but to lump together dissimilar cases to get a large sample. With case studies, however, it is practical to research cases with much higher conceptual refinement. For example, they can focus on a particular type of democracy, what George and Bennett call “democracy with adjectives,” such as federal, parliamentary, presidential etc.\textsuperscript{321} When distinguishing between subtypes of a concept, the researcher using case study methods can investigate how specific theories work in variations of the concept. In this way, the researcher can identify more relevant variables and help theory development. High internal validity is another strength of the case study approach. This means one can be more certain of the relationships that he or she observes in the single case. The trade off for this strength is external

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid.
validity. Unlike large –N cross-case study, it is hard to be certain of the representativeness of the single case in relation with the population.  

Yin suggests that a study protocol is a major component in raising the reliability of the case study research. A typical protocol should have the following sections: an overview of the case study project (objectives, issues, topics being investigated), field procedures (credentials and access to sites, sources of information), and case study questions (specific questions that the investigator must keep in mind during data collection). The introduction presented an overview of the case study project and case study questions. I will discuss the study’s sources of information in the remaining pages.

Sources of Information

The study’s first four research questions are as follows:

RQ1: Which individuals and organizations participate in the Iran policy debate and are thus part of the Iran issue network?

RQ2: What policy recommendations do the members of the Iran issue network propose?

RQ3: Which of these policy recommendations come under the category of public diplomacy policies?

RQ4: Based on Iran policy recommendations, and the relationships among network members, what policy communities can be identified within the Iran issue network?

In this study, my operational definition of the Iran issue network is as follows: all individuals who have published about Iran and provided policy recommendations at least once in

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322 Gerring, "The Case Study: What it is and What it Does."

323 Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods.
the time span from January 2008 to January 2009. Individuals who have endorsed a policy paper about Iran in the above time span are also included. This time period was primarily chosen for two reasons. It was the most recent time span before the completion of this dissertation, and it captured the policy debates during the most recent presidential election campaign. Policy communities generally become most vocal as presidential elections approach.

I search the following databases to identify the members of Iran issue network: Academic Search Complete, CIAO (Columbia International Affairs Online), Communication & Mass Media Complete, Factiva, Humanities International Complete, Index Islamicus, International Security & Counter-Terrorism Reference Center, LexisNexis Congressional, Middle Eastern & Central Asian Studies Collection, Military & Government Collection, OCLC WorldCat, Peace Research Abstracts, and PolicyFile. Appendix B presents the database providers’ description of the above databases. I then examine the organizational affiliation of the issue network members.

I use a network analysis approach similar to William Domhoff’s network analysis methodology to identify the issue network that is interested in the Iran policy debate. Domhoff contends that network analysis should include three steps. First, the researcher should conduct a membership network analysis, identifying the individuals and organizations that are part of an issue network. In any network analysis, the critical question is the criterion that links individuals in the network. Whereas in Domhoff’s approach, organizational affiliation serves as the link between individuals, in this study policy recommendations denote the linking relationship among the individuals. I use the organizational affiliation information to identify which organizations are more active in each policy community.

Domhoff’s second step to the construction of membership networks, i.e., tracing the money flow among individuals and organizations, is beyond the bounds of the current study.

324 Domhoff, State Autonomy or Class Dominance? Case Studies on Policy Making in America.
The third step in a network analysis, according to Domhoff, is the analysis of “the verbal and written ‘output’ of the network, that is, the speeches, policy statements, and legislative acts that allow us to study the goals, values, and ideology of the people and institutions in the network.” Here, I examine the published output of the issue network members within the study’s time span. Based on the documents retrieved from the above mentioned databases, I examine the policy recommendations of members of the Iran issue network and identify public diplomacy policy recommendations.

I use NVivo 8 data management software to organize and analyze the data. NVivo is designed to help users manage and analyze textual data by storing documents, organizing documents, assigning attributes to documents and their authors, and finding patterns among documents. I use the attributes feature of NVivo to assign attributes to the members of Iran issue network. Based on the attributes assigned, NVivo allows users to organize documents into sets that share similar characteristics. In this study, policy recommendations serve as the main attribute for members of Iran issue network. Another attribute is issue network members’ institutional affiliation. NVivo allows the user to group idiosyncratic attributes of documents and authors into broader categories. The resulting sets of issue network members denote the various policy communities within the Iran issue network. NVivo capabilities can be used to visually display the resulting sets.

The study’s fifth research question asks:

RQ5: What are the policies that the various offices within the U.S. government have formulated with regard to its public diplomacy towards Iran, and which of these have been implemented? What role do non-state actors play in advancing these policies?

325 Ibid., 14.
I use the mentioned databases in addition to the World Wide Web to identify key open source documents related to post-9/11 U.S. state and non-state actors’ public diplomacy toward Iran. I use the following keywords in combination with the word Iran in conducting the database searches: propaganda, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, soft power, anti-Americanism, battle for hearts and minds, war of ideas, ideological warfare, information operations, psychological warfare, psychological operations, psyops, information warfare, political warfare, cultural imperialism, media imperialism, cultural dependency, democratization, National Endowment for Democracy, Middle East Partnership Initiative, dissatisfaction, and dissent. I then present the policies that the U.S. government has implemented with regard to its public diplomacy strategy toward Iran.

According to Maykut, “it is desirable to end both data collection and data analysis when no new or relevant information is being uncovered, a process that has been described as reaching ‘redundancy’ in the data.”\footnote{Pamela S. Maykut and Richard Morehouse, \textit{Beginning Qualitative Research: A Philosophic and Practical Guide} (London: Falmer Press, 1994), 144.} Similarly, Ely says that redundancy is reached “when the data repeat themselves, when the researcher has confidence that themes and examples are repeating instead of expanding.”\footnote{Margot Ely, \textit{Doing Qualitative Research: Circles within Circles} (London: Falmer Press, 1991), 92.} Consequently, I end the data collection when I have reached the point of redundancy.

Based on an examination of the results to the study’s first five research questions, I address the following inquiry:

\textbf{RQ 6: Which policy communities from the Iran issue network correlate with the various components of the US government in their policy preferences?}

I address the final research question based on a synthesis of the information presented in the previous chapters:
RQ7: Do the current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran fit with the two-way symmetrical model, which is in line with the new public diplomacy paradigm?

As was mentioned earlier, I hypothesize that U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran do not employ the two-way symmetrical model. As Williams notes, “In qualitative research, a hypothesis might be framed in terms of a social setting having certain features, which, through observations, can be confirmed or falsified.”328 Therefore, I examine the direction and purpose of the current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran based on what is presented by U.S. government officials, as described in government documents or uncovered in my study of other data sources. In studying the direction of communication in U.S. public diplomacy initiatives, I see if their goals and objectives are geared toward “disseminating information” (one-way) or “an exchange of information” (two-way).329 I also examine whether the purpose of U.S. public diplomacy incorporates “communication effects on both sides and thus collaboration and cooperation” (symmetry) or “one-sided effects and, thus, advocacy” (asymmetry).330

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies

As extensive as this dissertation is, it has limitations that further studies should address. Throughout the discussion of how U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran is manifested, there is one enormous political reality that must be recognized. The United States and Iran do not have formalized diplomatic relations. Future works should examine how the case of Iran compares

330 Ibid.
with that of other countries that have friendly bilateral diplomatic relations with the United States.

Also, as stated earlier, no comprehensive study has focused on U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran in the post-9/11 period. The same is true for the Clinton, the first Bush and Reagan administrations (i.e., administrations that took office after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran). Future studies should address the question of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran by focusing on each of these administrations individually. This dissertation and its likes could then serve as the basis for a comparative analysis of a grand U.S. public diplomacy strategy toward Iran and potential similarities and differences between Republican and Democratic administrations. Future research should also examine the public diplomacy approach of the Obama administration and determine the degree of continuity and change as compared to the approaches of the previous administrations. There is also a need for a comparative examination of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran before and after the 1979 Islamic revolution, analyzing the evolution of public diplomacy practices and strategies when a client state becomes an enemy state.

Furthermore, I only examine the public diplomacy of the United States toward Iran. It would be beneficial for future research to address the public diplomacy of Iran toward the United States. Issues related to Iran are also important elements of European foreign policy. Future studies could examine the European public diplomacy policy toward Iran and the policy communities associated with it. It would be then beneficial to compare European and American approaches.

Lastly, the current events nature of this dissertation serves as an impediment to a complete analysis of the subject under study. A more accurate picture can be constructed in
future studies as classified government documents are declassified. An example of such research is Vaughan’s study of American and British propaganda in the Arab world in the 1940s and 1950s.\textsuperscript{331}

\textsuperscript{331} Vaughan, \textit{The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57: Unconquerable Minds}. 
5. THE DEBATE OVER UNITED STATES IRAN POLICY

The Iran Issue Network

The first research question for this dissertation inquires about the composition of the Iran issue network. Specifically, it asks which individuals and organizations participate in Iran policy debate and are thus part of the Iran issue network. To address this question, I searched the databases mentioned in the methodology chapter using the keywords Iran or Iranian. A total of 182 individuals met the criteria to be included in the Iran issue network as described in the methodology chapter. A number of these 182 individuals were affiliated with the same organization, bringing the total number of organizations that have an affiliate who is a member of the Iran issue network to 104. A full listing of the Iran issue network will be presented in the following pages.

Policy Communities and Policy Recommendations

The dissertation’s next three research questions asked: What policy recommendations do the members of the Iran issue network propose? Which of these policy recommendations come under the category of public diplomacy policies? And based on Iran policy recommendations, and the relationships among network members, what policy communities can be identified within the Iran issue network? To address these inquiries, I examined the documents retrieved during my search for the Iran issue network on a one-by-one basis, taking note of individuals’ policy recommendations. As the data analysis got underway, four broad frameworks emerged based on the individuals’ policy recommendations and their assumptions about the nature of the U.S.-Iran relationship and about political realities in Iran. The analysis revealed the existence of the following four broad categories encompassing the policy recommendations of the Iran issue
network: Strategic Engagement, Punitive Nonengagement, Hawkish Engagement, and Fundamental Change in U.S. Foreign Policy. The emergence of these categories denotes the existence of four main policy communities in the Iran issue network. As Figure 2 shows, while none of these categories command the support of the majority of the overall issue network, a large plurality of the experts give recommendations denoting Hawkish Engagement (83 individuals – or about 46 percent) and Strategic Engagement (56 individuals– or about 31 percent) categories. Another 33 individuals in the Iran issue network (about 18 percent) believe that punitive nonengagement is the best strategy, while only 10 (about 5 percent) think that there is a need for a fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy, in general, and U.S. policy toward Iran, in particular.

Figure 2. The composition of the Iran issue network
It is important to point out that the above categories denote segments of a continuum; where one leaves off, the other starts. Members of the Iran issue network were placed in each of the four groups based on their shared assumptions and the broad strategy that they favored. This does not imply complete uniformity in policy recommendations among members of a policy community. The following pages give a detailed description of the four policy communities, addressing the study’s first four research questions.

**Strategic Engagement**

About 31 percent of the Iran issue network members (56 individuals) propose diplomatic engagement with Iran, without preconditions, is the only viable approach that should frame United States strategy in its relationship with Iran. They also believe that United States should stay away from regime change measures and adhere to the 1981 Algiers Accord, in which it pledged to avoid political and military interference in Iran’s internal affairs. The recommendation for strategic engagement is premised on a pragmatic outlook that acknowledges the failure of all other available options. Sustained engagement is deemed “far more likely to strengthen United States national security at this stage than either escalation to war or continued efforts to threaten, intimidate, or coerce Iran.”332 Members of the Strategic Engagement policy community argue that Iran is a powerful and influential country in the Middle East, that there is room for common ground, and that the nuclear issue can be managed with international partnership in Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Therefore, they propose that, given the failure of all other options, it is wisest for the United States to become a strategic partner with Iran. This, however, does not mean a blanket endorsement of Iran’s policies and actions.

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This group of experts put forth two main recommendations for U.S. public diplomacy. First, they encourage the adoption of policies to facilitate people-to-people exchanges between American and Iranian “scholars, professionals, religious leaders, lawmakers, and ordinary citizens.” The increased unofficial cultural exchanges should be geared toward facilitating the initiation of a direct diplomatic relationship. The recommendation for increased people-to-people public diplomacy does not come with any qualifiers. Proponents of strategic engagement make a second public diplomacy recommendation: The U.S. government needs to cease its “democracy promotion” efforts as they are “harming, not helping, the cause of democracy in Iran.” This recommendation would mean a substantial downgrading in U.S. Farsi broadcasting, but more importantly, the elimination of U.S. funding of groups opposed to Iran’s government. Here, I refer to this public diplomacy approach as facilitative public diplomacy: a public diplomacy approach that is aimed at reducing tensions between the United States and Iran, fostering increased understanding between the two countries, and facilitating the movement toward normalized relations between the United States and Iran.

The Strategic Engagement option entails a series of principles as necessary first steps to a successful Iran policy. A joint experts’ statement on Iran – endorsed by 20 Iran experts including Thomas Pickering, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 1989 to 1992, and James Dobbins, the Bush administration’s first special envoy to Afghanistan – well captures the main elements of strategic engagement. According to the statement, first and foremost, United States policy makers should acknowledge that three decades of “U.S. efforts to manage Iran

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333 Ibid., 2.
334 Ibid.
through isolation, threats, and sanctions” have failed to solve “any major problem in U.S.-Iran relations, and have made most of them worse.”

United States efforts for regime change in Iran are deemed as the most destructive element of past U.S. policy toward Iran. Iran is not going to negotiate in good faith, the statement makes clear, while perceiving that the U.S. government is trying to overthrow it. Thus, the most fundamental step to starting a “meaningful dialogue” with Iran is to “replace calls for regime change with a long-term strategy.” According to the experts believing in strategic engagement, “Giving Iran a place at the table – alongside other key states” – is the key to resolving the Iran nuclear issue, the instability in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. Experts advocating strategic engagement do note that, after three decades of hostility, engagement with Iran may prove to be difficult and may not be a “cure all,” but it “certainly will change the equation.” True diplomacy has been the missing element in U.S. policy for the last thirty years, and it is time to see what it can accomplish, they say.

The Iran nuclear issue is believed to be best resolved as part of a wider U.S.-Iran relationship and carried through multilateral talks with the United States taking an active leadership role. Nuclear negotiations with no preconditions do not, however, eliminate the possibility of costs, in the form of sanctions, if negotiations fail. Engaging Iran diplomatically is also said to be beneficial to Israel’s security since Iran has much influence over Israel’s adversaries, Hamas and Hezbollah. According to the joint statement, Washington’s active diplomacy with Iran does not signal approval of Iran, just as earlier U.S. diplomatic interactions

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335 Ibid., 1.
336 Ibid., 2.
337 Ibid.
with governments of the Soviet Union or China did not mean an endorsement of their policies or actions.\textsuperscript{338}

According to this policy community, U.S. policies towards Iran have failed to achieve their objectives, mainly because “they are rooted in fundamental misconceptions that have driven U.S. policy in the wrong direction.”\textsuperscript{339} These misconceptions include the following:

- Myth # 1. President Ahmadinejad calls the shots on nuclear and foreign policy.
- Myth # 2. The political system of the Islamic Republic is frail and ripe for regime change.
- Myth # 3. The Iranian leadership’s religious beliefs render them undeterable.
- Myth # 4. Iran’s current leadership is implacably opposed to the United States.
- Myth # 5. Iran has declared its intention to attack Israel in order to “wipe Israel off the map.”
- Myth # 6. U.S.-sponsored democracy promotion can help bring true democracy in Iran.
- Myth # 7. Iran is clearly and firmly committed to developing nuclear weapons.
- Myth # 8. Iran and the United States have no basis for dialogue.\textsuperscript{340}

According to Suzanne Maloney, who is also an advocate of strategic engagement, the failure of the Bush administration’s Iran policy was in large measure a consequence of its ingrained faith in these “mistaken assumptions.”\textsuperscript{341} Maloney, who is now a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, served on the Department of State policy-planning team from 2005 to 2007. According to Maloney, with the conviction that the Islamic Republic of Iran was on the verge of collapse, the Bush administration included Iran as part of an “axis of evil,” which resulted in the termination of the unprecedented cooperation between Tehran and Washington on defeating Taliban in Afghanistan and supporting the government of Hamid Karzai. The Bush administration lost successive opportunities for engaging Iran diplomatically and instead pursued a “Freedom Agenda” to support opponents of

\textsuperscript{338} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{340} Ibid., 3-4.
the Iranian government. Based on her retrospective analysis of past mistakes, Maloney concludes that diplomacy is “the only alternative available to U.S. policy makers.”

In a recent paper, William Luers, president of United Nations Association of the U.S.A. and a former deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Thomas Pickering, the former U.S. ambassador at the United Nations; and Jim Walsh, a professor of international security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, lay out the case for strategic engagement in more detail. The authors urge the Obama administration to recognize that the prime issues of Iran’s nuclear capabilities and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan are interconnected and require a unified strategy. Taking military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, for example, would remove the prospects of American-Iranian cooperation on Iraq and Afghanistan. Resolving these issues requires direct talks without preconditions between the United States, Iran, and other interested countries. Specifically, the authors propose the creation of a continuing forum where such talks could take place. Luers, Pickering, and Walsh propose that creating an international consortium to enrich uranium in Iran under international inspections is a viable solution that has a higher possibility of being accepted by Tehran.

Luers, Pickering, and Walsh recommend the following course of action for a successful engagement strategy. Before the initiation of talks, which is recommended to take place after Iran’s June 2009 presidential election, the Obama administration should win the support of members of Congress, Europeans, Russians, and Chinese for an engagement strategy. The Obama administration should also assure American allies in the neighboring region – most notably the Arab states, Turkey, Pakistan, and Israel – that direct U.S.-Iran diplomacy serves their interests as well by diplomatically resolving issues that could lead to regional instability or

342 Ibid.: 36.
outright war. In the case of Israel, the authors suggest, strategic engagement with Iran will offer the best chance of dealing with Hamas and Hezbollah. The Obama administration should also make confidence-building overtures, including “a reaffirmation of Article I of the 1981 Algiers Accord, in which the United States pledged not to interfere politically or militarily in Iran’s internal affairs.”

In short, United States should engage with Iran based on mutual respect and not the domineering talk of “carrots and sticks,” a phrase which Iranians “associate with the treatment of donkeys and which in any case suggests that they can be either bought off or beaten into submission.” The authors express their criticism of the Obama foreign policy team for coupling its stated readiness for negotiations with a continuation of the “tough talk” of the previous administration. “The U.S. can impose costs on Iran, but it cannot impose its will,” the authors conclude. “The same is true for Iran. Progress requires on both sides a greater focus on strategy rather than tactics.”

Table 1 presents the list of the members of the Strategic Engagement policy community.

Table 1. Strategic Engagement policy community

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Current Affiliation</th>
<th>Affiliation Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Norman Neureiter^44</td>
<td>Amer. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science</td>
<td>NGO official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Richard Parker^48</td>
<td>American Foreign Policy Project</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Anthony Newkirk^49</td>
<td>American School of Kuwait</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Kaveh L. Afrasiabi^50</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Columnist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Emile A. Nakhleh^51</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Former U.S.G. official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Robert Baer^52</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Former U.S.G. official</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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^44 Ibid.
^45 Ibid.
^46 Ibid.
^48 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran.
^51 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ali Banuazizi</td>
<td>Boston College</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Augustus R. Norton</td>
<td>Boston University</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Paul Ingram</td>
<td>British American Security Information Council</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Suzanne Maloney</td>
<td>Brookings Institution</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>James G. Blight</td>
<td>Brown University</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Philip Giraldi</td>
<td>Cannistraro Associates</td>
<td>Former U.S.G. official</td>
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<td>Karim Sadjadpour</td>
<td>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</td>
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<td>William Odom</td>
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<td>Bradley L. Bowman</td>
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<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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353 American Foreign Policy Project, *Joint Experts' Statement on Iran*.
354 Ibid.
358 American Foreign Policy Project, *Joint Experts' Statement on Iran*.
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
364 Ibid.
365 American Foreign Policy Project, *Joint Experts' Statement on Iran*.
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<td>Vali Nasr</td>
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<td>Georgetown University</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Gawdat Bahgat</td>
<td>Indiana University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<td>Hadi Ghaemi</td>
<td>International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran</td>
<td>NGO official</td>
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<td>Allan C. Brownfeld</td>
<td>Lincoln Institute for Research and Education</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>Geoffrey E. Forden</td>
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<td>Jim Walsh</td>
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<td>John Thomson</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Trita Parsi</td>
<td>National Iranian-American Council</td>
<td>NGO official</td>
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372 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts' Statement on Iran.
375 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts' Statement on Iran.
376 Ibid, Luers, Pickering, and Walsh, "A Solution for the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Standoff.", ———, "How to Deal with Iran."
377 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts' Statement on Iran.
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<td>Flynt Leverett</td>
<td>New America Foundation</td>
<td>Former U.S.G. official</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Frida Berrigan</td>
<td>New America Foundation</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Roger Cohen</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>Columnist</td>
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<td>Barnett R. Rubin</td>
<td>New York University</td>
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<td>Farhad Kazemi</td>
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<td>Stephen Kinzer</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Joe Cirincione</td>
<td>Ploughshares Fund</td>
<td>NGO official</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>James F. Dobbins</td>
<td>RAND Corporation</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
</tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Hillary Mann Leverett</td>
<td>Strategic Energy and Global Analysis</td>
<td>Former U.S.G. official</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Mehrzad Boroujerdi</td>
<td>Syracuse University</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Rola el-Husseini</td>
<td>Texas A&amp;M University</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Geneive Abdo</td>
<td>The Century Foundation</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Jim Fine</td>
<td>The Friends Committee on National Legislation</td>
<td>Advocacy group member</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Samuel Gardiner</td>
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<td>Glenn Schweitzer</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>John W. Limbert</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Academy</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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383 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid.
386 Gard, Tomero, and Reif, Strengthening U.S. Security through Non-Proliferation and Arms Control.
387 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran.
388 Leverett and Leverett, "The Grand Bargain."
390 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran.
391 Abdo and Boroujerdi, "Ignore Iran's Exiled Dream Merchants."
394 Schweitzer and Neureiter, "Engaging Iran."
One of the more prominent members of the Strategic Engagement policy community is Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as U.S. National Security Advisor to President Carter. As is evident from the above table, the Strategic Engagement policy community includes four experts whose primarily affiliation is with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Among the four is Richard Haass, the president of the CFR, who was the Director of Policy Planning at the State Department in the first George W. Bush administration. Four other affiliates of the CFR are members of the hawkish Strategic Engagement policy community. Three of the Strategic Engagement policy community members are affiliates of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CACNP), including CACNP president Robert Gard, a retired army Lt. General. Of the 182 members of the Iran issue network, four are affiliated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and are all in the Strategic Engagement policy community.

Three of the think tanks and advocacy organizations represented in this policy community are quite active in Iran-U.S. relations issues. One is the New America Foundation, in which Flynt Leverett is a senior fellow. Leverett was the Senior Director for Middle East Affairs

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396 Luers, Pickering, and Walsh, "A Solution for the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Standoff.", ———, "How to Deal with Iran."
398 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran.
399 Ibid.
401 American Foreign Policy Project, Joint Experts’ Statement on Iran.
on the National Security Council in the first George W. Bush administration. In addition, two advocacy organizations have been active in opposing hawkish congressional legislation against Iran. One is the Friends Committee on National Legislation, an anti-war Quaker group, and the other is the National Iranian-American Council (NIAC), a Washington-based Iranian-American organization founded by Trita Parsi who was a former Ph.D. student of Zbigniew Brzezinski at the John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. A number of NIAC’s recent projects have been funded by Ploughshares Fund, whose president Joe Cirincione is also a member of this policy community.

**Punitive Nonengagement**

About 18 percent of the Iran issue network (33 individuals) advocates a punitive nonengagement strategy with Iran. This approach consists of a concerted and integrated strategy of sanctions, military threats, and support for regime change. The Punitive Nonengagement policy community views what is myth to those advocating strategic engagement as evidence of Iran’s clear and present danger to United States’ national security. Iran is perceived as an existential threat to both the United States and Israel. Central to this premise is the looming threat of a nuclear Iran that is deemed “almost certainly impossible to stop diplomatically,” according to John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006.403

After “the world was hit with a different kind of bomb,” as Norman Podhoretz terms the release of the unclassified summary of the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the unquestioned assumption that Iran is developing nuclear weapons was reframed.404 Now, “Iran continues to acquire the capabilities to make nuclear weapons, while disguising their political

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intent to build the bomb,” as noted by Kenneth Timmerman, the founder and president of the Foundation for Democracy in Iran. In an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, Bolton also expressed his frustration over the failure of the European negotiations with Iran. “Every day that goes by allows Iran to increase the threat it poses, and the viability of the military option steadily declines over time,” he said.

While the Punitive Nonengagement policy community frames Iran’s danger for U.S. national security in terms of the projected reality of a nuclear Iran, it is the very nature of the Iranian government that produces their perception of an existential threat. “Iran has been at war with this country since it came to power in 1979,” says the president of the Center for Security Policy Frank J. Gaffney, in an article in the Washington Times. The United States should take all measures to destabilize and eventually change the Iranian government, he recommends. These include imposing sanctions, best if targeted at investments in Iran’s oil and gas industry to deflate the price of oil, aiding Iranians to overthrow their government through all available covert and overt means, and keeping the military option a viable strategy. “We should be under no illusion: We will not avoid war,” says Gaffney; “it has been thrust upon us by the mullahs for many years now.” In essence, it is the threat of the Islamic nature of Iran’s government that makes the prospects of a nuclear Iran such a catastrophic event. Also, by its very nature, Iran is deemed untrustworthy and unreliable. These are assumptions that make deterrence a projected failure in the view of this policy community: “Deterrence could not be relied upon with a regime ruled by Islamofascist revolutionaries who not only were ready to die for their beliefs but cared

406 Bolton, "While Diplomats Dither, Iran Builds Nukes."
408 Ibid.
less about protecting their people than about the spread of their ideology and their power,”
according to Podhoretz, *Commentary* magazine’s Editor-at-Large. 409 “If the mullahs got the
bomb, it was not they who would be deterred, but we,” Podhoretz argues. 410

Given the above way of thinking about the nature of Iran’s government, the members of
the Punitive Nonengagement policy community were highly critical of the Bush administration’s
eventual entrance into diplomatic talks with Iran on its nuclear program, which was seen as a
departure from Secretary Rice’s earlier call for Iran to first verifiably stop enriching uranium.
The criticism referred to the Bush administration’s decision to send an envoy, as a “one-time
deal,” to the international talks with Iran in July of 2008. 411 “Diplomacy is not wrong,” says
Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “but President Bush’s
reversal is diplomatic malpractice on a Carter-esque level that is breathing new life into a failing
regime.” 412

Clearly, the punitive nonengagement perspective views public diplomacy as political
warfare, with the eventual goal of regime change. Michael Ledeen, a Foundation for Defense of
Democracy “freedom scholar,” captured the essence of the punitive nonengagement strategy:
“It’s all about the regime. Change the regime, and the nuclear question becomes manageable.
Leave the mullahs in place, and the nuclear weapons directly threaten us and our friends and
allies, raising the ante of the terror war they started twenty-seven years ago.” 413 “In Iran

409 Podhoretz, "Stopping Iran: Why the Case for Military Action Still Stands."
410 Ibid.
413 Michael A. Ledeen, Iran’s Nuclear Impasse: Next Steps (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2006),
revolution is the dream of at least 70% of the people,” Ledeen says, “They are waiting for concrete signs of our support.”

Ian Berman, the American Foreign Policy Council vice president for policy and a member of the Committee on the Present Danger, is another member of the Punitive Nonengagement policy community who expresses strong discontent with the Bush administration’s meager accomplishments in its Iran public diplomacy efforts. The Bush administration, according to Berman, has failed to bring about “the ‘empty political space’ in which real regime alternatives can flourish.” Berman urges that the new U.S. administration must “avoid short-term diplomatic deals” that could diminish the prospect of regime change in Iran.

Berman applauds President Bush’s January 2007 State of the Union address for broadening the focus of the war on terror. He argued that by extending the list of U.S. adversaries to include “Iranian-supported Shiite extremists in Iraq,” the president had rightly assessed that terrorism threats are beyond those posed by al-Qaida and Taliban-led Sunnis. This “wider war on terror,” Berman maintained, “requires that Washington resolutely confront the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

An aggressive public diplomacy, in Berman’s view, is an important mechanism for a resolute confrontation with Iran. In 2007 Berman edited Taking on Tehran: Strategies for Confronting the Islamic Republic, which includes a comprehensive view of the range of public diplomacy recommendations advocated by the Punitive Nonengagement policy community.

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414 Ibid.
416 Ibid.
Berman coauthored a chapter in the book with Robert A. Schadler and Bijan R. Kian specifically dealing with public diplomacy issues toward Iran. According to Berman and his co-authors, in the “struggle for hearts and minds, there is no more important battlefield than the Islamic Republic of Iran, the ideological and political epicenter of global Sh’ia Islam.”

The authors find the two main faults that inhibit the success of U.S. Persian international broadcasting to be the “MTV-ified” nature of such programming and their aim to be “balanced” “at the expense of a robust U.S. democratic message.” Referring to a 2006 report of the Defense Department’s Iran Steering Group, the authors harshly criticize the poor quality of news reporting and analysis on official U.S. broadcasting programs and their failure to provide “proper framing of issues.” The authors suggest that to bring about a successful political transformation, U.S. broadcasting should highlight the following themes:

a. American support for political opposition forces within Iran.

b. The fallacy of the Iranian government as the sole source of Islamic knowledge.

c. The corruption endemic of the country’s ruling clerical class.

d. The dangers that the Iranian government’s quest for nuclear weapons poses to its own population.

In his 2005 book on Iran, Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States, Berman maintains that buttressing the above messages with face-to-face cultural outreach programs could “loosen the ideological bonds between the Iranian people and Iran’s ayatollahs.” In this, the main constituency is said to be Iran’s youth who form a majority of the country’s population. Berman and his co-authors also find the Internet as the best and least vulnerable medium for reaching the Iranian public. They argue for the use of “advanced Internet techniques (podcasts,
email blasts, newsgroup postings and secondary distribution)” to provide an uninterrupted flow of information to Iranian activists. The authors consider the current U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran underfunded and ask for an increase in funding “to make it commensurate with the magnitude of the challenge to American interests now posed by the Iranian regime.”

Berman and colleagues also call for an increase in funding for the Iranian diaspora broadcasting into Iran. They consider the 2006 State Department $5 million funding of Iranian expatriate radio and television station not enough and believe the U.S. government “fails to appreciate the positional contribution expatriate broadcasting can make to public diplomacy toward Iran.” American officials, according to the authors, “must make it a priority to supplement existing official programming with the requisite funds to truly empower such private sector efforts.”

In his 2005 book, Berman takes specific note of the value of the Los Angeles-based National Iranian Television (NITV) and KRSI, Radio Sedaye Iran. Berman and his colleagues contend U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran should go beyond radio and television programming and include “scholarships, fellowships, speeches, artistic performances and a wide array of face-to-face meetings and exchanges, among numerous other efforts.” Such programs are significant, according to the authors, because they provide the United States with venues for “properly identifying and engaging emerging pro-democracy leaders in the region.”

In his 2005 book Berman highlights the significance of nurturing Iranian leaders as a vital part of a successful political warfare against Iran. “This promises to be a difficult undertaking.”

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424 Schadler, Kian, and Berman, "Getting Outreach Right," 37.
425 Ibid., 38.
426 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
428 Berman, Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge to the United States.
429 Schadler, Kian, and Berman, "Getting Outreach Right," 38.
430 Ibid.

94
writes Berman, “unlike the Polish opposition to the Soviet Union in its day, Iranians are still in search of their Lech Walesa – a charismatic, populist leader to serve as the public face of their resistance.”\footnote{Berman, \textit{Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States}, 140.} Among the exiled Iranian opposition, Berman entertains the possible leadership of Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah, or the Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO), an armed Iranian opposition group designated a terrorist organization by the Clinton administration in 1997. As both choices carry their “political baggage,” Berman is doubtful whether either one will garner Iranian’s support. Nevertheless, he says, “Washington now has some hard choices to make. It must either decide to harness these forces or to seek new ones.”\footnote{Ibid., 141.} Berman believes it is necessary to conduct polls of Iranians to gather more definitive information regarding viable alternatives to the current government. Meanwhile, in Berman’s view, Washington has to deal with “the discrepancy in the group’s [MKO’s] current legal status … for the MKO to assume a seat at the U.S. policy planning table.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Berman bases the above vision of public diplomacy toward Iran on their assessment of the key role of public diplomacy initiatives in winning the Cold War. Just as the United States, most notably under the Reagan administration, used public diplomacy “to pierce the Iron Curtain and export American ideals to the Soviet bloc,” Berman argues, so too can it achieve victory in its political warfare against the Islamic Republic of Iran.\footnote{Ibid., 133.} In addition to his vehement belief in the Reagan doctrine as the catalyst for changing the Iranian regime, Berman highlights the importance of the doctrine of preemption. Berman’s repeated designation of public diplomacy as political warfare and a mechanism for changing governments hostile to American national and transnational interests gives further indication of his vision of public diplomacy as one tool in the
preemption toolbox. In a 2006 testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Berman concluded with the following remarks:

...the goal of the United States should not simply be to contain and deter a nuclear Iran. It should also be to create the necessary conditions for a fundamental political transformation within its borders, through forceful public diplomacy, economic assistance to opposition elements, international pressure, and covert action.435

Table 2 presents a list of the members of the Punitive Nonengagement policy community.

Table 2. Punitive Nonengagement policy community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Current Affiliation</th>
<th>Affiliation Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 John R. Bolton</td>
<td>American Enterprise Institute</td>
<td>Former U.S.G. official</td>
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<td>2 Richard Perle</td>
<td>American Enterprise Institute</td>
<td>Former U.S.G. official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Danielle Pletka</td>
<td>American Enterprise Institute</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>4 Frederick W. Kagan</td>
<td>American Enterprise Institute</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Michael Rubin</td>
<td>American Enterprise Institute</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ilan I. Berman</td>
<td>American Foreign Policy Council</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mark Weston</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Uzi Rubin</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Retired military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Amir Taheri</td>
<td>Benador Associates</td>
<td>Author</td>
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441 Berman, "How to Think About the Iranian Bomb.", ———, "The President is Right.", ———, ed. Taking on Tehran: Strategies for Confronting the Islamic Republic, ———, "Confronting a Nuclear Iran: Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services.", ———, Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States.
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<td>10</td>
<td>Nir Boms 445</td>
<td>Center for Freedom in the Middle East</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Frank J. Gaffney 446</td>
<td>Center for Security Policy</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Norman Podhoretz 447</td>
<td>Commentary magazine</td>
<td>Columnist</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Michael A. Ledeen 448</td>
<td>Foundation for Defense of Democracies</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>Orfe F. Kittrie 449</td>
<td>Foundation for Defense of Democracies</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>Reuel Marc Gerecht 450</td>
<td>Foundation for Defense of Democracies</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Kenneth R. Timmerman 451</td>
<td>Foundation for Democracy in Iran</td>
<td>Advocacy group member</td>
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<td>Thomas G. McInerney 452</td>
<td>Fox News</td>
<td>Former U.S.G. official</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>David M. Denehy 453</td>
<td>Global Strategic Partners</td>
<td>Former U.S.G. official</td>
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<td>Ariel Cohen 454</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
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<td>James Phillips 455</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
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<td>Nile Gardiner 456</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Shayan Arya 457</td>
<td>Inst. for Monitoring Peace &amp; Cultural Tolerance</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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447 Podhoretz, "Stopping Iran: Why the Case for Military Action Still Stands."


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<th>Organization/Role</th>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Kimberly Kagan</td>
<td>Institute for the Study of War, Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Raymond Tanter</td>
<td>Iran Policy Committee, Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Ali Safavi</td>
<td>Near East Policy Research, Advocacy group member</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Daniel Gallington</td>
<td>Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Think tank fellow</td>
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<td>Louis Rene Beres</td>
<td>Purdue University, Professor</td>
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<td>James A. Lyons</td>
<td>U.S. military (retired), Retired military officer</td>
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<td>Rami Loya</td>
<td>U.S. military (retired), Retired military officer</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Gerald F. Seib</td>
<td>Wall Street Journal, Columnist</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>James G. Zumwalt</td>
<td>Washington Times, Retired military officer</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Jeffrey T. Kuhner</td>
<td>Washington Times, Columnist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Ronen Bergman</td>
<td>Yedioth Ahronoth, Columnist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this policy community, the American Enterprise Institute, Foundation for Defense of Democracy, and the Heritage Foundation are three think tanks that have been actively advocating a punitive nonengagement strategy with Iran. No affiliates of these three think tanks are part of the other three policy communities. David Denehy is also one of the prominent members of this policy community. Denehy was a Senior Advisor in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the

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457 Boms and Arya, "Iran's Blood-Drenched Mullahs." ———, "Looking for Enemies."
462 Beres and McInerney, "Target: Israel."
State Department, where he served as the Iran Freedom Agenda Coordinator from 2005 to 2007. Richard Perle, the chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee during the first George W. Bush administration, is another influential member of the Punitive Nonengagement policy community.

**Hawkish Engagement**

A third group of policy experts believe an engagement policy fortified with sharp sticks and appetizing carrots is the only viable method for dealing with Iran. The Hawkish Engagement policy community is the largest policy community in the Iran issue network, consisting of 83 individuals (46 present). The Hawkish Engagement policy community agrees with the Punitive Nonengagement policy community in that Iran’s policies and actions have been threatening American interests in the Middle East ever since the Islamic Republic’s inception in 1979 and that they pose an existential threat to Israel. Iran is deemed as United States greatest national security threat. Furthermore, Iran’s ascendance to a nuclear weapon state should be prevented.

In spite of these similarities, the Hawkish Engagement policy community does not preclude the engagement policy option. But unlike the view of the Strategic Engagement policy community, engagement is not considered to represent an umbrella strategy that could resolve America’s problems with Iran. This contrast is partly because the hawkish engagement proponents do not presume that Iran could ever be a trustworthy diplomatic partner and that its interests are always at odds with those of the United States and Israel, unless it is coerced to behave otherwise. To achieve behavior change, these policy experts propose that sharp sticks and appetizing carrots have to be administered strategically, although they may prescribe different measures of sticks or carrots. While regime change is considered a long-term strategy,
tactical engagement with Iran is deemed a necessary prerequisite to retard Iran’s nuclear capabilities in the interim.

On the public diplomacy front, they believe these efforts must continue but in a less flamboyant manner. Continued engagement with Iran, if Iran is compliant, is not seen as a lifeline for the Islamic Republic; rather, it is seen as a curse for the current Iranian government disguised as blessing that allows Iranian society to evolve due to the possibility of increased interaction with American society, in essence facilitating the realization of the long-term goal of regime change. Consequently, engagement is viewed as one of the several tactics that Washington is advised to use in concert to achieve its goal of halting Iran’s progress in its nuclear capabilities and its overall regional influence.

While the members of the Strategic Engagement policy community view the endurance of Iran through 30 years of war, isolation, and sanctions as testament to the failure of these tactics, the proponents of hawkish engagement view the failure of American policy due to a lack of an integrated approach that would make use of all of the mentioned policy options in a coordinated fashion. Moreover, Iran is seen as much more vulnerable to outside pressure compared to the view of the Strategic Engagement policy community in this regard. Here, the Hawkish Engagement group is closer to the Punitive Nonengagement group in its assessment of Iran’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities. As a result, even regime change is contemplated as a viable option, albeit in the long term.

A September 2008 report Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development, published by a task force convened by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) represents an example of a hawkish engagement strategy. BPC is a Washington-based policy group established in 2007 by former U.S. senators Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and
George Mitchell. George Mitchell was appointed as President Obama’s Special Envoy to the Middle East in January 2009. Among the task force members were Dennis Ross, the Special Advisor to Secretary of State Clinton for developing Obama administration’s Iran strategy; two former senators, Daniel Coats and Charles Robb; three retired generals; and two former assistant secretaries of Defense and State. The task force endorses an Iran policy that combines a diplomatic solution with “a comprehensive strategy involving economic, military, and informational components undertaken in conjunction with allied and regional states.”469 The report finds it unacceptable to trust Iran with a civil uranium enrichment program, even under international inspections. Nothing could provide “meaningful assurance to the international community” that Iran will not go nuclear if it is allowed to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, even under international inspections and even as part of an international consortium.470

If Iran rejects the offer to give up its uranium enrichment and support for Hamas and Hezbollah in exchange for “security assurances, lifting of economic sanctions, and the unfreezing of [its] assets,” the United States and her allies should administer a series of successive sticks, including a sanction or embargo of Iran’s energy sector and threats of force.471 The report advises that the new U.S. president create leverage for possible use of force by bolstering U.S. military presence in the Middle East, which would include “pre-positioning additional U.S. and allied forces, deploying additional aircraft carrier battle groups and minesweepers, emplacing other war material in the region, including additional missile defense batteries, upgrading both regional facilities and allied militaries, and expanding strategic partnerships with countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia in order to maintain operational


470 Ibid., iv.

471 Ibid., 55.
pressure from all directions.”\textsuperscript{472} The report assesses the presence of American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan a positive development in this regard. If United States military presence and threat of force fails to succeed as a deterrent or containment mechanism, the report suggests that the actual military attacks will be a last resort. According to the report, “The objective of any military campaign to end the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program would be either to destroy key elements of the program or to compel Tehran to dismantle these elements in a verifiable manner.”\textsuperscript{473}

It must be noted that not all members of the Hawkish Engagement policy community believe in the advisability of the use of military strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. As such, the Hawkish Engagement policy community could have been further divided into two categories: those that recommend military strikes and those that withhold such a recommendation based on pragmatic calculations. As this dissertation did not focus on the nuclear issue, the Hawkish Engagement policy community was not subdivided.

The signatories to the Bipartisan Policy Center report advise the president to implement “a concerted informational campaign” in conjunction with the above diplomatic and economic measures.\textsuperscript{474} “Investments in Radio Farda and Voice of America should be increased manifold to a level commensurate with the strategic threat which the Islamic Republic now poses,” the report recommends.\textsuperscript{475} The U.S. government should make sure its programming and message is “relevant to ordinary Iranians wishing to understand U.S. position and concerns,” the report states.\textsuperscript{476} In addition, the task force finds it “in the long term interest of the United States” to support Iranian reformists’ attempts to gain influence over Iran’s government. “The next

\textsuperscript{472} Ibid., xiii.  
\textsuperscript{473} Ibid., 74.  
\textsuperscript{474} Ibid., xiii.  
\textsuperscript{475} Ibid., xiv.  
\textsuperscript{476} Ibid.
president should recognize the importance of an independent civil society and trade union movement inside Iran and encourage their growth through any appropriate means,” the report asserts.⁴⁷⁷

With the following logic, the task force also recommends regime change: “Because nuclear knowledge cannot be reversed, should the Islamic Republic not forfeit its nuclear ambitions, the only permanent resolution may be regime change.”⁴⁷⁸ Here the underlying premise of the threat of Iran becomes evident: the knowledge of uranium enrichment. It is not the presence of an Iranian nuclear weapon program that is threatening; rather, it is the very ability to enrich uranium. Consequently, the release of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which stated with “high confidence” that Iran does not at present have a nuclear weapon program made little difference in the calculations of the hawkish engagement proponents.⁴⁷⁹ As a result, the ultimate solution is seen in transferring the control of such knowledge to a government that is more amicable to the United States and Israel.

Instigating labor unrest is recommended as the least risky of the options available for achieving regime change. Supporting exiled political groups such as the monarchists and the Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO) are not seen as a viable means for achieving regime change because “few [of these groups] can demonstrate much following inside the country.”⁴⁸⁰ The task force doubts the usefulness of MKO, which “has conducted terrorism against both Western and Iranian interests,” because it is widely hated across Iran for actively helping Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war.⁴⁸¹ Iranians look at MKO, the report says, “in the

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⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.
⁴⁷⁸ Ibid., 65.
⁴⁸⁰ Bipartisan Policy Center, Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development, 66.
⁴⁸¹ Ibid.
same way that many Americans view John Walker Lindh, the American student who joined the
Taliban to fight against his own people. While MKO is said to have provided “useful and
verified intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program,” they are not found as a reliable substitute
for Iran’s current government because their “bizarre philosophy and cultish behavior.”

Exploiting ethnic diversity as a regime change strategy is also said to be counterproductive
because Iranians have a nationalistic sense of identity despite their heterogeneous composition,
and ethnic minorities are well integrated in the ruling structure. “Khamenei [the supreme leader]
is an ethnic Azeri. Khatami, so often embraced by the West as a reformer, is half-Azeri,” the
report notes.

In short, the Hawkish Engagement policy community advocates the use of engagement
and negotiations as a necessary tactic to the successful administration of sticks and carrots for
achieving the eventual short-term goal of subverting Iran’s nuclear program and regional
influence and the long term goal of regime change in Iran. A list of the members of the Hawkish
Engagement policy community is provided in Table 3.

Table 3. Hawkish Engagement policy community

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Current Affiliation</th>
<th>Affiliation Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mani Parsi (^{485})</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Author</td>
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<td>Mark Parris (^{486})</td>
<td>Baker Donelson</td>
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<td>Steve Rademaker (^{487})</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gregory Johnson (^{488})</td>
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<td>Retired military officer</td>
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<td>Ronald Keys (^{489})</td>
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<td>R. James Woolsey (^{490})</td>
<td>Booz Allen Hamilton</td>
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\(^{482}\) Ibid.
\(^{483}\) Ibid., 67.
\(^{484}\) Ibid.
\(^{485}\) Parsi and Yetiv, "Unequal Contest: Iranian Nuclear Proliferation between Economic and Value Symmetry."
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<td>Bruce Riedel</td>
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<td>Caitlin Talmadge</td>
<td>Brookings Institution</td>
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<td>Daniel L. Byman</td>
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<td>Ivo Daalder</td>
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<td>James Roche</td>
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494 Ivo and Indyk, "A Time for Diplomatic Renewal: Toward a New U.S. Strategy in the Middle East."
496 Daalder and Gordon, "Talking to Iran Is Our Best Option."
500 Ibid.
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506 Riedel and Samore, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East."
512 Ibid.
513 Ibid.
514 Ibid.
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518 Ibid.
521 Ibid.
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528 Bipartisan Policy Center, *Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development*.
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537 Holbrooke et al., "Everyone Needs to Worry about Iran."
540 Ibid.
541 Parsi and Yetiv, "Unequal Contest: Iranian Nuclear Proliferation between Economic and Value Symmetry."
545 Ibid.
546 Ibid.
548 Ibid.
550 Oren and Robinson, "Talk Isn't Cheap with Iran."
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554 Holbrooke et al., "Everyone Needs to Worry about Iran."
555 Douglass and Hays, *A U.S. Strategy for Iran*.
Since President Barack Obama’s inauguration, seven members of the Iran issue network have taken senior level positions in the Obama administration, and all seven belong to the Hawkish Engagement policy community. They are Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; John Brennan, and Thomas Donilon, both deputies of the National Security Advisor; Susan Rice, ambassador to the United Nations; Samantha Power, Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs at the National Security Council; Michael McFaul, National Security Council’s Senior Director; and Dennis Ross, who was appointed as Special Advisor to Secretary of State Clinton for developing Obama administration’s Iran strategy.  

Ross reiterates the policy positions of the Hawkish Engagement policy community in writings of his own, which could be indicative of Obama administration’s approach to Iran. Ross believes the United States must “Talk tough with Tehran,” something the Bush administration failed to do appropriately in his belief. He states, “Iran has continued to pursue nuclear weapons because the Bush administration hasn’t applied enough pressure – or offered Iran enough rewards for reversing course.” The best way to achieve the needed pressure on Iran, according to Ross, is “to focus less on the United Nations and more on getting the Europeans, Japanese, Chinese, and Saudis to cooperate.” The main value of United States willingness to talk directly to Iran, in Ross’s view, is that U.S. partners will “feel more comfortable ratcheting up the pressure.” The ultimate aim goes beyond Iran’s readiness to forgo its uranium enrichment program and includes a change in Iran’s support for Hamas and

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569 Ross, "Iran: Talk Tough with Tehran."  
570 Ibid.  
571 Ibid.  
572 Ibid.
Hezbollah. Ross proposes that the United States enter the nuclear negotiations with Iran without Iran having to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, on the condition that the European Union agrees to “adopt more stringent sanctions on investments, credits, and technology transfer vis-à-vis Iran in general or at least on the Iranian energy sector.”

This move is necessary, “to avoid misleading the Iranians into thinking they had won,” Ross writes. “The price for our doing this [i.e., talking directly with Iran] would not be with Iran but with Europe.”

Before joining the Obama administration, Ross was the chairman of the Jerusalem-based Jewish People Policy Planning Institute. Ross and Richard Holbrooke also co-founded the American Coalition against Nuclear Iran (ACANI) in September 2008. According to its web site, ACANI aims to “prevent Iran from fulfilling its ambition to become a regional super-power possessing nuclear weapons.” In February 2009 ACANI announced the start of “Iran Business Registry” (IBR) as part of its web site, in which ACANI compiles a list of those countries and corporations that have dealings with the Iranian economy. IBR is an effort to “educate” investors and policymakers because Iran is said to be “uniquely susceptible to financial pressure.” In a full page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal on February 19, 2009, ACANI asked the readers to join the cause against a nuclear Iran by stopping to do business with companies that have economic dealings with Iran.

Among other prominent members of the Hawkish Engagement policy community are Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor under President Clinton; R. James Woolsey, the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency in the first Clinton administration; and Martin

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574 Ibid.
576 American Coalition Against Nuclear Iran, "About Us," http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/about.
Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel. Indyk is currently the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Seven out of eight Brookings Institution affiliates who are members of the Iran issue network promote a hawkish engagement strategy, with the last one (Suzanne Maloney) advocating strategic engagement. The same is true with the RAND Corporation, with five members in the Hawkish Engagement policy community and one member (James Dobbins) in the Strategic Engagement policy community. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) is another think tank that is a strong advocate of a hawkish engagement approach, with all of its six affiliates being part of this policy community. Dennis Ross was also a WINEP counselor and distinguished fellow before joining the Obama administration.

**Fundamental Change in U.S. Foreign Policy**

Members of the Iran issue network that advocate fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy find the underlying assumptions of U.S. Iran policy vitally flawed. These experts argue that Iran has never militarily threatened the United States or Israel and that it is not in violation of any international law. They further argue that U.S. allegations that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, supporting terrorism, and helping the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have not been substantiated with evidence. The United States and Israel, on the other hand, repeatedly threaten to use military force against Iran. Proponents of fundamental change maintain that the underlying aim of existing U.S. Iran policy has been and continues to be the prevention of Iran’s ascendance to a regional power and the preservation of U.S. hegemony in the region. This group believes that a legitimate United States Iran policy requires a fundamental change in the overall objectives of U.S. foreign policy and United States behavior. Unlike the Strategic Engagement policy community, the members of the Fundamental Change policy community do not propose a
change in the course of U.S. Iran policy due to pragmatic reasons; rather, they make the case for such redirection based on legal and moral grounds.

This policy community’s specific policy positions and recommendations could be gleaned from a 2008 report published by the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies entitled *Iran in the Crosshairs: How to Prevent Washington’s Next War.* Contrary to the position of the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities, Phyllis Bennis, the author of the report, lays out her arguments as to why Iran is not a threat to international peace. Bennis assertively states that “Iran does not and has never had a nuclear weapon – and no one, not even the Bush administration, claims they have.” She further asserts, the United Nation’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agrees that there is no evidence Iran has ever had a military program to build an atomic bomb. Moreover, she maintains, as a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “Iran has a legal right to produce and use nuclear power for peaceful purposes.” Thus, asking Iran to forgo uranium enrichment for fueling its civil nuclear program is to prohibit it from “exercising that internationally-guaranteed right.” With these premises, Bennis maintains, “The U.S.-orchestrated decision of the U.N. Security Council to strip Iran of that right and impose sanctions if Iran continued to exercise its NPT rights, has no grounding in international law; it is based solely on the U.S. claim that it doesn’t trust Iran.”

The author further asserts that it is not Iran that is “fomenting a nuclear arm race in the Middle East;” rather, it is Israel that is doing so. Also, contrary to the U.S. position, it is

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580 Ibid., 7.
581 Ibid., 8.
582 Ibid.
583 Ibid., 44.
584 Ibid., 14.
Washington that is in violation of its international obligations under the NPT, not Iran. Bennis notes that under Article VI of the NPT, the United States and the other nuclear weapons powers are obligated to move in good faith towards complete nuclear disarmament. The United States is also in violation of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice that, as quoted in the report, “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”

“What about Iran’s support for terrorism?” Bennis asks. While criticizing the U.S. government for failing to support this perpetuated argument with substantiated evidence, the author of the IPS report notes that Hamas and Hezbollah are “both important political parties that have been elected to majority and near-majority positions in the Palestinian and Lebanese parliaments.” Furthermore, they emphasize, the activities of these political parties are not merely militaristic; rather, they “provide important networks of social services, from clinics and hospitals to schools, daycare centers, food assistance, and financial aid, to the most impoverished, disempowered, and (in the case of the Hamas in Gaza) imprisoned populations of Lebanese and Palestinians.” Bennis also finds the allegation that Iran is instigating unrest in Iraq and Afghanistan as unsubstantiated. These allegations, the author argues, do not justify an attack on Iran.

“Is Iran a threat to Israel?” The author of the report thinks otherwise. It is Israel that has repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the United States fails to do so. These threats have come directly from Israeli officials who have control of Israel’s military and whose track record shows that these threats are real. Bennis stresses that Iran’s president does not control the country’s

585 Ibid., 16.
586 Ibid., 11.
587 Ibid.
military and that his comments regarding “wiping Israel off the map” have been taken out of context. Juan Cole, a professor of Middle East history at the University of Michigan with near native Farsi speaking ability – who is in the Strategic Engagement policy community – agrees. He told the New York Times, as quoted by Bennis, “Ahmadinejad did not say he was going to wipe Israel off the map because no such idiom exists in Persian. He did say he hoped its regime, i.e., a Jewish-Zionist state occupying Jerusalem would collapse.” Like the Strategic Engagement policy community position, Bennis asserts Iran has not declared its intention to attack Israel.

So why is Iran perceived to be such a fundamental threat to the United States and Israel? Bennis believes it is because “Iran is one of only two countries [the other being Iraq] in the Middle East with all the prerequisites to become an indigenous regional power: water, oil, and size.” To insure that Iran does not become a regional power, successive U.S. administrations have attempted to either “buy its allegiance, insure its weakness, or destroy its capacity.”

What Iran has done, according to Bennis, is “to threaten its [U.S.] control of Iran’s oil and its strategic neighborhood,” first through its 1951 oil nationalization and then through its 1979 revolution that ousted the Shah who was the de-facto United States gendarme in the region.

Despite Iran’s many grievances against the United States (i.e., the 1953 CIA coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddeq, American support for the Shah’s dictatorship, its backing of Saddam Hussein in Iraq’s war against Iran, American aid for the Iranian terrorist militant group MKO, funding Iranian opposition groups for regime change, and years of sanctions and threats of military attack), Bennis believes diplomacy is possible between the United States and Iran. She makes this assessment based on Iran’s constructive role in assisting the United States and other western countries in stabilizing Afghanistan. As James Dobbins, President George W.

588 Ibid., 23.
589 Ibid.
590 Ibid.
Bush’s first envoy to Afghanistan, as quoted by Bennis, said, “perhaps the most constructive
period of U.S.-Iranian diplomacy since the fall of the Shah of Iran took place in the months after
the 2001 terrorist attacks.” Notably, James Dobbins is among the Strategic Engagement
policy community who has a positive view of the prospects of U.S.-Iran relations.

According to Bennis, the potential of normalized relations between the United States and
Iran could only be realized if America recognizes that “negotiations and diplomacy, not crippling
sanctions, military threats, or military attacks, must be the basis of the U.S. posture towards
Iran.” She also believes that, as a first step to ease the nuclear dispute, the United States must
recognize and implement its obligations under the NPT. The U.S. must also recognize that it
does not have the jurisdiction to dictate to Iran about its nuclear program. Rather such
jurisdiction lies exclusively with the United Nation and the IAEA. Successful negotiations
require a recognition of Iran’s demands for “a security guarantee (guaranteeing no invasion, no
attack on nuclear facilities, and no efforts at ‘regime change’), recognition of Iran’s role as an
indigenous regional power, and reaffirmation of Iran’s rights under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.” Once again, Bennis’ assessment of what Iran wants is similar to the assessment of
the Strategic Engagement policy community. While the Fundamental Change policy community
makes this recommendation because it finds it the only legal and moral alternative, the same
recommendation is advanced by the Strategic Engagement policy community for its pragmatic
value. This assessment is, of course, a complete departure from the demeaning stick and/or
carrot approach of the other two policy communities.

Bennis makes a final recommendation that underscores one of the fundamental
differences between this policy community and the previous three policy communities:

591 Ibid., 33.
592 Ibid., 34.
593 Ibid.
Washington should stop using the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” as an instrument to gain regional support for its position in the U.S.-Iran crisis, as it did at the Annapolis conference in December 2007. Instead, it should change its Middle East policy from its current uncritical political, military, economic, and diplomatic support for Israeli occupation and discriminatory policies, to a policy aimed at establishing a just and comprehensive peace based on human rights, international law, equality, and UN resolutions.594

From the above positions, it is evident that the Fundamental Change policy community opposes public diplomacy efforts that are aimed at regime change or the destabilization of the Iranian government. In addition to this general public diplomacy stance, Bennis proposes the need for “broadened participation in people-to-people delegations to Iran,” which denotes a genuine interaction between the Iranian and United States societies.595 This recommendation hints at the need for moving beyond the people-to-people exchanges that are strictly controlled by the U.S. government. Table 4 gives a list of the members of Fundamental Change policy community.

Table 4. Fundamental Change policy community

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Current Affiliation</th>
<th>Affiliation Category</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hannes Artens596</td>
<td>Author</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jonathan Cook597</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Author</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sasan Fayazmanesh598</td>
<td>California State University, Fresno</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ervand Abrahamian599</td>
<td>City University of New York - Baruch College</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Akan Malici600</td>
<td>Furman University</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dedrick Muhammad601</td>
<td>Institute for Policy Studies</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Farrah Hassen602</td>
<td>Institute for Policy Studies</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
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594 Ibid.
595 Ibid., 36.
601 Dedrick Muhammad and Farrah Hassen, Christians United for Israel and Attacking Iran (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, 2008).
Table 4 continued

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<th>Think tank fellow</th>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Phyllis Bennis&lt;sup&gt;603&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Institute for Policy Studies</td>
<td>Think tank fellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tom O'Donnell&lt;sup&gt;604&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>The New School</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Stephen Zunes&lt;sup&gt;605&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>University of San Francisco</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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Institute for Policy Studies is the only major think tank that advocates an Iran policy incorporating fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy. IPS was founded in 1963 by two resigning Kennedy administration officials (White House staffer Marcus Raskin and State Department lawyer Richard Barnett) and began as an organization for the anti-Vietnam War movement. IPS has continued to oppose America’s successive military interventions, including the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars.

As Figure 3 shows, the Iran issue network is composed of 75 think tank fellows, 32 former U.S. government officials, 30 professors, 12 columnists, ten retired military officials, seven Obama administration officials, five authors, five NGO officials, three advocacy group members, and three military officers.

The Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities were dominated by the think tank fellow affiliation category, with 16 out of 33 and 38 out of 83 members respectively. Of the 56 members of the Strategic Engagement policy community, 18 were affiliated with a think tank and another 18 were professors. In the Fundamental Change policy community, the professor affiliation category had the highest number with 5 members.

Figure 4 gives a breakdown of the four policy communities based on the four affiliation categories with the highest number of issue network members.

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<sup>603</sup> Ibid, Bennis, *Iran in the Crosshairs: How to Prevent Washington's Next War*.


Figure 3. Number of issue network members in each affiliation category

Figure 4. Breakdown of policy communities by affiliation category
Think tank fellows mostly advocated a hawkish engagement strategy (38 individuals), followed by strategic engagement (18 individuals) and punitive nonengagement (16 individuals). The same applied for former U.S. government officials, of whom 19 promoted a hawkish engagement strategy, with the rest advocating strategic engagement (9 individuals) or punitive nonengagement (4 individuals). No former government official was among the Fundamental Change policy community. Most professors advocated a strategic engagement approach (18 individuals), followed by hawkish engagement (6 individuals) and fundamental change (5 individuals). The figures 2-4 of this study were generated by the NVivo software.

Policy Communities and the Question of Symmetry

Based on the policy recommendations of the four policy communities, it appears that symmetrical public diplomacy would only be realized under the foreign policy frameworks set out by the Strategic Engagement and Fundamental Change policy communities. Figure 5 places the four policy communities on the professional public relations continuum.

As mentioned in the theory chapter, symmetry requires an organization to actively engage with its environment, as in an open system, and to be receptive to both symbolic and behavioral changes while at the same time aiming to change the attitude and behavior of its stakeholders.\(^{606}\) The two-way symmetrical public relations approach plays a central role in raising an organization’s effectiveness in this regard.\(^{607}\) The two-way asymmetrical model of public relations, on the other hand, is defined by the practice of using social science and two-way

\[^{606}\text{Grunig and Huang, "From Organizational Effectiveness to Relationship Indicators: Antecedents of Relationships, Public Relationships Strategies and Relationship Outcomes."}\]

\[^{607}\text{Grunig, Grunig, and Dozier, Excellent Public Relations and Effective Organizations: A Study of Communication Management in Three Countries.}\]
communication for the sole purpose of bringing about change in the target population.

Organizations using such measures resist calls for change in the organization itself.

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**Craft Public Relations**

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<th>Press Agentry</th>
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**Professional Public Relations**

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<th>Two-way Asymmetrical</th>
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<tr>
<td>Punitive Nonengagement</td>
<td>Hawkish Engagement</td>
<td>Strategic Engagement</td>
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(Excellent public relations)

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**Figure 5. Iran policy communities placed on the professional public relations continuum.**

Given the centrality of negotiations, dialogue, mutual respect, and change of behavior on both sides, the Strategic Engagement policy community envisions in its policy recommendations a symmetrical relationship between Iran and the United States. The public diplomacy recommendations of the Strategic Engagement policy community show that the anticipated aim of such endeavors is conflict resolution rather than linear influence. This public diplomacy approach is in line with the two-way symmetrical model. Similarly, the Fundamental Change policy community views the only solution to the problematic relationship between the United States and Iran in structural behavioral changes in U.S. policy toward Iran. Again such a proposition embodies a symmetrical relationship, which in this case is closer to the pure symmetry end of the continuum compared with the Strategic Engagement policy community.

While the Fundamental Change policy community advocates symmetry in America’s relationship with Iran on ethical and legal grounds, the Strategic Engagement policy community does so because it sees a symmetrical relationship between the United States and Iran as the most
effective alternative in resolving United States’ challenges in the region. These two positions together are congruent with the findings of James Grunig and colleagues who argue that two-way symmetrical public relations practices are the most ethical and the most effective communication means for an organization to reach its goals. ⁶⁰⁸ When organizations display a willingness to change their behavior, their stakeholders more readily accept to compromise.

The foreign policy approaches of the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities stand in sharp contrast to those of the Strategic Engagement and Fundamental Change policy communities and exemplify an asymmetrical relationship between the United States and Iran. Here, Iran is deemed an arch enemy of the United States who poses an existential threat to the United States and Israel. Thus, harmonizing of interests between the United States and Iran and U.S. openness to change to achieve such harmony are nonissues. Evidently, the public diplomacy recommendations of these policy communities are in conflict with a symmetrical perspective. Nonetheless, the Punitive Nonengagement policy community comes closer to the pure asymmetry end of the continuum as its members perceive punitive measures to be the only acceptable options when dealing with Iran. Moreover, their benchmark of success is regime change regardless of Iran’s change of behavior. The Hawkish Engagement policy community, however, is ready to give some limited incentives to Iran for the country to change its policies. This short term goal, however, does not preclude necessary actions to bring down Tehran’s government in the long run. Given this mentality, the purpose of communication in both the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities is to achieve the desired effect in the Iranian society only. Therefore, it is expected that public diplomacy under a hawkish engagement approach would resemble the two-way

⁶⁰⁸ Grunig and Grunig, "Models of Public Relations and Communication."
asymmetrical public relations model. This discussion will be picked up in the conclusion chapter.

The above examination of the Iran issue network provides a unique contribution to a more nuanced understanding of the range of policy options being debated regarding the future of U.S.-Iran relations. The proposed typology in this dissertation is the first of its kind and could serve as a foundation for future research. Using the policy communities furnished here, other studies could do a concentrated analysis of the views of the more prominent members of each policy community paying closer attention to the networks that bind them together. Such network analyses could focus on the members’ shared organizational affiliations beyond their primary affiliation noted here, their prior government service, members’ co-authorship of articles, and citation analysis. Future examination of the funding sources of those think tanks that are most active in the Iran issue network may also prove beneficial. The role of lobbying groups, especially the Israel lobby, in the promotion of certain think tanks and policy positions must also be investigated. A review of the Foreign Agents Registration data could be useful in this regard.
6. STRUCTURE OF U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARD IRAN

This chapter aims to address the study’s fifth and sixth research questions about United States public diplomacy toward Iran and the policy communities whose views correlated with these policies. Specifically, the research questions asked the following. What are the policies that the various offices within the U.S. government have formulated with regard to its public diplomacy towards Iran, and which of these have been implemented? What role do non-state actors play in advancing these policies? And which policy communities from the Iran issue network correlate with the various components of the U.S. government in their policy preferences?

To fully grasp the current structure of U.S. public diplomacy, it is worthwhile to trace the development of its components. A little more than four months after its establishment, in December of 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) issued a directive, NSC 4, titled the “Coordination of Foreign Information Measures,” that became the bedrock for an intertwined official/private and overt/covert system of political warfare.609 The directive vested the Secretary of State with the authority to formulate policies and coordinate the implementation of all foreign information measures.610 NSC 4-A, part of the same directive, made the CIA responsible for conducting necessary covert psychological warfare activities, noting that “in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations.”611 With the passage of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, in 1948, the mandates of the above directive achieved legislative backing. In 1983, Congress

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610 Ibid.
founded the National Endowment for Democracy (Public Law 98-164) to take over some of the covert activities that were carried out by CIA in the previous decades. American public diplomacy is carried through the totality of the above-mentioned overt measures of information programs (i.e. sponsored international broadcasting, cultural and educational exchanges, etc.), covert CIA-directed psychological operations, and works of government-funded nominally-independent organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy.

An examination of the public diplomacy assets available to the U.S. government reveals the following elements:

- International broadcasting, which includes Voice of America, Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Middle East Broadcasting Network;
- State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Affairs (DRL);
- State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs;
- National Endowment for Democracy and the family of institutes affiliated with NED, namely the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, International Republican Institute, the Center for International Private Enterprise, and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity;
- The many non-profit organizations that receive government grants through USAID to concentrate on democracy promotion, such as the Freedom House;
- The Defense Department functions;
- The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, as the carrier of covert psychological operations.

As information on CIA and Defense Department activities involving Iran are not normally disclosed, they are out of the bounds of this dissertation. Hence, State Department public diplomacy activities, the activities of the National Endowment for Democracy, and international broadcasting serve as the focus of this study. Also, the study aims to identify the non-state actors (e.g. NGOs) that contribute to Iran-focused public diplomacy activities as

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grantees of the U.S. government. What follows is a discussion of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran.

**Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s February 2006 Initiative**

In its last two years in office, the Bush administration greatly augmented State Department’s infrastructure and funding for destabilizing Iran’s political system, to achieve the policy objective of regime change. This move was set in motion with former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s February 15, 2006, request for an additional $75 million for the State Department’s Iran democracy promotion activities and the subsequent establishment of the Office of Iran Affairs. In addition, the State Department established Iran monitoring positions in cities with large Iranian expatriate populations, namely in Dubai, Baku, Istanbul, Frankfurt, and London. Among their responsibilities were reporting on Iran-related political and economic developments through their engagement with the regions’ Iranian populations and increased public diplomacy outreach to Iranians. With these moves, the Bush administration attempted to restore State Department capabilities of dealing with Iran, resources that have been much limited compared to those available prior to the 1979 severing of Iranian-American diplomatic ties.

U.S. support for regime change in Iran is not a new phenomenon. In 1996, for example, former House speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) called on the CIA “to force the replacement of the current regime in Iran,” for which he proposed an $18 million package of funding.

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615 Tim Weiner, "U.S. Plan to Change Iran Leaders is an Open Secret before it Begins," *New York Times*, January 26, 1996,
regime change agenda got renewed life with expanded funding and allocation of resources in the Bush administration. In the period between 2006 to 2009 alone, Congress appropriated more than $200 million for Iran regime change purposes, which is in addition to the reported $400 million of funding under a presidential finding for covert operations to destabilize Iran’s government.

On June 13, 2006, a conference agreement reconciled differences between supplemental House and Senate spending measures and appropriated $66.1 million for Iran democracy promotion programs, $9 million less than the amount Secretary Rice had requested. The supplemental funding was to be used over the course of the next two years. Appropriations funded $20 million ($5 million above request) for democracy programs in Iran administered through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and in consultation with the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Congress fully approved $5 million requested for internet and other interactive programming administered through the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), and another $5 million requested for education and cultural exchanges administered through the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). President Bush signed the bill, the Iran Freedom Support Act, on September 30, 2006.

Middle East Partnership Initiative, established by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell in December 2002, supports Middle Eastern reformers “to create educational opportunity at a grassroots level, promote economic opportunity and help foster private sector development, and


to strengthen civil society and the rule of law throughout the region.” MEPI is managed by the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Bureau of International Information Programs’ initiatives include print and electronic publications as well as screening and planning traveling and electronically transmitted speaker programs. IIP also manages State Department’s America.gov website, which has a Farsi section. IIP’s Digital Outreach Team participates in Farsi discussion forums to advocate U.S. policy. According to its website, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is “including Iranians in a broad range of traditional educational, professional, and cultural exchange programs for the first time since 1979.” ECA programs include scholarships for student exchange and leadership programs for target countries’ elite. Among its Iran activities, ECA has planned and administered sport exchanges with Iran as part of its sport diplomacy program. IIP and ECA, formerly part of the United States Information Agency, were integrated into the State Department in 1999.

In her February 15, 2006 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Rice said that her request for increased funding was indicative of “a new effort to support the aspirations of the Iranian people.” She said that the extra $75 million public diplomacy funding, which was in addition to the $10 million that Congress had already approved, would be used in part “to develop support networks for Iranian reformers, political dissidents, and human rights activists.” Rice said the Treasury Department would lift U.S. restrictions to allow U.S. funding of American NGOs who have dealings with Iranian trade unions, political dissidents, and nongovernmental organizations. Rice also tangentially

620 ———, "Bureau of International Information Programs," http://www.state.gov/r/iip/.
622 Ibid.
624 Ibid.
mentioned her new plans for transforming the State Department workforce to better accommodate the new Iran policy.

The increased attention to Iran democracy promotion came in the context of the Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2005, which appropriated $10 million and directed the President of the United States to use these funds to help groups opposing the Iranian government.625 President Bush praised the congressional move as a first step to promote Iran’s opposition groups to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Also, the reallocation of resources to tackle Iran policy came as part of Secretary Rice’s vision for transformational diplomacy, which is defined in her words as the “effort to use our diplomacy literally to change the world.”626

Following Secretary Rice’s testimony, at a press briefing on the new Iran initiative, an unnamed senior State Department official said that the increased funding is just “a down payment” for efforts to come.627 This new effort, according to the State Department official, was to highlight United States’ concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, its support for terrorist organizations, and its democracy deficit. She acknowledged that there are restraints on what the United States can do in Iran given the lack of U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations, but added, “What we can do is show support for those in Iranian society ... who wish to see a different type of Iran, who wish to see further democracy and freedoms both for the press as well as for political figures and individual citizens.”628

Another unnamed senior State Department official at the same briefing said the United States will capitalize on many of the programs that are already in place in support of Iranian

628 Ibid.
labor unions, dissidents, and human rights activists. The official said civil society organization is the key to bringing about positive change in Iran. The State Department official, however, dismissed the idea of working with existing non-governmental organizations in Iran because, as she said, they all have been penetrated by the Iranian government agents. “The challenge is to help to organize other networks and help to take some of the extremely brave people who are risking their lives to speak out against the regime,” the official said.629 For now, the official said, the State Department will work through the intermediary of American and international NGOs until it can help organize other networks free of the Iranian government infiltration.

One such organization is the New Haven-based Griffin Center for Health and Human Rights, which received a grant of $1.6 million of the $3.5 million the U.S. government spent on democracy promotion in 2004 to start the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center. Among its activities, the center held a human rights workshop in Dubai for Iranian dissidents. According to a New York Times Magazine report, Emadeddin Baghi, an Iranian dissident, sent some of his family members to attend the workshops under the impression that the project was a U.N.-sponsored event.630 Upon arrival, Baghi said, the participants found themselves in a crash course on successful popular revolts. Several members of Otpor – the Serbian youth movement instrumental in ousting Slobodan Milosevic – were present, and “portions of ‘A Force More Powerful,’ a three-hour documentary series featuring civil-resistance movements overcoming authoritarian rule around the world, was also screened.”631 Participants were trained on how to use Hushmail (an encrypted e-mail account) and Martus (a secure open-source software) to

629 Ibid.
631 Ibid.
effectively and securely transfer information about human rights abuses. Participants were given the software to take back to Iran.

These activities have not gone unnoticed to Iranian authorities. “American officials have been inviting Iranian figures to so-called academic seminars over the past few years,” said former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations Javad Zarif. “However, when the Iranians attend these sessions, they realize they have gathered to discuss measures to topple the Iranian government.”  

Ramin Ahmadi, the Iranian-American founder of the Griffin Center and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, has new plans to translate “a sort of activist computer game developed by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict” into Farsi. Players could use the game to construct certain scenarios to play in, “like women rising up against a clerical regime.” Ahmadi plans to smuggle the games into Iran to be mass copied. He believes, “There will be 20,000 copies on the street in one week.”

According to a State Department fact sheet released on February 15, 2006, the $15 million (increased to $20 million by Congress) was designated to “foster participation in the political process and support efforts to expand internet access as a tool for civic organization.” The funding was to be spent with the help of “organizations such as the International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute and National Endowment for Democracy.”

Shortly after the supplemental budget request for Iran, the Office of Middle East Partnership Initiative announced “an open competition for grant applications that support

633 Azimi, "Hard Realities of Soft Power."
634 Ibid.
636 Ibid.
democratic governance and reform in Iran.” Applicants were asked to outline their proposed activities and demonstrate how their proposed program would “achieve sustainable impact in Iran.” Awards were said to range from $100,000 to $1 million for up to two years, with the possibility of an additional year of funding for projects that demonstrate results. According to a March 3, 2006 Congressional Research Service report, the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, which works with MEPI on grant awards, selects grantees that further the priority areas of “political party development, media development, labor rights, civil society promotion, and promotion of respect for human rights.”

NGOs with Iran-focused initiatives can also receive grants through the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) democracy promotion programs. USAID’s total “democracy and governance” grants for FY 2007 and FY 2008 amounted to about $12.7 and $14.0 million, respectively.

Specific information on Iran expenditures is not provided. USAID, however, gives the following criteria for potential Iran-focused grantees:

Applications should advance one or more of the following objectives: strengthening civil society organization and advocacy; increasing awareness of and strengthening the rule of law; and expanding freedom of information. USAID intends to make several awards under this APS for a total of up to $20 million. Applicants can request $100,000 to $3,000,000 for expenditure for a maximum of two years.

638 Ibid.
The USAID application instructions indicate, “Programs that have a strong academic or research focus will not be considered.” Also, programs that aim to support or advance the agenda of specific Iranian political parties do not meet the requirements for a USAID grant.

**Office of Iranian Affairs**

With the establishment of the Office of Iranian Affairs (OIA), the Bush administration institutionalized its moves to bolster opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran. On March 3, 2006, State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli announced that the State Department was to set up the Office of Iranian Affairs to supervise and administer the expenditure of funds associated with Secretary Rice’s February 15 Iran initiative, to augment Department of State public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population, and to monitor Iran issues. OIA which was created within State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs was supported by a team of Washington-based and regional Foreign Service officers. According to Ereli, of the new posts, one was located in the State Department’s Department of Human Rights and Labor, and eight were field positions based in regions with significant Iranian populations: Dubai, London, Frankfort, Baku and Istanbul.

Explaining the logic for creating these posts, Ereli said, “Iran is and is going to continue to be a very important country. We need to develop a cadre of foreign service officers who speak Farsi, who understand the region, not just Iran but the region where Iran has influence and reach.”

In a hearing on “United States Policy toward Iran” before the House Committee on International Relations, former State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas

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642———, *The USAID/Washington/Middle East Bureau 2008 Annual Program Statement (APS).*
644Ibid.
Burns described the creation of the new American presence posts in American embassies and consulates outside of Iran in the context of the Riga station that was set up in the 1920s to watch Russia in the absence of an American embassy there. “We sent young diplomats like George Kennan to Riga, and we created Riga Station. That station watched the Soviet Union from a close distance,” Burns said. The new posts were in essence American stations to watch Iran. Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, voiced his criticism of the State Department’s new approach saying, as quoted in London’s Financial Times, “Dubai is crawling with Iranian intelligence. Every Gucci wearing Iranian exile without a day job is for democracy now.”

In a May 19, 2006, article, Laura Rozen of the Los Angeles Times described the new Iranian office in the context of the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans. Rozen wrote that OIA will work in conjunction with a newly created “Iranian directorate” at the Pentagon, “set up inside its policy shop, which previously housed the Office of Special Plans. The controversial intelligence analysis unit, established before the Iraq War, championed some of the claims of Ahmad Chalabi.” Among those staffing or advising the new Pentagon Iran directorate, according to Rozen, are “three veterans of the Office of Special Plans: Abram Shulsky, its former director; John Triglio, a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst; and Ladan Archin, an Iran specialist.”

According to the New Yorker magazine, the outlines of the $85 million Iran Freedom Agenda had been developed by Elizabeth Cheney, the Vice-President’s daughter who was the

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648 Ibid.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Cheney had been assisted by J. Scott Carpenter and David Denehy, two Near Eastern Affairs officials who had both worked in the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Elizabeth Cheney became the head of the Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group (ISOG), which was established in March 2006 as part of the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. The unit was dismantled in late May 2007 as it was increasingly seen as a regime change operation group similar to the special committee group in the run up to the Iraq war.

The dismantlement coincided with a May 22 ABC News report that President Bush had given the CIA permission to subvert Iran’s government with a “coordinated campaign of propaganda, disinformation, and manipulation of Iran’s currency and international financial transactions.” ABC reported that Deputy National Security Adviser Elliot Abrams, who co-chaired the disbanded ISOG, spearheaded the covert action. Abrams’ involvement in the Reagan administration’s regime change operations against the Nicaraguan Sandinista government led to criminal charges in 1990. He was pardoned by President George H. W. Bush in late 1992 after pleading guilty in October 1991 to “two misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress.” Seymour Hersh of The New Yorker magazine also reported in 2008 that Congress had agreed in late 2007 to President Bush’s request for $400 million to fund the CIA covert action in Iran.

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649 Connie Bruck, “Exiles: How Iran’s Expatriates are Gaming the Nuclear Threat,” The New Yorker 82, no. 3 (2006), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/03/06/060306fa_fact_bruck.
652 Ibid.
653 Hersh, "Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration Steps up its Secret Moves against Iran."
In press reports following the creation of the Office of Iranian Affairs, David Denehy was often referred to as the head of the office. In an article he wrote for the *Journal of International Security Affairs* Denehy is introduced as “a Senior Advisor in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs of the United States Department of State, where he served as the Iran Freedom Agenda Coordinator (2005-2007).”\(^{654}\) According to a June 24, 2007, article by Negar Azimi in the *New York Times Magazine*, Denehy was “a veteran of democracy promotion programs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia with the International Republican Institute [an arm of the congressionally-funded National Endowment for Democracy] and a close associate of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz during the Iraq War, [where] he served in Baghdad from June to October 2003.”\(^{655}\) Denehy resigned from his position at the Department of State on October 26, 2007.

David Denehy’s *Journal of International Security Affairs* article entitled “The Iranian Democracy Imperative” leaves no doubt of the regime change motive. After outlining the existential threat Iran’s government poses for the United States, Denehy argues that the only respite is “revolution, not evolution.”\(^{656}\) “The answer to the question of how to curb Iran’s international misbehavior is fundamentally simple,” wrote Denehy, “change the nature of the relationship between the people of Iran and their leaders.”\(^{657}\)

Denehy believes many indicators necessary for revolution are present in Iranian society: half of the population is under 24 with little or no emotional tie to the 1979 revolution; Iran has a highly educated population; and there is high potential for dissent. Denehy believes that the United States should provide “a broad spectrum of moral, technical, and financial assistance” to

\(^{654}\) Denehy, "The Iranian Democracy Imperative."

\(^{655}\) Azimi, "Hard Realities of Soft Power."

\(^{656}\) Denehy, "The Iranian Democracy Imperative."

\(^{657}\) Ibid.
lift the revolution project from the ground. An important element, according to Denehy, is the engagement of Iranian diaspora who could then take the freedom agenda inside Iran. Engaging the Iranian diaspora with the freedom agenda was clearly an important factor in the decision to create several State Department presence posts in countries with large Iranian populations (in Dubai and Europe). These posts in essence were to operate as shadow embassies, a topic picked up in the coming section.

Richard Haass, former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s policy-planning director and now president of the Council on Foreign Relations, expressed concern that the State Department’s new Iran initiative reveals a growing contradiction in the Bush administration’s Iran policy. Haass, who was quoted in the *Los Angeles Times*, said, “We are telling Iran, ‘We want regime change, but while you’re still here, we’d like to negotiate with you to stop your nuclear program.” Haass recalls his days at the State Department, as quoted in *The New Yorker* magazine:

I was in one camp, and the Vice-President’s office and the O.S.D. “-the Office of the Secretary of Defense-” in the other. There were two very different schools of thought. One, that the U.S. ought to ‘engage’ Iran, offer the Iranians as much of a dialogue as they were prepared to have, to extend these concrete and political benefits, but only if we get what we want. The problem is that a lot of people in the government have been wedded to the idea of “regime change.” They thought the regime was vulnerable, and engagement would throw the Iranians a lifeline. I believed then and I believe now that they are dead wrong. History shows that the U.S. and Iran can do some business.

Rice’s initiative was received with skepticism among some Iran specialists as they believed the initiative could be seen as U.S. meddling in Iran’s internal affairs, which could inflame nationalist fervor among Iranians and strengthen public support of Iran’s nuclear program. Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was among this

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658 Ibid.
659 Rozen, "U.S. Moves to Weaken Iran."
660 Bruck, "Exiles: How Iran’s Expatriates are Gaming the Nuclear Threat."
group of specialists as he told the *Boston Globe*, “I don’t think it will help democracy, and I don’t think it will solve the Iran issue.”

On March 13, 2006, ten days after the announcement about the creation of the new Office of Iranian Affairs, Iran allocated $15 million to “probe and defuse” American conspiracies and interventions in the country, Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported. On the same day Iran’s foreign ministry again objected to Washington’s plan to spend $75 million in the Islamic Republic as an “intervention move,” the IRNA reported. A U.S. allocation of funds for pro-democracy activities in Iran is a “blatant violation of Washington’s commitments under the Algeria Declaration, by intervention into Iran’s internal affairs,” the ministry said in a letter to the U.S. Interest Section at the Swiss embassy in Tehran. “Based on the Algeria Declaration, Iran reserves the right to refer the U.S. violation of its commitments to legal and political actions,” the foreign ministry said. Under the Algeria Declaration, also known as the Algiers Accord, of January 19, 1981, the United States pledged not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs. “The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs,” reads Point 1 of the Accords.

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662 U.S. Department of State, *State Department Background Briefing with Two Senior Administration Officials*.
664 U.S. Department of State, *State Department Background Briefing with Two Senior Administration Officials*.
665 Ibid.
667 Ibid., 352.
Shadow Embassies

According to a March 6, 2006, unclassified State Department cable, which was posted online by the Center for American Progress Action Fund, a Washington-based think tank, the Office of Iranian Affairs is part of an:

initiative [that] will enhance our capacity to respond to the full spectrum of threats Iran poses, to reach out to the Iranian people to support their desire for freedom and democracy, over the long-term, reestablish a cadre of Iran experts within the Foreign Service. Additionally, these new positions are part of the Global Diplomatic Repositioning Strategy to support transformational diplomacy and the President’s Freedom Agenda.668

The cable announced “the establishment of three new, Iran-focused initiatives” in Dubai, Europe, and Washington. With the establishment of a Dubai-based central Iran-focused Regional Presence Post and four dedicated reporting positions in American embassies in Baku, Istanbul, Frankfurt, and London, the State Department aimed to enhance its political/economic reporting on Iran and direct public diplomacy outreach to Iranians. Reflecting on Burn’s statement that the new Iran initiative is a sort of throwback to Cold War-era Soviet monitoring efforts, the cable states that the Dubai Regional Presence Post, in particular, is modeled on Riga.669

Capitalizing on “its proximity to Iran and access to an Iranian diaspora numbering in the hundreds of thousands,” Dubai is designated as the central location for the network of Regional Presence Posts that together act as a shadow embassy. The Dubai post was staffed with four Farsi speaking Foreign Service Officers – i.e. director, deputy director/public diplomacy officer, an economic reporting officer, and the Iran watcher already positioned in Dubai – one office management specialist, and four locally engaged staff. The director oversees the activities of the

668 U.S. Department of State, Recruiting the Next Generation of Iran Experts: New Opportunities in Washington, Dubai and Europe.
669 Ibid.
rest of the staff and is authorized “to speak for the U.S. government on Iran issues to local
government officials, the private sector, and media representatives.”670

The deputy director has the responsibility to plan and coordinate public diplomacy efforts
to the Iranian people in general, especially the region’s 560,000 Iranian immigrants and the
10,000 Iranian students in UAE. The cable lists nine responsibilities for the deputy director
position. The deputy director is responsible to target and increase Iranian participation in the
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and State Department’s Bureau of Democracy Human
Rights and Labor (DRL) programs. He/she is to increase “engagement with Iranian people and
UAE’s huge Iranian community through Iran-related speaker programs, DVCs [Digital Video-
Conferencing], and American studies programs to promote U.S. policy on human rights,
democracy, terrorism, and non-proliferation.” The deputy has to find ways to support Iranian
political and civic organizations both financially and through U.S. government programs,
including organizing “series of NGO-sponsored conferences on Iran.” He/she has to assist MEPI
and DRL in the identification of potential pro-democracy groups inside and outside Iran. Also,
in consultation with Iran political officer, the deputy needs to notify Washington if there is a
“need to issue statements on behalf of Iranian dissidents.”671

Several of the duties of the deputy director involve engagement with Iranian students. In
partnership with U.S. universities, the deputy is to organize “Study in the United States”
seminars “to recruit Iranian students.” Of the other duties of the deputy director is arranging for
the establishment of American studies programs at UAE universities, with the Iranian students as
the target. In line with Secretary Rice’s policy of significantly increasing the Iranian student
body studying in the United States, the deputy director is responsible to directly advise Iranian

670 Ibid.
671 Ibid.
students who wish to study in the United States. The deputy is also in charge of identifying and processing exchange candidates for State Department’s educational and exchange programs.672

The economic officer at Dubai informs Washington of significant economic developments in Iran, with particular attention to Iran’s petroleum sector. Information of significant value involves analysis of problems in key sectors of Iran’s economy, especially the petroleum industry, and information on “terrorism finance, sanctions impact, and Iranian economic ties with other regional and international partners and companies.” Also, the economic officer is to report on potential economic corruption among Iranian leaders.673

The four officers stationed in the European cities are responsible to develop contacts with the Iranian expatriate community in their respective regions and are to provide Washington with “information and analysis on developments within the Iranian expatriate community” and “on Iranian foreign policy efforts” in their region. Notably, the cable states that these activities are to be carried out “in consultation with EUR [Europe].” The Iran watcher in Istanbul engages the Iranian community in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and Tel Aviv. The officers in Frankfurt and London are to report on developments in Germany and United Kingdom respectively. The Baku office is responsible for monitoring developments within the Iranian community in Baku, the Caucasus, and Turkmenistan, “with a particular emphasis on Caspian oil issues.”674

The Office of Iranian Affairs functions as “the nexus” for the “network of designated Iran watcher positions at overseas posts” and is responsible for providing them with policy guidance and coordinating all Iran-related activities. The office has the authority to program, administer, and track the democracy fund money for Iran. The office oversees the activities of the grantees and reports on the progress of their work to the Treasury Department, makes outreach to

672 Ibid.
673 Ibid.
674 Ibid.
congressional staff, and act as the liaison between the U.S. government and NGOs and the Iranian diaspora.

**Congressional Response to Secretary Rice’s 2006 Initiative**

On April 4, 2006, Condoleezza Rice defended the 75-million-dollar budget measure to promote democracy in Iran, saying the United States must speak out about the plight of Iranians. “I don’t think speaking softly about the democracy problem in Iran is really the appropriate course,” Rice testified before the House Appropriations Committee.

At the hearing, Representative David Obey (D-WI) said he had very little faith in prospects for success of the outreach effort. He said it could be characterized as a regime destabilization package and could be easily discredited by the Tehran government. Questioning the openness of the initiative, he asked:

> If we are going to engage in activity like that, why on earth would we be as public about it as we’ve been. It’s simply giving that regime an opportunity to claim that virtually every piece of information which is produced is disinformation from us. I mean, why are we making it easier for them to blame us for interfering in their affairs by being so public about something like this?

Rice answered that U.S. officials have heard from Iranians and frequent visitors to the country that the people of Iran want to hear the United States speak about their plight, and she said the experience of the Cold War era suggests they will not dismiss the U.S. message out of hand. In this regard, Rice said:

> I wouldn’t jump to the conclusion that Iranians believe what their government says about that. I remember in the days of Radio Free Europe and Voice of America that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European governments made the same claims about those. And people listened to them in droves anyway and they got the information they needed. And

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675 Ibid.
677 Ibid.
they sustained their hopes of one day being part of a democracy, even though their
governments said the same things.678

“I think we do have to be very public about it,” she added, since budgetary process requires the
administration to be public about the Iran program.

But one of the senior State Department officials who participated at the background
briefing on Secretary Rice’s new Iran initiative on February 15, 2006, acknowledged that the
administration would be somewhat secretive about its operations. “We don’t want to hurt the
people we’re trying to help,” the official said.679 “We understand very well that people that we
begin to work with will become targets and so, I think that you will see us not being as public as
we might otherwise be about specific individuals we’re working with.”680

According to a January 2009 Congressional Research Service report, in 2008 State
Department renewed its request for an additional $75 million, of which Congress approved $60.7
million.681 Of the funds appropriated, $21.6 million was set aside for pro-democracy programs,
“including non-violent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries.”682 An additional
$7.9 million was approved for use by the State Department Bureau of Democracy and Labor
(DRL) as “Development Funds.” Another $5.5 million was appropriated for educational and
exchange programs with Iran, and $33.6 million for broadcasting. The Department of State has
made a request for $65 million for fiscal year 2009 “to support the aspirations of the Iranian
people for a democratic and open society by promoting civil society, civil participation, media

678 Ibid.
679 U.S. Department of State, State Department Background Briefing with Two Senior Administration Officials.
680 Ibid.
681 Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.
682 Ibid.
freedom, and freedom of information.” The funds are to provide $20 million “for democracy promotion in Iran to counter Iranian influence in Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza.”

Notably, original House and Senate bills provided only $25 million for Iran democracy programs citing concerns over State Department’s inadequate justification for the requested funding, State Department’s inability to obligate the amount of funding appropriated for FY 2006, and the threat posed to the recipients of such funds. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) voiced the committee’s concerns thus:

The Committee supports the goals of promoting democracy in Iran, but received a total of only one page of justification material for the request of $75,000,000 for this program. The Committee is particularly concerned that grantees suspected of receiving U.S. assistance have been harassed and arrested by the Government of Iran for their pro-democracy activities.

Senator Leahy, then, recommends that the administration seek funding for Iran democracy project under the guise of a different appropriation function. Similar concerns were voiced by Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY) of the House Appropriations Committee:

The Committee recommendation includes $25,000,000 for programs in Iran, which is $50,000,000 below the request. The Committee is concerned that of the $25,000,000 appropriated for democracy programs in Iran in fiscal year 2006, less than $2,000,000 had been expended as of the end of May 2007. The Committee is further concerned at the lack of adequate justification for the funds that have been requested in fiscal year 2008.

On June 19, 2007, Representative Ander Crenshaw (R-FL) and Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) proposed amendments that increased the funding in the House and Senate bills to $50 and

683 Ibid.
685 Ibid.
$75 million, respectively. The final $60 million was enacted as a result of a compromise between the House and Senate in conference.

On June 4, 2007, a State Department report indicated that it had expended about $16.05 million (out of $20 million) for Iran democracy programs from the FY 2006 regular and supplemental budgets, administered through MEPI ($11.9 million) and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL $4.15 million). Also, $1.77 million (out of $5 million) had been used for information programs, and $2.22 million (out of $5 million) had been obligated through the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs.

In late September of 2008, Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA) introduced the “Fair Dealing with Iran Act of 2008” which prohibits the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense from covert operations to overthrow the government of Iran except in time of war. The bill is based on Representative Lee’s unsuccessful attempt to make an amendment to the House Committee on Rules for consideration to the 2009 Intelligence Authorization Act, H.R. 5959. The amendment would have prohibited the use of authorized intelligence funds to support or maintain covert action aimed at overthrowing a government of a member nation of the United Nations. No congressional action has been made, however, to prohibit the use of democracy promotion programs for regime change purposes.

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687 Joe Lieberman, “Senate Adopts Lieberman Amendment to Restore Funding for Iran Democracy Promotion,” http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=282017&&.
691 Ibid.
The Reaction of Iranian Opposition Groups

Iranian opposition activists almost unanimously disagreed with the Bush administration decision to finance Iranian opposition groups. Most expressed the belief that the policy of funding Iran’s dissidents will prove to be counterproductive. In an interview on “The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer” on PBS television, for example, winner of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize Shirin Ebadi said, “I don’t think that it [U.S. funding of Iran’s dissidents] benefits me or people like me, because whoever speaks about democracy in Iran will be accused of having been paid by the United States.”

In an April 4, 2006, report for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Golnaz Esfandiari wrote “prominent activists and political opponents of Iran’s hard-line administration are warning that U.S. funds designated to help civic groups could backfire” and have “rejected such aid as ‘an insult’ to the Iranian people.” The RFE/RL report quoted Mohammad Ali Dadkhah, a co-founder of the Center for Human Rights Defenders, saying:

Democracy is not a product that we can import from another country. We have to prepare the ground for it so that it can grow and bear fruit – especially because independent and national forces, and also self-reliant forces, in Iran will never accept a foreign country telling them what to do and which way to take.

Voice of America’s Gary Thomas, in a report from Tehran on July 14, 2006, quoted Emadeddin Baghi, another prominent opposition figure as saying, “I admire America as a dynamic democratic country, but I cringe at U.S. statements about promoting democracy in Iran.

694 Ibid.
Democracy has to be indigenous and homegrown so people do not think that it was bought with Bush administration broadcasts and money.”

The Washington Post writer Robin Wright reported on October 11, 2007, that 25 pro-democracy groups had signed an open letter to appeal Congress to cut or eliminate the Iran democracy promotion fund. An excerpt from the letter organized by the National Iranian American Council, the American Conservative Defense Alliance, and the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation read, “Iranian reformers believe democracy cannot be imported and must be based on indigenous institutions and values. Intended beneficiaries of the funding – human rights advocates, civil society activists and others – uniformly denounce the program.”

Opponents of the “Iran democracy slush fund” urged the Bush administration and Congress to scrap the counterproductive initiative “in favor of a more permissive U.S. stance toward the operation of U.S. nonprofit organizations in Iran.” As of now, U.S. sanctions prohibit American NGOs and non-profit organizations from dealings with Iran unless they apply for a license from the Department of Treasury. Under the present conditions, the U.S. government effectively controls which non-state actors it deems suitable to engage in pro-democracy activities in Iran.

Against this current of public outcry from Iranian, American, and Iranian-American individuals and organizations, some Iranian opposition figures defended the Bush administration’s request for the funding. “Don’t believe it when people say Iran’s democracy activists don’t want U.S. help,” wrote Akbar Atri, a former Iranian student leader and a member

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of the Committee on Present Danger, in an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal. Atri intensely questioned the merits of Iranian-American opposition to the new Iran policy, saying they do not represent the people of Iran. “With some help from their American allies,” insisted Atri, “Iranian democrats are brave enough and capable enough to achieve for their country what the likes of Mahatma Gandhi and Vaclav Havel achieved for theirs.”

Some exiled opposition groups were also quick to lobby for a prominent role in the regime change agenda. Ramesh Setehrrad, president of the Washington-based National Committee for Women for a Democratic Iran, told the Boston Globe that the administration would find it hard to fund any outside opposition organizations as they are mostly associated with the Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO) or with monarchists. A number of MKO supporters in the Congress, including Representatives Tom Tancredo (R-CO) and Bob Filner (D-CA), have been pressing for the removal of the group from State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. Also a government team, accompanied by David Denehy, the State Department Iran policy coordinator, and Ladan Archin, a Pentagon Iran specialist, made a trip to Los Angeles in 2006 to meet with monarchists and their affiliated media outlets. The move may have been made in part “to create a buzz within the Iranian American diaspora and its satellite media outlets, which are beamed into Iran,” Los Angeles Times reported.

699 Ibid.
700 Stockman, "Rice Wants Funds for Democracy Initiative in Iran."
702 Bruck, "Expatriates: How Iran’s Expatriates are Gaming the Nuclear Threat."
703 Rozen, "U.S. Moves to Weaken Iran."
In its concerted effort to undermine Iran’s government, the Bush administration used all public diplomacy assets available for influencing the elite and general Iranian public, including the National Endowment for Democracy. As was mentioned earlier, in her February 15, 2006, testimony, Secretary Rice specifically noted that the $15 million of requested funding (increased to $20 million by Congress) was to be administered mainly through the NED and two members of its family of grant-seeking organizations, namely the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute. Working through these organizations, Rice said, “we will support civic education and work to help organize Iranian labor unions and political organizations.”

By this time, the Bush administration had substantially increased NED’s role in democracy promotion activities in the Middle East. In his remarks on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of NED’s establishment in 2003, President George W. Bush inaugurated his vision of a Middle East transformed by democracy, given as an intended by-product of the Iraq War. With regard to Iran, Bush said, “The regime in Tehran must heed the democratic demands of the Iranian people or lose its last claim to legitimacy.” President Bush requested Congress to double funding for NED to $80 million (in FY 2005) from $40 million (in FY 2004). Congressional appropriation, however, increased NED’s budget to just $59.8 million. With the addition of $19.5 million for specific countries and regions, the final NED funding amounted to about $79 million for FY 2005. The increased funding was restricted to democracy promotion

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704 U.S. Department of State, "Reaching out to the People of Iran."
efforts in the Middle East. The administration again requested $80 million of funding in its FY 2006 budget request, and received $74.1 million for NED.  

NED was founded through an act of Congress in 1983 (Public Law 98-164) as one of several means to promote democracy around the world. This act also authorized congressional funding of projects to support the growth of democratic institutions abroad through the United States Information Agency (USIA), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of State. NED was established to carry what had been done through the clandestine auspices of the CIA during the initial decades of the Cold War. As Allen Weinstein, the acting president of the NED in 1984, said in a 1991 interview with the *Washington Post*, “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”

NED explicates its connection with the CIA in the “NED History” page of its website:

> In the aftermath of World War II, faced with threats to our democratic allies and without any mechanism to channel political assistance, U.S. policy makers resorted to covert means, secretly sending advisers, equipment, and funds to support newspapers and parties under siege in Europe. When it was revealed in the late 1960’s that some American PVO’s [Private Voluntary Organizations] were receiving covert funding from the CIA to wage the battle of ideas at international forums, the Johnson Administration concluded that such funding should cease, recommending establishment of "a public-private mechanism" to fund overseas activities openly.

Some doubt that NED’s democracy promotion activities are anything but the promotion of favored politicians and political parties abroad at the expense of U.S. taxpayer dollars. As Representative Ron Paul (R-TX) writes, “It is particularly Orwellian to call U.S. manipulation of

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707 *Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985*.
foreign elections ‘promoting democracy.’”710 This is especially the case in poorer countries
were the injection of a hundred thousand dollars will greatly skew election results in favor of the
helped politicians. “How would Americans feel if the Chinese arrived with millions of dollars to
support certain candidates deemed friendly to China? Would this be viewed as a democratic
development?” Ron Paul asks.711

Although it is almost entirely government-funded, NED benignly introduces itself as “a
private, nonprofit organization created in 1983 to strengthen democratic institutions around the
world through nongovernmental efforts.”712 According to NED’s 2007 annual report, of its total
support and revenue funding ($106,581,863), 99.8 percent ($106,408,363) comes from the U.S.
government (i.e. congressional appropriation and funding flowing through other government
bodies such as the State Department). The other 0.2 percent ($173,500) is from non-
governmental sources.713 “The convoluted organizational structure seems to be based on the
premise that government money, if filtered through enough layers of bureaucracy, becomes
‘private’ funding, an illogical and dangerously misleading assumption.”714

More than half of NED grants flow down to its four “core” grantees that represent the
two U.S. political parties, a segment of the U.S. labor, and organized business interests.
Specifically, the NED family constitutes the Republican Party’s International Republican
Institute (IRI); the Democratic Party’s National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
(NDIIA); the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), associated with the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce; and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS),

711 Ibid.
associated with the AFL-CIO.\textsuperscript{715} Former House speaker Richard A. Gephardt serves as NED’s current chairman.

**NED’s Work in Iran and Non-State Actors**

One of the venues for non-state actors to participate in U.S. public diplomacy efforts is to implement projects as grantees of NED. According to the NED’s online Democracy Projects Database, the following groups have received grants from the NED between 1990 and 2007: Iran Teachers Association in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 2001, 2002, and 2003 (a total of $316,860); Foundation for Democracy in Iran in 1995 and 1996 (a total of $75,000); National Iranian American Council in 2002, 2005, 2006 (a total of $196,000); Women’s Learning Partnership in 2003 ($115,000); Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 (a total of $450,000); Vital Voices Global Partnership in 2004 ($40,500); Institute of World Affairs in 2005 ($45,800); Civic Education and Human Rights in 2006 ($100,000); and Freedom of Information and Human Rights in 2007 (amount not reported). In addition, three of NED’s core grantees were among its Iran-focused grant recipients: Center for the International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in 2004 and 2006 (a total of $212,497); International Republican Institute (IPI) in 2005 ($110,000); and American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS) in 2005 ($185,000).\textsuperscript{716} Appendix C gives the highlights of the NED-funded projects as provided in NED’s online Democracy Projects Database.

NED also has a Farsi website, Panjereh (window in Farsi), that targets both Iranian and Afghan populations. While the information for the Afghan target audience appears to be benign, such as a book about family rights, the information targeting the Iranian public openly espouses regime change in Iran. The site features a Farsi translation of the book *Nonviolent Struggle – 50*

\textsuperscript{715} National Endowment for Democracy, "How the NED Works," http://www.ned.org/about/how.html.

The book is a publication of Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) in Belgrade, Serbia, and is available for download in five languages (French, Spanish, English, Farsi, and Arabic) from the official website of CANVAS. CANVAS is an NGO formed in 2003 by anti Slobodan Milosevic activists after the overthrow of Milosevic in 2000. According to the organization’s website, “CANVAS trainers and consultants support nonviolent democratic movements through transfer of knowledge on strategies and tactics of nonviolent struggle.” CANVAS lists Iran among five countries that is said to be the scene of “non-violent movements that are struggling to overthrow their authoritarian regimes.” The other four are: Belarus, Burma, Zimbabwe, and West Papua. The book comes under the title of civil society education.

It appears that the State Department-sponsored Iran Human Rights Documentation Center workshop in Dubai used the same group to train Iranian dissidents to bring down Iran’s government, as is evident from the reports on the Dubai conference organized in 2005.

Freedom House

Freedom House is another important actor in United States public diplomacy toward Iran. Like the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House is said to be an “independent nongovernmental organization” that, nevertheless, receives more than 80 percent of its funding through congressional appropriations and other government grants. Freedom House’s

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720 Popovic, Milivojevic, and Djinovic, Mobarezeh Khoshunat Parhiz: 50 Nokteh Asasi, (50.
721 Azimi, "Hard Realities of Soft Power."
2006 Form 990 tax return indicates that, of Freedom House’s total revenue ($26,266,878), about 85.4 percent ($22,436,883) comes from government contributions.\textsuperscript{723}

The organization was founded in 1941 by Wendell Willkie and Eleanor Roosevelt to give support to President Franklin Roosevelt’s advocacy for United States to enter World War II. Upon the ending of the war, “Freedom House took up the struggle against the other 20\textsuperscript{th} century totalitarian threat, Communism.”\textsuperscript{724} Today, the agenda of the organization is to fight the threat of “radical Islam.”\textsuperscript{725}

On March 31, 2006, \textit{Financial Times} reported that Freedom House was among several NGOs “selected by State Department for ‘clandestine activities’ inside Iran.”\textsuperscript{726} In a 2006 testimony before the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, Mark Palmer, then vice-chairman of Freedom House’s board of trustees, advocated an increase in U.S. government funding for NGOs to help support the non-violent overthrow of non-democratic governments. Palmer argued that funding should be shifted away from already democratic nations to higher priority “Not Free” nations.\textsuperscript{727}

In the case of the Freedom House’s efforts in this regard, Palmer said, “Our NGO funding for media is overwhelmingly for training. Imagine the credibility and influence if Iran’s national student movement had its own radio and therefore voice.”\textsuperscript{728} Palmer also advocated regime change in Iran saying, “A non-violent overthrow is precisely the main topic on the minds


\textsuperscript{725} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{726} Dinmore, "Bush Enters Debate on Freedom in Iran."


\textsuperscript{728} Ibid., 3.
of a majority of Iranians.” He made a proposition that U.S. government establish “an Independent TV and Radio Fund” to have “its own board to ensure that stations receiving support adhere to international broadcasting standards and promote non-violent transitions to democracy.” Palmer believes that such a fund could spend $100 million per year. Palmer, in the position of the chairman of the Freedom House’s board of trustees, is in effect advocating a return to clandestine funding of purportedly local media, i.e. the CIA’s clandestine establishment and funding of Radio Free Europe and its sister stations. Palmer also made the recommendation for “a special Students for Global Democracy Fund” run by students and youth leaders from the universities and youth groups of democratic countries to provide training and financial support to “student and youth groups committed to action” in “Not Free” societies. He said this is an imperative given the hesitation on the part of existing NGOs to render such support.

According to Freedom House’s 2007 annual report, the quasi-governmental organization supports Iranian “pro-democracy reformers and human rights defenders by connecting them, via the internet, to resources and counterparts worldwide.” Most prominently, it established in September 2006 a monthly, bilingual Farsi/English online journal, entitled Gozaar (“Transition”), devoted to “democracy and human rights in Iran.” Gozaar also features relevant educational and informational resources for Iranian reformists. Ladan Boroumand is one of Gozaar’s Advisory Council members. She is the co-founder and research director of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, which is one of the regular grantees of the National Endowment for Democracy.

729 Ibid.
730 Ibid.
731 Ibid., 4.
734 Ibid.
U.S. International Broadcasting

The origin of American international broadcasting goes back to the birth of Voice of America in 1942 during the Second World War. Ever since, international broadcasting has been an important element of United States propaganda measures. This has been the case during the Second World War, the Cold War, and in the years following the September 11 terror attacks. Broadcasting to Iran has been a high priority, especially after September 11, 2001. This section gives an overview of the structure of U.S. international broadcasting, paying special attention to those targeting Iran. These include, the Voice of America Persian News Network and Radio Farda (which means tomorrow in Persian). Today, the Broadcasting Board of Governors has operational authority over all elements of U.S. international broadcasting.

Broadcasting Board of Governors

In 1994, through the United States International Broadcasting Act, Congress created the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) within the USIA and brought all the elements of U.S. international broadcasting under its control and supervision. In 1999, the board became a self-standing federal agency when the USIA was absorbed into the State Department by the Clinton administration. BBG introduces itself as an “independent” and “bipartisan” federal agency with a mission “to promote freedom and democracy and to enhance understanding by broadcasting accurate, objective, and balanced news and information about the United States and the world to audiences abroad.”\footnote{Broadcasting Board of Governors, "Broadcasting Board of Governors," Broadcasting Board of Governors, http://www.bbg.gov/about/documents/BBGFactSheetDec08.pdf.} The congressionally-funded board consists of eight presidentially appointed members confirmed by U.S. Senate, with the Secretary of State serving as BBG’s
ninth member. BBG’s budget for fiscal year 2008 was $671.3 million.\textsuperscript{736} BBG’s requested budget for fiscal year 2009 is $699.5 million.\textsuperscript{737}

D. Jeffrey Hirschberg was appointed by George W. Bush in June 2008 to serve as BBG’s chairman. Hirschberg succeeds James Glassman, who left BBG to become the last Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the Bush Administration. Kenneth Tomlinson preceded Glassman and was forced to resign in March 2007 after a State Department investigation revealed that he had run his “horse racing operation” from his federal office, had billed the government for more work days than U.S. law permits, and had improperly hired and paid a friend as a contractor.\textsuperscript{738} Tomlinson had earlier been ousted on November 3, 2005, from his post as chairman of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting one day after an Inspector General report revealed evidence that he had violated rules set up to shield public broadcasting from political influence.\textsuperscript{739}

BBG oversees and is supported by the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), a federal entity that provides engineering, technical, and marketing support for all U.S. radio and TV broadcasts and is responsible for managing the Voice of America and Radio/TV Marti.\textsuperscript{740} IBB’s director is appointed by the U.S. President and confirmed by the Senate and reports directly to the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Danforth W. Austin is currently serving as IBB’s Acting Director. Austin has also been the director of the Voice of America since 2006. BBG also oversees the operations of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.

\textsuperscript{739}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{740}Broadcasting Board of Governors, "Broadcasting Board of Governors."
VOA broadcasts radio and television programs in 45 languages including Persian. The Office of Cuba broadcasting manages Radio and TV Marti that broadcast 24 hours of radio and eight hours of TV Spanish programming to Cuba. RFE/RL broadcasts in 28 languages and houses Radio Farda, a 24 hour Persian-language service that started as a joint venture between RFE/RL and VOA, Radio Free Iraq, and Radio Free Afghanistan. Radio Free Asia broadcasts in nine languages to Asian listeners. The Middle East Broadcasting Networks houses the 24 hour Arabic language Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV stations.\(^741\)

According to the BBG, RFE/RL, Radio Free Asia, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks operate as private, non-profit organizations that are nevertheless entirely government-funded “grantees” of BBG. The 1994 United States International Broadcasting Act, however, did not distinguish between these surrogate stations and those like VOA that are official voices of the U.S. government. Under the act, the BBG was given clear legislative authority to direct and supervise all non-military broadcasting activities of the United States government. The Secretary of State, as the \textit{ex officio} member of the board, is required under the provisions of the act to provide the board with “information and guidance on foreign policy issues.”\(^742\) The act also required that the board report directly to the USIA; the board now has to report to the State Department.

Congress is considering yet another restructuring of U.S. broadcasting infrastructure. The United States Broadcasting Reorganization Act of 2009 amends the U.S. International Broadcasting Act of 1994 to replace BBG with the United States International Broadcasting Agency (USIBA). The new agency will be headed by a Board of Governors that oversees all international broadcasting entities. The act also eliminates the IBB and transfers its

\(^{741}\) Ibid.

responsibilities to the newly formed agency. Similar to the BBG, USIBA shall consist of eight presidentially appointed members, with the Secretary of State acting as the ninth member. The eight members are to be selected “from among citizens distinguished in the fields of mass communications, print, broadcast media, or foreign affairs.”

Post 9/11 Media Initiatives – Operation Middle East

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a successful public diplomacy campaign targeting the Middle East became an imperative element of the U.S. war on terror. To achieve this goal, international broadcasting was deemed a vital weapon in the “war of ideas.” To increase credibility and to inoculate its target audience against perceiving U.S.-sponsored media as propaganda, the U.S. government began to rebrand its international media. Radio Sawa management, for example, banned its staff (mostly former VOA Arabic staff) from using VOA newsroom items and current affairs scripts, and VOA Arabic archival tapes were discarded. In short, VOA’s brand name was either silenced or downgraded in Middle Eastern language services. Alhurrah’s description of the station is also indicative of the attempt to distance itself from the U.S. government: “Alhurra is operated by non-profit corporation ‘The Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc.’ (MBN).” MBN is financed by the American people through the U.S Congress. All this rebranding appears to have taken place to achieve higher credibility among foreign publics. In the words of Jeffrey Gedmin, RFE/RL’s president, “to be  

744 Ibid.
credible, it can’t be the voice of Jeff Gedmin, it can’t be the voice of Washington.\textsuperscript{747} In sum, it cannot be the Voice of America.

In addition to the rebranding aspect, the U.S. government directed its new media initiatives to the general masses of target countries. This strategy is in contrast with the Cold War elite-oriented broadcasting style, which is also a staple of Voice of America tradition. With this framework, Radio Sawa and Radio Farda, the 24 hour music and news radio stations in Arabic and Persian respectively, were launched in 2002. In the years that followed, BBG funneled resources from the other broadcasting entities it supervised to these and other newly founded media outlets for the Middle East (i.e., Alhurrah TV and VOA Persian TV).

VOA enthusiasts complained, “The BBG has thrown money at Middle East public diplomacy while at the same time neglecting and starving the traditional instruments of public diplomacy directed to the rest of the world.”\textsuperscript{748} As an example, BBG closed down VOA’s Portuguese Service to Brazil. Also, according to a 2004 United States General Accounting Office report, BBG reallocated $19.7 million from “lower-priority or lower-impact language services to higher-priority broadcast needs, including Radio Farda and Radio Sawa.”\textsuperscript{749} In 2003, the board identified another $12.4 million that could be reallocated from lower-priority services or redundant language services for the expansion of Urdu language broadcasting to Pakistan and Persian television service to Iran. Based on its annual review process, BBG recommended the elimination of 17 of VOA’s Central and Eastern European language services, cutting back a projected $20.9 million for fiscal year 2004 and 2005.\textsuperscript{750}

\textsuperscript{750} Ibid.
The U.S. government shifted its resources because according to BBG board member Joaquin Blaya the local media in the lower-priority areas “are increasingly free and robust.”\textsuperscript{751} This is while, in a 2004 testimony before the Senate’s Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism, director of international affairs and trade at the U.S. General Accounting Office Jess T. Ford notes that BBG’s process for allocation of resources among its language services “lacks an adequate measure of whether domestic media provide accurate, balanced, and comprehensive news and information to national audiences.”\textsuperscript{752}

In 2004, BBG launched the Virginia-based Arabic Alhurra TV, which also includes a dedicated version for Iraq called Alhurra Iraq. The board allocated $102 million for starting Alhurra, $40 million of which was dedicated to Alhurra Iraq.\textsuperscript{753} The move was coupled with the elimination of 10 VOA Central and Eastern European language services, sparking a revolt among Voice of America’s staff. Nearly half of the VOA’s staff signed a petition to protest BBG’s “dismantling” of the Voice of America “piece by piece.”\textsuperscript{754} Petitioners protested the reallocation of VOA resources to finance the two Arabic language radio and TV stations that they said are not subject to VOA standards of objectivity and accountability. The petition concluded:

The BBG is creating radio and television entities that circumvent a Congressional Charter (Public Law 94-350) – designed to shield VOA from political interference and to ensure accurate, objective, and comprehensive broadcasts. No such editorial protections apply to the new broadcast entities.\textsuperscript{755}


\textsuperscript{752} Ford, \textit{U.S. International Broadcasting: Challenges Facing the Broadcasting Board of Governors}.


\textsuperscript{755} Heil, "Dissecting U.S. International Broadcasting at its Mostcritical Crossroads in Six Decades."
Then-BBG chairman Tomlinson also confirmed that these services were eliminated “to focus more resources on services to the Middle East.” Then in 2002, BBG had replaced VOA’s Arabic Service with Radio Sawa.

It may well be that the U.S. government aims to have a more direct supervision of these new radio and TV stations to maximize their public diplomacy value to the United States. In June of 2007, for example, BBG took action against Alhurra’s allegedly anti-Israeli broadcasts. The decision to review Alhurra’s programming for “journalistic integrity and adherence to the standards and principles of the U.S. International Broadcasting Act” came in response to neoconservative public attacks against Alhurra’s Vice President for News Larry Register. Register, a 20-year CNN executive, had given permission for the uninterrupted airing of two speeches by Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, and Ismail Haniya, the Palestinian leader of Hamas. On May 15, 2007, the network had also used the word “AlNaqba” (meaning catastrophe in Arabic) in its onscreen ticker to refer to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. The term, which is widely used in the Arab world to refer to the event, was removed within an hour. The network’s coverage of a Holocaust conference in Iran was also deemed “insufficiently skeptical.” “Our taxpayer-financed Arabic network was set up to counter Al-Jazeera, not echo it,” wrote Joel Mowbray in an opinion piece

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756 Faler, “VOA Staff Members Say Government Losing Voice.”
758 Blaya, Testimony of Joaquin Blaya.
760 “Outside Panel to Scrutinize U.S. Arabic TV Network."

Shortly after the Alhurra controversy, the House State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee refused to grant BBG’s request for $11.1 million for expanding Alhurra’s news programming in June 2007. On June 8, 2007, Register resigned after about seven months on the job. Representative Steve Rothman (D-NJ), a member of the House State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee, rejoiced: “Mr. Register’s resignation is welcome news. It is my sincere hope that Alhurra has learned from Mr. Register’s failures and is prepared to ensure that no terrorists are allowed to espouse hate speech on a television network paid for by U.S. taxpayers.” He also urged Alhurra to implement his transparency proposal “through the 24/7 live streaming, archiving, and translation of Alhurra’s original programming.” Daniel Nassif, a Washington representative of Council of Lebanese-American Organizations who had no prior television experience, succeeded Register as Alhurra’s news director.

In his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, BBG board member Joaquin Blaya explained that Alhurra’s inappropriate editorial decisions were mistakes and that the anti-Israel contents were aberrations. He nonetheless emphasized, “Our most precious commodity is our broadcast credibility and program excellence. Credibility is key to success in broadcasting, and it is our greatest asset.”

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761 Mowbray, "Register’s Last Hurrah."
764 Ibid.
765 Ibid.
767 Blaya, *Testimony of Joaquin Blaya*.
768 Ibid.
It is hard to see how Muslim populations are expected to find U.S.-funded news as credible if these media outlets are forced to censor voices critical of American policy. This is especially the case in the Arab and Islamic countries where more than 100 TV satellite channels, including Alhurra, Aljazeera, Alalam, and Hezbollah’s Almanar, seek to more persuasively frame world events from their point of view. Moreover, media credibility is deemed a necessary prerequisite for the success of international broadcasting. Without such credibility, U.S.-funded media will be dismissed as propaganda. And the “p-word” is what leading officials in U.S. international broadcasting dread being associated with. A telling example is RFE/RL’s president Jeffrey Gedmin’s response to an interviewer asking, “Does the United States government or Congress have a say in what you broadcast?” Gedmin replies:

In the sense that our funder, the U.S. Congress, decides what it finances, yes. But if you’re asking whether they tell us what to put in the programs, the answer is no. It may sound strange, even implausible. But it’s true and it’s a crucial point. Credibility is everything in this business. Our board, the Broadcast Board of Governors (BBG) – they oversee all U.S. International broadcasting – serves by law as a firewall to protect our editorial independence. The moment our audiences think we’re pushing propaganda, that we’re the mouthpiece of the U.S. government or a particular faction in Washington, we’re dead in the water. I’m happy to say I’ve not encountered a single instance where someone in Washington has tried to meddle in our editorial affairs.769

In February 2007, a month before Gedmin’s appointment as president of RFE/RL, concerns over proper editorial control of content troubled Voice of America Persian TV, a joint venture with Radio Farda. In a letter to President Bush, Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) wrote, “Voice of America [Persian TV] failed to provide Iranians a clear and effective presentation of our foreign policy but provided another platform for its critics.”770 Coburn then urges the

769 Pilon, "An Interview with RFE/RL Chief Jeffrey Gedmin."
president to more carefully consider his nomination for the new BBG chairman.\textsuperscript{771} In April 2008, Coburn put a hold on the confirmation of then-BBG chairman James Glassman, whom President Bush had nominated as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The move came in response to Coburn’s repeated failed attempts to get the English transcripts of VOA Persian TV and Radio Farda broadcasts.\textsuperscript{772} The controversies regarding Persian language broadcasting content will be discussed in more detail in the coming section. Here, I will turn to a closer examination of Voice of America and Radio Farda.

\textbf{Voice of America Persian News Network}

United States initiated the Voice of America, a short-wave radio station, on February 24, 1942, during the Second World War, under the supervision of the Foreign Information Service (FIS).\textsuperscript{773} At its inception, it only carried news in German and French to occupied Europe. In the later years of the war, VOA services expanded to include many more languages, including Persian. VOA operation continued under the command of the Office of War Information, which was created by President Franklin Roosevelt’s executive order in June 1942.\textsuperscript{774} In 1953, the radio station’s headquarters moved from New York City to Washington, DC, where it became part of the newly established United States Information Agency\textsuperscript{775}.

\textsuperscript{771} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{775} Cull, "VOA (Voice of America)," 423.
In August 1945, following the close of the Second World War, VOA discontinued many of its foreign language broadcasts including its Persian Service.\footnote{Hansjoerg Biener, ”The Arrival of Radio Farda: International Broadcasting to Iran at a Crossroads,” Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 7, no. 1 (March 2003), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a2.html.} The Persian Service resumed operation at the onset of the Cold War. Its programming was carried on in two intervals during the 1950s and 1960s, first from 1949-1960 and then from 1964-1966. VOA restarted broadcasting to Iran shortly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that ousted the Shah of Iran. Beginning in October 1996, VOA supplemented its radio broadcasting with a weekly, call-in radio and TV simulcast in Persian, titled \textit{Roundtable with You}, in partnership with the U.S.-sponsored Worldnet Television.\footnote{Ibid.}

With the addition of its newest program, \textit{Today’s Woman}, which debuted on September, 27, 2007, VOA Persian TV is now producing six hours of original TV programming, which is simulcast on Radio Farda, and an additional hour of original radio programming daily. The increase in satellite TV Persian programming materialized with the supplemental funding VOA Persian TV received through Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s February, 15, 2006, $75 million supplemental budget request for democracy promotion in Iran. At the time of the request, VOA Persian Service produced four hours of original TV programming.\footnote{Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2006 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2007), http://www.bbg.gov/reports/annualReports/06anrpt.pdf.} Congress ultimately approved $36.1 million supplemental funding for VOA TV and Radio Farda broadcasting, which was $13.9 million less than requested.\footnote{Kenneth Katzman, Iran Current Developments and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 38.}

BBG budget request for FY 2009 shows that VOA Persian TV’s actual cost for 2007 was about $11.3 million and its estimated cost for 2008 was about $16.8 million. BBG is requesting

VOA Persian Service, originally part of VOA’s West and South Asia Division, became a separate unit in July 2007 and was officially named Persian News Network. Currently, VOA Persian News Network is no longer managed by Voice of America leadership. It works in conjunction with Radio Farda and is run under the leadership of RFE/RL. VOA broadcasts consist of one hour of radio programming in the morning (6:00 to 7:00 a.m. Iran time) and six hours of primetime radio and TV simulcast (6:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Iran time). VOA broadcasts its Persian programs from its headquarters in Washington, DC. VOA Persian TV can be accessed by satellite in Iran and Europe. The programs are available live on VOA’s Persian website and are archived as well. The 24 hour VOA Persian News Network also provides “acquired” news programs from American domestic media such as CNN and the History Channel as well as two repeats of VOA’s original programming.

VOA Persian programs are mainly elite-oriented with the exception of a daily hour-long youth-oriented, magazine-style program that covers general interest news, sports, music, fashion, and entertainment issues (Shabahang). As of 2009, the elite-oriented political programs include a two-hour daily news broadcast (News and Views), two interview-style news analysis programs

(Roundtable with You and News Brief, each of which have special editions), and an hour-long program featuring female guests on political issues (Today’s Woman).\footnote{Voice of America News Farsi, "Barnamehaye Telvezioni."}

According to BBG member Joaquin Blaya a December 2006 survey shows the total VOA Persian TV audience is just over 20 percent of the Iranian population and Radio Farda has a 10.3 percent weekly listenership.\footnote{Testimony of Joaquin Blaya.} And according to a 2008 BBG surveys, 31.9 percent of Iranian adults (15+) either viewed VOA Persian TV or listened to Radio Farda broadcasts at least once during the week prior to the survey.\footnote{ExpectMore, "Detailed Information on the Broadcasting to near East Asia and South Asia Assessment," http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10000376.2004.html.}

**Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty**

Radio Free Europe and its sister station Radio Liberation from Bolshevism were born under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1950 and 1953 respectively. RFE operated as the broadcasting arm of the New York-based, CIA-founded National Committee for a Free Europe, established in June 1949.\footnote{Nicholas J. Cull, "REF/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty),” in Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present, ed. Nicholas J. Cull, David Culbert, and David Welch (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 351.} The “surrogate” stations aimed to bring about the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union and its satellite governments through critical coverage of the target countries’ local news. The CIA secretly funded the stations until, in 1967, the New York Times brought the secret sponsorship in public spotlight. In 1973, they were merged as a non-profit organization and renamed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. RFE/RL was placed under the direction of the newly established Board of International Broadcasting. RFE/RL is often credited for a positive and significant role in winning the Cold War.\footnote{Ibid.} In the post Cold War era, RFE/RL reallocated some of its services to new priority targets of interest, mainly in the Middle East. In 1998, under the leadership of Thomas Dine, a former executive director of

On June 28, 2005, Thomas Dine, who had served as president of RFE/RL for eight years, left the broadcasting entity. Dine’s departure left a leadership gap for more than a year, until Jeffrey Gedmin, a former resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, was appointed the president of RFE/RL by the BBG board in March 2007. Gedmin is a founding member of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Established in June 1997, the PNAC is devoted to promoting “a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity” through a significant increase in defense spending and interventionist democracy promotion policies.

Radio Farda

In December 2002, BBG started Radio Farda, a 24-hour, seven-days-a-week Persian-language radio station that features news and music aimed at the under 30 Iranian population. Radio Farda’s 2008 budget was $5.3 million. The new station was launched as a joint venture between RFE/RL’s Persian language Radio Azadi and VOA Persian radio and satellite TV programs to Iran. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Radio Azadi had increased its broadcasting to eleven hours from the original eight hours. The programs consisted of elite-oriented news and analysis originating from RFE/RL’s headquarters in Prague,

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Czechoslovakia. Radio Azadi stopped its operation on December 1, 2002. Meanwhile, in preparation for the commencement of Radio Farda the team continued to air 30 minutes of news and 2.5 hours of music daily, using the name of Radio Farda in its broadcasts. Radio Farda is heard on AM, FM, short wave, digital audio satellite and on the internet. Shortly after Radio Farda went on air, President Bush addressed Iranians: “I’m pleased to send warm greetings to the people of Iran and to welcome you to the new Radio Farda broadcast.” The president continued by telling Iranians they “deserve a free press to express themselves and to help build an open, democratic, and free society.” Radio Farda has now increased its evening newscast to one hour from the original 30-minutes and launched a news-oriented website. BBG is “proposing to transfer to RFE/RL the eight-hour news shift previously produced by VOA.” This move would make Radio Farda the sole news producer for the station, making VOA programming exclusive to satellite TV.

Since its inception, Radio Farda became subject to a barrage of criticism from conservative and neoconservative circles regarding its entertainment focus and weak performance in countering Iran’s government. These criticisms peaked in 2006 and subsided when in February 2007 Jeffrey Gedmin took over the leadership of Radio Farda as president of RFE/RL.

Like Radio Sawa, Radio Farda broadcasts a mix of news and music to appeal to its young target audience. A typical hour consists of 16.5 minutes of news, with the rest of the time slots

797 Ibid.
devoted to a mix of Iranian and Western pop music. The music is mostly “adult contemporary” with “a happy beat to it.” Some typical Western singers broadcast include, “Madonna, Michael Jackson, The Gipsy Kings, Bob Marley, Abba, Enrique Iglesias, Phil Collins, [and] Celine Dion.” The Iranian songs are from the popular singers of the deposed Shah’s era all of whom live outside Iran. The non-news content is prepared and delivered from Radio Farda office in Northern Virginia. According to Bert Kleinman, a consultant to Radio Farda, the radio’s news team consists of a 10-member news staff in Washington and a 28-member news staff in Prague.

The late Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) was one of the harshest critics of Radio Farda’s music-oriented format. In a December 16, 2002, Wall Street Journal article Senator Helms wrote: “It’s difficult to believe that the Bush administration has agreed to support this shift from a proven program of serious policy discussion to a teeny-bopper music-based format. It likely will insult the cultural sensitivities of Iranians, as well as their intelligence.”

Former head of RFE/RL S. Enders Wimbush (1987-1992), also, lamented the decline of what he terms “the idea menu” on Radio Farda’s broadcasts to Iran as compared to its predecessor Radio Azadi. In an article for the Weekly Standard entitled “Radio Free Iran; Down with music, Up with ideas,” Wimbush presses for the new station to stimulate debate within Iran rather than merely advocate for America. “To become an effective instrument in the war of ideas, Radio Farda should be completely overhauled, not just tinkered with,” he says.

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801 Ibid.
802 Ibid.
805 Ibid.
suggests six themes need to be tackled at great depth: 1- “question the regime’s legitimacy,” 2- “highlight the [Iranian] leadership’s disunity,” 3- “highlight threats to Iran’s culture” due to its isolation from the rest of the world, 4- “describe Iran’s isolation, economic decline, and growing lack of competitiveness,” 5- “build critical/pragmatic thinking,” and 6- “empower alternative power centers with new ideas.”

Wimbush, who is currently the senior vice president for International Programs and Policy at the Hudson Institute, is seriously doubtful of the capacity of the current Radio Farda, with its emphasis on music, for becoming a forum of debate for the above themes.

Perhaps the most damning criticism of Radio Farda came from a 2006 study by the now-dissolved Iran Steering Group, a joint task force between National Security Council and the Pentagon. The report was based on a six-month study of Radio Farda and VOA Persian TV broadcast content. While acknowledging the professional look of the radio and TV programs, the report charged both for “fall[ing] short of realizing their stated mission and mandate.”

According to the report, VOA Persian TV invited too many guests representing “the Islamic Republic viewpoint” and failed to effectively counter those views. The programs were found to at times become, in effect, a “debunking of U.S. policy.”

As an example, in an interview with Abbas Milani, a research fellow and co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, on March 15, 2006, the VOA interviewer asks, “Dr. Milani, how can a country that violates human rights be a defender of international human rights?” Milani replies,

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806 Ibid.
808 Ibid.
I think that what you are saying is 100 percent correct, that is why the U.S. is in a problematic position because of this. An America that has the Guantanamo Bay jail in it, an America in which minorities, blacks, have suffered from legal deprivations, without a doubt has international issues with regards to this. However, the reality is that with all these violations, America has other advantages. Throughout Iran’s history, even though there were the likes of [the coup in] 1953, there are tens of other examples where America has tried to establish democracy … But in total, we have to analyze the sum total of all of this, despite these shortcomings, and despite what I think is America’s shameful record of violation of human rights laws, despite all that, I think America’s interests lie in establishing democracy in the region. Ms. Rice spoke about this, I think.809

The interviewer then says, “Thank you very much, Professor Milani. Of course, the country I was referring to as the violator of human rights which cannot be a defender of international human rights was the Islamic Republic of Iran.”810

During the six months duration of the study, 23 VOA guests were said to have presented “anti-American and/or pro-Islamic stances” on multiple occasions, while only 10 guests advocated “structural changes to the Islamic Republic” and did not make “consistent adversarial or pejorative statements about United States policy.”811 Hooshang Amirahmadi, founder and president of the American Iranian Council and professor of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University, is among the guests in the “anti-American and/or pro-Islamic” camp. The report incorrectly says that Amirahmadi is “one of the few candidates vetted and accepted by the Guardian Council for the 2005 Iranian presidential race.”812 While Amirahmadi did run for the presidential race, he was disqualified by the Guardian Council because of his American citizenship.813

809 Ibid., 8.
810 Ibid.
811 Ibid., 9.
812 Ibid.
It is noteworthy that the personalities under question are not pro-Islamic Republic of Iran figures; rather, their stances are seemingly judged inappropriate as they do not pass the threshold of neoconservative ideological principles. As an example, Abbas Milani, as co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, advocates greater contact between Iranian and American societies because he views such an approach would eventually lead to the weakening and possibly the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Here is an excerpt from a commentary he co-wrote for the Washington Post on December 29, 2007:

Greater contact between Iranian and American societies will further undermine the regime's legitimacy, strengthen the independence of Iranian economic and political groups, and perhaps even compel some regime leaders to cash out and exchange their diminishing political power for enduring property rights. Over the past four decades, autocratic regimes have rarely crumbled as a result of isolation but more often have collapsed when seeking to engage with the West. Even the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred not when tensions between Moscow and Washington were high but during a period of engagement.814

The NSC/Pentagon report’s assessment of Radio Farda was not any more positive. The report charged Radio Farda of failing to perform as an effective “surrogate” news source because it lacked rigorous local coverage of Iranian news. The report said that Radio Farda heavily relied on Iranian sources of news such as the official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) and BAZTAB news website (now renamed TABNAK), which is said to be affiliated with Mohsen Rezai, formerly head of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps. The rest of its news is said to be from other sources such as BBC. In sum, the report charges Radio Farda for failing to lead in the fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the other hand, the Iran Steering Group judged the station to have been strongly critical of President Ahmadinejad.815

Tomlinson, BBG chairman at the time, dismissed the Iran Steering Group’s authority to critique Iran programming. “The author of this report is as qualified to write a report on

814 McFaul and Milani, "The Right Way to Engage Iran."
815 Iran Steering Group, A Study of USG Broadcasting into Iran.
programming to Iran as I would be to write a report covering the operations of the 101st Airborne Division,” Tomlinson said to Knight Ridder Tribune.816 According to the New York Times, the report was prepared by Ladan Archin, a former student of Paul Wolfowitz who was serving in the Defense Department at the time of the report.817 In response to critiques that see Radio Farda as too soft on the Islamic Republic, the station’s staff argued that, to be taken seriously, Radio Farda has to avoid being viewed as an instrument of U.S. propaganda.818

In 2008, Radio Farda conducted exclusive interviews with President George W. Bush819 and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,820 on March 19 and July 8 respectively. President Bush, who spoke from the White House, and Secretary Rice, who spoke at RFE/RL headquarters in Prague, both reiterated that Iran’s government could not be trusted with the technological know-how that could lead to nuclear weapons. They also voiced support for democracy movements inside Iran. In 2007, a number of prominent American and Israeli officials appeared on VOA’s political talk shows. Among the guests were Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad, late Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA), and Israeli Consul General in Los Angeles Enod Danuch. Interviews also included Iranian student leaders and lawyers involved in Amir Kabir University (Tehran) demonstrations.821

817 Azimi, "Hard Realities of Soft Power."
On April 1, 2007, a few days after Gedmin became president of RFE/RL, VOA Persian TV featured an interview with Abdolmalek Rigi, the head of the militant Jundullah that operates in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan from the Pakistani Baluchistan province. Rigi, who was introduced in the VOA program as “head of Baluchis Resistance,” was invited to discuss “internal resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran.” As the head of Jundullah, Rigi has led a number of hostage takings and deadly terrorist attacks in the Sistan Baluchistan province along the Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan tri-border region. On April 3, 2007, the ABC News reported that the group “has been secretly encouraged and advised by American officials since 2005.” On May 22, 2007, ABC News reported that “President Bush has signed a ‘nonlethal presidential finding’” for “a covert ‘black’ operation to destabilize the Iranian government.”

According to a report prepared by Sam Gardiner, a U.S. Air Force retired colonel, “the covert programs of the United States involve efforts for propaganda and disinformation and the support of political minorities” including the Jundullah, the Ahwazi Arab group, and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK). Gardiner maintains that some of the over $120 million Iran Democracy Fund, most of which has gone to fund broadcasting, “seems to have been passed to exile groups that can make connections with opposition groups inside Iran.”

822 Azimi, “Hard Realities of Soft Power.”
825 Ibid.
826 Ibid., "Bush Authorizes New Covert Action against Iran."
827 Gardiner, Dangerous and Getting More Dangerous: The Delicate Situation between the United States and Iran, 10.
828 Ibid.
VOA Persian TV and Radio Farda’s Internet Face

An important element of U.S. public diplomacy is its use of the internet to supplement its broadcasting efforts. This is especially the case in countries where BBG is “facing serious challenges to reach strategically important audiences,” namely Russia, Venezuela, China, Vietnam, and Iran.829 These challenges emanate from local government attempts to jam U.S. broadcasting as well as the changing media consumption habits of target populations. In Iran, for example, internet use has jumped 29 folds since 2000.830 BBG is to invest an additional $6.4 million in internet programming for the 2009 fiscal year, $4.4 million of which comes from reallocation of BBG resources resulting in a $2.0 million net increase in BBG budget. BBG is adding 18 positions to its current staff to implement its internet programming.831

The use of new media technologies has been especially significant in the Persian services.832 Both Radio Farda and Voice of America Persian News Network have strong news-oriented Persian language websites, with frequent news updates and interactive features such as podcast and RSS feed capabilities. Programs are available live from the websites and are archived. VOA also has started a Persian News Blog.

Azeri Language Broadcasting

In its latest efforts to boost its public diplomacy programs for Iran, the United States Government has decided to create a specific Azeri language radio targeting Iran’s largest ethnic minority. In its 2009 budget request to Congress, BBG has proposed to start a daily one-hour Azeri radio program and a companion website as part of the RFE/RL network.833 The program

830 Ibid., 2.
831 Ibid., 1.
832 Ibid.
833 ———, Broadcasting Board of Governors FY 2009 Budget Request, 3.
targets Iran’s Azerbaijani population, the largest Azerbaijani population anywhere in the world including in Azerbaijan, and aims to reach 1.5 million Iranian Azerbaijanis in the future. The new Iranian Azerbaijani programming will draw on the reporting and technical resources of Radio Farda and RFE/RL’s current Azerbaijani Service. The board has requested Congress for $1.2 million to launch this program.

BBG argues that this programming is necessary in part because the Iranian government represses its minorities’ constitutional right to use their languages in the mass media. In fact, Iran has provincial television stations in each of its 30 provinces in addition to its six national TV channels and 14 national radio stations. The provincial television satiations in Iran’s Azeri speaking provinces regularly broadcast Azeri language programs. Iran also broadcasts in Azeri language to its neighboring Azerbaijan as part of its international broadcasting. U.S. government’s strategy of exploiting ethnic strife as a regime change strategy fails to take into account the fact that Azeri community is represented in every asset of Iranian society, including its religious and political strata. For example, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader who is Iran’s head of state and holds the highest political office in the country’s political system, is an ethnic Azeri originally from Khamene, a town in Iran’s East Azerbaijan province.

835 Ibid., 1.
Conclusion

With this extensive account of the different elements of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran, it is now possible to examine similarities between the public diplomacy recommendations of the four Iran policy communities and the policies of the Bush administration. This chapter showed that the underlying goal of public diplomacy toward Iran has been regime change. This approach is contrary to the recommendations of the Strategic Engagement policy community and the Fundamental Change policy community, who advise the U.S. government to drop its so-called “democracy promotion” activities aimed at changing Iran’s government. As was said in the previous chapter, members of the Strategic Engagement policy community, in particular, believe that public diplomacy should aim to decrease tensions and hostilities between the United States and Iran and facilitate the normalization of relations between the two countries. The Strategic Engagement policy community makes the recommendation for facilitative public diplomacy on the grounds that “democracy promotion” efforts have backfired and are thus pragmatically unjustifiable. The Fundamental Change policy community, on the other hand, disapproves of such measures on moral and legal grounds. What is evident, despite this difference, is that the recommendations of these two policy communities do not coincide with the policies that have driven public diplomacy targeting Iran in the Bush administration.

The two other policy communities, namely Punitive Nonengagement and Hawkish Engagement, agree with the Bush administration’s strategic decision to employ all public diplomacy means to achieve regime change in Iran. Their public diplomacy recommendations, nonetheless, embody tactical differences that make the recommendations made by the Punitive Nonengagement policy community more in line with the tactics employed under the Bush administration. Specifically, the Punitive Nonengagement policy community discredits any
public diplomacy move that would benefit political parties or other organizations operating within the framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The very idea of reformists vs. hardliners is downplayed in favor of the generic “Iranian people” vs. “the regime.” Helping the reformists is perceived as giving the Islamic Republic a life line, when it is on the verge of collapse. As this chapter has shown, this mentality emerged as the central element in the Bush administration policy toward Iran. Not only did the U.S. government refrain from engaging Iranian reformists, but it also abstained from engaging existing Iranian NGOs on the grounds that they are all infiltrated by the Iranian government. The Hawkish Engagement policy community, in contrast, finds it in the long term interest of the United States to support the ascendance of Iranian reformists to centers of power in Iran’s government.

Supporting exiled opposition groups is another tactical difference between the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities. The Hawkish Engagement policy community did not recommend the use of exiled opposition groups for achieving regime change in Iran, as most have not demonstrated to command the support of Iranian public. This is said to be especially the case with MKO, who are said to be widely hated in Iran. The Punitive Nonengagement policy community, on the other hand, believes that the U.S. government should enlist the MKO and the monarchists in their efforts at regime change. While it is not clear as to how the Bush administration might have used the services of the MKO, it did vet monarchist groups in preparation for Secretary Rice’s Iran initiative.

Another area of divergence between the Bush administration policy and the Hawkish Engagement policy community is the viability of exploiting ethnic strife in achieving regime change. The Hawkish Engagement policy community believes that exploiting ethnic diversity as a regime change strategy is counterproductive because Iranians have a nationalistic sense of
identity despite their heterogeneous composition, and ethnic minorities are well integrated in the ruling structure. The Punitive Nonengagement policy community, however, does not preclude the use of ethnic diversity as a means for regime change. In line with this stance, the Bush administration decided to create Azeri language radio broadcasting targeting Iran’s Azeri population.

The Punitive Nonengagement policy community was at times highly critical of the quality of the Bush administration public diplomacy for achieving regime change. The members of this policy community were most disapproving of the entertainment orientation of Radio Farda. They also advocated substantial funding of expatriate Los Angeles-based Iranian media. While aspects of both the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy community recommendations for U.S. public diplomacy correlate with Bush administration policies, neither one does so perfectly. The evidence provided in this chapter, nonetheless, shows that the Punitive Nonengagement policy community’s policy preferences correlates more readily with the various components of the U.S. government public diplomacy toward Iran.
7. CONCLUSION: U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARD IRAN AND THE TWO-WAY SYMMETRICAL MODEL

The present study’s final research question asked whether U.S. public diplomacy initiatives toward Iran fit with the two-way symmetrical model, which is in line with the new public diplomacy paradigm. To address this inquiry, this section seeks to assess whether the criteria for two-way symmetrical public diplomacy and new public diplomacy, as explicated in the theory and methodology chapters, have been present in different elements of the Bush administration’s U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran.

The previous chapter showed that regime change was the overarching objective of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran during the Bush administration. Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent in overt and covert public diplomacy initiatives to “support the aspirations of the Iranian people,” to use Secretary Rice’s terms. 840 Other U.S. public diplomacy officials, as quoted in the previous chapter, expressed the opinion that the Iranian people fervently desire regime change. The question remains whether regime change is indeed the aspiration of the Iranian people. As public diplomacy involves “informing, engaging and influencing foreign publics,” 841 it is important to assess the state of Iran’s public opinion before determining the presence of symmetry in United States public diplomacy toward the Iranian people. Recent public opinion polls indicate that international publics especially those in the Middle East hold persistently negative views of the United States and its policies. 842 Earlier, a 2004 Department of Defense report on U.S. strategic communication to the Middle East observed that “the overwhelming majority” of Muslim populations are in “soft opposition” to the U.S.

840 Rice, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Holds Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Proposal for Foreign Affairs.
government’s foreign policies. In the following pages, I would present a summary of recent public opinion polls of the Iranian people to see if Iran’s public opinion environment compares with that of the Middle East as a whole.

**The Myth of the Yearning Masses**

In her February 15, 2006 congressional testimony, Secretary of State Rice likened the Bush administration’s Iran Freedom Agenda to U.S. experience in Poland during the Cold War. Rice said,

> I think the Solidarity model is a good one, where you had numbers of people come together. You had the labor unions in Poland come together, but they also then were joined by the academics, by human rights activists. When people organize themselves and really become unified in calling for change, then you get the change that you need, and we believe that the Iranian people deserve change.” Rice added, “No one wants to see a Middle East that is dominated by an Iranian hegemon.  

The comparison to Poland, however, may not be a good one because the Iranian government is not as weak and as unpopular as Poland’s dictatorship was when an externally supported Solidarity challenged it. In this regard, a January 2009 Congressional Research Service report for Congress asserts, “Many question the prospects of U.S.-led Iran regime change through democracy promotion or other means, short of all-out-U.S. military invasion, because of the weakness of opposition groups.” Moreover, recent polls of the Iranian public, conducted by American and European polling agencies, show that Iranian public opinion is much in line with the stance of Iran’s government on key issues, including Iran’s nuclear energy program. The polls show that while Iranians strongly favor democracy they view their system of governance as democratic. Contrary to the U.S. government depiction of the Iranian public as a

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pro-American populace, polls show that a large majority of Iranians hold negative views of the United States.

According to a 2006 nationally representative survey of 1000 Iranians – conducted jointly by United States Institute of Peace, University of Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes, and Search for Common Ground – there is solid popular support among Iranians for Iran’s nuclear program. Of all the respondents, an extraordinarily large majority (91 percent) said it was important for Iran to develop a “full nuclear fuel cycle” (enrichment capacity for nuclear fuel) with an overwhelming majority (84 percent) saying it was very important for Iran to do so. 846 “Notably, there was no statistically significant variation in responses to the question by gender, age, geographical location, and most other demographic factors.”847 A 96 percent of the respondents believed Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear energy is important for Iran’s economy, with 89 percent of the respondents thinking it is very important.848 An interest in current affairs and residence in Tehran and its vicinity had a statistically significant positive effect on the respondents’ belief that Iran’s nuclear program was important for its economy.849

In response to a question asking about the degree to which respondents felt their country is “governed by representatives elected by the people on a scale of 1 to 10” (where 1 means “not at all” and 10 means “completely”), Iranians gave their country an average score of 6.9 with 61 percent giving a score of 7 or higher. In a concurrent poll, sponsored by the same organizations

848 Kull, Public Opinion in Iran and America on Key International Issues.
849 Fair and Shellman, "Determinants of Popular Support for Iran's Nuclear Program: Insights from a Nationally Representative Survey."
and conducted through Knowledge Networks, Americans gave the United States a comparable rating of 7.3.\textsuperscript{850}

Large majority of Iranians polled held negative views of the United States and its foreign policy, with 93 percent indicating unfavorable attitudes about the U.S. government, 76 percent displaying a negative attitude toward the United States in general, and 78 percent holding unfavorable views of American culture. Views of American people were ambivalent (49 percent unfavorable and 45 percent favorable). When asked about the effect of American bases in the Middle East, 79 percent said the bases have a negative effect with 59 percent saying they have a very negative effect. The poll found strong opposition to American presence in the region with 89 percent saying they opposed such presence and 80 percent saying they were strongly opposed to it. Iranians were very skeptical of United States’ primary goal in its war on terrorism, with only one in ten believing the U.S. primarily seeks to protect itself. A solid majority (76 percent) believed that the primary goal of the U.S. war on terrorism was to either “weaken and divide the Islamic world, the Islamic region, and its people” (29 percent) or to “achieve political and military dominance to control Middle East resources” (47 percent).\textsuperscript{851}

Based on an analysis of the above poll data, Christine Fair, a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, and Stephen Shellman, a professor of International Relations at the University of Georgia, find that in addition to the economic benefits of nuclear energy, Iranians believe that a full nuclear fuel cycle capacity confers the following benefits: serving as an indication of technical competence (74 percent) that adds to Iran’s status (61 percent), serving as “an independent source of energy that reduces Iranian vulnerability to outside pressure [76

\textsuperscript{850} Kull, \textit{Public Opinion in Iran and America on Key International Issues}.  
\textsuperscript{851} Ibid.
percent], and providing at least an existential nuclear deterrent [50 percent].” Of all the benefits, fewest people believed that full nuclear fuel cycle was important because of its deterrence benefit, which was worded as follows, “will deter other countries from trying to economically and politically dominating Iran.”

Interestingly, while Fair and Shellman find a statistically significant positive association between respondents’ negative American opinion and their support for a full nuclear fuel cycle capacity, they find no statistically significant relationship between such support and Iranians’ belief about the vulnerability of a conflict with the Western world or their opinions about nuclear Israel and Iran’s nuclear neighbors. Fair and Shellman conclude, “There is less distance between the sentiment of the [Iranian] public and that of the regime than may be popularly believed. Indeed in some measure the premise of American ‘regime change’ funds presumes a degree of difference that is not supported by these data.”

Other polls of the Iranian public conducted by western polling agencies have produced similar results, pointing to an often overlooked congruency between Iranian government’s policies and Iranian public opinion. A 2008 BBC poll of 4,163 Iranians showed that there is strong public support (94 percent) for Iran’s nuclear program. In response to a question that asked about the two most important issues facing Iran today, only one percent said lack of democracy or need for political reform. The number one issue for most Iranians was the economy (45 percent).

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853 Kull, Public Opinion in Iran and America on Key International Issues, 18.
855 Ynet, "94% of Iranians: We Have Right to Develop Nuclear Plan," http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3655909,00.html.
A 2008 World Public Opinion survey of more than 17,000 adults in 19 countries on governance and democracy shows that Iranians’ view of their country “being governed according to the will of the people” is higher than all but one of the 19 countries polled. Iranian respondents gave their country an average score of 5.9, compared to 4.9 for Great Britain, 4.7 for Russia, and 4.0 for the United States. According to the poll, a substantially large majority of Americans (80 percent) say that “their country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves,” which might explain the low mark for Americans’ view on the United States being run according to the will of the people.\footnote{Steven Kull, \textit{World Public Opinion on Governance and Democracy} (Washington, DC: Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2008), 13, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/may08/WPO_Governance_May08_packet.pdf.} According to the same survey, a significant majority of Iranians express trust in their government to do the right thing most of the time (48 percent) or some of the time (26 percent).\footnote{Ibid.}

A 2006 Zogby International poll of 810 Iranians indicates that the majority of Iranians are either hoping for a change toward a “more religious and conservative” society (36 percent) or are satisfied with Iranian society as is (15 percent). Only 31 percent of respondents said they wish to see Iranian society “more secular and liberal” in the future. Notably, more respondents from the youngest age group expressed support for a more religious direction compared to other age groups (38 percent). Another 18 percent of the 18-29 age group said they wish Iranian society stay as is, which is also higher than the percentage for all respondents (15 percent). Fully 28 percent of the respondents in the younger cohort said that they hope to see Iran more secular and liberal.\footnote{Zogby International, \textit{Poll of Iran May, June 2006} (Washington, DC: Zogby International, 2006), http://www.rd.com/images/content/071306/iranpollresults.pdf.} Evidently, the U.S. government is hoping to increase this substantial minority of
Iranians, who envision a secular and liberal Iran, to achieve a viable popular force for regime change.

In addition to these and similar survey results, the relatively high voter turnout among Iranians is another indication of their overall political attitudes. Despite dissidents’ call for a boycott of elections, mainly voiced through Radio Farda, VOA Persian TV, and the Los Angeles-based expatriate Iranian satellite TV broadcasts to Iran, 63 percent of Iranians participated in the 2005 presidential election.

The high rate of Iranian participation in their present political system and the above survey results show the fallacy of the underlying assumption for a proactive U.S. policy of regime change in Iran that the Iranian public, especially its youth, are strongly pro-U.S., fed up with their system of governance, and longing for the United States to rescue them by changing the regime that has been ruling them since 1979. Such an expectation is what Roger Howard calls “the illusion of popular support.” The assumption is made that “enemy regimes’ are not merely oppressive of ‘the people’ but of a populace distinctly sympathetic to the United States and its values.” From this premise, the illusion follows that “the imposition of regime change is likely to be widely welcomed inside that country.” Sariolghalam maintains that this line of argumentation is advancing an unrealistic picture of Iranian politics. “The overwhelming majority of the people from all walks of life are interested in the state’s efficiency, not in overthrowing it,” he says.

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860 Ibid., 35.
861 Ibid.
Has Iran-Focused U.S. Public Diplomacy Been Symmetrical?

As was explicated in the theory chapter, symmetrical models of public diplomacy (whether one-way or two-way) underscore a willingness on the part of the sponsoring government to be responsive to its stakeholders’ views. In other words, to be symmetrical, the United States has to balance its foreign policy goals and objectives with the needs, goals, and objectives of its various stakeholders. Such an approach to public diplomacy would harmonize the advocacy of the sponsoring government’s policies with an accommodation of the wishes and aspirations of the targeted public. In the case of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran, the different segments of the Iranian public serve as strategic stakeholders of the United States. While the Bush administration spent hundreds of millions of dollars to promote regime change, it ignored a significant portion of Iran’s population (a majority according to the above polls) that opposes U.S.-sponsored regime change. The Bush administration simply ignored this strategic stakeholder by lumping together the entirety of the Iranian population into its own camp. This refusal to consider the needs and aspirations of that segment of Iranian public who oppose United States’ policy of regime change is indicative of the asymmetrical nature of U.S. public diplomacy. Evidently, U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran was aimed at changing the attitudes and behavior of the Iranian public but not those of the United States regarding Iran. It embodied a top-down directive to change the social and political structure of the Iranian society.

Another indication of the asymmetrical nature of U.S. public diplomacy is the Bush administration’s “hierarchical state-centric” approach to public diplomacy, as compared to a “new public diplomacy” approach. In a “hierarchical state-centric model” of international relations, “the foreign ministry and the national diplomatic system over which it presides act as gatekeepers, monitoring interactions between domestic and international policy
environments." As was said in the previous chapter, for example, because of the sanctions that are in place, American NGOs are legally constrained from transacting with the Iranian society unless they obtain a permit from the U.S. Treasury Department. In addition to the Treasury Department, NGOs had to pass through the Department of State’s Middle East Partnership Initiative or the USAID grant application processes. This specific situation, allows the U.S. government to act as a gatekeeper between American NGOs and the Iranian society.

The hierarchical state-centric approach to U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran stands in contrast to the paradigm of new public diplomacy which is not a mere state activity. While NGOs were used as links between the Bush administration and the Iranian society, they operated as grantees of the U.S. government rather than independent actors. In addition, the Bush administration excluded all existing Iranian NGOs on the grounds that they have been infiltrated by the Iranian government. Knowing the asymmetrical nature of U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran, the question remains whether the United States employed two-way communication in this regard.

**Has Iran-Focused Public Diplomacy Employed Two-way Communication?**

In the two-way asymmetrical model of public relations, as discussed in the theory chapter, two-way communication is employed as a mechanism for achieving greater influence in the target audience but no change in the organization. The organization actively employs social science research (e.g., polls and focus groups) to obtain feedback from its target public in order to fine-tune its informational campaign. Thus, for the U.S. public diplomacy to be qualified for the two-way asymmetrical model of public relations, it should have mechanisms for gauging the effectiveness of its public diplomacy outreach.

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The Broadcasting Board of Governors conducts annual measures of audience reach as well as audience perception of program quality, reliability, and credibility. BBG is working to add a new measure for gauging audiences’ enhanced understanding of American culture, institutions, values, and policies as a result of listening to or viewing U.S. government international media. All BBG broadcasting entities will be reviewed on this basis from 2008 to 2013.864

In 2008, BBG spent $26 million for audience research.865 The office of Audience Development for U.S. International Broadcasting is responsible for carrying out audience research to assist BBG in gauging the effectiveness of the broadcasting entities it supervises. In 2008, the program received a “performing – effective” rating for the PART (Program Assessment Rating Tool), which is carried by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.866 The Audience Development program measures each language service’s audience reach, program quality, and credibility.

Audience reach is a measure of language services’ audience size, calculated as the percentage of the target audience that regularly listen/view the relevant broadcasting entities. Regular audience is defined as the percentage of the adult (15+) population listening/viewing at least once a week, as determined by an audience survey that has an adequately designed sample.867 According to the measure, 31.9 percent of all adult Iranians listen to Radio Farda or view VOA Persian TV at least once a week. Audience reach in Afghanistan is said to be 75.7

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866 Ibid.
867 Ibid.
percent. The assessment results indicate that all VOA language programs received a rating of good or better (at least 2.7 out of 4.0 possible points). The rating system is said to be an industry standard used to assess the target audience’s evaluation of the quality of the media. A monitoring panel of regular viewers/listeners from the target audience rates the program’s “accuracy, reliability, authoritativeness, objectivity, comprehensiveness, and other variables reflecting distinct statutory, policy, and mission mandates for the different stations.” In addition, internal and external reviewers assess the quality of “delivery systems (engineering and transmission), marketing and program placement efforts, and other broadcasting support functions.” The resulting cumulative score is determinative of the overall Program Quality Score, which ranges from 1-4. Ironically, the audience-rated quality score is not presented separately. It appears that the addition of the quality of program delivery systems (which is probably high) is used to boost the score for audience’s perception of program quality. Radio Free Iraq has received a quality score of 2.9 (good), and Afghan Radio Network has received a quality score of 3.6 (good to excellent).

The credibility score is determined based on survey responses to questions about “trustworthiness of news and information.” The questions are five-point likert scales with options ranging from very trustworthy to very untrustworthy. The credibility index is the

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868 ———, "Detailed Information on the Broadcasting to near East Asia and South Asia Assessment."
871 Ibid.
872 ———, "Detailed Information on the Broadcasting in Arabic Assessment."
873 ———, "Detailed Information on the Broadcasting to near East Asia and South Asia Assessment."
percentage of respondents answering very or somewhat trustworthy.\textsuperscript{874} The credibility index for Radio Sawa is reported to be 83 percent, and that of Alhurra TV is said to be 72 percent.\textsuperscript{875}

No scores for program quality or credibility are given for Radio Farda and VOA Persian TV, which are directed to Iran. It is not clear whether this lack of information is due to inadequate survey research in Iran, or rather the information is just not presented as is the case with that of most other language services.

BBG received a “performing – effective” rating for broadcasting in Arabic, with an 84 percent score for program results and accountability.\textsuperscript{876} The agency received a “performing – moderately effective” rating for its broadcasting to Near East Asia and South Asia (which includes Iran), with a 67 percent score for program results and accountability.\textsuperscript{877} BBG is designing new assessment programs to gauge the impact of U.S. government broadcasting to enhance audience understanding of United States culture, institutions, and policies.\textsuperscript{878}

During the last six years, the Washington-based InterMedia corporation has been the recipient of BBG’s audience evaluation contract. According to its web site, the corporation “carries out a combination of market, audience and social science evaluation and research in some 60 countries annually,”\textsuperscript{879} including in “difficult-to-access populations” such as those in Iran.\textsuperscript{880} The corporation has the capacity to do large-scale national surveys with up to 10,000 interviews.

InterMedia also conducts longitudinal studies gauging the effectiveness of the U.S. Department of State Youth Exchange and Study Program (YES) “that brings approximately 600

\textsuperscript{874} ———, “Detailed Information on the Audience Development for U.S. International Broadcasting Assessment.”
\textsuperscript{875} ———, “Detailed Information on the Broadcasting in Arabic Assessment.”
\textsuperscript{876} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{877} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{878} Broadcasting Board of Governors, \textit{Broadcasting Board of Governors 2008-2013 Strategic Plan}.
\textsuperscript{879} InterMedia, "About InterMedia Clients," http://www.intermedia.org/about_clients.php.
\textsuperscript{880} ———, "About InterMedia Overview," http://www.intermedia.org/about_firm_overview.php.
students from across the Islamic world to the United States.” Using the indicators and methodologies it has developed for this project, “including online surveying and focus groups,” the corporation reports on the success of the YES program on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{881} InterMedia was founded in 1996, bringing together individuals who had previously worked in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and the British Broadcasting Corporation.\textsuperscript{882}

While this study finds that U.S. public diplomacy toward Iran has not been symmetrical, the use of polling and focus groups for assessing the effectiveness of public diplomacy indicates that it does fit with the two-way asymmetrical public relations model. This finding confirms the study’s hypothesis that the current U.S. public diplomacy efforts toward Iran do not employ the two-way symmetrical model.

It may appear that a two-way symmetrical approach to public diplomacy is paradoxical given the fact that public diplomacy, by its very nature, entails an advocacy of foreign policy. It is indeed paradoxical to ask for symmetrical public diplomacy when the U.S. foreign policy establishment for the most part is resistant to reconsider its aim of regime change to accommodate the needs and aspirations of a large segment of the Iranian people. The emergence of a symmetrical approach to Iran-focused public diplomacy is dependent on a change in the mindset of U.S. foreign policy elites toward Iran. The Strategic Engagement and Fundamental Change policy communities envision such a change in mindset so that the relationship between the United States and Iran is based on mutual respect and reciprocal accommodation and not on coercion, threats, and intimidation.

The findings of this dissertation predict that the Obama administration’s approach to public diplomacy toward Iran will remain asymmetrical. This conclusion is based on the views

\textsuperscript{881} \textit{———}, “About InterMedia Clients.”
\textsuperscript{882} \textit{———}, “About InterMedia Overview.”
expressed by the group of advisors guiding the Obama foreign policy. In an op-ed piece on January 12, 2009, *New York Times* columnist Roger Cohen sarcastically points to the lack of diversity of viewpoints in the Obama administration team of advisors. “The Obama team is tight with information, but I’ve got the scoop on the senior advisors he’s gathered to push a new Middle East policy as Gaza war rages: Shibley Telhami, Vali Nasr, Fawaz Gerges, Fouad Moughrabi, and James Zogby,” Cohen writes.883 “This group of distinguished Arab-American and Iranian-American scholars, with wide regional experience, is intended to signal a U.S. willingness to think anew about the Middle East, with greater cultural sensitivity to both sides, and a keen eye on whether uncritical support for Israel has been helpful,” Cohen fantasizes.

In reality, as Cohen writes, the new Middle East policy team is anything but a departure from the U.S. foreign policy establishment. “They include Dennis Ross (the veteran Clinton administration Mideast peace envoy who may now extend his brief to Iran); James Steinberg (as deputy secretary of state); Dan Kurtzer (the former U.S. ambassador to Israel); Dan Shapiro (a longtime aide to Obama); and Martin Indyk (another former ambassador to Israel who is close to the incoming secretary of state, Hillary Clinton).”884 There is nothing wrong with a foreign policy guided by a group of “smart, driven, liberal, Jewish (or half-Jewish) males; I’ve looked in the mirror,” Cohen writes.885 What is wrong with this setup is its failure “on the diversity front” and “on the change-you-can-believe-in front.”886 It is ironic to hope for success using the failed approach of previous administrations.

As was mentioned in chapter 5, all of the seven Iran issue network members holding key positions in the Obama administration believe in a hawkish engagement strategy with Iran. As

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884 Ibid.
885 Ibid.
886 Ibid.
members of the Hawkish Engagement policy community, these individuals recommend that the United States should in the short term force Iran to change its foreign policy and give up its right to have a full nuclear fuel cycle capacity. But more importantly, like the Bush administration, these individuals agree that regime change remains the ultimate goal of the United States.

Such a perspective entails an asymmetrical relationship between the United States and Iran, the country whose behavior is deemed contrary to American interests in the region. Unlike the position of the Strategic Engagement policy community, the Hawkish Engagement community is not concerned with cooperation with Iran. As such, harmonizing of interests is a nonissue. Instead, the aim is to achieve U.S. objectives by forcing Iran to change through the use of necessary sticks and carrots. Under this framework, the purpose of communication is not cooperation and collaboration, as in symmetrical public relations; rather, it is the asymmetrical goal of changing Iranian society and politics only.

A public diplomacy that is at the service of these foreign policy goals is unlikely to balance these objectives with the interests of the various segments of the Iranian public who hold views contrary to those of the United States. The unchanged substance of U.S. foreign policy will inevitably exacerbate anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, in general, and in Iran, in particular. This lack of reform when coupled with a rhetoric that promises change in the U.S. approach is likely to prove counterproductive.
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APPENDIX A. A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS

January 1883: S. G. W. Benjamin, the first American Ambassador to Iran meets with
Mozafaredin Shah Qajar in Tehran and delivers the letter of President Chester Alan
Arthur.

October 1888: Haj Hossain Nuri, the first Iranian Ambassador to the United States, meets with
President Grover Cleveland in Washington and delivers the letter of Mozafaredin Shah
Qajar.

August 1953: The CIA overthrows the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq by
covertly staging a coup and installing the Shah.

January 1976: President Gerald Ford permits the sale of nuclear technology to Iran.

January 16, 1979: The deposed Shah of Iran is forced to leave Iran for Egypt after his regime is
unable to contain widespread revolutionary demonstrations and strikes.

February 1, 1979: The leader of the Islamic Revolution Imam Ruhollah Khomeini returns from
15 years of exile.

October 22, 1979: The U.S. government allows the Shah to enter the United States despite
objections from Iran’s new revolutionary government.

November 4, 1979: Shah’s regime collapses.

November 4, 1979: Iranian university students seize 63 Americans at U.S. embassy in Tehran,
making their release conditional on U.S. return of the Shah to Iran to face trial.

November 14, 1979: President Carter orders the freeze of $12 billion of Iranian government
assets held in U.S. banks.

April 7, 1980: The United States cuts off diplomatic relations with Iran and starts economic
sanctions.
January 19, 1981: United States and Iran sign the Algiers Accords, which obliges the United States to transfer Iranian assets held in US banks back to Iran. The agreement also requires the United States to pledge not to interfere in Iran’s affairs politically or militarily.

January 20, 1981: Iran releases the imprisoned Americans 444 days after the U.S. embassy’s seizure.

1985-1986: The Iran-Contra affair, in which the Reagan administration used the funds from the sales of arms to Iran to fund the Nicaraguan Contras.


July 1988: U.S. cruiser Vincennes shoots down an Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf, killing all 290 people on board. The U.S. government states the shooting was a mistake.

March 1995: The Clinton administration imposes oil and trade sanctions on Iran.

June 1996: The U.S. Congress passes the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which places a penalty for any company that engages in oil and gas investment projects in Iran and Libya that equal or exceed $40 million.\(^{887}\)

January 2002: In his State of the Union address, President George W. Bush places Iran, Iraq and North Korea in an “axis of evil.”

December 2002: The U.S. government revives its allegations that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program. The allegation comes after the publication of satellite images of a uranium enrichment plant under construction in the Iranian city of Natanz.

May 2003: Iran offers U.S. officials a proposal for comprehensive bilateral talks.

February 2007: U.S. officials allege they have proof that Iran has provided Iraqi insurgents with sophisticated weaponry which have been used to kill American soldiers. Iran rejects the allegation.

May 2007: The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, meets with his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, to discuss Iraq’s security. The meeting marks the first high-level U.S.-Iran talks in almost 30 years.

November 2007: The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate stated that Iran did not, at the time, have a nuclear weapons program. NIE claimed that Iran had stopped one such program in 2003.

November 2008 - President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sends a letter to President Barack Obama congratulating his election as U.S. president. President Obama offered to talk with Iran.
# APPENDIX B. LIST OF DATABASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Database Name</th>
<th>Database Provider</th>
<th>Database Provider’s Description of the Database</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic Search Complete</td>
<td>EBSCO</td>
<td>A multi-disciplinary database, with more than 6,100 full-text periodicals, including more than 5,100 peer-reviewed journals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAO (Columbia International Affairs Online)</td>
<td>Columbia University Press</td>
<td>A database for theory and research in international affairs. Includes working papers from university research institutes, occasional papers series from NGOs, foundation-funded research projects, and proceedings from conferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication &amp; Mass Media Complete</td>
<td>EBSCO</td>
<td>A database with full-text of 350 journals in areas related to communication and mass media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factiva</td>
<td>Dow Jones</td>
<td>Provides full-text access to major national and international newspapers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GuideStar</td>
<td>Philanthropic Research, Inc.</td>
<td>A source of information about U.S. nonprofits, with information on the programs and finances of more than 1.7 million IRS-recognized nonprofits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities International Complete</td>
<td>EBSCO</td>
<td>Includes all data from <em>Humanities International Index</em> (more than 2,100 journals and 2.47 million records). The database includes full text for more than 890 journals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index Islamicus</td>
<td>EBSCO</td>
<td>Indexes worldwide literature in European languages on Islam, the Middle East and the Muslim world. Includes a wide range of periodicals and collective publications, as well as monographs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Security &amp; Counter-Terrorism Reference Center</td>
<td>EBSCO</td>
<td>Includes hundreds of full text journals and periodicals, hundreds of thousands of selected articles, news feeds, reports, summaries, and books that pertain to terrorism and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LexisNexis Congressional</td>
<td>LexisNexis</td>
<td>Provides access to Congressional Indexes produced by or pertaining to the United States Congress. Provides full text for legislation and public policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern &amp; Central Asian Studies Collection</td>
<td>EBSCO</td>
<td>A bibliographic index of research, policy and scholarly discourse on the countries and peoples of the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa. This database contains more than 413,530 records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military &amp; Government Collection</td>
<td>EBSCO</td>
<td>Provides indexing and abstracts for over 500 (with full text for 400) military and general interest publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCLC WorldCat</td>
<td>FirstSearch</td>
<td>Provides access to over 49 million bibliographic records for books, audio-visual materials, maps, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Research Abstracts</td>
<td>EBSCO</td>
<td>Includes bibliographic records covering areas related to peace research, including conflict resolution and international affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PolicyFile</td>
<td>Chadwyck-Healey</td>
<td>Is a resource for U.S. public policy research. Users are able to access information from over 350 public policy think tanks, non-governmental organizations, research institutes, university centers, advocacy groups, and other entities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX C. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IRAN-RELATED PROJECTS GRANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant Recipient</th>
<th>Year and Amount of the Grant</th>
<th>Highlights of the Programs as Provided by the National Endowment for Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Center for International Labor Solidarity</td>
<td>2005 - $185,000</td>
<td>To support the emergence of a sustainable independent labor movement. ACILS will develop and translate labor education and worker rights resources into Farsi, hold a strategic planning meeting to foster an international network of Iranian labor leaders and to develop a work plan, and develop advocacy manuals addressing challenges to the rights of Iranian labor activists. ACILS will also conduct an international workshop for Iranian labor leaders to acquire skills and benefit from the experiences of other trade unionists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for International Private Enterprise</td>
<td>2006 - $156,548 2005 - $55,949 2004 - $55,949</td>
<td>To raise the capacity of Iranian businessmen and businesswomen to engage as private-sector actors and to expand the existing modest networks in Iran that can promote market-oriented reform. CIPE will work to initiate a series of workshops on entrepreneurship in Iran. To inject the voice of business into the reform debate in Iran. CIPE will translate four publications on private sector development, corporate governance and the linkages between democratic and private sector development into Farsi. The publications will be distributed through various networks of academics, business people and the media in Iran and will be posted in electronic format on Iranian websites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Education and Human Rights Foundation</td>
<td>2006 - $100,000</td>
<td>To train Iranian human rights defenders on human rights monitoring, reporting, and fact finding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation for Democracy in Iran</td>
<td>1995 - $50,000 1996 - $25,000</td>
<td>The Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI) received Endowment support to document the human rights situation inside Iran through first-hand monitoring, which will include calling local Iranian news reports that are not available in the West. FDI will engage qualified reporters and other sources inside Iran. FDI</td>
</tr>
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</table>

888 National Endowment for Democracy, "Democracy Projects Database."
will publish this information in regular reports and
distribute them to the international media, other human
rights groups and policy makers. To inform the Iranian
public on their basic human and political rights, the
information will be aired through international
broadcast services such as the Voice of America and
the BBC, in both English and Farsi, as well as through
television networks. FDI also maintains an Internet
Web site that facilitates international dissemination of
its reports, including inside Iran.

| Institute of World Affairs | 2005 - $45,800 | To start the debate for judicial reform through research,
training programs, and legal consultations focusing on
problematic issues of law and justice in Iran. IWA will
organize a conference and a series of discussion
seminars to discuss the relationship between Sharia and
Western concepts of the rule of law. |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
<td>2005 - $110,000</td>
<td>To support reformist elements in Iran and attempt to end their current isolation through a pilot project that seeks to link Iranian political activists to democratic reformers in other countries. The program will develop an international support network for Iranian reformers as well as strengthen their communications and organizing capacity through the provision of skills-building and increased access to information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Iranian American Council</td>
<td>2006 - $107,000, 2005 - $64,000, 2002 - $25,000</td>
<td>To foster cooperation between Iranian NGOs and the international civil society community and to strengthen the institutional capacity of NGOs in Iran. NIAC will conduct a three-week training program on project design and grant writing for a group of 14 Iranian civil society leaders. NIAC will assist the trainees in designing a project to be implemented inside Iran and developing grant proposals for their prospective projects. To strengthen the capacity of civic organizations in Iran, NIAC will hire a Farsi-English speaking expert to advise local groups on project development, proposal writing and foreign donor relations. To design and implement a two-day media training workshop in Iran for forty staff members from five civic groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital Voices Global Partnership</td>
<td>2004 - $40,500</td>
<td>Vital Voices will conduct a leadership training-of-trainers seminar in Washington, DC for five emerging women leaders. These women will form a core group of trainers who in turn will train and support other Iranian women.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VITA

Foad Izadi was born in September 1969 in Tehran, Iran, to Ezzatollah Izadi and Akram Ghaffari. He moved to the United States when he was 16 years old. Foad attended Robert E. Lee High School in Houston, Texas, and got his diploma in 1987. He received his Bachelor of Science degree in economics from the University of Houston in 1992. He then started a small business before returning to University of Houston to continue his studies.

In 2005, Foad received his Master of Arts in Mass Communication degree from the School of Communication at the University of Houston. His master’s thesis was “A Discourse Analysis of American Newspaper Editorials: The Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” for which he received distinction. In 2007, he published an article with the same title in the Journal of Communication Inquiry.

In fall 2005, Foad joined the doctoral program of the Manship School of Mass Communication at the Louisiana State University to earn a doctorate in mass communication and public affairs with an emphasis in international political communication and a minor in political science. His teaching experience while at the Manship School includes comparative media systems, introduction to mass media, and foundations of media research. He completed his coursework at the Manship School with a GPA of 4.0. Foad’s research interests include propaganda, public diplomacy, international political communication, persuasive communication, and public opinion formation and development. He coauthored an article on the ethics of public diplomacy in the first ever Public Diplomacy Handbook published by Routledge in 2009.

Foad has been married to Hakimeh Saghaye-Biria since 1998. Their first daughter, Mahdiah, was born in 2002, and their second daughter, Masumah, was born in 2006.