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# Struggle for Unification

**Stephen L.Fussell**

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The crowning of King William I of Prussia as German Emperor in 1871 had a profound effect on Europe and the world. Spanning only forty-seven years, the Second Reich grew from the position of an unstable union to that of a sturdy world power. Though Germany has suffered through many transformations because of war since 1871, the fact remains that a single German nation has survived even into the present.

The Second German Empire was a grandiose consolidation of several German states into one confederation. It was, however, the union of many German peoples accustomed to life in independent states. Merging together the German people protective of their personal interests and the rights of their regions was not easy. Religious conflicts and political battles, proliferating throughout the struggle for unification, helped to complicate the process further. Unification was accomplished. But the merging of the fragmented states was not an equitable one. The delicate task of consolidation involved breaking down state particularisms to facilitate a single nation-state. Accommodating all of the particularistic demands was impossible. It was, however, possible to strike a common ground in many of the cases. This study examines the degree to which the bargaining and political maneuvering occurred.

Particularism and religion were underlying currents throughout the struggle for unification. Particularism, constantly interwoven

with religion, was a tremendous hurdle for the movement. Regional aspirations for sovereignty threatened the creation of the Second Empire, as well. Furthermore, particularisms and religion were factors in the debate over the military and education. Otto von Bismarck, Prussian aristocrat and statesman, played an important role in the struggle for unification as well. Though it is not the purpose of this study to analyze the life and times of the count, the impact of Bismarck as a great nationalist is undeniable. It would be like discussing late eighteenth century France and omitting Napoleon.

This study addresses the question of the influence of Prussia in the Second Reich vis-à-vis the smaller (secondary) states. Identifying real gains toward state control as opposed to symbolic or non-essential concessions to particularistic interest enables the student to assess correctly the question. For the purpose of clarity through example the states of Hanover and Bavaria are examined juxtaposed Prussia. Hanover, to the west, was annexed by Prussia following the Seven Weeks' War in 1866. Proud and independent-minded, the Hanoverians provide good examples of the particularistic sentiment (specifically from the point of view of an annexed kingdom) that characterized the struggle for unification. Bavaria, in contrast, was the largest state after Prussia and the dominant state in the south. Because of their prominent position, the Bavarians were approached in a far different manner than the Hanoverians. Predominantly Catholic and suspicious of the mighty Prussian state, their role in the struggle also illustrates the complexity of the unification.

And while the unification was an important event far past 1871, it is beyond the bounds of this study to analyze it into the twentieth century. The 'Bismarckian era' is often used to mark the bounds of this discussion. Though the count was a fixture in German politics through much of the latter half of the nineteenth century, this study's focus runs from the early 1860's to the late 1870's.

Most historians are in agreement concerning the struggle for unification. Prussian military power, along with her solid social structure are credited by scholars such as Gordon C. Craig and Theodore Hamerow as contributing factors to her success. Other historians such as Steward Stehlin, Margaret Anderson, and George Windell, while writing on particularists and forces opposed to Bismarck and Prussia, agree with the general notion of Prussian hegemony. These historians, however, also argue that bargaining and deal-making occurred. That argument is picked up in this study of the struggle for unification.

## I.

### **Sovereignty and Particularism**

From the earliest days of the Teutonic Order, to its occupation by allied forces in 1945<sup>1</sup>, the state of Prussia had a special place in German history. Although rather unimpressive in her earliest days -- with a small territory and population -- she was to rise to great stature and wealth in people, resources and power.

The story of Prussia is one of tremendous expansion between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Between the time of the Great Elector (d.1688) and the unification of 1871, the population grew from a modest 1.5 million to 24.5 million people with the territory increasing from 110,000 to almost 350,000 square kilometers. Although much of the population increase was due to territorial annexations, immigration of those seeking work and refuge from religious persecution played a part<sup>2</sup>. The Industrial Revolution that swept across Europe in the nineteenth century brought with it changes that were noticeable on the surface in Prussia. The underlying class structure however, was hardly shaken. The middle class and a rise in urban populations were

consequences of the revolution, but throughout Prussia, the alignment of the two primary classes remained. The position of the Junkers and the peasantry, as well as their relationship toward one another remained constant.

Prussian society before the Bismarckian era was based on agriculture and a strict class structure. Prior to industrialization, it appeared a backward and poor land of Junkers and peasants, where towns were of little significance, economically or otherwise.<sup>3</sup> The stratification of the classes was profound and quite distinct. At the top of the pyramid were the landed nobility paired with the Hohenzollern crown. At the bottom lived the peasantry, committed to working the lands. A true middle class evolved in the nineteenth century, but found a strained existence in the cities of the once predominately rural state.

The role of the Junkers in the Prussian squirearchy was profound. Whereas other landowners merely leased off the land, the Junkers were on the estates, working them first-hand<sup>4</sup>. The power of the nobility rested in the ownership of the land as a mark of high birth and the gauge of aristocracy. The significance of working the land was fundamental to the power of the Junkers, and was thus the foundation of the social and political structure.<sup>5</sup> Even though Prussia was the second most industrialized state in Germany, 'agricultural occupations including farming, gardening, fishery and forestry continued to predominate' through 1867.<sup>6</sup> The real strength of the aristocracy however, was their strategic position within the administrative apparatus, and the resultant



legal power at their disposal in the countryside.<sup>7</sup> In the 1860's, the aristocracy filled the ranks of the officer corps as well. High positions in administration, society and military were filled by the aristocracy.

For the lowest class, serfdom existed on the expansive Junker estates early in the nineteenth century. Agricultural work required great numbers of peasants to man the fields. They lived in a state of servitude in Prussia , but retained legal rights that were unheard of in some regions (e.g. Czarist Russia). The right of every citizen to go to court was extended to the peasantry with the existence of a bureaucracy to insure that the landowners observed the peasant's rights.<sup>8</sup> Following the reforms of Karl von Stein and Prince Karl August von Hardenberg serfdom was abolished in the first decade of the century. But in the countryside, emancipation of the peasantry caused little change in the class structure. According to Theodore Hamerow, 'The position of the Junker remained unassailable afterwards as before'.<sup>9</sup> Even though they were freed persons, the peasants could not escape the grip of the Prussian aristocrats. With the failure of mid-century reform efforts, it became clear that a dynamic class of small independent farmers was not to emerge in Germany.

Nothing less than a revolution in agrarian property relations could have broken the power of the aristocracy over the countryside, and such a revolution was inconceivable under the alliance of crown and nobility on which the Hohenzollern state had been built. Indeed as the century wore on, the structure of rural society became increasingly stratified and inflexible. There was progressively less opportunity to rise in the world, to acquire property, to attain security, and to become an independent farmer.<sup>10</sup>

The result was political apathy among the peasantry. Ironically it was that apathy that strengthened the established order of the conservative stronghold. With the coming of the great population expansion, the Prussian ruling class was able to use these even greater numbers to their advantage.

Emerging on the solidified Prussian social structure was the burgeoning middle class. Born of the Industrial Revolution, the bourgeoisie was a new breed for the old Junkers. The Middle Class brought with them opportunistic ideas of reform, liberalism and change. Though relatively small in Prussia, they were a group on the rise and committed to 'the progress of industrialism and the establishment of a political system with which it is consistent'.<sup>11</sup>

Prussia's southern counterpart state of Bavaria was a proud, venerable land. Grand in size and rich in culture, she was more than just the big trophy in the struggle for unification. The nation could not be brought together without the inclusion of Bavaria into the confederation.

The fact that Bavaria was over two-thirds Catholic (while Prussia was as equally Protestant) was also a point of concern for Prussia. Considering that her fellow states in the south had many Catholics, Bavaria was in prominent company south of the River Main.<sup>12</sup> When grouped with Baden, Wurttemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt, Bavaria took on the look of loyal opposition to her Protestant neighbor to the north.

Sovereignty was most important to the Bavarians. During the Napoleonic Wars, Bavaria rose to the status of Kingdom. By the

time Prussia was in a position to seize power in central Europe, the Bavarians firmly possessed particularistic sentiment. The *Recht auf Existenz* and *originare Recht auf Hoheitsrechte* (sovereignty) were qualities the Bavarian people were proud of and unwilling to surrender.<sup>13</sup> Their neighbor to the north also held particularistic feelings and watched carefully the motions of Prussia.

At first glance, the Kingdom of Hanover pales in comparison to the large and powerful states mentioned above. Though smaller in size and population, the kingdom's history, tradition, connections and structure set it apart from the other German states. Hanoverian pride and particularism were formidable forces in the west.

Hanoverians based their pride on the fantastic history of their ruling family, the Guelphs. The origins of Hanover in the Middle Ages were less than auspicious; this was a time of fragmentation for the Guelphs. But after medieval power struggles within the Holy Roman Empire and the acquisitions of titles and lands, Hanover was by the nineteenth century a kingdom. Perhaps the greatest prize for Hanover was the 1714 ascension of George Louis (then Elector of Hanover) to the throne of Great Britain.<sup>14</sup> Hanoverian society was also a source of pride for the Lower Saxons. Predominately Protestant and basically an agricultural area, the kingdom possessed a cultural uniformity that was different from any of the other territories 'across the Elbe or in the Rhineland'.

Such examples include a particular dialect -- plattdeutsch, or low German -- common folklore and architecture.<sup>15</sup>

Unique also to the Kingdom of Hanover was the role played by the nobility. The landed aristocracy in Hanover was markedly different from its counterpart across the Elbe. With the ruling family distracted across the English Channel, the administration was left up to the nobles. The nobility had few feudal rights. Most of the land was held by a vigorous and flourishing peasant class. Large estates were foreign to Hanoverian nobility; they possessed only five per cent of the land ownership while the peasantry in fact held eighty per cent.<sup>16</sup> As a result, the Hanoverian aristocracy was established in government rather than in estates and was not a large group. Many preferred life in the government. The oligarchy they set up was well run and quite efficient.<sup>17</sup>

The Hanoverians had an established and comfortable system that they did not want their Eastern neighbor to upset. The Prussian civil service was also well run, but the Junkers' aim in the bureaucracy was to increase and strengthen their own social position, while their counterparts to the west concerned themselves more with the society as a whole.

\* \* \*

The political matrix in the Second German Empire after 1871 was a constitutional monarchy with a multi-party parliament. The

lower house, the Reichstag (Imperial parliament), consisted primarily of the Conservatives and the Liberals with minor parties mobilizing and developing on the periphery. Conservatives desired to maintain the status quo. The Prussian aristocrats -- the Junkers -- for example, were conservative. They had an established, secure lifestyle in the northeast and wanted to perpetuate the bureaucratic control that was their power source. Liberals in contrast, were for a more open regime of laissez-faire and free market policies. The Bismarckian period was characterized by a quid pro quo approach to legislating. In order for the Count to fulfill his grand plans, he bargained with both sides, often giving little for more in return. Conservatives and Liberals were played off of one another, usually to the benefit of Bismarck's goals.

Particular interests were pertinent to the members of the parliament. Around the time of unification, distinct parties had developed for the purpose of representing specific interests, along traditional, social and religious lines, such as the Catholic-backed Center Party or the National Liberals. The Center Party was established for the concerns of the Church. The organization, conservative in nature, evolved after 1866 for the purpose of standing up to the many encroachments to the faith and for combating the changes in their old society.<sup>18</sup> Catholic morals and traditions were at stake. The National Liberals, in stark contrast, evolved to press for a unified nation-state of a progressive nature in business relations and government.

Particularism describes the protective attitude that factions within each state took toward their own interest. This practice was common throughout Germany and took on many guises. Bavaria, for example, was concerned that the schools remain under the care of the churches. In Hanover, parliamentary struggles over such things as the centralization of administration, tax bills and school reform were particularistic in nature. Each particularistic group was after protection of its interest.<sup>19</sup> The process of unifying was mired in those pursuits.

In Prussia, conservatives had maintained authority over a mainly agrarian state. In the 1850's, the Junkers, the nobility and the military elite found a common ground to organize into a political group. They dominated the regime until the impact of the Industrial Revolution. On the wave of change, however, rode a collection of liberal-minded interests: bourgeois businessmen and industrialists, intellectuals and others who called for a parliamentary government. These middle class men felt that they could not fulfil their calling unless they lived in a society that was 'economically as well as politically free'.<sup>20</sup>

Perhaps the most outstanding domestic part of the process of unification came in the form of the constitutional struggle. It has sometimes been called 'the central event in the domestic history of Germany in the last hundred years.'<sup>21</sup> The struggle began on the heels of the 1848 revolutions in Germany. King Frederick William IV promulgated a constitution 'with free royal hand' in 1850 to the Prussian people. The idea of a 'free hand' meant

different things to the two sides, however. For the liberals, the pledge of an oath to the constitution taken by the king was believed to be a conservative retreat. The royal court regarded it as a gracious gesture. It was clearly a bipartisan battle of interpretation.

For the conservatives -- the Crown, the Prussian nobility and most of all the military leadership -- the constitution was a mere formality. Following the Crown's successful disposal of the reform-minded Prussian Parliament of 1848, the king was in an eminent position. His choice of action at that delicate time demonstrated his magnanimity by granting a constitution to his subjects. The crucial aspect for the conservatives was that the gift was made 'independently by the monarch and of his own free will'.<sup>22</sup> That was the foundation upon which the conservatives based their position on the constitutional struggle. The inference was that the gift would be at the mercy of the monarch, subject to alteration or revocation. The king's view of the document was that he accepted it unwillingly, but loyally. His interpretation rested in the belief of absolutism, however. The divine right of the King, the conservatives believed, won out over all. 'The constitution was merely a means of associating the public in the affairs of government, but he [the monarch] expected it to assure public approval of all measures which he particularly advocated. In the case of conflict parliament should acquiesce in the King's will.'<sup>23</sup>

The liberal faithful felt differently about the role of the constitution and the importance of the king's oath. They saw the promulgation as a step towards representative government, in particular the role of ministerial responsibility to the parliament. The struggle became increasingly complex, particularly for the war minister, as the process of unification moved toward 1871. Conservatism against liberalism underscored the issue of the "German question" as well.

Throughout the nineteenth century, liberals and reformers throughout the states clamored for the unification of a single German nation-state. Clouding the issue of unification was the 'German question' -- *Grossdeutschland* or *Kleindeutschland*? The former would be an amalgamation of all German people with Austria included while the latter would be a smaller merger of the fragmented states with Prussia, to the exclusion of Austria. At stake was hegemony over central Europe. With some qualifications, George Windell distinguishes Prussia from the south as mainly Protestant and Catholic respectively.<sup>24</sup> In that distinction lay a conflict in the two regions based on distrust and antagonism. He depicted religion and state particularism as the most profound influences in the south. The decision between the *Grossdeutschland* or *Kleindeutschland* solution to the 'German question' for the southern states was clearly in favor of the former. Catholics had strong ties to the Hapsburgs. Many in fact perceived the Prussian state as militarist and politically aggressive rather than champion for the cause of unification.<sup>25</sup>



Within the south, the question had a polarizing effect (Windell includes other secondary states as well when discussing the political atmosphere - e.g. Hanover). To the left stood Protestants blended in with the liberal bourgeoisie and anticlerical groups, who all favored *Kleindeutschland*. On the right were the conservative Catholic particularists who were weary of the Prussians and inclined to *Grossdeutschland*. At the heart of the latter's movement was the protection of their old way of living. Prussian-based nationalism appeared threatening to the southern right. Industrialism and liberalism were further encroachments into their stable society. The feeling was similar to the anxieties of the old conservatives vis-à-vis the liberals in Prussia. The southern right was bent on maintaining Catholic morals and doctrines and particularly its system of education. Newspaper editor and Patriot Party leader Joseph Jörg described *Kleindeutschland* as the product of the destructive individualism of the bourgeoisie.<sup>26</sup> The old society was eroding due to the spread of nationalism. Catholics believed that supervision of morals, traditions and the educational structure was sure to fall out of their hands.

Prussia of course was in favor of the *Kleindeutschland* choice. They found their most ardent supporters in the liberals who saw unification as the road to prosperity.

## II.

### **The Process of Unification**

In evaluating unification, the student must realize that the merger could not be a simple, friendly affair; scraping and grabbing for as much of the pie as possible was part of the process. From the parliamentary struggles of the Conservatives, Liberals and Catholics -- all fighting on their particularistic fronts -- to the subversive activities of Bismarck and Guelph loyalists in Hanover, the movement for unification was perpetually strained. In this study of Prussia and the sample states of Bavaria and Hanover, each had its own ideas of how post-unified Germany should exist. Prussian hegemony in central Europe became defined and finalized in the second and third Wars of Unification. Since they were the victors of the fighting, why would the Prussians give up any authority? In their corner would be the King, the minister-president and the constitution.<sup>1</sup> For Hanoverians, their heritage along with their political ties to England and memories of Medieval glories became linked with pride for their present to 'foster among Hanoverians a sense of superiority over other Germans'.<sup>2</sup> Bavaria, a proud state as well, was most focused on preserving its precious sovereignty while fighting off attempts of Prussianization.

This study of German unification raises the question: which dominated German unification, Prussia or the secondary states? Were the characteristics that made up Prussia transposed to the secondary states -- and therefore to the nation as a whole, or did the smaller states transform Prussia into a more equal-partner state?

German unification was a delicate process involving diplomacy and military might. The merger of Prussia with the secondary states was clouded by anxieties and stubbornness, religion and particularisms. As stated above, a movement was felt toward unification throughout the nineteenth century, but the necessary pieces of the puzzle never quite arranged themselves to provide for the union. Nationalism -- a sentiment that many shared -- was the one transcendent quality that reached out and grabbed Germans. When the German nation was threatened by a foreign foe, nationalistic zeal ran rampant not only in Prussia, but in the south and west as well.<sup>3</sup> There was a genuine attraction of the fatherland. It was crucial for that characteristic to be exploited if the crystallization of the nation was to happen. Fortunately for Germany, there lay in Count Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen a diplomat with foresight, imagination and a certain amount of ruthlessness for getting a job done. Otto Pflanze described Bismarck as a genius-statesman in the Frederician tradition who 'legitimized and preserved' the German political system of authoritarian executive combined with a popular legislature.<sup>4</sup> Throughout his tenure, the Iron Chancellor

identified diplomatic situations early and adjusted to them accordingly. From his swift peace settlements to his ideological meandering in the *Reichstag*, Bismarck was a political animal bent on fulfilling his plans for the German state. It was through his heavy-handed guidance that the German nation-state arrived 18 January 1871, in the form of the Second Reich.

Between 1864 and 1871 three wars occurred that involved soldiers of German descent and led to unification. In November 1863, the King of Denmark died rather unexpectedly. This rekindled a situation that presumably had been solved just fifteen years before concerning the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The latter was in the German Confederation and almost completely German, while the former -- mostly German -- had a large Danish minority. The crisis at hand concerned a Danish constitution drawn up by Frederick VII, King of Denmark, just before his death. The document called for Denmark and Schleswig to be brought closer together politically and in a fashion that warned of union between the two.<sup>5</sup> To complicate things further, after Frederick's death, a controversy ensued over the heir to the throne, as Frederick was childless. This was a situation that Bismarck could capitalize upon by pushing the issue to conflict. Bismarck's forcing of matters to a crisis was a tactic that he used successfully in the three Wars of Unification. By creating a tense situation, Bismarck rallied parliamentary support, whipped up nationalistic sentiment and most importantly initiated war, which was an important tool he used to aid in unification. His ambitions here were three-fold: to

annex the territory of Schleswig, to show his military reforms were a success and to manipulate the incident to humiliate the Austrians<sup>6</sup>. On 1 February 1864, Prussia and Austria rolled into Schleswig. By October 1865, the war was over and a treaty was signed. With Denmark now out of the German picture, Bismarck's moves became more clearly focused on confrontation with Austria. While Schleswig was annexed by Prussia in every way but name, Austria's acquisition of Holstein was of far less significance to the Hapsburgs.<sup>7</sup> At this point, Prussia showed no signs of central European dominance having shared the victory with Austria. They in fact were overshadowed. But for Bismarck, the brief war was successful on all three fronts and marked the beginning of the quest for unification. Bismarck scored a political victory in the duchies as well in the case of the Augustenburg candidacy. Following the death of the King, Prince Frederick of Augustenburg proclaimed his succession in Schleswig-Holstein. The Prince found much support for his candidacy, principally from the liberals. Conservative Bismarck, along with the Austrians, found it more advantageous to move in and annex the territory. From a political point of view, the annexation prevented the creation of another state to agitate Prussia, but more importantly it stifled the liberal voice.<sup>8</sup>

The next step toward Bismarck's goal for Germany was to instigate a conflict with Austria and eliminate the possibility of Grossdeutschland. In his typical fashion, Bismarck plotted to create a situation that would steam his unification ship along.

Here again confrontation with the purpose of rallying public opinion was his intent. In February of 1866, Bismarck found his opportunity with King William's permission to strike an alliance with Italy. This was a direct slap in the face to the Hapsburgs in that the Italian province of Venetia was under Austrian control. Newly unified Italy and Austria were naturally at odds over this situation. The alliance between Prussia and Italy marked a high point for tensions between the two mighty German states. This was also a time of decision for many of the smaller German states. Suspicions and fears of Prussia and her hard driving prime minister weighed heavily upon the minds of many. State sovereignty and particularisms were effectively countering Bismarck's calls for nationalism. Perhaps more important was the issue of religion. Most Catholics felt far closer to the Hapsburgs than to the Hohenzollern family.<sup>9</sup> For Bavaria, the move toward Austria was undeniable. Possessing all of the anxieties of the Prussian state and a population predominately Catholic, Bavaria allied with Austria for the Seven Weeks' War. Hanover likewise joined in on the Austrian side. Other southern states with considerable Catholic populations also sided with the Austrians in the quasi-civil war.<sup>10</sup> With the sides divided, the Seven Weeks' War began. Following the joint victory over the Danes at Schleswig-Holstein, Austria possessed a tremendous reputation as the principal power of central Europe. Austria's striking victories in the Duchies overshadowed the Prussian performances.<sup>11</sup> Austria was impressive with a large infantry, good cavalry and courageous and devoted

officers. But Austria's Imperial Army was flawed as well. Following a financial crunch of the previous decade, the Army was 20-25 per cent smaller. Relaxed conscription further weakened her effective fighting force. Among other problems were deficiencies in organization, modern weaponry, tactical doctrine and the command and staff system.<sup>12</sup> The Prussian forces were far stronger than they appeared at Schleswig. In fact, Prussia excelled where the Austrians failed. King William's troops were strong in organization, practice and weaponry, and had an aggressive infantry with a proliferation of intelligent soldiers throughout the rank and file.<sup>13</sup> All of that coupled with the strategic genius of General Moltke provided Prussia with a force to be reckoned with.

The fighting was swift and precise for the Prussian forces superior in both numbers and skilled leadership. The Prussian army was successful in the west at the battle of Langensalza, while at the battle of Custozza (over Italian forces) and on the Adriatic Sea the Austrians found victory. These campaigns, though significant, paled in comparison to the battle of Königgrätz. There in July 1866, the Prussian army under the leadership of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke delivered the *coup de grâce* that defeated the Austrians and established Prussian hegemony in central Europe.<sup>14</sup> Bismarck's reforms paid off on the battle field near Königgrätz. Speedy mobilization along with the size and strength of the Prussian army outmatched the Austrians.<sup>15</sup>

So ended *Grossdeutschland* versus *Kleindeutschland*. With the crushing Prussian victory came the spoils of success, and Prime

Minister Bismarck was fully prepared to capitalize once again on the opportunity to further the pursuit of unification. But his manner was Machiavellian as always. He pursued victory as voraciously as the lion, but with the cunning of the fox as the war ended and peace negotiations began. Thinking diplomatically and with concerns for international opinion, the minister commenced the peace swiftly and proceeded to make post-war arrangements that would be most beneficial to Prussia, such as the annexation of some territories. The swift settlement cooled international tensions. All of the European monarchs were concerned at the rise of Prussia as well as disheartened by the failure of one of their own. The quick peace with Francis Joseph made Prussia appear not aggressive, but controlled and limited in her scope. Bismarck the statesman always kept his finger on the pulse of international diplomacy. Though it seemed to some that Bismarck was lenient to the fallen by not marching on Vienna or demanding more territory as concessions, he successfully gained for Prussia that which was needed to further her role as vanguard of German unification. The tactic of quick peace was as important to him as his use of war as a tool. Furthermore, the Duchy of Holstein, Hanover, the Electoral Hesse, the Duchy of Nassau, the city of Frankfurt and other territories would all be gained by the victory. Therefore Bismarck was able to gain territory and establish peace amongst the European powers. The annexation of Hanover stands out as the most provocative of Prussian territorial gains. Hanover's autonomy was a casualty of the process of unification. Bismarck saw both the elimination of



northern resistance and the addition of territory to the Prussian state as indispensable to his plans.

Reminiscent of the previous war, the Iron Chancellor also scored another political victory. In defeating the Austrians, Bismarck proved that his policies, namely the military reforms, had paid off. Furthermore, since liberals could not come up with an alternative to the crisis, they were forced to admit the correctness of Bismarck's ways. Prussian liberals turned to Bismarck's camp following Königgrätz because it was obvious that his guidance was leading to German unification.<sup>16</sup>

The real reward for Bismarck following the war was his Indemnity bill that legalized all expenditures of the previous years. This bill, magnificent if in symbol alone, was a declaration of capitulation from a parliament that he had been fighting for years. The liberals were now in Bismarck's corner and awaited his next move.<sup>17</sup>

In conjunction with the effort to unite, Bismarck created the North German Confederation (1866-1870) following the victory at Königgrätz. Otto Pflanze wrote:

A continuation of the constitutional conflict would have driven German nationalists, north and south, into the opposing camp. By identifying its cause with that of the nation, Prussia could cut off all hope of revenge on the part of the defeated states and undermine their resistance to the future completion of German unification under Prussian hegemony. . . . Bismarck spoke of the North German Confederation as but a "stage" toward German unity.<sup>18</sup>

The development of this body was more than an attempt to settle the crisis by Bismarck. He could feel the political winds of change that told him he had to gain moderate liberal support in order to remain atop the government. This was not an easy marriage. Bismarck however, knew that he could seduce the liberals by taking up the cause for unification. He was also prepared to bargain on the budget issue. Among other concessions given to the liberals were provisions for a free market economy. Liberals had long desired the right of freedom of movement and unitary systems of measurements and currency. Also, universal male suffrage, which was drafted for German nationalists, proved advantageous for them in Reichstag elections.<sup>19</sup> On yet another front, the liberals were given a place in the much contested realm of military affairs with a review of the military budget every seven years.<sup>20</sup>

In return for these 'concessions', Bismarck strengthened his growing liberal support after 1866. Their acceptance of the "mixed constitution", a monarchical institution, was a victory for the count. After all, unification and the Indemnity Bill were objects of his desire anyhow. Bismarck had successfully negotiated the course of unification both domestically and abroad.

It was not long before the final step in the quest for unification developed. A situation arose again over succession to a throne. Following the deposition of Queen Isabella II in 1868, a king was needed for a newly drawn constitution. The vacancy allowed for Bismarck to manipulate the situation in order to create tensions with France. Through secret negotiations between the



Spanish, the Hohenzollern family and the Prussian court, it was decided that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (a cousin of King William I of Prussia) would receive the crown. This was sure to place Paris in an uproar, and well it did.<sup>21</sup> The tense situation was however eased when William began to back off of the candidacy of young Leopold. He approached the possibility of war with France with great trepidation. For the most part, all were relieved that the crisis had been calmed except Bismarck. It appeared that he had missed an opportunity to exploit a crisis. Fortunately for him though the French government chose to push the issue. French ambassador M. Benedetti met with King William and demanded a statement that the Crown renounced the candidacy and would not again pursue the Spanish crown. Benedetti's insistence was to cool public rage growing in France. William was polite to the ambassador as they met at the health resort of Ems. He was, however, not disposed to acquiesce in the ambassadors demands. King William did send a telegram to Bismarck describing the day's events. After reading the telegram as he sat at dinner with Field Marshal Moltke and General Roon, Bismarck recognized one more chance of exploiting the fleeting tensions. Without changing the facts of the meeting, Bismarck shortened and embellished William's accounts of the conversation with Benedetti to make it appear as though the King had been rude and that they parted abruptly.<sup>22</sup> The telegram -- immortalized as the Ems dispatch -- was made public the next day and soon appeared in French newspapers. Public outrage swept France as crowds gathered and demanded a call to arms to

champion the attack on French honor. On 19 July 1870, France declared war. This time, however, the big four southern states pledged their support to Prussia. Patriotic sentiment at this point peaked and all of Germany was fighting as a nation.

Once again Prussian military efficiency made quick work of the enemy. Prussian victories grew as the fighting progressed westward. The crushing blow came to France with the decisive battle of Sedan on September 1. Not only was a major French army forced to surrender, but Emperor Napoleon III was taken prisoner. From that point on there was no doubt that war would be won by the Germans.

The unity between Prussia and the South German States came after a period of high tensions between the two sides of the Main. The victory at Königgrätz was seen by Catholics in the south as a defeat for their faith rather than a step in the direction of unification. The year 1866 was devastating to the Catholics politically. To quote Windell:

The final exclusion of Austria from any share in the affairs of Germany destroyed at one blow the foundation upon which they [Catholics] had so long built their way of life politically.<sup>23</sup>

Throughout the Wars of Unification, Bavaria and the others, very distrustful of the Prussian state and military tradition, fought Prussianization through the parliamentary struggles of southern conservatives and the Center parties. In the delegate Windhorst, Bismarck found particularism and the protection of specific rights personified.<sup>24</sup> Unification, however, was now at hand.

As King William of Prussia stood in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace of Versailles and assumed the title of German Emperor January 18, 1871, the picture of central Europe was significantly changed. Germany would now stand as one nation-state. But unification was far more complex than defeating another country on the battlefield. Although victory over France marked the crescendo in patriotism and national pride, the jubilation soon would subside and internal conflicts would threaten the delicate fabric of unification. The conflict at hand pitted Prussia against the other states of the empire. A blending of the states into a cohesive and congenial confederacy was the ideal conception, but possible in theory alone. In Germany, state particularisms ran high. Prussia had her own interests and ways. Each of the other states was too distinctive in their mannerisms. Prussia was powerful: militarily, diplomatically, physically. The secondary states paled in comparison to their juggernaut neighbor. They remained particularistic, however, and demanded the sovereignty to which they had become so accustomed. They were determined to control governance, education and the basic administration of their states. The battlefield following Sedan was to be the Reichstag, and so began the struggle to unify a divided people -- *Einigkeitskampf*.

## III.

**The Role of the Army**

If, as has often been said, the Prussian army made the Prussian state, then it is also true that the subsequent political development of Prussia and Germany was dependent, to a far greater extent than is true of any other country, upon the organization of the army, its relationship to the sovereign power and the will of its leadership.<sup>1</sup>

Conservatives and liberals from the uproars of 1848 to the 1866 Indemnity bill -- the Waterloo of liberalism -- were tremendously sensitive to the role that the army played in the *Einigkeitskampf*. Control over the army meant control over the state. The conflict of prerogative power over the military was among the most intensive and pertinent battles in the 'protracted constitutional struggle'.<sup>2</sup> Conservatives, particularly the military leadership, were adamant about the prerogative power of the Crown. For the liberals, it was imperative that they get a place in the military.

For several centuries Prussia had been ruled by monarchs who governed the kingdom absolutely. The revolutionary years, 1848-49, however, ushered in a movement of change that smacked of liberal reform. Constitutional reform, the liberal *raison d'état*, consisted of representative government similar to that of western countries, namely, the idea of ministerial responsibility and effective parliamentary control over state administration and policy.<sup>3</sup> The movement was also a dynamic one that swept across

Europe, from the universities in Paris to the streets of Berlin. It occupied state capitals across Germany and by 18 May 1848, had given the liberals a chance to draft the constitution they were after. The movement faltered in the long run however, as normality returned. Under the command of Field Marshal von Wrangel, the liberal Prussian Parliament in Berlin was forcefully dismissed. Although slight resistance was registered from some Constituent Assembly members and the Bürgerwehr (civilian defense force), Wrangel delivered, in a bloodless victory, the power of Prussia back to his king, Frederick William IV. The loyal actions of Wrangel were an indication of the strength associated with an army faithful to its king.

The possibility of legislative encroachment on the army was a hot topic for both sides of the battle. The conservatives sought to protect the king's prerogative, and the liberals hoped to get a hold on some of the royal power -- even if only to get their foot in the door. By 1850, a confrontation was at hand between the two sides concerning the responsibility of the War Minister to the parliament and the military budget.<sup>4</sup>

King Frederick William's 1850 promulgation of a constitution seemed like a remedy to the conflict. The document, while addressing fundamental structural issues, fell silent on the army. The king had publicly stated that the army would take an oath to the constitution. That proclamation was met with a great deal of indignation from military personnel. They believed that such an oath would break the strength of the fatherland and leave the Crown



helpless against future democratic attacks. The outcry over the oath was tremendous from pensioned and active officers alike.<sup>5</sup> In the end the king omitted the oath, thus leaving the army outside of the constitution and in his control. He and his ministers made a pledge to the constitution, but for the military leadership, the important thing was the fact that the parliamentarians would not have their hands on the soldiers.

For the liberals, the pledge to the constitution by the king and his ministers presented an opportunity they were not going to pass up. Likewise, the conservatives, especially those in the military circles, were fighting equally as hard to thwart liberal efforts. But the time had arrived for the liberals.<sup>6</sup> The quest for ministerial responsibility was crucial to the liberals if they were to have a hope of participating actively in the government. The responsibility of the minister of war to the parliament was, for the liberals, an important victory. As a minister, he was required to take an oath to defend the constitution. This was significant in that it forced the minister to send all acts of government through proper channels of jurisdiction and defend them in parliament. This provision, however, conflicted with the article stating that the king had supreme command over the army. The war minister took an oath to the king as well. The king's solution to the dilemma was to have the minister submit information to the legislature that was of an administrative nature only. The end result was an office weakened by the dualism that characterized the new government.<sup>7</sup>

The provision calling for the lower house of parliament to approve the military budget created further friction between conservatives and liberals. It became a troubling situation for the military who, after snuffing the revolts and winning the debate over the oath, felt that parliamentary powers were undercutting their establishment. The budget became an item of scrutiny for the legislators. The post-revolutionary period was characterized by the army's fight to justify budgetary increases to a liberal parliament that could not help but remember the events of 1848. The generals were in a position where they had to win popular support and show their importance for Prussia at a time when the parliament was primarily interested in domestic affairs.<sup>8</sup> The years between 1850 and 1857 were exasperating for the Prussian Crown and military leadership.

In October of 1857, after his mental and physical collapse, the reign of Frederick William IV ended and that of William I (under a regency) began. The election of 1858 also brought change to the Landtag where liberals won control over the Prussian conservatives. This body was moderate in its approach to working with the new crown, however. They were more interested in such domestic issues as tax reform than in bickering over the question of prerogatives concerning the army.<sup>9</sup> The important confrontation between the parliament and the Crown was to come in the army reform bill of 1860.

The wheels had been in motion for years to improve upon the efficiency of the Prussian army. The eventual plan called for

correcting an obviously inequitable system and to expand and rejuvenate the line and *Landwehr*.<sup>10</sup> But King William was influenced by another source that heavily swayed his thinking of army reform. General Albrecht von Roon, who had developed a close relationship to the regent, convinced William that Prussia was vulnerable militarily. He urged that Prussia could only maintain and improve her international position 'with sword in hand'. That called for a large, well trained and well disciplined army led by professional officers.<sup>11</sup> William decided to go with Roon in 1859 and bypass the minister of war in assigning the duty of drafting the reform bill. His intent was for a bill primarily concerned with military well-being and resistant to parliamentary intrusion into the army.

Early in 1860, an army reform bill was drafted that called for an increase in the budget and the number of regular divisions, but a decrease in the *Landwehr*. By May of 1860, the committee on military affairs amended and passed the army reform bill that had been introduced in February. It called for a large cut in the budget and the reduction in the number of new regiments, particularly the Guard regiments that liberals feared. Furthermore, the *Landwehr*, the traditional army for provincial defense, was to be preserved. The *Landwehr* was dear to the liberals in that it was a civilian army, based on the 1814 Boyen law, and outside of the grasp of the aristocratic officer corp.<sup>12</sup> The government threw a curve into this arrangement, however. In a move that further escalated the tensions between the military and

liberals, the reform package was withdrawn and replaced with a plan calling for a provisional grant to maintain the army over the next fourteen months until another revised bill was drafted. This was a slap in the face of the conservative soldiers who were offended by the parliamentarians' disregard for their professional advice. They were certain that some ulterior motive was behind the sudden change.<sup>13</sup> The move did not stop the King and General Roon, however. They proceeded with their plans for the military structure.

In September of 1862, King William, frustrated and in a ministerial crisis because of the lack of cooperation over the army budget, appointed Bismarck as his Minister President. Bismarck agreed with key conservative strong men in the king's coalition, such as Roon and Manteuffel, when it came to military prerogative. But Bismarck was of a different breed. He possessed ambitions for his state, his fatherland and himself. From the very moment he entered the office, Bismarck began working on his plans for 'molding Prussian policy to the requirements of his own realistic opportunism.'<sup>14</sup>

Bismarck began by trying to reconcile with the parliamentary opposition. He drafted a compromise package that was both desirable to the liberals and advantageous to the crown. His plan never made it to the floor however because (Chief of Military Cabinet) Manteuffel persuaded the king that it would be too much of a moral victory for the opposition. It was a good plan sabotaged by an overzealous absolutist who was a prime example of the reason

why the conflict persisted. Bismarck, recognizing this deficiency within his own ranks, decided that the only way to handle the struggle was to get tough with the chamber. He had to step to the forefront and take charge of the deputies in the name of the crown.<sup>15</sup> Bismarck let it be known that the Parliament was not going to interfere with the process of governing -- that was still strongly vested in the monarchy. He took control of the bureaucracy by filling its ranks with loyalists, going as far as punishing or dismissing civil servants if they defended the constitutional argument by backing an opposition party.

The solution to Bismarck's governmental entanglement rested in the use of the military. He knew that the key to winning liberal support was to prove that military strength was a necessity for German unity. Oddly, it was through his foreign policy genius that Bismarck quelled the domestic fight over military reforms in the Landtag. With each victory the Prussian army scored on the battlefield, Bismarck was able to prove that his military policy was on line. Regardless of Bismarck's handiwork, though, he knew that an agreement had to be reached with the liberals if unification was to be achieved.<sup>16</sup>

Following Königgrätz the position of the liberals was greatly damaged by the diminishing support of the middle class.<sup>17</sup> The granting of the Indemnity Bill of September 1866 marked a crushing blow to the Prussian liberals. In one sweeping act, the conservatives were excused of operating outside of the constitution and the bonds of legitimacy. It was a resounding endorsement for

the prerogative powers of the Crown in military affairs and a colossal defeat for liberalism. The historian and liberal contemporary of Bismarck, Heinrich von Sybel, describes the Indemnity Bill as a pledge by Bismarck to work with the parliament as well as a 'simple harmonious settlement' between the lower house and the Crown.<sup>18</sup> His point is valid in that the bill did relieve many liberals who feared that Bismarck and the conservatives would discard constitutionalism. Bismarck's request for the indemnity, however, was only a facade as far as a settlement is concerned. His motive was to secure liberal support in the months to come, not to guard against the growth of imperial power. Furthermore, the liberals had no choice in the matter. The victories on the Bohemian battlefields proved that the army deserved the money in the first place. Sybel admitted that the lower house was in error.<sup>19</sup> The political impetus following the army's triumphs was clearly behind the Crown. For the liberals, voting in favor of the Indemnity Bill was a political necessity.

The impact of the army on the Prussian state was not limited to the constitutional conflict. With each of the victories in the Wars of Unification, it actively aided the unification process by generating nationalistic sentiment. War with France proved to be a perfect opportunity and the fuel for what Otto Pflanze called the *Furor Teutonicus*.

From the outset the war was popular on both sides of the Rhine. William received ovation after ovation on his journey from Ems to Berlin. In the capital thousands gathered spontaneously at the railway station to receive him. Afterward they massed in the

square before the royal palace to cheer and applaud.<sup>20</sup>

The hatred of France, 'rather than spontaneous deviation to Germany', toppled the sentiment of separatism. Memories of Napoleonic France 'effectively aroused the awareness of a single nationality among the governments and peoples of Germany'.<sup>21</sup>

Thanks to the swift and ignominious defeat of the French at the hands of the Prussian army, the mighty state was poised, in 1871, to ascend to heights thought possible by few people. Now that the Second Reich had been born, it had to be reared in an environment that was gradually losing the enthusiasm of the nationalistic victories. Though disunity had been conquered, the particularistic nature of Prussia's fellow states remained.

The war of 1870 brought all of the German states together to fight as one. This was quite a departure from the scene in 1866 in which Bavaria and Hanover both sided with Austria. Following the Franco-Prussian war, the two states found themselves in an awkward position vulnerable to the control of the newest European power.

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For the proud particularists of Hanover, Bismarck had plans that were not welcomed. Following the Prussian victory at Königgrätz, the Guelph dynasty was in peril. Elimination of the *Grossdeutschland* possibility and Bismarck's momentum toward unification meant annexation of the kingdom. Bismarck had to

envelop the region. He would not allow for the opportunity of Guelph loyalist or anti-Prussian elements to have a breeding ground. Secondly, the territorial gain was obviously important to Bismarck, but he inevitably thought of the future parliamentary struggle that was to come.<sup>22</sup> In this though, Bismarck walked softly again. His intent was for a formal abdication from King George. The abdication would I) ease particularist sentiment, II) appease European apprehensions of the hostile overthrow of a monarch and III) facilitate a peaceful assimilation of Hanoverians into the confederation. As for King George, he could find no help from the European monarchs.

The Guelphs resorted to subversive acts in an attempt to regain their kingdom. Propaganda was one avenue, but far more threatening to Bismarck was the Guelph Legion. A small group of loyalists secretly camped in France threatened the new Hanoverian administration and were in a position to ally with anti-Prussian forces. It was a clandestine struggle between Bismarck and George that ended in favor of the chancellor with George's order for the disbandment of the Legionnaires.

The decisive blow to King George and the particularists who hoped to see the kingdom regained came with George's forced surrendering of his forces. By the first day of 1867, Bismarck had placed an ultimatum on the officers of the defunct Hanoverian army -- 'enlist now or miss out'. For most, this was an offer that they could not refuse. King George, faced with the possibility of 'losing his officers by default', reluctantly absolved his men of their oath to him.<sup>23</sup> With his army now in the hands of Prussia, there was no hope for reviving his kingdom.



With that failure King George turned to the parliament as a way to regain power. With George's banishing of the Guelph Legion and his formal dismissal of the troops from his service, the Hanoverian army was no longer an obstacle for the chancellor. Bismarck successfully assimilated Hanover into the North German Confederation, an important step along the road to unification.

Bismarck knew that annexation was not a reasonable option in acquiring Bavaria. This largest of the southern states had to be approached with finesse rather than force. The Bavarians had the capacity to unite with other European powers if needed to protect their particularistic interests. On the outbreak of the Seven Weeks' War they sided with their Catholic compatriots, the Austrians, and threatened alliance with France during the Luxemburg Crisis of 1867. Bismarck understood this leverage as well as the Bavarian heads of state. He knew that absorbing these southerners would be a delicate operation and was willing to accommodate the special interests of Bavaria for as long as possible.

Paramount to the Bavarians' concerns was sovereignty. It was absolutely fundamental that they have control over their own affairs. Bavaria's special place as the dominant state south of the Main River gave her leverage in the unifying years. Under the guidance of Minister-President Prince von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst cooperation was established between Munich and Berlin. While Hohenlohe (and his cabinet) was for joining the Northern Confederation, he was under tremendous pressures from his legislature to defend Bavarian sovereignty.<sup>24</sup> Hohenlohe would not lead his state to unification, however. He was voted out of office by the Patriot Party two years before the war with

France.

Instrumental in the struggle for unification was King Ludwig II. Typical of the Bavarian persona, Ludwig was more interested in Wagner and the fabled Knight Lohengrin than military organization or politics. That is not to say that Ludwig was simple minded or was to be taken for granted by Bismarck.<sup>25</sup> His relationship with Bismarck will be discussed later.

Bismarck's success at capturing Bavaria began with his military alliances. After the crushing victory at Königgrätz the secondary states found it crucial to establish military ties with Prussia through an alliance treaty. Fear of isolation necessitated it. The delicate secret treaty between the rival states came close to peril, however, in the Luxemburg Crisis. It was disclosed publicly when Bismarck proved that he had an agreement in writing with Bavaria. The move was to ease the fears of conservatives in Prussia who were wary of the southern state's loyalty. The effects were nearly disastrous south of the Main. The publication of the alliance 'served only to heighten the tensions between pro- and anti-Prussians throughout the south. The latter could now claim that they had been misled and betrayed by their governments'.<sup>26</sup> There was much anger heard south of the Main; fear of Prussianization was beginning to show. The alliances remained however. Bismarck's earnest warnings about Prussia's determination to look out for her own interests were good enough to keep the fear of isolation in the minds of Ludwig and Prince Hohenlohe. That fear propelled the Bavarians into war in 1870 side-by-side with the Prussians.

The post-war era in relations between Prussia and Bavaria resumed from where they had been disrupted -- with the cries of particularism. The Bavarians were adamant about the *originare Rechte auf Hoheitsrechte* (sovereignty). And in that sentiment, there was a demand for 'special' and 'reserved' rights.

*Militarwesen*, the right to manage their military affairs was a major concern.<sup>27</sup> Bismarck's plan for assimilating the south into the union called for cautious steps. He was willing to grant 'reserved' rights to the Bavarians in exchange for real guarantees that would strengthen the nation-state.

The Bavarians received more rights than all the other secondary states. Among those privileges were a seat on the Bundesrat committee on foreign affairs, the power to appoint all officers and commanders of fortresses, and most importantly, the right to maintain an 'army' as a self-contained unit of the German army with its own budget.<sup>28</sup> Bavaria accepted Bismarck's terms and joined the confederation. These concessions, though symbolically substantial, were trivial in the context of actual effectiveness. Commissioning officers was an important military responsibility, but with William retaining wartime authority, Bavaria's military autonomy was limited. From 1871 on, even though Bavaria and Prussia had a 'mutual exchange of information', William I was vested with the control and authoritative leadership in the military.<sup>29</sup>

## IV.

**Party Meandering and Political Consolidation**

Unification under Prussian auspices was complete after 1871 with the emergence of the Second Empire. With all of the mechanics for unifying the German people completed, it was then up to Prussia to formulate a harmonious nation-state. For Prussia, the role that Bismarck would play seemed indispensable to that mission. He was a man of phenomenal diplomatic abilities. But as the German nation evolved, so did her most distinguished statesman. As the post-unification order unfolded, Bismarck became something of an extra-entity above Prussia and the secondary states, becoming a servant of Germany rather than of Prussia. He became intertwined in the national fabric. The count had lifted the state of Prussia to the prominent position he desired via the *kleindeutschland* solution and was then ready to heighten the nation-state of Germany. As evident by his shifting from conservatism to liberalism between 1867 and 1878, Bismarck became disassociated with Prussian particularism. Following his resignation as Prussian prime minister in 1867, he espoused his belief that Prussia must conform to a German pattern.<sup>1</sup> The result of this transformation of realigned allies was a series of parliamentary battles over conservative particularism and liberal change. Bismarck's staunch Junker conservative past was cast aside after 1867 when he sided with the National Liberals (only to be revived in 1878). Even though Bismarck jumped sides,

the old distinctions between the conservatives and the liberals remained with renewed particularisms.

Bismarck turned all of his energies toward domestic issues following unification. He knew that a great effort was needed to improve upon the state of Germany. Prepared to meet the challenge, the minister-president attached himself to the political group that he had been fighting his entire career, the liberal faction. Bismarck had grown closer to the National Liberals in the 1860's. Their ideology complemented his plans for unification. Confident in their support for unification, Bismarck forged a working relationship with the middle-class products of the Industrial Revolution. By concluding the constitutional conflict and working with them on the military budget issue, the minister formed a coalition with the party that, after unification, considered itself the governing party.<sup>2</sup> By 1870, Bismarck was poised to push through the liberal measures he had been working on for the past three years.<sup>3</sup>

The realignment of the late 1860's, joining Bismarck with the National Liberals, was essential to both. While the latter had the numbers in the Reichstag -- giving Bismarck the parliamentary support he needed -- the Count was in a position to establish the measures that the liberals sought. Though it appeared that the count was conceding ground, he maintained his course -- primacy of the state. Most liberals wanted to work with Bismarck simply to gain from his power. Conversely, liberal support was essential to the minister-president's goal of passing the constitution and the process of unification.<sup>4</sup>

Bismarck became disenchanted with the National Liberals, however. Though his relationship to them was vital following unification and during the *Kulturkampf*, fundamental differences arose that eventually would destroy the partnership. Bismarck began to lose faith in free trade. His gestures toward nationalizing the German railways clearly indicated movement back to the right. More importantly, however, was the issue of the protective tariffs which were due to expire January 1, 1877. The practice of *laissez-faire* was a success following the post-Franco-Prussian War economic boom. But where Prussia had succeeded on the battlefields, Russia and America excelled on trade markets. As the post-war Prussian boom began to deflate, the real (economic) world became clear. Expanded American grain exports flooded the European market. The result was an all-out depression as grain prices plummeted.<sup>5</sup> By 1877, trade conditions had tightened. The threat of cheap Russian grain flooding the German market thanks to a new railway system was too much for Bismarck, who was inherently anti-free trade. Conservatives exclaimed the error of liberal policies. Secondly, the young Reich was still quite financially unstable, depending upon the states for the bulk of its income. A tariff would 'both protect German industry and give the Reich a secure revenue of its own.'<sup>6</sup> It must also be said that the shift in thinking was sure to win the count back the conservative support that was vested so heavily in agriculture.<sup>7</sup> In 1878, over the issue of a tobacco tax, Bismarck broke from the National Liberals and returned to the right and conservatism.<sup>8</sup>

Bismarck's battle with Catholicism marked another episode of party meandering. The *Kulturkampf*, or struggle for civilization,

was a glaring blemish in Bismarck's career in office. Following the 1864 *Syllabus of Errors*, the definition of Papal Infallibility, Bismarck began a campaign to prevent possible subversive activities by Catholics. The doctrine, sent down by the Vatican, called for all Catholics to uphold the 'infallible' statements pronounced by the Vatican. Interpreting it as a threat to the authority of the emperor, more specifically a source of disaffection and disloyalty to the Empire, Bismarck crusaded to block what he mistakenly saw as a Catholic plot. Primarily with legislation known as the May Laws of 1873, 1874 and 1875, he instituted controls over all Catholics. Among the regulations were: the institutionalization of civil marriage, the withdrawal of state support from recalcitrant clergy, the placement of all clerical education and appointments under the state and the elimination of the Jesuit order.<sup>9</sup> The *Kulturkampf* severed ties between Bismarck and many conservatives. Paramount to Bismarck's concerns was the fear of Catholics -- north and south -- joining together in a movement to undermine the Reich. That fear never materialized and the *Kulturkampf* was abandoned. In the battle against Catholicism, he took an uncharacteristic departure from his usual style of calculated diplomacy. Instead of gently coaxing the Catholics into the camp of German nationalism, the count tried to force it upon them. His fear of mass opposition clouded his judgment and nearly jeopardized his plan. That fear and focused antagonism appeared in Bismarck's bout with the rising Socialists. A set of anti-Socialist laws, drafted after two attempts to kill Kaiser William I (and on the heels of the *Kulturkampf*) illustrates this difficult period for the count. The laws, an attempt to break up and destroy the socialist leadership,

proved only to strengthen and consolidate the burgeoning Socialist Party.<sup>10</sup> Perhaps the complexity of juggling the affairs of Prussia along with annexation of Hanover and the negotiations with the southern states was taking a toll on the Iron Chancellor.

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The annexation of Hanover did not end with the successful elimination of the Legionnaires and King George's capitulation of his army to Prussia. With that failure King George turned to the *Reichstag* as a way to regain what power he could. The DHP (*Deutsch-Hannoversche Partei*), the party of the Guelph dynasty, made its particular goal to be the opposition to Prussia in the legislature. Their strength rested in those opposed to Prussian annexation: civil servants and particularist conservatives in the military, nobility and clergy. To Bismarck's advantage there was a sound liberal base within Hanover that was unanimously and wholeheartedly behind *Kleindeutschland*. In the year following Königgrätz, the election for *Reichstag* delegates was discouraging for the DHP. With a slim victory going to the candidates who favored annexation and Prussian hegemony, the Guelph aspirations of fending off annexation fizzled out.<sup>11</sup>

The German political environment after 1871, as well as that before unification, was best described as particularistic. Factions and states continued to battle for strength in the new empire. This was a contingency that Bismarck had to face and well he did. But from the province of Hanover, Bismarck faced his most taxing opposition from the Catholic lawyer and parliamentarian



Ludwig Windthorst. The role of Windthorst as the *Zentrum* Party chief was one of loyal opposition and factional leadership for a variety of causes opposing Bismarck. Windthorst maintained his convictions to legality, constitutionalism and strong monarchism in his parliamentary battles with Bismarck.

Windthorst's upbringing and educational background was of strong convictions, legal obedience and the Catholic faith. These traits were to guide him throughout his life. At the beginning of his political career, Windthorst was firm in his ideology. He espoused both constitutionalism and the belief that the authority of the monarch was all but absolute. The state was an organic whole with the monarch as the supreme member. The constitution was the tool which codified the country. Its purpose was to represent the interest of society while all political power in the state went to the executive -- the monarch. The representative body had a very conservative role: to prevent the unpolitical use of power, i.e., interfering with society -- the family, the Church or the social structure.<sup>12</sup> Windthorst's conservative views and his belittlement of the parliament were to change, however, with the upheaval brought about by Bismarck.

Two factors transformed the behavior of Windthorst: Bismarck's sequestering of the *Welfenfonds* and the *Kulturkampf*. Ludwig saw the seizure of the Guelph's fortune as 'bullying of a helpless individual by a mighty state'. From that point on he was committed to be 'particularly and permanently defensive'.<sup>13</sup> He pledged himself to loyal opposition. As for the *Kulturkampf*, Windthorst found himself pushed in the direction of liberalism. He worked for democratic franchising and parliamentary budget rights as well as

governmental restraints and the protection of ethnic minorities. Unlike typical liberal parties, however, the *Zentrum* did not try to seize power. Windthorst, though popular, did not represent the middle class; he didn't share their 'deepest feelings and vices . . . [he] was aloof and an outsider'. The *Zentrum* was thus a permanent minority in which Windthorst sought influence rather than the minister-president's office.<sup>14</sup> After all, Windthorst believed in the monarchy and federal prerogative while he maintained his convictions to legality, constitutionalism and strong monarchism in his parliamentary battles with Bismarck.

Windthorst was a man of singular quality in the Second Reich. Although he rose to power, he never had Bismarckian appetites. He remained committed to what he believed was his role, a strong voice in the parliament for the Center. Though he was labeled an Ultramontanist and an enemy to the state, Windthorst remained above it all. While Bismarck's 'political thought was primarily concerned with the problems of power, rather than ideology or sentiment', Windthorst concerned himself with politicking for the purpose of protecting those causes he felt vulnerable to the menacing Prussian state.<sup>15</sup>

Even with valiant opposition in the *Reichstag*, Bismarck proceeded with assimilating the Hanoverians into the Prussian system. Though the liberal victories finalized the annexation, Bismarck was committed to making the process as smooth as possible. The Hanoverians -- i.e., the DHP -- would not, however reciprocate Bismarck's peaceful gestures. Until the end of his career, they were anti-Prussian agitators who provided 'perpetual opposition' to him and his policies.<sup>16</sup>

Bismarck however, held a trump card that he used most effectively after defeating the Guelphs. He sequestered the Guelph family fortune, the *Welfenfonds*. Using the funds to his benefit, the minister countered the subversive activities of the Guelphs in their campaign to block Prussianization. With it, Bismarck financed operations against the Guelph Legion, controlled the press, provided funding for public projects and even bribed important persons.<sup>17</sup> The money proved to be critical to the success of unification.

Angered by the Hanoverians' resolve, Bismarck turned to oppressive means to assimilate them. The years 1866-67 saw military rule and the censorship of anti-Prussian, particularistic newspapers. Bismarck soon checked himself, however, deciding to pursue a conciliatory avenue with the Lower Saxons. His wisest move was to concentrate on the administrative abilities of which they were so proud. In the summer of 1867, Bismarck announced a new administrative system that blended Prussian and Hanoverian elements in the local administration of the *Amtsbezirk*. Furthermore, the count hand-picked for the position of *Oberpräsident* a young man who held a large estate in the province but was not of the 'old Prussian' bureaucracy. In that appointment, Bismarck pleased the nobility 'not only because the new High-Governor had not come from the ranks of the Prussian bureaucracy but also because Bismarck had paid the new province a compliment by naming a man of such good lineage to the office.'<sup>18</sup> On the higher level concerning the military and provincial taxing, the authority was retained by a Prussian, however.

To further win the hearts of the Hanoverians, Bismarck spent a great deal of money to improve the economy and established many public works programs.<sup>19</sup> This was all made possible by the *Welfenfonds*. These gestures of good will and friendly cooperation effectively ended the last bureaucratic holdout against annexation and snuffed out remaining aristocratic appeals for the old order.

Religion and education were the two other sensitive areas with which Bismarck had to contend. The Church of Hanover adhered to a strict orthodox Lutheran doctrine in the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. They existed as independent bodies that preserved narrow denominational differences in their creed. The Prussian Evangelical Church was a combination of the two with Calvinist elements. The Hanoverian clergy disapproved of that church and feared they would have to assimilate into that system 'for the sake of political integration'. Bismarck, however, insisted that the Hanoverian Lutheran Church not be incorporated into the Evangelical Church of Prussia.<sup>20</sup>

Closely associated with the concerns of the clergy was that of education. The Lutheran clergy was adamant about retaining jurisdiction over primary education. The issue of confessional versus interconfessional schools was active throughout Imperial Germany. Traditionally under the guidance of the Catholic or Protestant Churches, the school issue became another pawn in the politics of unification. Liberals were interested in secularizing the educational system for purely political motives in Prussia as well as the other states.<sup>21</sup> For the National Liberals, educational reform was the logical accompaniment to political unification. Their fight against confessionally divided school systems under

clerical supervision was waged to break down religious particularisms, foster cultural integration, establish the primacy of the citizen's loyalty to the nation-state and nationalize the consciousness of the German people. Those affiliated with the Progressive party were convinced that school reform was a precondition to emancipate the society from the obscurantism and intolerance that hindered progress. Public enlightenment could only be achieved after church influences were eliminated.<sup>22</sup> It was a confrontation that Bismarck hoped to avoid, but its political importance made it an issue that the minister had to address. Interconfessionalism never was achieved in the Bismarckian period, even in the social and politically integrated state of Prussia. With that said, it is preposterous to assume that it would have had a chance in the other states that identified non-confessional schools as a Prussian infringement. The confessional system was to survive the liberal attacks. An 1879 decree by minister of education Robert von Puttkamer thwarted the interconfessional movement. In his defense of the clerical system, Puttkamer determined that the drive behind interconfessionalism was politics. He insisted that the liberals, under former minister Falk, were coercive and did not give consideration to the rights and interests of the religious minorities in the traditional establishment.<sup>23</sup>

In Bavaria, the process of assimilation was considerably more difficult than the Hanoverian annexation. The Bavarians knew that, although trapped in the clutches of the Reich, they were still second only to their captor within it. That translated into special constitutional demands, the protection of particularistic interests and tangible controls over internal affairs.

The *Recht auf Existenz* and *originare Rechte auf Hoheitsrechte* were perennial cries of the Bavarians. While Bismarck determined to control the vital aspects of each state (the military, taxation), he was willing to listen to their demands for *besonderen Hoheitsrechte* (particular sovereignty). Following the birth of the Reich, Bismarck made some solid concessions to the southern state to appease its particularistic appetites. Among those allowances were the rights to home and settlement establishment (related to real estate); to control railway, post office and telegraph affairs; and of authority in real estate affairs.<sup>24</sup> The Bavarians also retained lighter duties on their beer, the state industry.<sup>25</sup>

In the largest of the Catholic states, religion of course held a prominent position. For Bavarians tolerance of their Catholic educational system was a high priority. Liberal ploys to establish interconfessionalism never materialized south of the Main. Particularistic characteristics in the southern states were, however, undeniable. In *Regionalism and Nationalism in South German History Lessons, 1871-1914*, Katharine Kennedy examines the process of educating south German students after unification.<sup>26</sup> Ms. Kennedy explains that cultural unification was not complete in 1871. Examination of the curricula and the readers (standard instructing manuals) proved that regional topics remained central to the history in the south. In unification and nationalism -- strongly tied together -- Prussian influence in the role of unifier was initially belittled. The history of the Franco-Prussian War was of courses and not causes. While battlefields and statistics were taught, little if any background was given on the war: "July 19, 1870 . . . Napoleon III declares war on Prussia . . . without

grounds . . . ." The war with Austria was, if not omitted completely, mentioned only vaguely as a civil war. Austria, during the Franco-Prussian war, was said to have 'forgotten' her recent defeat and remained neutral. The creation of the new nation was credited to the German princes and not to Bismarck (Prussia finally received more credit after 1900).

Nationalism, important to the southern educators, was incorporated into their history curricula. Medieval Germany was the focus of their lessons, however, in which the students were taught an invented tradition of a continued Holy Roman Empire. Thus the schools proved to be another battleground where particularists deflected the glory of the unification away from Prussia and Bismarck.<sup>27</sup>

But the significance of Prussia and her 'mad Junker' is undeniable. Evidence that illustrates the point of Bismarck's political success in unifying Germany can be found in the ideological makeup of the Chamber of Deputies for Prussia, Hesse-Darmstadt, Württemberg and Bavaria between the years 1868-1877. In Prussia, the National Liberals held 23 per cent of the seats in 1867 and 40.2 per cent in 1874, compared to 33.8 per cent to 7 per cent for the conservatives and 0 per cent to 20.3 per cent for the Center. In Hesse, the liberals rocketed from 28 per cent in 1867 to 80 per cent in 1876, while the conservatives fell from 16 per cent to 2 per cent and the Center went from 7 per cent to 10 per cent. For Saxony, the liberals grew from 37.5 per cent 1869 to 46 per cent in 1873, while the conservatives fell from 51 per cent to 47.5 per cent -- the Center Party not registering. In Württemberg, the liberal faction went from 18 per cent in 1868 to 64.5 per cent

in 1876 while the conservative group fell from 33 per cent to 18.5 per cent and the Catholics from 31 per cent to 17 per cent. Finally in Bavaria, the granddaddy of the southern particularists, while the Catholic faction -- the Patriot Party -- lost one percentage from 52 per cent in 1869 to 51 per cent in 1875, the liberals jumped from 0 per cent to 49 per cent.<sup>28</sup>

These numbers show a tremendous amount of support for unification in that the liberals were the party of that cause. Conversely, the faction of particularism and anti-nationalism -- the conservatives -- suffered resounding defeats in the *Landtag*.



## V.

**Conclusion**

Germany, past unification and into a post-Bismarckian era, was not an enlarged version of Prussia. The *Einigkeitskampf* saw once autonomous states able to preserve some identity within the union. Hanoverian influence in the bureaucracy remained in that region. The Bavarians maintained a significant position in the military and in many of the state's administrative roles. Supervision of religious matters, especially the clerical school systems, survived as well. But when the real victories of the *Einigkeitskampf* are tallied, the Prussian imprint on the nation-state is unmistakable.

As a state within the union, Prussia not only sustained her stature, but strengthened it by territorial gains. Where other states were forced to accept Prussianization to some degree, Prussia took on none of the traits of her neighbors. The only impact on Prussian society in that part of the nineteenth century was caused by the Industrial Revolution.

The most crucial components of the new nation-state, when viewing Germany as a whole, are characteristic of Prussia. On the outer layer, symbols of the nation were Prussian. The head of state -- the emperor -- was of the Prussian house of Hohenzollern. The structure of the state -- the constitution -- was the product of the North German Confederation and distinctly Prussian. Underneath the surface the most profound object that embodied the

mark of Prussianization on the Second Reich was control of the military. The position of the army in the second half of the nineteenth century was colossal to say the least. From the uprisings of 1848 to the parliamentary battles into the post-Bismarckian era, the quest to seize the reins of the army was a non-stop domestic war.

Following unification, the authority rested firmly in Prussia. From the King's general supremacy in command, to the oath of the men in the line, the military character of the mighty state highlights the Prussian dominance in the *Einigkeitskampf*. States annexed, such as Hanover, obviously were eliminated from the military question. Those that hung on to their sovereignty were effectively belittled. Bavaria, the biggest of the non-Prussian states, had a military that was reduced to a glorified state national guard. The symbols of the German nation-state and the power that it held, were of Prussia.

Finally, in retrospect to the discussion on the *Einigkeitskampf*, the role played by Otto von Bismarck in the unification deserves some concluding remarks. While the intent of this study was not to emphasize the work and abilities of the count, it was impossible to exclude him. Each source tapped for this narrative contained at least one passage dedicated to the prominent role of Bismarck in the development of Germany. In discussing the Wars of Unification, his vast abilities in the international arena were merely skimmed. Likewise, the attention given to his brilliance in handling domestic matters does not do the diplomat justice.

Bismarck functioned as a catalyst in the *Einigkeitskampf*. He successfully directed the aspiration of German unification. Though ruthless and often surreptitious in his approach, Bismarck masterminded the unification through war and diplomacy. He was indeed an opportunist dedicated to lifting the state to great heights. As his state transformed from Prussia to Germany, the count converted as well. Bismarck's role was paramount in the creation of the Second Reich. Unification, as accomplished through the auspices of Prussia in 1871, could not have occurred without his genius.

## Chapter 1

1. Von Thadden, Prussia: The History of a Lost State. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.1-9. An argument exists over the exact dates of the existence of the Prussian state.
2. Ibid., p.22. E.g., the Huguenot Edict of Potsdam opened the door for much of the religious migration.
3. Ibid., p.25
4. Ibid., p.25
5. Theodore S. Hamerow, The Social Foundations of German Unification 1858-1871. Vol I. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p.61-63. The author is making the argument that the Junkers and peasantry had a feudalistic relationship that increased the former's power.
6. Ibid. p.58-59
7. Ibid. p.60
8. H.W.Koch, A History of Prussia. (London: Longman Group Limited, 1978) p.168-169
9. Hamerow, Vol I, p.62
10. Ibid., p.62
11. Mr. Hamerow describes that they were held together by an 'economical dependence on manufacture, commerce, or the learned professions, a generally similar intermediate position within the social order, a common minimum level of income and education, and a pervasive hostility to the hierarchical structure of authority'. p.64-65. See also p.68
12. George G. Windell. The Catholics and German Unity 1866-1871, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), p.299. See Appendix: Religious census 1871.
13. Max Spindler, Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte, vol.4, part 1. (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1974). p.284.
14. Stewart A. Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph Problem 1866-1890. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p.7-9. George Louis' ascension to the throne was due to the 1701 Act of Settlement, 'whereby the British Parliament recognized the rights of succession of the Guelphs to the British throne in the event that Princess Anne, the sister-in-law of William III, should die without issue.' She did in 1714. The duel reign of the Guelphs would end, however, in 1837 upon the rise of Victoria. Hanoverian law prohibited a woman to govern.

15. Stehlin, Ibid., p.10

16. Stehlin, Ibid., p.10

17. Stehlin, Ibid., p.11 Hanover earned the title of one of the best administered territories in Germany. It was said that there was no lack of good officials to sustain the Lower Saxon reputation for efficiency.

18. George G. Windell, The Catholics and German Unity 1866-1871. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), p.29.

' . . . the rise of liberalism, with its demand for parliamentary government . . . were undermining the traditional tie between throne and altar.

18. Stehlin, Ibid., p.138

20. Hamerow, Vol I. p. 154-58

21. Gordon C. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1955), p.137.

22. Craig, Ibid., p.121. Frederick William was inclined to revoke all of the gains that the liberals had made over the revolutionary period. He was persuaded however to observe the Prussian atmosphere. Minister President Count Brandenburg was successful in his arguing that 'provocative gestures would merely reanimate the revolutionary zeal of the Prussian people and would cause new domestic disorder at a time when Prussian unity was desirable.'

23. Eugene N. Anderson, The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia 1858-1864. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1954), p.178. See also p.176-78.

24. Ibid., p. 69

25. Ibid., p.14-15

26. Ibid., p.41

## Chapter 2

1. The president-minister of course being Otto von Bismarck, the main author of the constitution.

2. Stehlin, p.9

3. George G. Windell, The Catholics and German Unity.

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), p.247.

Following a patriotic address to a special session of the Reichstag, 15 July 1870, Mr. Windell points out that there was no opposition to the processes of the declaration of war. The consensus was in support of 'the German Fatherland', Catholics

included. The point is capsulated with a remark about Peter Reichensperger, 'the inclusion of Reichensperger is . . . indicative, revealing that one of the most hard-headed Catholic politicians was as capable of being swept away by the emotion of the day as were any of the National Liberals.

4. Otto Planze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany. Vol.I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) Bismarck was always aware of the political environment and used political parties particularly well in his pursuit of his raison d'état - Prussian expansion. p.3-14.

5. Marshall Dill, Jr., Germany. A Modern History. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970) p.134.

6. Notes for lecture of 18 November 1991 in History 4025 by Professor David Lindenfeld.

7. Dill, p.136. Although not formally annexed, the duchies were set up as German states with an agreement for navy bases and other alliances.

8. Koch, p.255-56.

9. Windell, p.14-15.

10. Ibid., p.299 Appendix of Religious Census 1871, e.g. Württemberg 30.4 per cent, Baden 64.5 per cent

11. Gordon A. Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz. Philadelphia & New York: J.B. Lippencott Company, 1964), p.6.

'The victories of the Austrian infantry over the hard-fighting Danes had obscured parallel Prussian operations so completely that it became embarrassing, and this had led Archduke Albert to suggest in a letter to General Ludwig von Galbenz that, for the sake of harmony between allies, some kind of a victory should be arranged for the Prussians.

12. Ibid., p.6-16.

13. Ibid., p.16-25.

14. Dill, p.139.

15. Koch, p.259-60.

16. Ibid., p.262.

17. Dill, p.139-40.

18. Pflanze, Vol I, p.324.

19. Planze, p.328. In actuality, Bismarck drafted the suffrage bill in an effort to strengthen the conservatives at the liberals' expense. The move only added the National Liberals.

20. Notes for lecture 11 November 1991 in History 4025 by Professor David Lindenfeld.

21. Dill, p.142-43. An inflammatory speech by the French foreign minister declared that France would not tolerate a resurrection of the empire of Charles V.

22. Planze, Vol I, 2nd ed. p.451-469

23. Windell, p.27.

24. Margaret L. Anderson, Windthorst, A Political Biography. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p.102. Windthorst saw Bismarck's handling of the Guelph dynasty as a bullying tactic. He would be extremely mindful of Prussian moves in respect to the letter of the law. 'His stance from then on would be particularly and permanently defensive.'

### Chapter 3

1. Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), xiv.

2. Ibid., xiv.

3. Ibid., xiii-xiv.

4. Ibid., pp.123-25.

5. Ibid., p.122-23. Within military circles it was believed that in addition to the already mentioned, such a move would be destructive to discipline, efficiency and loyalty to the crown. The sentiment was quite solid.

6. Ibid., p.123-24. The author maintains that, even though the uprisings of 1848-49 had been effectively put down, the winds of change were undeniable. Frederick William realized that and understood that the constitutional struggle would end 'not with a definitive victory of the crown, but with a very uneasy compromise.'

7. Ibid., p.125.

8. Ibid., p.126-35.

9. Ibid., p.137-38.

10. Ibid., p.139. The report concluded by Lieutenant-Colonel von Clausewitz was aimed at correcting problems in conscription that were due to population changes over the previous thirty years. The end suggestion called for the term of service to be legally set at two years instead of three and for an increase in the annual levies.

11. Ibid., p.139-40.

12. Ibid., p.69-71.

13. Ibid., p.148.

14. Ibid., p.160

15. Ibid., p.162-64. 'Bismarck proved far more offensive than his colleagues'. The author makes a point that Bismarck had little choice in this new attitude toward his position. Another attempt at compromise by Bismarck would have 'aroused doubts concerning his reliability and firmness of purpose.' There was little room for leniency toward the parliamentarians within the circles of the military and the Crown.

16. Ibid., p.174.

17. Hamerow, Vol I, p.154-56.

18. Heinrich von Sybel, *the Great Compromise, Otto von Bismarck, A Historical Assessment*. 2nd ed. (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), pp.31-37.

19. Ibid., pp.31-37.

20. Pflanze, Vol.I. p.468-71. The author maintains that Germans of that time had been raised in the tradition of the war of 1812. There was a suspicion of France in Germany that Bismarck capitalized upon by getting the German nation to identify with the Prussian cause.

21. Ibid., p.437.

22. Stehlin, p.42.

23. Ibid., p.160-62. The decision for many of the officers was not a difficult one. Artillery and engineer officers were mainly of a middle class background.

24. Spindler, Vol.IV, Pt.1, p.262-63.

25. Notes for lecture of 11 November 1991 in History 4025 by Professor David Lindenfeld.



26. Pflanze, p.386-87. The Bavarians insisted upon Bismarck to announce that the alliances were defensive only. Bismarck refused their demand.

27. Spindler, p.284.

28. Pflanze, p. 488-89. The independence of the Bavarian army was a farce. In a time of war the Kaiser (i.e. William I of Prussia) would assume command over the forces.  
See also Ibid., p.289-91.

29. Spindler, Vol IV, pt.1, pp.289-90.

#### Chapter 4

1. A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman. (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1955), p.145. See also Koch, A History of Prussia, p.274. Bismarck believed in the primacy of the state -- the state after 1871 being Germany.

2. Ibid., p.144.

3. Ibid., p.144.

4. James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century. (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.130.

5. Pflanze, Vol. II, p.282-85.

6. Taylor, p.155-156.

7. Ibid., p.151. Mr. Taylor asserts the theory that Bismarck had distinct political motives in the tariff plan. He maintains that tariffs would replace the failed *Kulturkampf* in supplying a new national appeal. Concerning the *Kulturkampf* Mr. Taylor said, 'Bismarck always held that struggle against a common enemy was the simplest method for attaining political unity'.

8. Taylor, p.160-161. Bismarck announced in the Reichstag that he was in favor of the tax in that it was the first step toward a tobacco monopoly. The symbolic gesture was anti-liberal and referred to its use as a weapon in the centralized government of Austria and France.

9. Dill, p.150-52.

10. Koch, p.273-79.

11. Stehlin, p.98-137. Regaining power was a concern of the Guelphs, but from a realistic point of view they had to be more concerned with 'its property rights, monarchical claims, and relations to the Prussian state.'

12. Anderson, p.92-94.

13. M.Anderson, p.102-107.
14. Ibid., p.403.
15. Planze, p.369.
16. Stehlin, p.156.
17. Ibid., p.210-11. The author expresses confidence in the theory that money from the *Welfenfonds* was used to bribe King Ludwig of Bavaria (who was in financial straits) into crowning William German Emperor. An event that was crucial not only to please William, but also one that was significant in neutralizing particularisms.
18. Ibid., p.175-76.
19. Ibid., p.176-93.
20. Ibid., p.99,164-5.
21. Windell, p.233.
22. Marjorie Lamberti, State, Society, and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany. (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.9-12,32-35.
23. Ibid., p.88-94.
24. Spindler, Vol IV, pt.1, p.284-85.
25. Taylor, p.131.
26. Katherine D. Kennedy, *Regionalism and Nationalism in South German History Lessons, 1871-1914*, German Studies Review. XII, (1989). Arizona State University, p.11-34.
27. Ibid.
28. James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century. (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.146-149, tables 10.1-10.7.