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The Role of Norms in UN Peacekeeping Operations: European Union Member States and Collective Identity Formation

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The Role of Norms in UN Peacekeeping Operations: European Union Member States and Collective Identity Formation

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1. Introduction

What factors influence a state's decision to participate in UN peacekeeping operations? Typically, this debate has centered on the realist explanation of national interests: states view UN peacekeeping as an extension of their foreign policy tools and a way of promoting national security. However, despite its survival, this explanation, though still at the center of many arguments, has become more specific through its use in case studies of particular countries, demonstrating how different facets of realism can serve as an explanatory guide to state motivations.

In addition to this approach, further theoretical approaches have been adopted in response to the question. Other scholars have approached the question of state motivations through structural institutionalism, focusing either on the UN's institutional capacities or the internal decision-making apparatuses of individual states. Unsatisfied with approaches which focus exclusively on the state, still other scholars have identified changes in the debate on humanitarian intervention as crucial, while others have focused on the role of the media, also referred to as 'the CNN effect.'¹ More recently, globalization or 'global culture' has been proposed as an explanatory link for understanding state participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Yet what none of these explanations fully considers is the importance of international norms in state decision-making. Rather than strictly focusing on either the international environment or the state, it would be more useful to try to understand the relationship between both. In *Social Theory of International Politics*, political scientist Alexander Wendt

¹ The 'CNN effect' is a term in political science which suggests a causal link between the media and foreign policy decision-making.

provides the theoretical foundation for this approach by arguing that national interests are made of ideas, rather than material factors, such as human nature or constraints exerted upon them by the anarchy of the international system. States act based on their understandings of their interests and their perceptions of other states, thereby creating and sustaining the international environment in which they live.² A social constructivist approach to state decision-making would therefore be interested in the internalization of norms that might affect participation in UN peacekeeping operations. I am particularly interested in how the formation of a collective identity among member states of the European Union has influenced their foreign policies.

Although the values articulated in the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy were perhaps previously shared outside of the EU, the articulation and codification of these values have additionally shaped member-states. Through internalization of these values and more importantly, social interaction, the European Union contributes to the notion of a collective identity among its member states. Although perhaps still in its formative stages, I argue that because these states are participants in a supranational organization, they are more concerned with pursuing a policy guided by collective security than one of selective engagement. I will further explore this argument in the next section, particularly concerning how EU member states have internalized the norm of collective security. I am first interested in what the current literature offers to the question of states' motivations.

² Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 92-96; 113-134.

2. Review of the Literature on State Decision-making in UN Peacekeeping Operations

I. National Interests

1. The Cold War

Despite the emergence of other views, the realist perspective, emphasizing the anarchy of the international system and the state as a rational, unitary actor, continues to dominate the literature on state decision-making. Understanding the variety of realisms can help to understand the argument's pervasiveness. In "Competing Realist Perspectives on Great Power Crisis Behavior," Benjamin Miller identifies four veins of realism that offer different perspectives on state behavior: power politics, balance of power, hegemonic, and international society.³ Cold War explanations of states' motivations are unique in their almost exclusive focus on the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is certainly difficult to draw upon these explanations for support today since they assume a specific bipolar structure of international politics. However, they are still useful for understanding the foundation of the national interests explanation for peacekeeping. In understanding Cold War peacekeeping, it is also important to note that Security Council Members did not participate in peacekeeping operations based on the principal of neutrality. Still, within the Security Council, the two superpowers exercised considerable control over operations through their authorization of mandates and veto power.⁴

³ Benjamin Miller, "Realist Perspectives on Great Power Crisis Behavior," *Security Studies*, Volume 5.3, Spring 1996, 309.

⁴ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006, 12-14.

In *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*, Indar Jit Rikye explains the efforts of both superpowers to isolate the conflicts that had resulted from the decolonization process, as in Indonesia and Pakistan, through UN operations. Rikye argues that the United States, more than the Soviet Union, supported the system, ultimately transforming it into a tool of U.S. foreign policy. Still, since the 1950s, the ability of the system to function reflected the willingness of both superpowers to participate in it.⁵ Similarly, Alan James acknowledges the influence of the great powers on the success or failure of UN peacekeeping in general. However, his argument differs from Rikhye's in its prediction that UN peacekeeping, although dependent on the support of the Soviet Union and the United States, was not strictly a result of the Cold War. Because of peacekeeping's ad hoc nature, he argued that it did not totally reflect the international environment and was therefore likely to continue beyond the Cold War.⁶

In his study of international conflicts from 1946 - 1977, Mark Zacher moves slightly away from the superpowers to explain the behavior of other states either in the superpowers' coalitions or the nonaligned coalition. However, he describes these states almost exclusively in terms of the superpowers, emphasizing that, because both the United States and the Soviet Union were capable of threatening the security of the states in their coalitions, these states generally acquiesced in questions of international security.⁷

William Durch describes how the increased cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in UN peacekeeping operations developed towards the end of the Cold War, allowing the UN to increase the number and scope of its operations. During the 1980s,

⁵ Indar Jit Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*, London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 1984, 7-8; 224.

⁶ Alan James, *The Politics of Peacekeeping*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1969, 435

⁷ Mark Zacher, *International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946 - 1977*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, 38-39.

Soviet support of peacekeeping operations allowed the UN to play a more significant role in the area of international security. However, minus the Soviet threat, the United States' initiative to become involved was reduced. Durch argues that cooperation between the two states during the 1990s allowed the United Nations to increase the number and scope of its operations. Like Rikhye, he emphasizes that, ultimately, the system would not be able to function without great power support, particularly the support of the United States.⁸ Other scholars, writing several years after Durch's publication in 1993, were less optimistic about the continuation of this support.

2. Post-Cold War: An Agenda for Peace?

The increasing complexity of UN peacekeeping operations following the end of the Cold War added to uncertainty about the future of peacekeeping. Between 1987 and 1994, the number of peacekeeping operations tripled, and the number of military forces involved multiplied by seven. In *Making War and Building Peace*, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis describe the post-Cold War changes: "[t]he traditional borders between sovereign consent and intervention were blurred. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement almost merged into 'robust peacekeeping,' which signaled a willingness to use force if needed whether in consent-based peacekeeping or imposed peace enforcement."⁹ Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali articulated the increasing complexity demanded of peacekeepers in his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*. In the post-Cold War world, he hoped that United Nations security policy would consist of preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. This more inclusive definition of

⁸ William Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 23-26.

⁹ Doyle and Sambanis, 7.

peacekeeping implied more serious consideration of the use of force as well as the possibility of longer-term missions.¹⁰

Doyle and Sambanis organize Boutros-Ghali's description of future peacekeeping into three "generations" of peacekeeping that had evolved since the end of World War Two. These three generations comprise the variety of functions that peacekeepers can play, either as temporary or long-term mediators. Rather than viewing these generations as perfectly evolutionary steps in peacekeeping, they acknowledge that there has been some overlap, citing, for example, the ONUC mission in the Congo from 1960-1964 as an example of a second-generation peace-keeping operation¹¹. However, in the post-Cold War world, they view these three generations as operating simultaneously, observing that "[t]he result...was an unprecedented expansion of the UN's role in the protection of world order and in the promotion of basic human rights in countries, until recently, torn by costly civil wars."¹²

The following year, in 1993, Adam Roberts responded to Boutros-Ghali's policy suggestions. He acknowledged that states had moved away from exclusive reliance on unilateral intervention, but argued that they were far less willing to relinquish their sovereignty than Boutros-Ghali assumed. States still disagreed over major security issues, as well as whether the UN was capable of handling them. Furthermore, the conflicts that the UN might become involved in had grown more dangerous and more intractable, probably necessitating more than an observation mission and therefore leading to less willingness on the behalf of states to participate.¹³

¹⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Peace*. New York: United Nations, 1992.

¹¹ Doyle and Sambanis, 11.

¹² Doyle and Sambanis, 17.

¹³ Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," *Survival*, Vol. 35.2, Summer 1993, 4-5; 27.

Michael Mandelbaum focuses specifically on how domestic impatience with the increasing complexity of peacekeeping would lead to less willingness on behalf of states to participate. He initially offers a more optimistic understanding of peacekeeping operation than Roberts, arguing that the operations in Somalia and Yugoslavia were undertaken primarily as humanitarian endeavors to protect those countries' citizens. However, because this type of peacekeeping operation is inevitably political, long-term, and expensive, it is ultimately unsupportable by the American public. He concludes that the UN's member-states ultimately lack the will to intervene in complicated situations.¹⁴

Steven Ratner and Agostinho Zacarias also discuss the problem of high-risk operations. Following the end of the Cold War and the Security Council consensus on second-generation operations, the five permanent members began to offer troops to peacekeeping operations as a way of demonstrating their great power status. However, because these states are also risk-averse, they will typically pressure the UN to modify its mandate or withdraw from a mission altogether if their nationals encounter harm. If neither of these developments takes place, they may choose to uninvolve themselves from the mission.¹⁵ Agostinho Zacarias also identifies the most dissuasive factor for participation as the high level of risk. He predicts that peacekeeping operations which require enforcement will preclude high levels of member state involvement.¹⁶

The failure of the UN to react to the crisis in Rwanda demonstrated the difficulty of UN member-states to cohere in response to humanitarian emergencies. Specifically, Stephen

¹⁴ Michael Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 95, Summer, 1994, pp. 3-18.

¹⁵ Steven Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: UN Organs and Supporting Participants*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, 81-82.

¹⁶ Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*. New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999, 177-178.

Hill and Shahin Malik argue that the reluctance of the Clinton's administration to involve itself in the conflict in Rwanda in 1994 set an example for other UN member-states for the near future.¹⁷ In 1990, Augustus Norton and Thomas Weiss had similarly focused on the continued importance of the United States as well as Russia even in the post-Cold War, attributing the resurgence in UN peacekeeping operations and the increasing acceptance of the use of force primarily to policy shifts by the two superpowers.¹⁸

Likewise, Bruce Russett and James Sutterlin cautioned that UN peacekeeping would always be sensitive to the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁹ However, they also echo an observation Alan James had made in his 1969 publication, *The Politics of Peacekeeping*: that opposition from smaller states might prevent the two superpowers from cooperating to intervene anywhere they wished. Smaller countries would be reluctant to allow peacekeeping operations without the full consent of all parties involved.²⁰ It is debatable, however, whether these countries would be able to prevent these operations or not; in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, Dorinda Dallmeyer describes the fear from the developing world of being excluded from this debate altogether.²¹

Other realist explanations in the post-Cold War era focus more entirely on all or almost all of the UN member-states, either by referring to "states" in general, or by exploring particular decisions by individual states. In her article, "UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?" Laura Neack introduces two conflicting notions about peacekeeping:

¹⁷ Stephen Hill and Shahin Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996, 155-156.

¹⁸ Thomas Weiss and Augustus Norton, "Superpowers and Peacekeepers," *Survival*, Vol. 32.3, May 1990, 220.

¹⁹ Bruce Russett and James Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70.2, Spring 1991, 69-83.

²⁰ Alan James, *The Politics of Peacekeeping*, 427.

²¹ Dorinda Dallmeyer in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, Eds. Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes. London: MacMillan Press, 1995, 33.

on the one hand, the idealist explanation that states are now able to work together in the UN to promote international norms and maintain peace and, on the other, the realist explanation that states are growing more cautious about the encroachment of the UN on their national sovereignty, and therefore, more selective about choosing whether or not to participate. Neack argues that states use the neutrality of peacekeeping to intervene in other states for purely national interests. She focuses on the peacekeeping endeavors of the Western middle powers, arguing that their frequent participation supports the argument that participants are those states most likely to benefit from the status quo. These Western middle powers use peacekeeping to advance their national interests in areas outside of their spheres of influence, particularly the Middle East. However, unlike Alan James, she argues that participation by these middle powers would decline in the post-Cold War era as the tensions between the two superpowers decreased.²²

Like Mandelbaum, Neack also draws upon the international community's protest, for example in Somalia, to the over-reach of UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s and open rhetoric of public officials over the fear of that the UN would delimit national sovereignty. How are these debates to be reconciled with the idealist explanation for state participation in peacekeeping? In addition, she asks why the decision-making process has not yet developed into a more democratic practice, allowing the involvement of more states. She predicts that the West may use its dominance of international peacekeeping to design a system that will allow it to frequently intervene in the affairs of non-Western states.²³

The Stimson Center's publication in 1991, "Peacekeeping and the National Interest" exemplifies Neack's observation. The authors recommend that the U.S. participate in UN

²² Laura Neack, "UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32.2, May 1995, pp. 181-196.

²³ Op. cit.

peacekeeping operations because they would be a useful tool for exercising U.S. foreign policy. Further, acting collectively would relieve the United States of some of the financial burden and lend its policy credibility.²⁴ Similarly, Anthony Parsons argues that the United Nations had been useful for Great Britain as a foreign policy tool by serving as an intermediary between parties in conflict and persuading them towards a resolution as well as providing an “escape-route” for states when they have tied themselves up in over-ambitious policies (for example, as was the case with Great Britain and France during the Suez crisis of 1956).²⁵

Like Neack, Terry Terriff and James Keeley focus on the unwillingness of states to participate in peacekeeping operations when it is not in their national interest. They develop a ‘window of opportunity’ concept to explain how states may still be willing to participate when they believe that a peacekeeping operation would serve their interests. This concept identifies factors which may facilitate or delimit involvement in a UN peacekeeping operation. The intensity and scale of a conflict as well as the type of conflict are significant factors in lowering the threshold for participation. However, other more political factors, such as the alignment and power of the states are also influential. Like Neack, Terriff and Keeley predict that the end of the Cold War, and therefore, the decrease in conflicts directly connected to the superpowers, would lead to a decrease in participation. They argue that the cases of Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Haiti, all cases in which the UN operation was either led

²⁴ Working Group on Peacekeeping and the U.S. National Interest, “Peacekeeping and the U. S. National Interest,” Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994, 2-3.

²⁵ Anthony Parsons in *United Nations, Divided World*, Eds. Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, 47-60.

by one state or initiated by the actions of one state, demonstrate the will of states to use peacekeeping operations to protect their interests.²⁶

Terriff and Keeley's interpretation of these operations reflects one of the four categories, "backyard operations," that Alan James invented in his 1990 publication, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, to describe types of peacekeeping operations. He intended for these to be more than theoretical explanations, but instead interpretations of how peacekeeping operations had played out up until that time and might play out in the future. All four categories reflect the intensely political nature of peacekeeping, but the term "backyard operations" indicates the particular willingness of states to intervene when a conflict is in their national interests.²⁷

II. Selected Case Studies of State Decision-making

Excluding considerations of the international environment and state institutions certainly simplifies the question of when states will or will not participate in peacekeeping operations. However, understanding these interests as subjective rather than given would provide a more critical approach. The following publications move in this direction by examining states' motivations on an individual basis, indicating the different meaning of national interests for different states. Because these arguments are state-specific, they are not necessarily limited to one theoretical lens and move slightly beyond what Cindy Collins and Thomas Weiss criticize as the "ultrasimplistic notion of national interests."²⁸ These publications are the most difficult to situate, since they retain the traditional realist

²⁶ Terry Terriff and James F. Keeley, "The United Nations, Conflict Management, and Spheres of Interest." *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 2.4, Winter 1995, 512-526.

²⁷ Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, 13.

²⁸ Cindy Collins and Thomas Weiss, *An Overview and Assessment of 1989 - 1996 Peace Operations Publications*, Providence, Rhode Island: Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1996, 94.

explanation of national interests at the center of their arguments, but occasionally acknowledge the presence of other factors. Still, most of these authors are reluctant to do more than provide context for the national interests argument.

In *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, for example, Angela Kane stays close to the national interests explanations in her descriptions of state motivations. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been particularly motivated to participate in peacekeeping, which Kane attributes to an interest in increasing the morale of the military, protecting Russian interests abroad, and earning revenue to offset its military budget. Similar to Russia, France and Great Britain participate in peacekeeping operations in order to symbolize and maintain their international status. China, on the other hand, has insulated itself from peacekeeping operations as well as the peacekeeping debate. Unlike some of the Western democracies, its decisions to participate are not significantly influenced by public opinion or military experience.²⁹

Aside from Security Council members, both Japan and Germany were forced to re-evaluate their contributions to some extent, following criticism from their Western allies in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, Japanese participation has remained limited, due to the public pressure towards isolationism. German citizens have, on the whole, supported involvement in non-combat, humanitarian operations, but have only reluctantly agreed to participation in operations which sanction the use of force, such as the operation in Somalia. At the time of writing, in 1994, a debate over the legality of the operations was underway in the Bundestag. Kane suggests, however, that German involvement would not increase without wide

²⁹ Angela Kane in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, Eds., Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes. London: MacMillan Press, 1995, 120-128.

consensus from the population, echoing both Michael Mandelbaum and Laura Neack's arguments.³⁰

Trevor Findlay attributes motivations of most of the member-states to considerations of national interests, but also considers altruism or national identity as factors. He observes that motivations have not changed significantly since the end of the Cold War, but that some states, such as the Caribbean states that participated in the U.S.-led Haiti operation, and Tajikistan, which participated in UNITAF, can be explained by great power pressure. Other states, such as Canada, Norway, and Sweden, which are long-time participants, may become involved based on their national identity as peacekeepers. He acknowledges, however, that this altruism is also mixed with a desire to increase international prestige, a consideration particularly important for former republics of the Soviet Union.³¹

In her introduction to *Major Powers and Peacekeeping*, Rachel Utley echoes Findlay and Kane by describing the increasing selectivity of the major powers in deciding when to participate in peacekeeping.³² Using this observation as a starting rather than concluding point establishes an even more pessimistic framework for understanding great power crisis behavior. Edward Spiers describes the decline in U.S. participation and the unwillingness of the U.S. to participate unless it is in charge of the mission. He predicts that the events of September 11 would lead to further disinclination.³³ Like Kane, Isabelle Facon notes Russia's increased interest in peacekeeping, but also focuses on the Russian difficulty of reaching a political consensus and the inability of the military to rise to the demand for

³⁰ Ibid, 129-132.

³¹ Trevor Findlay, ed., *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 3-7.

³² Rachel Utley and Owen A. Hartley in *Major Powers and Peacekeeping*, Ed. Rachel Utley, Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006, 1.

³³ Edward Spiers in *Major Powers and Peacekeeping*, 63-80.

language and other tactical skills.³⁴ Gary Rawnsley connects Chinese and Japanese interests in peacekeeping to wider foreign policy interests, but predicts that the United States' War on Terror would contribute to confusion in Chinese and Japanese decisions to participate in peacekeeping.³⁵ David Francis also examines the effects of the location of the peacekeeping operation, finding, similar to Neack, that in Africa, because major powers do not believe their national interests to be at risk, they are more reluctant to intervene than in the Middle East, where they, particularly the United States, do.³⁶

In *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, David Sorenson and Christina Wood offer varied explanations for the motivations of Australia, Germany, Argentina, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Nigeria, India, Austria, and Canada. Similar to other writers interested in post-Cold War peacekeeping, they are pessimistic about the future of UN peacekeeping. They describe the status of peacekeeping at the time of writing (2002) as retrenched, due to the increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations and the difficulty of success in the 1990s.³⁷ Like Findlay, the contributors to this volume expand their explanations slightly to incorporate perspectives other than realism. They cite a variety of motivations: "increasing international status and prestige, gaining regional influence, safeguarding or securing a permanent seat in the Security Council, access to training and weapons, containing regional instability, and humanitarian concerns."³⁸ The realist perspective, however, remains at the center of several of these explanations. Hugh Smith, for example, attributes the rise in Australia's participation in peacekeeping operations

³⁴ Isabelle Facon in *Major Powers and Peacekeeping*, 31-48

³⁵ Gary Rawnsley in *Major Powers and Peacekeeping*, 81-100.

³⁶ David Francis in *Major Powers and Peacekeeping*, 101-118.

³⁷ David Sorenson and Christina Pia Wood, eds. *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Frank Cass, 2005, 3.

³⁸ Ibid, 4.

to its interest in promoting its own regional security and extending its international influence.³⁹ Like Kane, Wood identifies France's motivations for participation as protection of international prestige and particular interests in former colonies.⁴⁰ However, this volume also includes other explanations, which I will return to later, which venture further from the traditional realist explanation.

III. Structural Institutionalism

1. State Structures and Position in the International System

In their bibliography on 1989 - 1996 peace operations publications, Cindy Collins and Thomas Weiss encourage scholars and policy makers to "augment the simplistic national interest explanation for why states do or do not contribute to peace operations with more subtle and empirical analyses--that is, more research into what drives foreign policies and fewer conceptions based on opinion."⁴¹ They identify several studies which take a closer look at particular states' motivations for participating in peacekeeping operations and offer more complex explanations.⁴²

For example, structural institutionalist explanations for state motivations open the state to further inspection than the national interests explanation. Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach's volume, *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*, offers recommendations for expanding U.S. peacekeeping operations and explains the current barriers, both institutional and conceptual, which prevent this expansion. In their

³⁹ Hugh Smith in *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, 9-28.

⁴⁰ Pia Christina Wood in *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, 68-94.

⁴¹ Cindy Collins and Thomas Weiss, *An Overview and Assessment of 1989 - 1996 Peace Operations Publications*, Providence, Rhode Island: Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1996, 90.

⁴² Collins and Weiss, 91-92.

introduction, Chayes and Raach describe the difficulty for the U.S. government in reconceptualizing the zero-sum game of the Cold War to allow room for peacekeeping in military policy. They also describe organizational barriers, such as the lack of coordination between Congress and the executive branch. More clarity surrounding the implications of peacekeeping operations, (for example, clarifying that they do not diminish combat readiness but may in fact enhance it) would help to resolve this lack of coordination.⁴³

In *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, edited by William Durch, Ivo H. Daalder focuses on structure, but even more specifically on General Colin Powell, as an explanatory factor in the U.S.' reluctance to participate in peacekeeping operations. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations found it difficult to “overcome the long-standing resistance by the U.S. military to participate actively in UN operations.” In this case, members of the Executive Office, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations supported full participation in UN operations, but General Powell opposed them. His opposition might not have been so fundamental, had it not been for President Clinton’s own lack of military experience and the Republican Party’s interest in supporting Powell for the foreseeable future.⁴⁴

This example illustrates the wider importance of individuals in an administration. In addition to military officials, Congressional members with military experience also play an important role in decisions over peacekeeping. Other sources that focus on these internal governmental structures and the relationships between them include *Uneasy Partners: NGOs*

⁴³ Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach, *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*. Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995, 7.

⁴⁴ Ivo Daalder in *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, Ed., William Durch. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, 35-68.

and the US Military in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, produced by the U.S. Army War College, *The US Military/NGO Relationships in Humanitarian Intervention*, by Chris Seiple, and *The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars* by Deborah Avant.

Also relevant for a structural institutionalist approach is the position of a state in the international system. In *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, Trevor Findlay explores how a state's position changes considerations of peacekeeping. For Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, and Pakistan, peacekeeping serves as a possible route to permanent membership in the Security Council, if membership rules were ever to change or expand. Interestingly, Findlay describes the participation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as "down payments" for their possible future need of peacekeeping operations in their own countries. For Greece, Egypt, El Salvador, Israel, Jordan, Namibia, South Korea, and Zimbabwe, current peacekeeping may be a sort of repayment for previous peacekeeping operations. He identifies the most attractive facet of peacekeeping for states as the overseas experience and contact with other international military forces that it offers.⁴⁵

Likewise, Kane's explanations for the motivations of Asian, Latin American, and African countries vary slightly from the explanations of great power participation. Although these states may use peacekeeping as a way to increase their international prestige, they also participate to assert the presence of the developing world. For example, Kane attributes Malaysia's motivation primarily to its self-understanding as a "champion of the Third World," and specifically, to help fellow Muslims, as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Latin America, Kane focuses on the efforts of Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina to participate in peacekeeping operations as a way of increasing their status in the international system. Kane

⁴⁵ Findlay, ed., 8-9.

also underlines Brazil's participation in the operations in the Portuguese-speaking countries of Angola and Mozambique. Although Africa has become most often the target of UN peacekeeping operations, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, and Tunisia have contributed regularly, and Morocco, Egypt, and Zimbabwe emerged as newcomers in the early 1990s. Zimbabwe, in particular, under Mugabe has indicated its interest in leading the developing world's commitment to African security. Similarly, Egypt demonstrated its sense of geopolitical responsibility in its participation in the peacekeeping operation to Somalia. However, Kane also notes Egypt's motivation to participate for the compensation, usually of \$1,000 per soldier per month, which far exceeds Egypt's average per capita income of \$610.⁴⁶

2. Bureaucracies of the United Nations

In addition to these examinations of structural processes within a state and the state's position in the international system, other scholars have explored how the United Nations as a whole affects contributions to peacekeeping operations, by focusing on either its bureaucratic structure or its role as a manager of collective security. In *The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies*, David Pitt describes the role of the political elite in influencing which issues are brought to the table and controlling how finances will be allocated. Writing in 1986, he portrays UN peacekeeping as a disaster, characterized by "many signs of a social pathology," concluding that reform of the bureaucracy in the area of human rights and peace has yet to occur.⁴⁷ Similarly, James O. C. Jonah, in his speech "Differing State Perspectives on the United Nations in the post-Cold War World," given at Brown University in 1993,

⁴⁶ Ibid, 133-141.

⁴⁷ David Pitt in *The Nature of United Nations Bureaucracies*, Eds., Pitt and Weiss. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986, pp. 23-38.

expressed disturbance over the club-like atmosphere in the Security Council. Close cooperation among the council members has played out in informal discussions regarding security decisions, which often exclude the parties involved in a conflict.⁴⁸ These observations move slightly away from understanding a particular state's motivations, but nonetheless help to provide the context for understanding the opposition of developing countries to what they perceive to be Western domination of peacekeeping and the peacekeeping debate.

Other scholars have written on peacekeeping through the lenses of institutionalism, collective learning, and regime theory. In their introduction to *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, Roberts and Kingsbury observe that "it is commonly said that the UN is nothing more than the sum of its parts. However, it is important to also recognize how institutions can develop a life and ethos of their own."⁴⁹ In this vein, Ernst Haas provides an interesting analysis of the UN as a whole through theories of collective calculations and learning. He argues primarily that "states are able to change their policies as a result of realizing that earlier policies failed."⁵⁰ However, because the actors involved in deciding whether to participate in peacekeeping operations are concerned with short-term success only, it is difficult for them to recognize constraints on their behavior, such as isolation that might result from pursuing unilateral policies.⁵¹ Yet over time, even "states devoid of altruism can be reasonably expected to become aware of their enmeshment in a situation of

⁴⁸ James O. C. Jonah, "Differing State Perspectives on the United Nations in the post-Cold War World." Providence, Rhode Island: Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1993, 11-12.

⁴⁹ Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury in *United Nations, Divided World*, Eds., Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, 4.

⁵⁰ Ernst B. Haas in *Collective Security in a Changing World*. Boulder, Ed., Thomas G. Weiss, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1993, 68.

⁵¹ Ernst B. Haas, *United Nations and Collective Management of International Conflict*, New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1986, 53-54.

strategic interdependence...⁵² He emphasizes, nonetheless, that this process of institutional learning is slow-moving and fragile.⁵³

Kenneth Dombroski proposes the idea of understanding United Nations peacekeeping or a set of peacekeeping operations in a particular region as a regime. Like Haas, he is interested not only in the long-term effects of states on peacekeeping but also of peacekeeping on state behavior.⁵⁴ However, ultimately his conclusions line up with realism rather than institutionalism: his study of peacekeeping in the Middle East reveals that the peacekeeping regime adapted in response to the states involved in it, as opposed to the other way around.⁵⁵ Rather than serving as a causal factor in itself in understanding state behavior, UN peacekeeping is understood as “an intervening variable between causal factors.”⁵⁶

By opening the black box of the state, these structural institutionalist explanations shed further light on the question of states’ motivations. However, considering the extent to which state and international institutions are subject to norms would build upon these explanations even more. Institutions may ultimately be more important as intermediary rather than causal variables.

IV. Constructivism

1. Changing State Identities

In addition to the structural institutionalist and realist arguments, constructivism provides another perspective for understanding state participation in peacekeeping

⁵² Ibid, 54.

⁵³ Ibid, 56-57.

⁵⁴ Kenneth Dombroski, "When Institutions Matter: Peacekeeping as an International Regime." *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, USA, Mar 22, 2006*, 1-4.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 38.

⁵⁶ Op. cit.

operations. Constructivist arguments may focus either on changing norms in the humanitarian intervention debate as a causal explanation or more specifically on state identities. The following arguments are related to the argument that I wish to make in their understandings of state identities as shifting in the context of a changing international environment. However, rather than treating changing state identities and the changing international environment as separate, I am more interested in how they are mutually constitutive. In *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, Weiss et. al. recognize this relationship by linking Lawrence Finkelstein's observation that there has been a general move away from the acceptance of the Westphalian state to their observation that states are increasing to "subordinate authority and independence to multilateral norms and procedures."⁵⁷ Like Haas, they argue that states are capable of collective learning, and have adjusted their security policies as a result of changes in UN peacekeeping and changes in how they perceive their interests.⁵⁸

Some of the literature on states' identities focuses exclusively on the 'old' peacekeepers, such as Canada, Australia, and Norway, who perhaps are not so helpful for understanding recent changes, since they have contributed to peacekeeping for so long. More relevant is the shifting debate on humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War, which has affected and been affected by the shifting of the newer peacekeepers' understandings of their own interests.

William Robinson, for example, describes how the norm of 'democracy promotion' has replaced the support of 'client regimes' during the Cold War in U.S. foreign policy. This development has implications for peacekeeping, since the U.S. will use 'democracy

⁵⁷ Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, eds. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 2nd ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, 10.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 10-11.

promotion' as a pretext for intervening in 'Third World' conflicts. Richard Connaughton, on the other hand, focuses on the traditional "warfighting" identity in American foreign policy, which has contributed to risk-aversion in the less habitual realm of peacekeeping.⁵⁹ In the case of France, Phillipe Guillot identifies how admiration of military heroes leads to support of the use of force in peacekeeping interventions.⁶⁰

David Forsythe examines the integration of the two polar tendencies in American foreign policy identified by Robinson and Connaughton: on the one hand, the realist pursuit of self-interest and, on the other, the inclination towards humanitarianism. For the U.S., more than for many states, the pressure towards liberal human interest policies weighs upon its decision-makers, as a result of demands from its domestic audience and historically rooted self-understandings of the country as a "city on a hill."⁶¹ Forsythe concludes that decision-makers have responded to these divergent strands of foreign policy with "inconsistency and constancy,"⁶² since these principles are malleable enough to permit both isolationism and involvement. The place for human rights in U.S. foreign policy "will remain on the US foreign policy agenda"; however, even "after years of debate and reflection, it [is] still not clear how a consensus for action [can] be formed..."⁶³ Recognizing the presence of competing identities helps to understand what appear to be incoherent policies.

Some of the more varied arguments in David Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood's volume that I drew upon earlier fall into this category of changing national interests as well. Mary Hampton's explanation for German participation as a result of not only the end of the

⁵⁹ In Chayes and Raach's volume, A. J. Bacevich also identifies the warfighting identity in American foreign policy and discusses how it might change.

⁶⁰ Phillipe Guillot, "France, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Intervention." *International Peacekeeping*, 1, Spring 1994, 30-43.

⁶¹ David Forsythe, "Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Two Levels, Two Worlds." *Political Studies*, 43, 1995, pp. 111-112.

⁶² Ibid, 116.

⁶³ Ibid, 129.

Cold War but also the broad domestic support for operations undertaken to defend humanitarian and democratic values.⁶⁴ Tom Woodhouse and Alexander Ramsbotham explain the evolution of British participation, particularly the emphasis placed on post-conflict resolution, as partly attributable to pressure from humanitarian groups like Oxfam.⁶⁵ David Rudd describes Canada's continued support of peacekeeping as a result at least partly of the desire to promote Canadian norms, such as liberal democracy and the protection of human rights.⁶⁶

In their bibliography, Collins and Weiss identify states that have developed a "peacekeeping identity." Canada and Sweden's frequent participation may be explained by the cultural importance given to peacekeeping; for example, both countries have built a monument to peacekeepers, and peacekeepers are glorified in Canadian films. Like the Scandinavians, Canada and Sweden have participated in peacekeeping operations since the end of World War II, and, over time, have incorporated peacekeeping into their national identities.⁶⁷ A newer state with a peacekeeping identity may be Argentina, which Deborah Norden discusses by linking Argentina's recent democratization to its participation in peacekeeping.⁶⁸

Bo Huldt adds to the discussion of "old peacekeepers" by explaining the understanding of peacekeeping from the perspective of these states, which he identifies as Canada, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Ireland and Italy. For the old peacekeepers, "peacekeeping has to a large extent been a question of obligations undertaken in the name of

⁶⁴ Mary Hampton in *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, 29-51.

⁶⁵ Tom Woodhouse and Alexander Ramsbotham in *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, 95-113.

⁶⁶ David Rudd in *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, 158-175.

⁶⁷ Collins and Weiss, 101.

⁶⁸ Collins and Weiss, 102; Deborah L. Norden, "Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina's UN Missions." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 2.3, Fall 1995, pp. 330-345.

the international community - with often very little relationship to direct national interests.” He predicts, however, that this will change in the future given the increasing regionalization of peacekeeping and rethinking of traditional peacekeeping norms of impartiality and consent.⁶⁹

Although some of these arguments, such as those made by Robinson and Forsythe, recognize the connection between the international environment and state identity, most focus exclusively on the state. Certainly a particular state’s shifting identity provides insight into why that state would participate in peacekeeping operations. However, if this change in identity were to, in turn, affect a change in the international environment, then the resulting increase in participation in peacekeeping would probably be more sustainable. Understanding the influence that states exert on their environments, therefore, would help in understanding how norms might lead to changes in the frequency of peacekeeping.

2. The Changing Debate on Humanitarian Intervention

As I described earlier, changes in the debate on humanitarian intervention became particularly pronounced after the end of the Cold War. The norm of non-intervention was relaxed, and the understanding of United Nations peacekeeping operations was expanded to include enforcement measures. Weiss et. al. recognize these changes as synonymous with changing ideas about state sovereignty and adjustments to states’ security policies. However, they are modest in their evaluation of these adjustments, acknowledging that, although states

⁶⁹ Bo Hultdt in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, Eds., Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, London: MacMillan Press, 1995. 20-39.

have endowed the UN with more power than they had to the League of Nations, the organization is still no more than the sum of its parts.⁷⁰

Adam Roberts questions, with skepticism, whether or not a new consensus actually has emerged on humanitarian intervention. He remarks that the mere acceptance of the possibility of a right to humanitarian intervention demonstrates dramatic changes in the debate since the Cold War era; he attributes changes in this debate to the growth of human rights doctrine, greater cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council, and questioning of the principle of consent in all cases. Overall, however, he is less decisive in his conclusions than Weiss et. al. On humanitarian intervention, he writes: “while there have certainly been developments indicating that the law has changed, there is no prospect of formal agreement among the states of the international community on exactly how.”⁷¹

In contrast, John Harriss, in his introduction to *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, acknowledges that “there has been a fairly consistent trend towards the recognition of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.”⁷² However, John Seaman’s contribution to this volume qualifies this argument by focusing on the selectiveness of this trend. He emphasizes the continued dominance of the Western members, which provide a significant amount of the financial assistance, in determining which conflicts receive attention as well as the filtering of conflicts by Western media. He concludes that the changing debate has not had a significant impact on the self-understandings of UN member-states.⁷³

⁷⁰ Weiss et. al, 10-11; 93.

⁷¹ Ibid, 447.

⁷² John Harriss, *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, New York: Pinter Publishers, 1995, 3.

⁷³ John Seaman in *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, 17-32.

Michael Mandelbaum also draws upon the idea of international norms, arguing that the decision to intervene is shaped both by national interests and the debate on intervention. Two factors have shaped the debate on humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War. For one, the threat of the Soviet Union's or the United States' intervening for ideological reasons is no longer omnipresent, rendering constant defense of the norm of non-intervention less crucial. In addition, the norm of individual rights has become more widely accepted over the rights of governments. However, Mandelbaum concludes that, although there has been general agreement over the right of states to intervene in the affairs of other states, the UN has lacked the capacity to act⁷⁴.

3. The Media and Globalization

Related to these changes in the debate are changes in context. Or, one might argue, as does Mandelbaum, that the changes in context have led to the changes in the debate. It is certainly difficult to extricate these two factors from one another. Rather than focusing exclusively on the debate, however, other scholars have backed further away from states in order to look for explanations for participation in peacekeeping in the changing environment. Specifically, the relevance of the media as a factor in influencing participation in peacekeeping operations has been questioned.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen, for example, asks whether national interest, humanitarianism, or CNN best explains UN peace enforcement in the post-Cold War world. His study begins by introducing several assumptions which I have already covered; for example, that domestic support is necessary for Western states to participate in peacekeeping and that states will

⁷⁴ Mandelbaum, 13-14; 17.

decide to participate based on whether it is in their national interests to do so.⁷⁵ Jakobsen emphasizes, however, that “changes in the strategic environment that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union make it necessary to examine whether national interests in the traditional sense dominate decisions to intervene as they did during the Cold War.”⁷⁶ He also introduces Nik Gowing’s argument that the ‘CNN effect’ is a necessary condition for intervention.⁷⁷

Jakobsen’s study of peacekeeping operations in Kuwait, northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti reveals that a clear moral and/or legal case and as well as the ‘CNN effect’ are necessary conditions. Unlike Terriff and Keeley, he argues that the cases he presents were not motivated by national interests; rather, “the Western great powers, which have led all the humanitarian interventions, have begun to define their interests differently with the end of the Cold War.”⁷⁸ Furthermore, the case of Haiti demonstrates that broad domestic support is not a necessary condition for intervention. However, despite shifting national interests, Jakobsen recognizes the risk-aversion of the Western powers, particularly in cases which they do not regard as critical towards their national interests. He predicts, therefore, that the general reluctance to intervene in humanitarian interventions will likely continue.⁷⁹

Rotberg and Weiss explore more specifically the direct and indirect effects of the media on American political decisions to participate in peacekeeping operations. They demonstrate the dramatic development in the significance of the media as an causal factor.

⁷⁵ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement After the Cold War?” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33. 2, May, 1996, 205-215.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 206.

⁷⁷ Op. cit.; Nik Gowing, “Real-time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions.” Working paper. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 1994.

⁷⁸ Jakobsen, 212.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 213.

Like Jakobsen, Fred Cate concludes that “media attention, particularly if not sustained, may not be sufficient to generate a response, but it is necessary.”⁸⁰ However, other contributors focus on the problems posed by the media, such as their selectivity, as emphasized by Seaman, and their misrepresentation of events. Philip Taylor views the media as a problematic rather than positively influential link between government and the domestic population. He emphasizes the media’s “short attention spans, certain difficulties in objectivity, and generally decreasing commitments to foreign news reporting.”⁸¹

However, the media are only one aspect of the larger phenomenon that scholars have identified as ‘globalization.’ Peter Viggo Jakobsen considers the broad term, which he understands in terms of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s definition as “a set of economic, political, social and cultural processes that increase the interconnectedness and interdependence between societies across the globe, thereby shrinking distances and making the world a smaller place.”⁸² He describes the changes in the international system following the end of the Cold War that made it more possible for states to concentrate on peacekeeping. However, more importantly, he identifies “the acceleration in the globalization of democracy and human rights triggered by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of global instant communications and a global mass media.”⁸³

Similarly, Roland Paris describes how peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has taken place within a normative global culture which promotes the Westphalian state and

⁸⁰ Fred Cate in *From Massacres to Genocide*, Eds., Robert Rotberg and Thomas Weiss, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The World Peace Foundation, 1996, 15-44.

⁸¹ Philip M. Taylor, in *Major Powers and Peacekeeping*, ed., Rachel Utley, Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006, 63-80.

⁸² Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, qtd. in Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s: Adding Globalization to the Conventional ‘End of the Cold War’ Explanation.” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 37.3, 2002, 267.

⁸³ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s: Adding Globalization to the Conventional ‘End of the Cold War’ Explanation,” 267.

liberal democracy.⁸⁴ This reflects his more specific argument made a year earlier, in 2002, that peacekeeping is a ‘mission civilisatrice,’ or an effort of agencies to “remake the periphery in the image of the core.”⁸⁵ While he does not go so far as William Robinson and Michael Pugh, who identify peacekeeping as a veiled form of economic exploitation, he does intend to portray peacekeeping as an operation with not entirely altruistic means. However, rather than being shaped by national interests, these means are shaped by the prevalent global culture. While I am interested in these arguments concerning changes in the international environment, rather than considering changes in the international environment as a phenomenon separate from changes in states’ identities, I am more interested in how culture is impacted by states’ ideas of it.

In *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, O’Neill and Rees provide a helpful sketch of how both arguments concerning changes in the international environment and arguments emphasizing the self-interested behavior of states have helped to explain peacekeeping since the 1990s. Although developments in the international environment implied some changes in peacekeeping, the realities in Somalia and Bosnia demonstrated that states had failed to totally correlate their behavior with the ‘new’ international system.⁸⁶ Likewise, Jarat Chopra explains disconnect between international changes and national obstinacy as a result of the fact that “the psychological shift among populations in the area of peace operations or on home fronts of nations contributing personnel have not kept pace with

⁸⁴ Roland Paris, “Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture.” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 9.3, 2003, 441-473.

⁸⁵ Roland Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice.’” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, 2002, pp. 637-656.

⁸⁶ John Terrence O’Neill and Nicholas Rees, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Routledge, 2005, 1-9.

[...] global developments.”⁸⁷ Similar to Forsythe’s description of the two polarities in American foreign policy, Jean-Marc Coicaud describes two developments in peacekeeping in the post-Cold war world: both the greater awareness of humanitarian issues and the continued importance of sovereignty for member-states. Both have affected peacekeeping operations, implying neither a renaissance nor total failure.⁸⁸

V. Conclusion

Overall, it appears that even when scholars move away from explaining state motivations in terms of national interests, they are reluctant to abandon this argument altogether, often advocating a multi-factor approach that incorporates the national interests argument as a fall-back option. I agree that the national interests argument is helpful as a starting point, but would argue that it would be more helpful to understand national interests in terms of how states perceive them, rather than as given facts. In this case, states would not necessarily pursue totally egoistic security policies, but could widen their understanding of interest to include other states. This understanding of states’ interests as changeable implies that a consideration of the internalization of international norms would be helpful in understanding increased participation in UN peacekeeping operations. For example, to what extent have the member states of the European Union adjusted their foreign policies as a result of their membership in that organization? In the next section, I will explore the possibility that these member states have internalized an understanding of collective identity, and that this internalization has led to increased participation in UN peacekeeping.

⁸⁷ Jarat Chopra, ed., *The Politics of Peace Maintenance*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, 17.

⁸⁸ Jean-Marc Coicaud, *Beyond the National Interest*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007, 76-77; 97-105..

3. Collective Identity Formation Among European Union Member States

Considering the relationship between states and their environments, rather than either factor independently, is helpful in understanding how norms might sustainably influence states' decisions to participate in peacekeeping operations by also affecting the international environment in which states act. In *Social Theory of International Politics*, Alexander Wendt uses a theory of social learning to explain how states' actions produce and sustain their understandings of themselves and their international environment.⁸⁹ The important distinction between Wendt's argument and the realist argument is that Wendt considers states' national interests as primarily composed of ideas and social context, rather than concrete material forces.⁹⁰ Rather than understanding the anarchy of the international system as a given condition, he proposes understanding it instead as a product of states' ideas of what they want and how they think about what they want.⁹¹

Variation in state identities implies, for Wendt, varying international cultures. Wendt divides the possibilities of international culture into three different understandings of the broad roles states see for themselves and other states: enemy, rival, or friend. Corresponding to these roles are Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures.⁹² A state in a Hobbesian culture assumes the violent intentions of the Other and is violent in response.⁹³ A state in a Lockean culture, in contrast, is characterized primarily by its respect of sovereignty and, therefore,

⁸⁹ Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 36; 326.

⁹⁰ Wendt, 92-96; 113-134.

⁹¹ Ibid, 247.

⁹² Op. cit.

⁹³ Ibid, 259-278.

limitation of need to conquer the Other.⁹⁴ Only in the Kantian culture, however, is the use of non-violent means to resolve a dispute taken for granted.⁹⁵ Each of these cultures may be internalized to varying degrees, depending upon whether norms are forced upon states, whether states follow them out of self-interest, or whether they accept them as legitimate.⁹⁶ The deepest degree of internalization in the Kantian culture allows room for the possibility of collective identity formation. Here, “[t]he cognitive boundaries of the Self are extended to include the Other; Self and Other form a single ‘cognitive region.’”⁹⁷

If a culture is internalized to the degree that its norms are considered legitimate, it is difficult to understand how structural change would occur. Wendt emphasizes that structures are always undergoing a process of change, because it is the ongoing process of states’ actions that constitute them.⁹⁸ So what determines the transformation of a structure from one culture to another? Wendt uses four variables to explain how a Lockean culture might be transformed into a Kantian one. Three sufficient variables, interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity, may actively push states towards a more peaceful system, in which they can envision the interests of other states as at least partially constituting their own.⁹⁹ However, any one of these variables must also coincide with an understanding of self-restraint, which overrides the fear of “being engulfed, physically or psychically” by another state.¹⁰⁰ These variables are useful for understanding how the member states of the EU may have moved away from a Lockean culture towards a Kantian one.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 279-297.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 297-308.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 266-278.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 305.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 313.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 343-357.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 357.

Several authors, such as Eva Gross and Ben Tonra, have used the term “Europeanization” to describe changes in member states’ foreign policies, suggesting, like Wendt, the role of norms in influencing state decision-making.¹⁰¹ Gross organizes the concept of Europeanization into three processes: national projection, national adaptation, and changing policy preferences. She recognizes the first two as “interlinked [processes], rendering Europeanization not just a result or a consequence of policy, but also an ongoing and mutually constitutive process as the responses of member states to the EU integration process feed back into EU institutions.”¹⁰² The third process is set apart, as it “moves the definition of Europeanization closer to notions of integration and suggests the possibility of eventual convergence of national foreign policy.”¹⁰³

However, there is a difference between how Europeanization plays a role in national foreign policies and how it affects the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Institutional barriers may account for part of this difference, while the difficulty of reconciling the foreign policies of twenty-seven member states accounts for another. Conceptualizing these different realms, both the national and the European, helps to understand how the national realm, separate from the impediments posed by institutions and the interests of other member states, might be more conducive to the negotiation of multiple identities.

Therefore, examining the identities of member states outside of the realm of the EU would be more useful in understanding how these identities have changed over time as a

¹⁰¹ Gross, Eva. *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Tonra, Ben. *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish, and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2001.

¹⁰² Gross, 18.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 19.

result of socialization through the EU. The decision to contribute troops to UN peacekeeping operations is one example of a foreign policy question separate from the European Union that might demonstrate these changes. Knud Erik Jorgensen observes that “[never] before have all member states been so committed to UN peacekeeping as in the 1990s...therefore, if there is a common European tradition in crisis management, UN peacekeeping is it.”¹⁰⁴ However, Jorgensen also identifies UN peacekeeping as primarily a means of increasing power. He concludes that “if there ever was an element of altruism in peacekeeping, it has clearly diminished.”¹⁰⁵

It is certainly difficult to think of UN peacekeeping as a purely altruistic endeavor. The UN, moreso than the EU, has difficulty in convincing anyone that it is more than the sum of its parts, due to the range of interests that must be reconciled. Yet even in Wendt’s Kantian culture, states retain some degree of individuality.¹⁰⁶ This reservation of national interests does not necessarily rule out the possibility that states are acting on the basis of a collective understanding of security. Especially considering the recent developments that have increased the scope of missions, extending the function of peacekeepers into the post-conflict stage, it is difficult to understand why European states would choose the UN avenue over unilateral involvement if they were solely concerned with the protection and advancement of their own interests. Smaller member states may see the UN (as well as the EU) as a useful tool for exercising control that they would not be able to exercise unilaterally. But, even so, participation in a peacekeeping operation limits national flexibility.

¹⁰⁴ Knud Erik Jorgensen in *European Approaches to Crisis Management*, ed. Jorgensen, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, 150.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 151.

¹⁰⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 306.

More importantly, EU member states do not act in a vacuum, but rather against a complex background of developments unfolding in the EU that allow the possibility of social learning. Rather than understanding the Europeanness of participation in UN peacekeeping operations as totally self-interested, it would be more useful to understand it in the context of a growing collective identity among EU member states. I understand this as a ripple effect. EU member states are increasingly able to balance both European and national interests at the national level; as a result, they have internalized, to some extent, the value of collective security and enact this value in their choice to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Identifying the degree of this internalization is where things get murky. However, in the context of the norm-laden EU and the relaxing of the Westphalian idea of sovereignty, it is possible to conclude that the participation of EU member states in UN peacekeeping operations can be explained by their understanding of collective action as useful, rather than threatening, for their own interests.

It is important, however, to distinguish between the development of collective identity and increased value placed on collective security and further European integration. Perhaps through bureaucratic change, as Simon Nuttall suggests, the negotiation of European and national identities could take place at both the national and European level.¹⁰⁷ But the integration of European norms into national foreign policies may occur, as Marcussen et. al argue, in distinct national colors, further distinguishing national foreign policies rather than integrating them.¹⁰⁸

It is also necessary to qualify Wendt's argument that structural change, while not necessarily evolutionary, is not likely to reverse itself. For example, Wendt argues that it is

¹⁰⁷ Nuttall, 13.

¹⁰⁸ Marcussen et. al, 617; Gross, 19.

unlikely that a Kantian culture would transform into a Lockean or Hobbesian culture, as a result of the privileges enjoyed in the more peaceful system.¹⁰⁹ However, as Eva Gross points out, because EU member states must negotiate European, transatlantic, and domestic commitments, the internalization of European norms is reversible.¹¹⁰

The non-linearity of this process makes more sense in the context of the culture of the entire international system. Rather than assuming the development of a collective identity among all states, it would make more sense to recognize the overlap of cultures. While EU member states may be moving closer to a Kantian culture, the states around them may still be locked into a Lockean one. For this reason, the process of structural change that I have suggested underway among EU member states may reverse itself, in the case of states that must also negotiate transatlantic or domestic commitments contradictory to the formation of a European collective identity. This lines up with Kant's idea that perpetual peace is only established when all nations are republics and members of a federation of free states.¹¹¹

However, although reversible, this process is still importantly influenced by time.

Hypothesis 1: I would argue that the longer a state is a member of the European Union, the more likely it is to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, as a result of its eventual arrival at an understanding of collective security as beneficial for its own interests.

¹⁰⁹ Wendt, 311-312.

¹¹⁰ Gross, xiii; Kjell A. Eliassen, *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*. University of Michigan: Sage Publications, 1998, 14.

¹¹¹ Kant, Immanuel. *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*, trans. Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983, 112-115.

This argument returns to the argument posed by Laura Neack that, in deciding whether to participate in peacekeeping operations, states are purely concerned with national interests. By understanding these interests as subjective rather than material and fixed, it is possible to understand how EU member states would be passively influenced by their membership and, over time, internalize an understanding of collective identity.

4. Research Design

In order to test the relationship between length of EU membership and rate of participation in UN peacekeeping operations, I gathered data on the contributions of military personnel to all past and ongoing operations in Africa.¹¹² I was particularly interested in Africa since more UN peacekeeping operations have taken place there than in any other region. The pervasiveness of conflict in Africa seems to demand peacekeeping operations, and I was interested in how the European countries responded to this demand. Further, Neack as well as Terriff and Keeley commented on the reluctance of Western countries to participate in peacekeeping operations in Africa because they did not perceive their national interests to be at stake there. For this reason, I would argue that Africa presents the most difficult test for the European countries. The earliest of the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa took place in the Republic of Congo from 1960 to 1964, and the most recent began in the Sudan on July 31, 2007.¹¹³

For each of the twenty-seven member states of the EU, I noted when a state had joined the EU and which operations it had participated in. Using the accession date as a starting point, I specified whether the participation had occurred before membership (either up to ten years or more than ten years before) or after (either ten, twenty, thirty, or more than forty years after).¹¹⁴ For this reason, the groups of states changed over time. For example, France participated in operations 0 to 10 years after joining, 30 to 40 years after joining, as well as more than 40 years after joining. The 0-10 group included not only the founding members of the European Union, but also the states that joined in 2007, 2004, 1994, 1991,

¹¹² “United Nations Peacekeeping.” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>. Web. 1 April 2010.

¹¹³ Op. cit.

¹¹⁴ “Member States of the EU.” <http://europa.eu/>. Web. 1 April 2010.

and 1986. For states, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, which joined in the middle of the year (in their case May 2004) I counted PKOs that began during or after May as having occurred within 0 to 10 years of their joining, and before May as having occurred 10 to 0 years before joining.

I also included the 24 non-EU European states which are or were members of the UN in both the category of states that had joined more than 10 years ago and between 10 and 0 years. This group encompassed all states listed as either “Other European countries” or “European portal countries” on the EU’s portal website, except for the Vatican.¹¹⁵ In addition, I included Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia & Montenegro. For these states, to calculate their rate of participation, I only included the operations that took place while these states existed. For example, for Yugoslavia, I calculated how many PKOs it participated in until 1992, and for Serbia & Montenegro, how many after 1992 but until 2006. This time period overlapped slightly with Serbia, which participated in an operation as early as 1999.

Because Security Council members did not, in principle, participate in Cold War operations, I also tested the rate of participation for Cold War operations only and post-Cold War operations only. For the Cold War test, I excluded members of the former Yugoslavia as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. I only counted three of the twenty-six total operations in Africa as Cold War operations. The first, the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC) took place from 1960 to 1964; the second, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), from January 1989 to May 1991; and the third, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Angola and Namibia, from April

¹¹⁵ “Other States.” <http://europa.eu>. Web. 1 April 2010; “Candidate States.” <http://europa.eu/>. Web. 1 April 2010.

1989 to March 21, 1990. I did not include the two missions that began in 1991, UNAVEM II and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), because both of these extended beyond the end of the Cold War (in fact, the latter is ongoing). All Security Council members, except for the United States, participated in UNTAG, but I included this operation anyway, since it is difficult to delineate a clear cut-off point for Cold War and post-Cold War operations. For this test, no states had been members of the EU for 20 to 30 years during the time in which one of these Cold War operations took place. Although the founding members joined in 1957, no Cold War operation took place from 1977 to 1987.

I was also interested in whether a large portion of the operations that previous colonial powers participated in were correlated to their former colonies. For this test, I retained the categories of length of membership in the EU, although these were less useful since the countries involved were reduced to the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy.

In order to control for the ambitious peacekeeping of several states, I tested the rate of participation correlated to length of EU membership excluding 'traditional' peacekeepers. Although these peacekeepers counter my argument by having participated frequently before and after their membership, I would argue that they are unique in this phenomenon. I was interested, still, in whether the frequency of this peacekeeping increased after accession into the EU. Bo Huldt identifies these peacekeepers as Canada, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Ireland and Italy; however, he does not spend much time defending why they have done so much peacekeeping.¹¹⁶ This argument is taken up further by Collins and Weiss, who

¹¹⁶ Bo Huldt in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, Eds., Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, London: MacMillan Press, 1995. 20-39.

explain that at least, for the Scandinavians, peacekeeping has become a part of the national culture in these countries.¹¹⁷ Certainly Russia throws off the balance of non-EU states that have participated frequently, but it can also be considered an exception due to its Security Council status.

¹¹⁷ Cindy Collins and Thomas Weiss, *An Overview and Assessment of 1989 - 1996 Peace Operations Publications*, Providence, Rhode Island: Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1996, 102

5. Results

After calculating the rates of participation, the most noticeable result was that, in general, EU member states were more likely to participate in peacekeeping operations than non-EU member states. The most frequent non-EU participants were Russia (16/26), Norway (15/26), Croatia (7/22), Serbia, (4/13), the Ukraine (6/26), Switzerland (5/26), Moldova (4/26), and Turkey (3/26). The most frequent EU participants were the Netherlands (15/26), Ireland (12/25), France (12/26), Sweden (6/14), Belgium (8/26), Spain (7/25), Italy (7/26), and Denmark (6/25). (These rates are the rates of participation after these states had joined the EU.)

More difficult was determining how the rate of participation changed over time. For states that joined the EU as recently as 2004 or 2007, the results proved the opposite. Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia all participated at a higher rate before joining than after joining. Perhaps this can be accounted for by the larger number of PKOs available for participation from 1994 to 2004 (12) as well as from 1997 to 2007 (11) as opposed to after 2004 (3) and 2007 (2). Poland was the only country that joined in 2004 to have participated after joining (in 2 out of the 3 PKOs). It is also possible that these states participated frequently before joining to demonstrate their 'Europeanness' and breathed a sigh of relief after being admitted. However, I would argue that these states will take up peacekeeping once more within the next twenty years, as they, like other long-term members, internalize the norm of collective security.

Because so little time has passed since these countries have joined the EU, it would be more useful to examine the rate of participation of a country that joined earlier, such as

Spain or Portugal, both of which joined in 1986. However, the opposite problem presents itself here, since very few opportunities for participation (only one) existed before 1986. Still, neither country participated in the one PKO that existed before this date (ONUC: 1960-1964). Within their first ten years of joining, Portugal participated in 3 out of the 12 operations that occurred from 1986 to 1996, and Spain participated in 4 out of the 12. Within 10 to 20 years of joining, both countries participated in 3 out of the 11 PKOs that occurred from 1996 to 2006. However, within 20 to 30 years of joining, neither country participated in either of the two operations that occurred from 2006 to the present. Denmark provides a more illustrative example. Although it always participated frequently, this frequency increased from ten years after it joined in 1973, when it participated in 1 out of 6 PKOs, to a rate of 3 out of 14 PKOs from 1993 to 2003. Since 2003, it has participated in 2 out of 5 PKOs.

In general, the graph of rate of participation in relation to length of EU membership indicated a steady rise in participation until states reached a length of 20 to 30 years of membership. After this period, states that had been members for 30 to 40 years were correlated once again with increased participation, but after more than 40 years, the rate dropped. The 20-30 category includes the operations that Spain and Portugal have participated in since 2006 (0/2 in both cases), the operations Greece has participated in since 2001 (1/7), and the operations that Denmark, Ireland, and the UK participated in from 1993-2003. In both the cases of Denmark and the UK, these rates were higher (3/14 and 5/14, respectively) than their rates of participation from 1983 to 1993 (both 1/6). Of these three countries, only Ireland participated in fewer peacekeeping operations during this time than

previously. It is possible, therefore, to attribute this drop, at least to some extent, to the limited opportunity for Spain and Portugal to have participated in PKOs since 2006.

The 40+ group includes the participation of the founding members (France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) from 1997 to the present. Of the thirteen operations that took place during this period, France participated in 8, the Netherlands in 5, Germany in 4, Belgium in 3, and Italy in 2. Comparing these rates with the rates of participation from 1987 to 1997 does not reveal any dramatic differences, with the exception of the Netherlands. Of the 12 PKOs during this time period (from 1987 to 1997), the Netherlands participated in 9, Belgium in 5, France in 5, Italy in 4, and Germany in 3. The strangest factor in both of these sets was Luxembourg, which has yet to participate in a PKO in Africa.

The data on Cold War operations indicated a more dramatic increase in the rate of participation from non-members to members, as well as from members who had been in the EU for at least 10 years, to members who had been in the EU for at least 20 years. This rate dropped off once again for EU member states who had been members for 30-40 years. This 30-40 group included the two Cold War operations that took place from 1987 to 1997 for the founding members. All of these members except for Luxembourg participated in UNTAG (1989-1990), while the Netherlands also participated in UNAVEM I (1989-1991). The more dramatic increase in the rate of participation can probably be attributed to the smaller number of countries in each set and the fewer opportunities for participation.

The data on post-Cold War operations was similar to the data on all operations, with the exception of a less dramatic fall in the rate of participation of countries that had been members for 10 to 20 years to the rate of participation of countries that had been members

for 20 to 30 years. This can be attributed to the fact that the 10-20 group included the operations of Ireland, Denmark, and the UK from 1983-1993. All of these countries had participated in UNTAG (1989-1990), while Ireland had also participated in UNAVEM I (1989-1991). Because these operations were excluded, the rate of participation dropped from 1 out of 6, in the cases of Denmark and the UK, and 5 out of 6 in the case of Ireland, to 0 out of 4 in the cases of Denmark and the UK, and 3 out of 4, in the case of Ireland.

Eliminating ‘traditional peacekeepers’ smoothed out the increase in the rate of participation, but also removed the effective example of Denmark. Removing Norway and Switzerland from the -10 + and -10-0 groups increased the discrepancy between non-EU member states’ and EU member states’ rates of participation. The removal of Sweden and Finland also helped to remove some of the dramatic increases in participation for states who had been members for only 0 to 10 years. This also helped to solve the problem that Sweden’s rate of participation had decreased from 1995 to 2005 (at 5/11) to the time period after 2005 (at 1/3), perhaps attributable to the smaller number of PKOs available. This had also happened in the case of Ireland, from 1983 to 1993 at a rate of 5 out of 6, to a rate of 4/13 from 1993 to 2003, as well as in the case of Italy, at 4 out of 12 from 1987 to 1997, to 3 out of 13 since 1997.

It is difficult to draw any concrete conclusions from the data on rate of participation in peacekeeping operations in former colonies. To calculate this rate, I only included the actual number of PKOs that the state had participated in the denominator, rather than all potential PKOs. This revealed that, of all of the former colonial powers, Portugal participated in the most operations that also took place in a former colony, at a rate of 4 out of a total 6. Spain, Italy, and Germany all participated in PKOs in former colonies at a rate

of 2 out of 7, Belgium at a rate of 3 out of 8, and France at a rate of 3 out of 12. Colonial ties, therefore, might account for Portugal's high rate of participation when it first became a member of the EU, from 1986 to 1996, as it participated only in operations that took place in former colonies (Angola and Mozambique). However, it sustained this rate from 1996 to 2006, although only one of the PKOS in which it participated took place in a former colony (Angola).

This data provides an introductory sketch of the relationship between the two variables of length of EU membership and frequency of participation in PKOs. While it is difficult to trace the rate of participation of any member state since its accession into the EU, due to the dispersion of PKOs over time and the lower frequency of recent operations, it is still possible to conclude that, of the countries that have participated, EU member states have participated at a higher rate. It is also important to note the significant increases in participation that have occurred, for example in the cases of Spain and Portugal after ten years of membership, in the case of the UK after twenty years, in the case of France after forty years, and consistently in the case of Denmark. Further analysis would also consider observation vs. other missions, as well as different types of contributions, such as command personnel, non-command military personnel (for example, whether police, observers, or peace-keeping troops), logistical support, and non-medical, non-logistical supplies.

It is also important to remember that the rate of participation in UN peacekeeping operations is only one measure of the formation of collective identity and the internalization of the norm of collective security among EU member-states. A closer look at the actual processes underway in the European Union, such as the formation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the joint peacekeeping missions that have taken place

between the EU and the UN in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Balkans, would also be helpful in understanding the role of norms in institutions and in the formation of states' foreign and security policies. Examining these processes might also reveal psychological factors that lead to more frequent participation in UN peacekeeping operations. What role do in-group dynamics, for example, play in convincing EU member-states of the benefits of UN peacekeeping operations? Specifically, how does the EU affect states' perceptions of the legitimacy of collective security? It would also be worthwhile to look at possible causal variables within specific EU countries, such as geographic location or historical experience with war, that could affect participation in UN peacekeeping operations or, more broadly, states' foreign policies.

6. Conclusion

After reviewing the data on the rate of participation of EU and non-EU member states in PKOs in Africa, my hypothesis that EU member states participate more frequently in UN peace-keeping operations the longer they are members of the EU appears to be not quite as strong as the hypothesis that EU member states participate more frequently in peace-keeping operations than non-EU member states. This revised hypothesis is not quite as ambitious, but further testing of the rate of participation, in other regions, for example, and more specifically, concerning whether logistical or military support was offered, would be necessary in order to support it. However, this hypothesis still raises important questions in the field of international relations by countering the realist argument that international institutions do not play an important role in the international system. As evidenced by my tests of the rate of participation of EU compared to non-EU states, institutions matter.

I maintain my argument that the increase in the rate of participation of EU member states relative to non-EU member states can be attributed primarily to an internalization of collective identity among these states, reflected in an understanding of collective security as beneficial rather than harmful. Merely talking about the necessity of a “strategic partnership” between the European Union and Africa changes how these states will decide whether or not to participate in peacekeeping operations. Although the suggestions of reports such as “The Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership” to “enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security” may seem meaningless, they acquire more significance when considered in the context of member states’ foreign policies.¹¹⁸ This language is especially significant when


¹¹⁸ General Secretariat of the Council, “The Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership.” Brussels: European Communities, June 2008. Online. 25 March 2010.

compared to the constant evocation of “national interests” in U.S. foreign policy towards Africa.¹¹⁹ That EU member states rarely call these things “national interests” may be because they are not necessarily strictly restricted to egoistic economic and security policies. However, this does not mean that more cooperative policies are not in the national interest of these states. Rather, these national interests may simply be more subjective than previously assumed.


¹¹⁹ Edmond Keller in “Africa and the United States: Meeting the Challenges of Globalization,” Eds., Rothchild and Keller, *Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.

7. Appendix A: Graphs


Years Since (2010) Joining EU	-10+	- 10 - 0	0 - 10	10 - 20	20 - 30	30 - 40	40 +
Rate of Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations	13.57%	17.81%	21.21%	30.77%	24.53%	35.63%	28.20%




Years Since (2010) Joining EU	-10+	- 10 - 0	0 - 10	10 - 20	30 - 40
Rate of Participation in Cold War UN Peacekeeping Operations	17.44%	21.67%	50.00%	66.67%	50.00%



Years Since (2010) Joining EU	-10+	- 10 - 0	0 - 10	10 - 20	20 - 30	30 - 40	40 +
Rate of Participation in post-Cold War UN Peacekeeping Operations	13.57%	15.54%	21.17%	27.12%	24.53%	33.33%	28.21%



Years Since (2010) Joining EU	-10+	- 10 - 0	0 - 10	10 - 20	20 - 30	30 - 40	40 +
Rate of Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations Excluding Traditional Peacekeepers	11.68%	13.46%	16.46%	23.40%	24.00%	33.85%	30.77%



Years Since (2010) Joining EU	0 - 10	10 - 20	20 - 30	30 - 40	40 +
Rate of Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations in Former Colonies	50.00%	28.57%	40.00%	29.41%	35.29%

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