The response of the National School Lunch Program and Food Stamp Program in southern Louisiana in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

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THE RESPONSE OF THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM AND FOOD STAMP PROGRAM IN SOUTHERN LOUISIANA IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science

in

The School of Human Ecology

By
Emily Sashel Whelan
B.S., Texas Christian University, 2000
December 2006
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my grandfather, Robert DeLaney, who passed away during my graduate studies. Throughout his life, he maintained a steadfast dedication to education. It is in his honor that I carry out our family’s tradition of higher learning.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my committee director, Dr. Carol E. O’Neil, for her meticulous attention to not only detail, but to the overall picture. She has been outstandingly patient when things have taken longer than I expected. I am honored to have been able to work with her and owe much of my success as a master’s student to her.

I would also like to thank my other committee members, Dr. Annrose M. Guarino, Dr. Michael J. Keenan and Dr. Betsy Garrison. Dr. Guarino has been a mentor and friend during my most trying moments. Her outstanding ability to wordsmith will forever affect my writing. Dr. Keenan has been a positive motivator throughout my tenure at LSU. His passion is contagious and inspiring. Dr. Garrison has been instrumental in shaping my research. She is an outstanding listener, advisor, and educator. All of my professors have been role models to me and I thank them for my development as a graduate student.

I owe much gratitude to all of the participants in my research. The School Food Authority Supervisors and Food Stamp Program Administrators were more than generous with their time. This project could not have been done without them.

Thank you to my family. Mom, Dad, and Samantha have been always been my best supporters and encouragers. Thank you to James, who will forever be my shining star and who makes me officially, the proudest and happiest aunt. I love you very much.

I would also like to thank my support system in Baton Rouge. Dr. and Mrs. Harry Roberts have been my family in Baton Rouge. Dr. Roberts’ LSU experience and insight has guided me throughout my graduate studies.

In addition, I would like to especially thank Linda Silverman, Caroline Burke, and Victoria Burke. Your friendship and support are invaluable.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ARC: American Red Cross
CND: Child Nutrition Division
CNP: Child Nutrition Programs
DHH: (Louisiana) Department of Health and Hospitals
DNA: Division of Nutrition Assistance
EBT: Electronic Benefits Transfer
EOC: Emergency Operation Centers
EPR: Emergency Preparedness and Response
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Association
FDD: Food Distribution Division
FNS: Food and Nutrition Service
FSP: Food Stamp Program
GOA: Government Office of Accountability
LADOE: Louisiana Department of Education
NSLP: National School Lunch Program
PIN: Personal Identification Number
PL: Project Liberty
POS: Point of Sale
SFA: School Food Authorities
SSI: Supplemental Security Income
US: United States of America
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture
ABSTRACT

This study was designed to understand the response of the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in southern Louisiana during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This study used portions of the PRECEDE/PROCEED model to develop the questions for the interviews and interpret the barriers and enabling and reinforcing factors with regard to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and program administration after the hurricanes. Information collected from this research seeks, not only to contribute to the literature on this topic, but to be made available to policymakers and program administrators to make informed decisions.

The effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in southern Louisiana were catastrophic. They were unusual in that the impact of the storms covered an extraordinary amount of the Gulf Coast region and an enormous amount of people were affected. In response to the catastrophe, two federally mandated food assistance programs, the NSLP and FSP, released a series of waivers, initiating a disaster program, which decreased eligibility requirements; therefore allowing more people affected by the hurricanes to access the benefits.

One-on-one interviews were conducted with regional, state, and local program administrators to understand the challenges and successes faces while implementing the disaster programs. The study participants were asked to participate based on their roles, responsibilities, and direct affect of either Hurricane Katrina, Rita, or both. Results of the study revealed the speedy response of the USDA and community support led to the success of the programs. The barriers that most administrators faced while trying to implement the programs were infrastructure damage, lack of communication due to power outage and loss of cellular service,
and lack of commerce in the area. Overall, both programs were successful in their commitment to their underlying mission: increasing food access to those affected by the storms.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to depict qualitatively the successes and challenges of the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in Louisiana in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Nationally, the NSLP and the FSP are the two largest food assistance program in the United States (US) (1). One-on-one interviews were conducted with state, regional, and local administrators from Louisiana’s NSLP and FSP to understand the responses of the programs during and after the hurricanes. A recount and analysis of the NSLP and FSP disaster policy, changes in budget and reporting, and responses to shifts in program administration and how they may have changed policies and procedures may reveal challenges that should be addressed and successes that should be replicated.

Justification

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were unusual in that the impact of the storms covered an extraordinary amount of the Gulf Coast region and an enormous number of people were affected by the storms. During a disaster, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) typically releases waivers that alter the programs to accommodate those affected. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the waivers released by the USDA relaxed eligibility requirements for the NSLP and FSP, which as expected, profoundly increased participation (2).

South Louisiana is currently between the recovery phase and the mitigation phase of the four phases of disaster management (3). During the recovery phase, actions are taken to restore normalcy to a community after a disaster. Activities that involve planning and preparing for future disasters occur during the mitigation phase (4). Since disasters, natural or man-made, affect the way we live and work, it is important that independent research evaluates responses of
the federal programs during emergencies. By doing this, challenges may be uncovered and successes can be replicated.

Other than program integrity studies within the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), there is no other research on disaster and food assistance programs. Information collected from this research seeks, not only to contribute to the literature on this topic, but to be made available to policymakers and program administrators to make informed decisions.

Objectives

One-on-one interviews were conducted with state, regional, and local NSLP and FSP administrators in southern Louisiana by using the PRECEDE/PROCEED model to:

1. Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances and the predisposing factors of the NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures.
2. Determine the successful enabling and reinforcing factors associated with program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
3. Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.

Additionally, suggestions from the NSLP and FSP administrators’ interviews will be relayed for future NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures.

Assumptions

The assumptions made prior to the study are:

1. Enrollment data were current and accurate.
2. Interviews were an effective method of collecting data to determine the NSLP and FSP response in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
3. Interviewers’ responses were honest and unbiased.
4. The interviewees chosen were key informants to identify the barriers and predisposing, enabling, and reinforcing factors of the response of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

**Limitations**

1. The amount of time elapsed between the hurricanes and the interviews may have caused perceptions of the event to change.

2. A snowball sampling technique was used to recruit participants.

3. Key NSLP informants from Orleans, St. Bernard, St. Tammany, Jefferson, and Livingston Parishes did not participate in the study.

4. Key FSP informants from Louisiana’s Office of Family Support did not participate in the study.

5. Two FSP interviews declined to have the interviews recorded; therefore, data analysis from these interviews may have been impacted.

**Definitions**

1. Administrative Assessment: policies, resources and circumstances that may enable or encumber the implementation of a health promotion program (5)

2. Disaster: a situation of hardship and human suffering arising from events which cause physical loss or damage, social or economic disruption from which the country or community is unable to cope with fully alone (6)

3. Disaster Area: an area declared by the President of the United States or a state governor as a disaster; at this time that federal monies and programs are available to local government (7).

4. Disaster Area Resident: a person who resides within a disaster area.
5. Disaster Gross Income Limit: equals the sum of maximum monthly net income limit plus
the maximum standard income deduction amount and shelter expense deduction (8).

6. Emergency Management: the organization and administration of funds and
responsibilities in order to prepare, respond, and recover and mitigate in attempt to lessen
the impacts of disasters which may include life, property and community resources (9-10)

7. Food Purchasing (Buying) Power: a family’s or individual’s ability to purchase food for
consumption by means of job earnings or government assistance (11)

8. Food Stamp Program: a state/federal program designed to increase food purchasing
power for low-incomes families (1, 12-14)

9. Food Stamp Program Eligibility: benefits are determined by income, assets, and certain
allowable deductions (12-14)

10. Liquid Resource: includes cash on hand and in checking or savings accounts (12)

11. Policies: a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures
especially of a governmental body (15)

12. Procedure: a traditional or established way of doing things (15)

13. National School Lunch Program: federally assisted program that offers reimbursement to
the school foodservice program as long as meals meet certain nutritional requirements set
by the USDA; meals offered through the NSLP are lunch and after-school snacks (16)

may receive federally subsidized lunches; depending on the families’ household income
the student may be eligible for free or reduced-cost lunch (16)

15. Nutrient Standard: required minimum number of calories and specific nutrients for a
specific grade or age group for a school lunch (17)
16. School Food Authority: a Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) certified governing body which is responsible for one or more schools’ foodservice operations, including the NSLP requirements (17)
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina reached the United States’ Gulf Coast region. The outer bands of the category-3 hurricane made landfall between Grand Isle, LA and the Mississippi River delta, south of Buras, LA (14). As the eye of the hurricane moved inland, hurricane force winds extended 120 miles from the eye. There were 10-12 inches of rain along the path (2); however, the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina was from the storm surge, which ranged between four and thirty feet (15). The storm surge led to breaches in the area’s levee system. The subsequent flooding left some neighborhoods of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes under 20 feet of water (14, 15). The loss of property in the areas surrounding the levee breeches was colossal. At Governor Kathleen Babineaux-Blanco’s request, on August 26, 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) declared 23 southeast Louisiana parishes disaster areas after Hurricane Katrina.

Figure 1: Photo of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (abc.net.au. October 31, 2006)
Less than one month later, on September 24, 2005, the eye of Hurricane Rita made landfall between Sabine Pass, TX and Johnson’s Bayou, LA. An additional 15 parishes in southwest Louisiana parishes were declared disaster areas (16). The American Red Cross (ARC) estimated that 345,000 homes were destroyed by the two storms (17).

Figure 2: Maps of federally declared disaster parishes in Louisiana after Hurricanes Katrina (left) and Rita (right). Dark Orange Parishes are designated for individual and public assistance. (FEMA, October 31, 2006)

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left many residents in southern Louisiana without a home or a place to work. In May 2006, it was estimated that over 200,000 Louisianans were homeless; further more, over 71,000 businesses were adversely impacted and over 300,000 jobs were lost (15). It is likely that Katrina impacted more than 1.37 million people. Hurricane Rita left an additional 76,500 Louisianans homeless, and affected over 10,000 businesses in Louisiana; over 45,000 people in Louisiana lost their jobs.

**Recovery in Louisiana**

Unlike past hurricanes, residents were unable to return home within a few days after Hurricane Katrina or Rita. Ten months after Hurricane Katrina, only one-fourth of the residents of flood areas had returned to New Orleans (18). The security of long-term housing, employment, and schools are influencing Louisianans to relocate permanently to other cities.
The US census in 2000, gave Louisiana’s population as 4,468,976 (19). In July 2005, the estimated state-wide population of Louisiana, one month prior to Hurricane Katrina, was 4,523,628. In January 2006, Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) calculated that the state’s population had decreased by 276,993 to total 4,246,635. The populations of Calcasieu, Cameron, Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes have diminished significantly. Population reports from Orleans Parish indicated a population decrease from over 447,000 to fewer than 157,000 (20-21). The most profound change in population occurred in St. Bernard Parish, which has decreased by over 75% (22).

Because there is no national tracking mechanism for those who relocated after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, is difficult to say where all of the displaced Louisianans are currently living and working. The population of Baton Rouge, Houston, San Antonio, Birmingham, and Atlanta increased after the hurricanes (23). Baton Rouge may have experienced the largest population increase, doubling in size immediately after Katrina (20, 23). In August 2006, the US postal service continued to forward the mail of over 72,000 residents of New Orleans’ to Baton Rouge. An estimated 100,000 displaced residents remain in Baton Rouge (23-24). Immediately following the storm, buses evacuated residents from the New Orleans Superdome directly to Houston and San Antonio. Houston’s population initially increased by as much as 250,000 with as many as 110,000 remaining there. At least 25,000 people evacuated to San Antonio and as many as 18,000 are still there (23-24). Atlanta’s City Report estimates approximately 70,000 evacuees still lived in Atlanta in August 2006 (23, 25). There is no consensus about the speculated population increase of Birmingham, AL. Estimates from Alabama’s Department of Health suggest that the number is approximately 1,500 people, while FEMA estimates that this number is closer to 13,000 (26-28).
Countless reviews and reports have been published (18, 29-39) about the Gulf Coast, New Orleans, and the lasting affects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Of these, the emerging themes are (1) evaluating the response of the local and federal governments; (28-29) (2) addressing the long-term needs of the evacuees, which includes sub-topics such as health care, employment, and housing (30-34); (3) rebuilding New Orleans (34-37); (4) strengthening technology and infrastructure for effective disaster management (38-39).

**Federal Government’s Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita**

The costs of rebuilding the Gulf Coast Region are staggering. One year after the hurricanes, it is estimated that the total costs will reach well over $200 billion (40). This is in part due to the widespread area of the affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Brookings Institute calculated that over $108 billion has been committed by the US Congress for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma recovery efforts (40). In an executive report published in May 2006, by the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the US Senate, Hurricane Katrina revealed the “failure of government at all levels to plan, prepare for and respond aggressively to the storm” (42). These failures were called insidious. A 2004, planning exercise, “Hurricane Pam,” was sponsored by the federal government with participation from federal, state, and local officials and was designed to create a hypothetical category-3 hurricane. Both the Louisiana Department of Education and the Louisiana Department of Social Services were recruited to participate in the drill. Its scenario anticipated hypothetical consequences of a category-3 hurricane hitting New Orleans. Draft plans and lessons emerged during the exercise; however, the report described them as incomplete or ignored when Hurricane Katrina hit the Louisiana coast (42).

The slow and incongruent response to Hurricane Katrina led to the resignation of Michael Brown from position of Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), a
position generally referred to as the director or administrator of FEMA, on September 12, 2005. Secretary Michael Chertoff assumed all of Brown’s responsibilities. On November 1, 2005, President George W. Bush named Donald Powell the Federal Coordinator of Gulf Coast Rebuilding. This newly created position involves developing a long-term rebuilding plan for Gulf Coast region, coordinating the federal efforts and assisting state and local officials develop a vision for the region (40).

**Federal Nutrition Programs**

The USDA is a massive federally managed agency with an annual budget of over $38 billion (41). It is made up of offices and agencies that create and implement policies with overall regard to: (1) farm and foreign agricultural services and (2) food, nutrition, and consumer sciences. The FNS, an agency of the USDA, is comprised of seven food assistance programs, which include the NSLP and the FSP, designed to reduce hunger by increasing food purchasing power in low-income families. At any given time, an average of one out of every five persons in the US participates in one of the FNS food assistance programs (42-43). The NSLP and the FSP are the largest of the FNS programs. In FY 2005, the FSP accounted for $18 billion of the USDA’s $38 billion overall budget (43) while the NSLP accounted for $7.9 billion (44).

**The National School Lunch Program**

The evolution of feeding programs in schools dates back to the 1870s in Germany, where needy school children were supplied free food from an outside philanthropic group. In the early 1900s, England’s concern over the nations inability to meet the nutritional needs of the children, led to a Provision of Meals Act. This too was an outside collaboration designed to feed needy school aged children. In 1904, Robert Hunter published *Poverty*. His theory that the poverty of a family was most serious when they were “obtaining the only education which they are ever to receive,” resonated with government officials. Soon after, the first subsidized, reduced, and free
lunches were served in the US in Milwaukee and New York. By 1937, 15 states were authorized to run kitchens and to serve lunch.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, many families could not provide enough food to adequately feed the entire family or enough money to pay for the children’s lunches at school. Malnutrition was a serious national concern (43). The 74th Congress passed Public Law 320 in August of 1936, to provide agricultural surplus, particularly wheat and milk, to schools. In March 1937, 3,839 schools used these commodities to serve 342,031 children daily. By the end of 1942, 92,916 schools were serving 5,272,540 students (43).

The federal government assigned the USDA to oversee and regulate school foodservice in The Child Nutrition Act of 1966. The Act established standards for nutrition, sanitation, management of funds, and overall program continuity. Requirements for reporting were defined for all schools to submit a report to the state educational agency including the number of children who received free and reduced lunches during the preceding month. The Act mandated that the state agencies in turn submitted a report to the USDA.

The NSLP is currently active in 100,000 public, non-profit private school, and residential child care centers in the US. The NSLP is managed by the FNS and administered by the Child Nutrition Division (CND). They are responsible for reimbursing participating school food authorities (SFA). All lunches served in participating school cafeterias in the US are subsidized by the USDA. Schools are reimbursed $2.40 for every free lunch it serves. Schools receive $2.00 for every reduced-price lunch and $.23 for all “full-cost” meals purchased. This rate is subject to change at the end of the NSLP 2007 FY: June 30, 2007. In FY 2004, the cash reimbursement totaled $7.1 billion dollars (45).

To receive reimbursement, schools must provide a lunch that meets specific nutritional requirements. The school foodservice must use nutrient standards for the established grade
groups, i.e. preschool, grades K-6, and grades 7-12 (46). Meals contain about 30% of the daily energy requirements for the grade groups. Total fat cannot exceed 30 percent of calories and the total amount of saturated fat must be less than 10 percent of calories. Minimums are set for protein, calcium, iron, vitamin A and vitamin C.

The Louisiana Department of Education (LADOE) is the state educational agency responsible for managing the NSLP. FNS provides the state with both cash assistance and food commodities (47). Cash payments are awarded to the states in two ways. General cash assistance payments subsidize all lunches that are served to students. Special cash assistance payments are paid to schools in amounts according to the number of students receiving free and reduced lunches. In addition to cash payments, USDA commodity purchases are allocated through the FNS Distribution Program and provide schools with about 15-20 percent of the food schools serve in their meal programs (45).

To approve the reimbursement to the school, the LADOE is required to report reconciliation to the FNS in monthly, quarterly, and annual reports. The monthly report is submitted to FNS no later than 90 days after the last day of the month reported. No later than 30 days after the end of the fiscal quarter, the quarterly report is submitted. The annual report is submitted to FNS 120 days after the close of the fiscal year (45).

Normally, this report must include:

1. Documentation of participation by school
2. Production, menu records, and nutritional analysis
3. Student participation records indicating one lunch per child
4. Up-to-date applications for free and reduced lunches (both denied and accepted)
5. Description of approved (“verified”) and denied applications, including the approved/verified applications (45).
Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the NSLP was operating in 1,200 sites through over 120 SFA in Louisiana (48). Louisiana adopted the national income eligibility guidelines set by the FNS for the School Year (SY) 2004-2005 (48). The FNS defines income to include all compensation and cash income (49-50). Households receiving benefits from additional federal programs are not required to report the benefits as income (49). Students of families with total incomes at 185% of the federal poverty guidelines are eligible for reduced lunch. Students of families with incomes at 130% of the federal poverty guideline are eligible for free lunch (49).

Table 1: NSLP annual income requirements for free and reduced lunch in FY 2004-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Size</th>
<th>Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Free Lunch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$23,107</td>
<td>$16,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$28,990</td>
<td>$20,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$34,873</td>
<td>$24,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$40,756</td>
<td>$28,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$46,639</td>
<td>$32,773</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under normal, non-disaster circumstances, children can either be directly certified by school officials or are required to submit an application determining income eligibility. Direct certification bypasses the formal application process by using documentation indicating the families’ participation in the FSP (50). The SFA or school must keep a list of all of the students who are directly certified. Verified applications are also kept on file for other students receiving free or reduced-price lunch. Students may also receive temporary certification if the family experiences a disruption in their normal income, which may include layoffs, disability, or zero income. If zero income is claimed, the school must contact the household after a specified time period, generally 45 days, in order to determine whether income status has changed (49-50).

**NSLP and Disasters.** Under disaster circumstances, or when damage demands exceeds the availability of the local resources (51), the disaster policies and procedures of the NSLP are initiated (52). The governor of the affected state is responsible for asking the President of the US
for assistance. The President follows guidelines outlined by the FEMA in order to make the assessment as to whether the state requires resources from the federal government.

If a disaster creates an environment where the nutritional needs of the community cannot be met through normal means, USDA commodities may be used from the NSLP inventory. The American Red Cross (ARC) may set up temporary kitchens and shelters in schools for mass feedings. The FNS guarantees financial reimbursement to a SFA/school that lends food to other SFA/school or to the ARC for congregate feeding (52). If schools require additional food due to the loss of influx of students, commodities can be shifted between SFA and states that weren’t affected by the disaster in order to ensure that lunches are served to students (52).

In August 2005, the LADOE updated Title 28, Part XLIX, Bulletin 1196: the Louisiana Food and Nutrition Programs, Policies of Operation. Chapter 31 (Appendix A) discusses disaster feeding and includes a section on emergency shut down procedures, food salvage, and shelter operations. In section 3109 of the guide, the state recommends that the LADOE Director of the Child Nutrition Program develop and write a Disaster Feeding Plan to include 20 objectives. Topics include: communication systems (cell phone, radio), contact information, emergency shut down procedures, commodities, shelter procedures, and post-disaster cleaning.

In anticipation of a disaster, FNS Headquarters (national), regional, and state distribution agencies are asked to make general preparations. The FNS national office identifies a Disaster Coordinator and establishes an emergency contact list with back-ups from the USDA Kansas City Commodity Office. The national office anticipates a number of people that may be affected by the disaster and who may require emergency food assistance. If a state experiences widespread electrical or cellular service loss, the regional offices can act as the liaison for the state office (52). Ongoing communication between the state level and the regional offices is highly encouraged, although methods for communicating with widespread power outages have
not been established. In 2004, a system to ensure that the foods provided during an emergency met the USDA’s dietary guidelines did not exist (42).

Unlike some disasters, hurricanes’ paths can be tracked and intensity can be predicted. If a hurricane is predicted to hit Louisiana, the LADOE asks that each school report to the SFA their inventory of all commodities (42). This information is passed to the state and regional offices, as well as the Food Distribution Division (FDD). Prior to Hurricane Katrina and Rita specifically, the LADOE suggested preparation activities; i.e. secure a generator for refrigeration, stock paper and plastic products, create a list of food inventory and prepare order for any shortages, print and save to a diskette or CD, a copy of inventory, students’ lunch identification numbers (IDs), and account balances. Prior to the disaster, the schools are advised to use most or all of the fresh produce, perishable foods, and frozen leftovers (42, 53).

**The Food Stamp Program**

Primitive versions of the modern the USDA’s FSP began in the 1930s in order to alleviate poverty and hunger during The Great Depression. After nearly 30 years of pilot programs, on January 31, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson requested Congress to pass legislation making the FSP permanent. Although, the public law’s purpose was advertised to strengthen the agricultural economy and to increase food purchasing power among low-income households; its primary function was to bring the pilot program under federal control. The Food Stamp Act of 1964 stated that each state developed its own eligibility requirements; recipients of the program must purchase stamps; only foods fit for human consumption, no alcoholic beverages, or imported foods can be purchased with the stamps; and that the costs of administrating the program would be shared between states and the federal government. During the first year, $75 million was appropriated for the program. This increased to $100 million in the second year and by the third year $300 million dollars were appropriated for the program.
The US Congress passed the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (Public Law # S. 275) (54). Its underlying purpose was to eliminate the purchase requirement for the food stamps. Along with this, the Act detailed income and resource (such as vehicles) eligibility requirements, retailer obligations, and mandated that states develop a disaster plan. In 1979, FSP participation surpassed 20 million people and in 1994, it reached a new high of 28 million people. Over 24 million people in the United States participated in the FSP in fiscal year (FY) 2004 (55). Before Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, the FSP had on average 25.8 million participants (54).

While eligibility guidelines are set nationally and defined in the Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Code of Federal Regulation, 7 CFR 273.20 (56), it is the responsibility of the individual state to administer the program locally (54). Each state determines the agency that will manage FSP operations. In Louisiana, the Office of Family Support (OFS) within the Department of Social Services (DSS) operates the FSP. The state’s responsibilities include certification, coupon transfer, complaints, employee training, reporting reviews and reports, and maintaining detailed records in order to determine whether the program is in compliance with federal regulations (42).

As of July 2005, or the first month of the FSP Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, a household in Louisiana was eligible for Food Stamps as long as they meet certain resource and income tests (42). A household can have access to a maximum of $2000 in a bank account or $3000 if one member of the family is at least 60 years of age or disabled. Houses, vehicles, or additional income from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) do not count towards these resources (57).

The household is defined by gross and net income, supplemental income, age, and disability (58). Gross income is the household’s total income without deductions. A total of 20% of the gross earnings may be deducted from the net income, which may decrease total earnings and increase benefits. This is referred to as the Earned Income Deduction (58). The
Standard Deduction is $134 for a household with one to four members and increases with additional family members. Deductions can be made for medical reasons, child care, child support, and shelter. The net income equals the gross income minus the deductions (58).

Table 2: FSP monthly gross and net income requirements to be eligible for food stamp benefits in FY 2004-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Size</th>
<th>Gross Monthly Household Income (130% of Federal Poverty Level)</th>
<th>Net Income Household Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$1,037</td>
<td>$798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$1,390</td>
<td>$1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$1,744</td>
<td>$1,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$2,097</td>
<td>$1,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$2,535</td>
<td>$1,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$2,904</td>
<td>$2,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>$3,272</td>
<td>$2,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>$3,640</td>
<td>$2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each additional person</td>
<td>+369</td>
<td>+284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Louisiana’s FSP enrollee benefits are issued through an Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) card system, branded the Louisiana Purchase Card (59). It is designed and used similarly to a bank debit card. Recipients receive the food stamp benefits once during the first fourteen days of the month. Each recipient receives their benefits on the same day each month as long as they are enrolled in the program uninterruptedly. Eligible applicants or those with little or no money in Louisiana receive food stamp benefits within four days after the DSS receives the application. Those who are not eligible will receive notification within thirty days. During emergency situations, the benefits are accessible immediately (59). To protect the enrollee’s benefits from fraudulent use, a Personal Identification Number (PIN) is issued and used at Point of Sale (POS) machines where food is purchased. Purchases are debited immediately and the remaining balance is printed on the receipt (59). In October 2005, Louisiana’s FSP had authorized over 3,700 food retailers for use of the Louisiana Purchase Card (60).
In June 2005, the end of Louisiana’s FY 2005, the state FSP had served over 3.2 million people. Louisiana’s 2003 FY served over 2.7 million and almost 3.1 million in FY 2004 (45). Compared with other states, Louisiana ranked 14th in overall participation.

**Disaster Food Stamp Program.** Section 11(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 mandated that all USDA regional offices submit an updated disaster plan by August 15th each year (60). Although it is the ultimate responsibility of the state agency running a FSP, the USDA recommends collaboration among USDA headquarters, regional offices, local food stamp offices, FEMA, and other federal or advocacy organizations (61).

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act was established in 1988 to assist all state and local governments, including the USDA, and their citizens during a disaster (62). Its overall objective is to reduce damage to humans and land during and while responding to a disaster. Subchapter III permits federal assistance programs to waive administrative activities during a disaster if it is determined necessary. The Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP) is an example of a waiver permitted by this public law.

To get disaster area status in a state, the governor must make is request to the President through the regional FEMA office (9). If the President consents to the governor’s request, the area affected by the disaster is officially declared an area a federal disaster area (60). It is possible to initiate a disaster without the President’s authority. The Secretary of Agriculture may choose to operate a DFSP if methods of local food distribution have been interrupted (60).

In May 1995, the USDA approved a massive Disaster Food Stamp Program Manual. It includes regional and state pre-disaster planning, disaster response, and recovery. The document includes checklists and sample floor plans, and recommendations for crowd control and staffing (50).
In October 2000, the FNS published a voluntary EBT Disaster Plan Guide offering guidance to states interested in issuing food stamps with EBT during a disaster (38). The EBT Disaster Food Stamp Program asked that states:

1) develop a user-friendly system for recipients, as well as state and county staff.

2) locate a storage facility to stock EBT cards in order to respond to the increased demand during an emergency. The FNS suggests to the state that a system should be designed so that there is a maximum three day turnover from the time of application until issuance of EBT.

3) network information on the web and through off-line reports detailing eligibility; thus providing a smooth transition during or after the disaster (9).

The flexibility of a disaster program allows the requirements to adjust to the needs of the circumstance. To be eligible for the DFSP, specific requirements must be met, which differ from than of the regular FSP. Table 3 summarizes the requirements and differences.

**Four Phases of Disaster**

The key objective in emergency management is to protect life and alleviate suffering. The second goal is to reduce damage to infrastructure and to the environment (26, 63).

Emergency management focuses on the actions that occur before the emergency, during the emergency, and after the emergency (63).

Prior to an anticipated hurricane or disaster occurs, the first phase of the emergency management is implemented. This is the mitigation phase which involves planning and preparedness (63). This involves a sketch of the possible outcomes of hurricane including considerations to hazard assessment (64). Using previous emergency response successes and failures, as well as scientific literature, pre-disaster sketches can be depicted to include the possible consequences of the impact, such as infrastructure damage (64-65).
Table 3: Summary of Requirements and Differences of the DFSP and FSP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligibility</th>
<th>FSP</th>
<th>DSFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster Status</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>One of the following</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Damage to home or self-employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Disaster related expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Income disruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Inaccessible resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residency</strong></td>
<td>• Project area</td>
<td>• Disaster area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Verified</td>
<td>• Verified if possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household</strong></td>
<td>Defined by 7 CFR 273.20</td>
<td>• Members of household who are living and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>eating together during disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Does not include members with whom the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>applicants are temporarily staying during</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefit</strong></td>
<td>Calculation according to 7 CFR 273.20</td>
<td>Maximum allotment for household size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students</strong></td>
<td>Calculation according to 7 CFR 273.20</td>
<td>Status not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SS #</strong></td>
<td>Failure to provide may lead to disqualification</td>
<td>Failure to provide may not result in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>disqualification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work Requirements</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td>• Not to exceed $2000 (non-elderly in</td>
<td>• Total income plus resources cannot exceed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>household)</td>
<td>disaster gross income limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not to exceed $3000 (elderly in household)</td>
<td>• Only liquid resources are counted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• No special provisions for elderly or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>handicapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenses</strong></td>
<td>Deductions include: standard earned income,</td>
<td>• Maximum standard and shelter expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>excess shelter, dependant care, and medical</td>
<td>• Non-reimbursable disaster related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(for elderly and disabled recipients only)</td>
<td>expenses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Preparedness relies deeply on the extensiveness of the planning. This phase incorporates the planned sketches with actions to reduce damage and compromise to the program. In order for the action plan to translate into response, immediate resources, i.e. money from Washington, access to food, must be available immediately upon request.

The phase that is initiated during or immediately (within hours) following the disaster is the response phase. The ultimate activity during this phase is to provide emergency and speedy
assistance to all of those who were directly or indirectly affected by the disaster (49). The speed to which normalcy returns combined with the reduction of the likelihood that secondary damage will occur is the ultimate goals of the response phase. It is usually regarded as short-term reactions and solutions. This can mean temporary policy changes in order to feed or increase food purchasing power to those affected directly or indirectly by the disaster. Because of the nature of the environment immediately following a disaster, this is a very vulnerable phase in the overall management of the emergency (66). During this phase, support from the community can be an important factor determining movement to the recovery phase (66).

Once those affected by the hurricane are stabilized and the program’s systems return to normalcy, the recovery process can initiate. This phase typically involves long-term activities and may continue for several years (49). Revisiting and evaluating the response phase can potentially further the progression from normalcy to improvement (49). Improvement occurs when evaluation from the recovery phase in considered as the mitigation phase recharges the emergency management cycle. The 4 phases of disaster management is depicted in Appendix B.

**Interviews in Qualitative Research**

Interviews are used to collect data for qualitative research (67). Semi-structured interviews, while designed in advance, offer the researcher flexibility during the interview to follow each question with an additional probing question (67-69). Semi-structured interviews are often used in qualitative methodology to gain insight to experiences, knowledge, and opinions of program implementation (67). The questions in this study were designed to reveal the experiences, knowledge, and insight about the NSLP and the FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This type of design is called a phenomenological interview (67). It is preferred over a multiple-choice questionnaire, since often times the interviewee can offer more depth than what a multiple-choice questionnaire can provide (67).
In all types of interviews, the interviewer is the instrument through which data are collected (67, 70). The guides are useful tools when time is limited and to maintain focus through a multifaceted discussion (70). Prior to the interview, an interview guide is carefully constructed. In general, semi-structured interviews start with a few broad questions and lead to more specific questions. Questions are open-ended to encourage thorough responses. The usefulness of the data is determined by the researcher and the research team (70).

A probing question is one that follows the main question to elicit a deeper meaning (69). The researcher may repeat the interviewee’s response in their own words to imply understanding. The act of repeating may reveal parts of the question that were originally unexplained. The participant can then choose to add details (67). The researcher may also choose to select parts of the interviewee’s response to focus on for greater understanding.

Probing also adds to the interview a human element that can provide the rapport to strengthen a qualitative interview (68). It is important for the researcher to maintain a balance so that in-depth information is given and rapport is established, while at the same time the interviewer does not come across as intrusive (69).

The researcher decides how to record the data collected during an interview. Audio taping is frequently the desired medium and it often relieves the researcher from extensive note-taking (68, 54). It can also serve as a memory tool when notes are incomplete. Careful scrutiny of the recordings can decipher nuances and tones set by the participant (68, 54).

Transcribing the recorded interviews is a useful tool in the analysis of qualitative data (55). From the transcriptions, the researcher searches for emerging patterns of experiences and themes (55). The researcher should stop conducting interviews when: (1) resources or possible participants have been exhausted; (2) patterns and themes emerge and no new information is learned; (3) the data begin to exceed the scope of the purpose of the study (54).
For the purpose of qualitative research, interviews have benefits and limitations. Open-ended interviews allow the researcher to develop a deeper understanding of topics (64). In addition, qualitative evaluation may help the researcher to explain quantitative results, such as enrollment or participation. Often times the data can produce unpredicted results that lead a researcher to future studies (72).

In terms of limitations, probing encourages interviewees to elaborate. Their elaborations may provide information that is unnecessary or beyond the scope of the study (67, 73). It is the role of the interviewer to explain why data are omitted. Another limitation in the use of interviews in qualitative evaluation is the researcher’s role in collecting and interpreting the data (72). Bias can ensue as the researcher takes field notes or while listening to the audiotapes, focusing on topics of interest or personal values (72). Thus, the results of the data can be unreliable and invalid.

Because empirical research is limited on the topic of federal food assistance programs and disaster program evaluation, few of these types of studies have incorporated interviews in their study design. However, as an overall evaluation tool, interviews and focus group discussions are among the most common qualitative tools (67-67, 73).

**Theoretical Model: PRECEDE/PROCEED**

The PRECEDE/PROCEED theoretical model is a two-part, nine-step approach to health promotion (74) (Figure 3). The PRECEDE portion of the model works backwards from step 1, which addresses the health needs and objectives of a community or individual. PRECEDE is an acronym standing for Predisposing, Reinforcing, Enabling Constructs in Educational/Environmental Diagnosis and Evaluation. The second portion of the model or the PROCEED component starts at step 6 and takes into account the implementation and evaluation of an intervention. PROCEED is an acronym for Policy, Regulatory, Organizational Constructs
in Educational and Environmental Development (74). The complete model is depicted in Figure 3. For the purpose of this study, only Step 6-9 of the PROCEED portion of the model will be considered and are illustrated in Figures 8 (NSLP) and 9 (FSP).

The PROCEED portion of the PRECEDE/PROCEED model begins with Step 6. It is at this time, plans PROCEED to implementation and evaluation (74-75). In our study, it was during step 6, that disaster plans were executed and USDA waivers were applied. Step 7, or the process evaluation phase, uses three factors to evaluate the process by which the program, or disaster plan, was implemented. The three characteristics or factors that are most likely to influence behavior are predisposing, reinforcing, and enabling factors. Predisposing factors motivate the behavior and include psychological indicators, such as culture and past experience. Reinforcing factors are the perceived positive or negative outcome of the behavior once the behavior has begun. Social support and symptom relief are examples of reinforcing factors. Reinforcing factors often act as incentives to continue the behavior. Enabling factors may include policy, waivers, and accessibility (74-75). Enablers can either be considered an aid or a hindrance to the implementation of the program.

The influence of these factors can inhibit or lead to risk factors associated with program implementation. Step 8, the impact evaluation phase, measures program effectiveness with regard to risk factors associated with changes in predisposing, enabling, and reinforcing factors. The two risk factors evaluated in this phase are behavioral and environmental. Behavior indicators include compliance and coping. Examples of environment indicators include infrastructure damage and services (74).
Figure 3: The PRECEDE/PROCEED Model adapted from Green LW, Kreuter MW, 1999
The final step in the PRECEDE/PROCEED Model is step 9, the outcome evaluation phase. Assessments are made on the changes in the quality of life and health.

Since the development of the PRECEDE/PROCEED model in the 1970s, the model has been used in more than 700 scientific articles. It is a valid model for program evaluation and implementation. For example, the PRECEDE/PROCEED Model has been used at a health fair in Mexico City to address the health needs of community and measure the effectiveness of the intervention (74-75). The model has also been used to assess the acceptance computer tailoring as a health education intervention (76). This model is a well established and used internationally for the assessment, implementation and evaluation of nutrition interventions (74-75). We were unable to find studies incorporating the PRECEDE/PROCEED model for evaluating federally mandated programs after a disaster.

Evaluation and Disaster

Evaluation is a tool for researchers to use to gain insight to the target population’s experiences and to determine the effectiveness a program implementation (77). Summative evaluation uses information collected at the end of an implemented program and can help prepare for program revisions (78). Summative evaluation is an appropriate for disaster evaluation. Formative evaluation would shift the focus from response and recovery to evaluation. Summative evaluation is the focus of this study since the disaster program of the NSLP and FSP were completed at the start of the evaluation. In addition to determining effectiveness, summative evaluation allows identifying or highlighting specific indicators that need to be addressed prior to future program implementation.

After September 11, 2001, an exploratory study was conducted with crisis counselors from Project Liberty (PL) in order to identify thematic issues for future program planning (81). Moynihan et al. conducted two focus groups in the Bronx, NY in order to gain insight to the
work that the counselors (n=9) at the crisis center performed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The focus groups were taped and transcribed. Five themes emerged from the study: (1) perceived marginalization of the Bronx Community, (2) role diffusion due to competing demands and needs, (3) 9/11 as a socially acceptable way to express symptoms of psychological distress, (4) burdens of care, and (5) job satisfaction. The responses from the evaluation indicated that the counselors expressed both positive and negative experiences while working at PL. Many of the counselors suggested that they felt that this type of work was needed and they were likely to participate in outreach services again in the future. A common negative response was the lack of support, as much of the staff was “ill equipped, untrained, and unprepared” (81).

The themes that emerged from the focus group were an important consideration in the overall snapshot of the PL inner workings. The researchers noted that the intent of PL and the roles of the crisis counselors were not clearly defined prior to program implementation which may have led to some of the negative experiences during the length of the program. Moreover, their suggestions for future disaster-related programs indicated that the counselors can be more responsive to their clients if the programs are designed to continuously respond to stresses, frustrations, and successes with workers and administration.

The qualitative design had limitations. The agencies in the Bronx, NY were selected because of their proximity to the disaster site. Fewer residents of the Bronx were directly affected by the attacks and may have been a less sensitive topic to those coping with the disaster (81). Clients of PL in the Bronx may have required different needs from those residents within closer proximity to the disaster. Finally, the small sample size may not be generalizable to the other agencies that implemented a PL (81).
Summative evaluation was also used to describe the experiences of program managers of community-based earthquake preparedness organizations in the Bay Area of San Francisco, CA (82). Community-based earthquake preparedness organizations in the Bay Area were asked to participate in an earthquake drill on April 20, 1996. A press release described the hypothetical earthquake scenario. It included its magnitude (7.1), location (Hayward fault), duration (30 seconds), damage (extensive), deaths (1,500-4,400), and people needing hospitalization (4,500-12,000) (82).

The goal of the earthquake simulation was to test the organizations preparations or to refresh emergency response skills. On the Monday following the simulated drill, a survey was mailed to the 48 operating neighborhood earthquake preparedness organizations. Of the 48 drill participants, 45 completed and returned the survey. From the 45 returned surveys, 17 of them participated in “Drill Day” in their community. The 17 community centers were telephoned with a follow up interview (82) with a 100% response rate.

The questions on the interview guide elicited information regarding: (1) location of program leadership, (2) goals and training, (3) volunteers, and (4) targeted organizational unit. The responses were analyzed qualitatively. The telephone interview revealed that over half of the communities simulated injuries. Fire stations, schools, and Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) were recruited and played an active role in the drill activities. The level of participation in the community varied and was positively linked to Drill Day’s promotion (82).

Promotion was determined to be a consistent problem reported by the program managers. In this study, promotion was defined as advertisement. For a majority of the communities, recruiting volunteers to participate was not a challenge. Five of the 17 groups reported that enrolling participants was problematic. Logistics, resources or the allocation of the resources, as expected, were among the problems reported most often.
Insightful recommendations for future earthquake drills emerged from the telephone surveys. Two different community centers recommended setting up a Drill Day committee who would head the logistics, resources, and publicity. Several respondents hoped to recruit volunteers to lead a drill on their residential block. Less experienced response teams suggested starting with a discussion or a “tabletop drill,” as running the functions of the drill and training volunteers simultaneously was disorganized (82).

Drill Day and the subsequent study had limitations. The earthquake simulation rarely involves neighborhood residents, which means fewer members of the community are exposed to preparation activities. Staff members of the EOC are involved, but during an actual disaster, some or all may not be able to participate in mitigation activities. It is difficult to hypothesize a realistic situation, as all of the surveyed community organizations simulated were manageable (82).

Both of these studies used interviews for program evaluation after a disaster. While they had limitations, they were able to elicit qualitatively themes that presented an overall picture of the program. In addition to the themes, insightful recommendations for future programs were provided from those involved in program implementation. And while neither mentioned follow-up studies, the themes that emerged from the studies deserve future investigation.
CHAPTER 3
PARTICIPANTS AND METHODS

Institutional Review Board Approval

The study was approved by the Louisiana State University (LSU) AgCenter Institutional Review Board (IRB) (#HE06-10). A copy of the submitted form can be found in Appendix C.

National School Lunch Program

Participants

Local and state administrators from Louisiana’s NSLP were asked to participate in the interviews. Prior to each interview, an information sheet was provided and a consent form was signed by the interviewer and participant. Each interview was conducted privately with only the interviewer and participant present.

The first NSLP interview was conducted on March 8, 2006, with the Director of School Food Services for the LADOE, Division of Nutrition Assistance (DNA). She provided a list of Louisiana SFA supervisors and directors who might be able to participate in the interviews. From the list provided by the LADOE, SFA supervisors were chosen to represent a range of experiences based on area of jurisdiction, which hurricane affected region, and changes in enrollment (Table 4). The hurricane that affected the region was determined by the path of the hurricane and the location of the parish. The areas that were affected by changes in enrollment were based on information provided by the Director of School Food Services.

The SFA Director from Orleans Parish declined participation in the study. The SFA Supervisor from St. Bernard Parish resigned prior to Hurricane Katrina and no one was available for participation from that parish. The SFA from St. Tammany Parish (Director), Jefferson Parish (Asst. Superintendent of Operations), and Livingston Parish (Supervisor) did not respond to attempts to contact them.
**Interview Design**

The NSLP interview (Appendix D) was designed to use the information from the implementation of disaster policy to evaluate the factors with which predisposed, enabled, hindered or reinforced the system administration during the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Semi-structured, open-ended questions were designed based in part on topics (program policy, budget, reporting, and administration) and then guided by step 7 in the PRECEDE/PROCEED model. Step 7 from the PRECEDE/PROCEED model was isolated in this study to identify the factors (predisposing, enabling/barriers, and reinforcing) that are required to initiate change (67). Table 5 lists simplified versions of the NSLP questions, matched objective and the identifying factor.
Table 4: NSLP administrators chosen based on area of jurisdiction, which hurricane affected region, and changes in enrollment in chronological order of interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Title</th>
<th>Area of Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Hurricane Perspective</th>
<th>Change in Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of Food Services, Louisiana Department of Education, Division of Nutrition Assistance</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Hurricanes Katrina and Rita</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor</td>
<td>Cameron Parish</td>
<td>Hurricane Rita</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette Diocese SFA Supervisor</td>
<td>Vermilion, Iberia, St. Mary, Acadia, St. Martin, Evangeline, St. Landry, Lafayette Parishes</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina and Rita</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin Parish SFA Supervisor</td>
<td>St. Martin Parish</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of School Food and Nutrition Services of New Orleans (Archdiocese of New Orleans)</td>
<td>Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, St. Tammany, and Washington Parishes</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina</td>
<td>Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Food Distribution Division</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Hurricanes Katrina and Rita</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Baton Rouge Parish SFA Assistant Director</td>
<td>East Baton Rouge Parish</td>
<td>Hurricanes Katrina and Rita</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Charles Parish SFA Director</td>
<td>St. Charles Parish</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James Parish SFA Supervisor</td>
<td>St. James Parish</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangipahoa Parish SFA Director</td>
<td>Tangipahoa Parish</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interview questions were grouped according to the identifying factors. The factors include:

1. Policy (P)
2. Budget (B)
3. Reporting (R)
4. Program administration (PA)

5. Suggestions for future disaster planning. (FDP)

The final NSLP survey consisted of 30 questions (P=7, B=6, R=1, PA=13, FDP=1). In addition, question #29 solicited additional information from the participant that was not covered in the discussion. Question #30 asked the participant to make recommendations for others to interview. Due to the semi-structured nature of the survey, after each question the interviewer probed additional questions for additional clarity and understanding as necessary.

**Interview Discussions**

Prior to the interview, an electronic version of the respective interview was e-mailed to the participant. An appointment was scheduled either by e-mail or by phone call. At the beginning of each interview, the participant was given an information sheet, which included contact information, to read and discuss before signing a consent form (Appendix F). A copy of the consent form was provided to the participant for their records. Participants were then interviewed. Two recording, digital and analog, devices were used in each of the interviews. In additional, detailed field notes were taken.

**Analysis**

Following the interviews, digital tapes were transcribed verbatim. Analog tapes were compared to the digital tapes and field notes to enhance clarity and understanding. Each of the responses were grouped by question number and by identified factor and then compared. Frequency of responses and themes were identified. Interviewees’ responses to questions were also classified as predisposing, enabling, or reinforcing factors for the successful execution of the NSLP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Table 5: NSLP Interview Questions by number, paraphrased questions, matched objective, and identified factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Condensed Question and Matched Objective</th>
<th>Identified Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>What emergency/disaster preparations were in place prior to Katrina? <strong>Objective #1:</strong> Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>What enabled the success of the program after Katrina? <strong>Objective #2:</strong> Determine the successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>What barriers were faced while trying disaster plan after Hurricane Katrina? <strong>Objective #3:</strong> Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Did post-Hurricane Katrina barriers lead to changes in policy? <strong>Objective #1:</strong> Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Were changes (#4) temporary or permanent? <strong>Objective #1:</strong> Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Did Hurricane Rita compound or reinforce any changes? <strong>Objective #2:</strong> Determine the successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>What enabled the success after Hurricane Rita? <strong>Objective #2:</strong> Determine the successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>What barriers were faced while trying to implement the disaster plan after Hurricane Rita? <strong>Objective #3:</strong> Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in policy? <strong>Objective #1:</strong> Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 5, con’t)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Were these changes (#9) temporary or permanent?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>What parts of the disaster policy were designed for decisions to be made by the parish? District? School? How was this dependant on the nature or degree of the disaster or emergency?</td>
<td>Predisposing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Did Hurricane Katrina require the LADOE to re-budget federal and state NSLP funds among parishes?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>How did re-budgeting (#12) affect Louisiana’s ability to offer free and reduced lunch in the 2005-2006 school year?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Will the changes in the policy and budget affect future national, state, or local disaster policy? If so, how?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Will the changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future national, state, or local disaster policy? If so, how?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Will these changes in the NSLP policy and budget affect Louisiana’s ability to feed school-aged children in the future?</td>
<td>Reinforcing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by parish/city public school districts?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 5, con’t)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Were Louisiana NSLP employees relocated to other parishes after Hurricane Katrina to help relieve schools that were short-staffed?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Was personnel shifted between parishes after Hurricane Rita?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>How did school foodservice and administration handle instances where employees could not be located?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>What are some examples of how some schools’ foodservice handled infrastructure challenges?</td>
<td>Reinforcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>What effects did the hurricanes have on Louisiana’s NSLP food access and inventory?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Were there costs associated with NSLP personnel and infrastructure changes, shifts in student enrollment, or the actual physical loss of food?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>How was the Red Cross able to assist Louisiana with the delivery of school food service after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Which and to what capacity were other civic organizations able to assist the NSLP in Louisiana after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 5, con’t)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>If so, did this contribute to the Louisiana Department of Education’s ability to meet the needs of the National School Lunch Program? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</th>
<th>Reinforcing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated students and families know that they were automatically eligible for free lunches? How was the state effort different from the local and national efforts? Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Do you have any suggestions for future NSLP disaster policy in Louisiana or in the United States? Objective #5: Relay suggestions from the NSLP and FSP administrators’ interviews for future NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Are there any other additional comments that you would like to add with regard to the National School Lunch Program in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview?</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unique characteristics that define the participating NSLP SFA (Archdiocese of New Orleans, Breaux Bridge, Cameron, East Baton Rouge Parish, Lafayette Archdiocese, St. Charles, St. James, and Tangipahoa) and FSP (Orleans, Thibodaux, and Lake Charles) regions were reported. For example, shifts in enrollment or damage reports were included in this summary. Enrollment summaries are characterized by parish and by public school only, not the SFA. Consequently, shifts in enrollment from the Archdiocese of New Orleans and the Lafayette diocese could not be tracked.

Food Stamp Program

Participants

A similar selection process was conducted for the FSP. Local and state administrators from Louisiana’s were recruited and asked to participate in an interview. Prior to each interview, an information sheet was provided and a consent from was signed by the interviewer and participant. Each interview was conducted privately with only the interviewer and participant present. Potential participants were listed based on the job titles, area of jurisdiction, which hurricane affected the region, and possible changes in enrollment (Table 6).

Permission for 7 interviews was granted by the Executive Director of Family Assistance Program Policy and Field Operations Division. The first FSP interview was conducted on March 14, 2006, with the Southwest Region Sections Chief. The Regional Manager from Covington Region III declined participation in the study.

Interview Design

The FSP interview questions (Appendix G) were designed to use the information from the implementation of disaster policy in order to evaluate the factors with which predisposed,
enabled, hindered or reinforced the system administration during the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Semi-structured, open-ended questions were designed based in part on topics (program policy, budget, reporting, and administration) and then guided by step 7 in the PRECEDE/PROCEED model. Step 7 from the PRECEED/PROCEED model was isolated in this study to identify the factors (predisposing, enabling/barriers, and reinforcing) that are required to initiate change (67). Table 6 lists paraphrased versions of the NSLP questions, matched objective and the identifying factor. Table 7 lists paraphrased versions of the FSP questions, the matched objective, and the identifying factor.

The interview questions were grouped according to the identifying factors. The factors include:

1. Policy (P)
2. Budget (B)
3. Reporting (R)
4. Program administration (PA)
5. Suggestions for future disaster planning (FDP)

The final FSP survey consisted of 32 questions (P=7, B=5, R=1, PA=16, FDP=1). Information that the participant wanted to include, but that was not covered in the interview was covered in Question #31. Question #32 asked the interviewee to make recommendations for others to interview.

**Interview Discussions**

Prior to the interview, an electronic version of the respective interview was e-mailed to the participant. An appointment was scheduled either by e-mail or by phone call. At the beginning of each interview, the participant was given an information sheet to read and discuss before signing a consent form (Appendix H). A copy of the information sheet which included contact information was provided to the participant for their records. Participants were then interviewed. Two recording, digital and analog, devices were used in each of the interviews, except for the interviews conducted the Regional Managers from the Lake Charles and New Orleans Regions, who both requested that their interviews not be recorded. Detailed field notes were taken during all of the interviews.

**Analysis**

Following the interviews, the digital tapes were transcribed verbatim. Analog tapes were compared to the digital tapes and field notes for clarity. Each of the responses from each of the questions were grouped by question and identifying factor and then compared. Frequency of responses and themes were identified. Interviewees’ responses to questions were also classified as predisposing, enabling, or reinforcing factors to the successful execution of the NSLP and FSP
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and sorted in a table. Unique characteristics that define the participating NSLP SFA (Archdiocese of New Orleans, Breaux Bridge, Cameron, East Baton Rouge Parish, Lafayette Archdiocese, St. Charles, St. James, and Tangipahoa) and FSP (Orleans, Thibodaux, and Lake Charles) regions were reported. For example, shifts in enrollment or damage reports were included in this summary.
Table 7: FSP Interview Questions by number, type, phase in emergency management response and factor identified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Paraphrased Question and Matched Objective</th>
<th>Identified Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>What emergency/disaster preparations did the DSS have in place prior to Hurricanes Katrina? <strong>Objective #1:</strong> Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td>Predisposing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Objective #2:</strong> Determine the successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>What barriers did the DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after Hurricane Katrina? <strong>Objective #3:</strong> Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Did these barriers lead to changes in policy prior to Hurricane Rita? <strong>Objective #3:</strong> Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Were these changes (#4) temporary or permanent? <strong>Objective #1:</strong> Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Did the arrival of Hurricane Rita compound or reinforce any changes to Louisiana’s DFSP? <strong>Objective #3:</strong> Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration.</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>What enabled the success of Louisiana’s DFSP after Hurricane Rita? <strong>Objective #2:</strong> Determine the successful reinforcing, predisposing and enabling factors associated with program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>What barriers did the Louisiana DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after Hurricane Rita? <strong>Objective #3:</strong> Find the barriers faced while trying to implement the programs and how they led to changes in policy, budget, reporting, and administration</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 6, con’t)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.</th>
<th>Enabling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in disaster policy?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Did Louisiana adapt the national Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP) application or use a state-specific application? If Louisiana used a state-specific application, how was the DFSP application adapted for Louisiana? Hurricane Katrina? Hurricane Rita?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Were adaptations to the DFSP application dependent on the nature or degree of the disaster?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Will any of these changes permanently affect the eligibility or disaster policy?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>With regard to the DFSP, did Hurricane Katrina require the LA DSS re-budget federal and state funds among parishes?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>If so, how did the revised budget change with the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>How did the re-budgeting affect Louisiana’s ability to offer non-Disaster Food Stamps in the 2006 fiscal year and in the near future while rebuilding of Louisiana’s Gulf Coast?</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 6, con’t)
| 17 | How will changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future national, state, or regional disaster policy? **Objective #1**: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 18 | How will the changes in the policy and budget effect Louisiana’s ability to provide nutrition assistance during the next emergency? **Objective #1**: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 19 | Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by cities? Parishes? State? **Objective #1**: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 20 | What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated families know that they were automatically eligible for the DFSP? How was the state effort different from the local and national efforts? **Objective #1**: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 21 | Were Louisiana DSS employees relocated or reassigned to other parishes after Hurricane Katrina to help relieve increased administration burden? **Objective #1**: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 22 | Were temporary application/issuance sites coordinated in any parishes in Louisiana in order to increase access to the DFSP? **Objective #1**: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 23 | If so, where in Louisiana were the temporary application/issuance sites set up? **Objective #1**: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |

(Table 6, con’t)
| 24 | How did Louisiana’s DSS handle instances where OFS Family Assistance employees could not be located? For example: Did new personnel have to be temporarily assigned or hired? Were out-of-state or in-state volunteers recruited to assist? | Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 25 | How were food stamps issued to Louisiana residents affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita when Social Security cards, verification of identity, proof of residence, and income information were not available? | Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 26 | What are some examples of how DSS handled infrastructure damage? | Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 27 | Facing the same infrastructure damage, how were EBT cards acquired and physically distributed? | Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 28 | What fraud prevention efforts did the DSS administer after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? | Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 29 | How did the federal staff of the Disaster Response Assistance Team (DART) assist Louisiana’s DFSP? | Objective #1: Obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Enabling |
| 30 | Do you have any suggestions for future DFSP policy in Louisiana or the United States? | Objective #5: Relay suggestions from the NSLP and FSP administrators’ interviews for future NSLP and FSP disaster policies and procedures. | n/a |
| 31 | Are there any additional comments that you would like to add that you feel are important to include with regard to the DFSP in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? | n/a |
| 32 | Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview? | n/a |
CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS

A total of 17 interviews were conducted (NSLP=10, FSP=7) with administrators from the NSLP and the FSP. Characteristics of the NSLP interviews are shown in Tables 8.

Table 8: Ten NSLP interviews conducted with title of participant, date of interview, location of interview, and length of interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Length (hour:min:sec)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of Food Services, Louisiana Department of Education, Division of Nutrition Assistance</td>
<td>Department of Education, state office, Baton Rouge</td>
<td>March 8, 2006</td>
<td>1:06:22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor</td>
<td>Cameron Parish SFA Office</td>
<td>April 8, 2006</td>
<td>1:02:42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette Diocese SFA Supervisor</td>
<td>Lafayette Diocese SFA Office</td>
<td>April 10, 2006</td>
<td>42:12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin Parish SFA Supervisor</td>
<td>St. Martin Parish SFA Office</td>
<td>April 10, 2006</td>
<td>58:37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of School Food and Nutrition Services of New Orleans (Archdiocese of New Orleans)</td>
<td>New Orleans Diocese SFA Office</td>
<td>July 6, 2006</td>
<td>47:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Food Distribution Division</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Forestry Office</td>
<td>July 7, 2006</td>
<td>32:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Baton Rouge Parish SFA Assistant Director</td>
<td>East Baton Rouge Parish SFA Office</td>
<td>August 8, 2006</td>
<td>1:27:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Charles Parish SFA Director</td>
<td>Local Café in Lulling, LA</td>
<td>August 18, 2006</td>
<td>57:24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James Parish SFA Supervisor</td>
<td>St. James Parish SFA Office</td>
<td>August 23, 2006</td>
<td>27:27 (Plus additional non-taped time)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangipahoa Parish SFA Director</td>
<td>Tangipahoa SFA Office</td>
<td>August 24, 2006</td>
<td>25:51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National School Lunch Program

Successes during Implementation

Most of the successes or enablers identified by the SFA supervisors resulted from waivers released by the USDA (Appendix H) and the dedication of the employees and
volunteers. The USDA waivers were issued from a federal level and disseminated to the SFA through the state office. The waivers that were most often mentioned as the most helpful during implementation of the NSLP during the storms were those regarding eligibility, reporting, meal pattern, and verification requirements. A summary of enabling factors is shown in Table 9.

Table 9: Summary of enabling factors by SFA reported by NSLP administrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFA</th>
<th>Enabling Factors</th>
<th>Hurricane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of School Food Services (state office)</td>
<td>USDA waivers, Dedication of employees</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Distribution Division</td>
<td>Dedication of SFA</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron Parish SFA</td>
<td>USDA waivers, Dedication</td>
<td>Rita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Charles Parish SFA</td>
<td>USDA waivers, Dedication</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA</td>
<td>USDA waivers, Dedication</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangipahoa Parish SFA</td>
<td>USDA waivers, National Guard</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James Parish SFA</td>
<td>USDA waivers, Dedication</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin Parish SFA</td>
<td>USDA waivers, Dedication</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette diocese SFA</td>
<td>USDA waivers, Dedication</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Baton Rouge Parish SFA</td>
<td>USDA waivers, Dedication</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Eligibility.** The waiver released by the USDA on August 31, 2005, and extended on September 26, 2005, changed the eligibility requirements for the NSLP allowing an increased number of students to receive free lunch. As stated in the waiver described in Appendix I, children who came from families participating in emergency food stamps or who were displaced (and therefore considered homeless) from either of the storms were eligible for free lunch. This meant that reimbursement from the USDA was increased regardless of the schools’ pre-storm enrollment.

The Director of School Food Services said that “we could not have done it without USDA saying just feed the children.” This was also the principal enabling factor for the Cameron Parish SFA. After Hurricane Rita, the Cameron Parish schools opened on October 31, 2005, at that time waivers had declared all displaced families homeless. The SFA supervisor
was prepared to report 100% homeless status. This not only minimized the time that would otherwise be spent on reporting and verification, but reimbursement increased. The SFA Director of St. James parish added to by saying, “we are a parish more affluent than most in Louisiana. We’re only 47-48% free and reduced, [the homeless waiver] meant we got more free students and so our reimbursement was higher.”

The Director of the New Orleans diocese SFA added a different perspective to how this waiver affected the students. The director suggested that the students would move around the district and that they “had been through enough.” The waiver allowed them “to be able to come into the cafeteria and we could just say, ‘Welcome, sweetie, here’s your lunch.’”

Allowing all children to eat free “simplified” things for the SFA Director of the Tangipahoa Parish. The Lafayette diocese SFA Director added that the administration anticipated that some families would leave without paying tuition, but allowing the claim free lunches for all of the students that relocated helped the budget. East Baton Rouge Parish opened up an additional two schools to accommodate the influx of students displaced by the hurricanes. The director said, “Accountability was a nightmare. And the state gave us the okay to count these students as free for three months. So this saved us a tremendous amount of time.”

**Reporting.** The waiver released by the USDA on September 7, 2005, stated that Louisiana had the option to extend the deadline (inventory and NSLP participation) for reporting to December 31, 2005, or waive it entirely. However, on September 22, 2005, the USDA released another waiver stating that the deadline for the required reports was extended further. October 2005, claims could be submitted on or before January 31, 2006. November 2005, claims could be submitted on or before February 31, 2006.
The waiver also adjusted the required paperwork while reporting participation. The schools were allowed to list free and reduced lunch eligibility. During this time, individual applications were not required for the student to receive benefits.

After Hurricane Rita, the Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor was faced with challenges in her reporting system. Four of the schools in Cameron Parish were completely destroyed and all of the students that remained in the parish attended two school sites with an extended day schedule. It was requested that all original six schools continue to maintain separate reporting. Thus, students eligible for free or reduced lunches as well as the food bought and served to them would be reported as if they were still attending their schools. The supervisor added that keeping the students separate wasn’t a huge problem, but that there “was no way” she could have kept a separate inventory. The supervisor asked and was permitted by the state to report inventory on the two open schools (Hackberry and Johnson Bayou) only.

Meal Pattern. The waiver released by the USDA on August 31, 2005, and extended after the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 26, 2005, stated that meal pattern flexibility was allowed. Schools may be exempt from milk and other meal component requirements. This meant that the schools could serve the foods that they were able to receive from their vendors without concern for reimbursement by USDA.

The Director of School Food Services said that this enabled the success of the program after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita because “we couldn’t get food.” The director added that the districts were “scrambling” and that they needed the flexibility that the USDA allowed so that they “could just feed the children.” The Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor agreed that this was a factor in her ability to feed the students in her parish. The Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA Director added that the meal pattern flexibility was “critical” because of the “mass transition” coupled with the “lack of labor.” This was a substantial time saver and stress reducer since she
“didn’t have to worry about putting their names in the computer, getting the piece of paper, and tracking all of that.”

Although the milk component of the meal pattern was waived, finding milk to serve students was a difficult for some parishes. The St. James Parish SFA Supervisor and the St. Charles Parish SFA Director said that because their milk vendors were in New Orleans and dairies were not operating, finding milk to serve was a challenge. The St. Charles Parish SFA Director added that because it was not required to have milk that the director “was very fortunate.”

Some parishes pooled resources to increase variety of available food. The Lafayette diocese SFA Director said that sharing food and support “helped a lot.” She and the St. Martin SFA Director network in a self-organized consortium of Louisiana SFA Directors in southwest LA. The group includes: Acadia, Beauregard, Jefferson Davis, Evangeline, St. Landry diocese, Vermillion Parish, Calcasieu, Cameron, Iberia, St. Martin, and Lafayette Parishes. After the storms, the group convened to “brainstorm.” At that time, they shared “commodities, flour, or do a transfer.” The Lafayette diocese SFA had a food warehouse, so the group ordered truckloads of one product for a better price and stored it in the Lafayette diocese warehouse until it could be picked up by the other SFA. She noted that “a truckload of French fries is much better priced than trying to by it by the case.”

Many parishes were still able to serve a reimbursable meal. St. James Parish, the New Orleans diocese, and St. Charles Parish all said that with the exception of milk, most if not all of their meals that they served would have been otherwise reimbursable by USDA.

Verification. The USDA released a waiver on September 7, 2005, that eliminated the verification requirement for schools affected by Hurricane Katrina. This was later extended for Hurricane Rita on September 26, 2005. Instead of requiring a paycheck stub and verifying the
social security number of the parents, the information on the application was trusted as accurate. The East Baton Rouge Parish SFA Director noted that this was “a huge timesaver. We were so busy getting free lunch applications in and trying to establish rosters of children who were being enrolled. It was good a thing that happened.”

**Dedication of Staff and Community.** All of the SFA Directors and Supervisors that were interviewed mentioned that the dedication and commitment of their staff and independent volunteers or civic organizations were an enabling factor in the success of the implementation of the NSLP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Director of the Food Distribution Division noted that “the school lunch and the state are staffed with very forceful and resilient ladies. There is nothing that they can’t tackle, or won’t.”

When asked what enabled the success of the NSLP after Hurricane Rita, she said, “the dedication of employees was number one.” She then added that employees had lost their “houses and everything, and showed up to work to give everything. The stuff that they did, Emily. They went into horribly disgusting, nasty, rank, walk-in cooler freezers with food. They cleaned out kitchens and just did everything.” She added that these employees were paid the same amount as displaced employees who weren’t currently working for the New Orleans diocese.

The Director of the School Food Service expressed pride in the SFA leadership and added that they did “whatever they could.” Cameron Parish’s SFA Supervisor returned with her family to the parish before electricity had been restored or she could contact employees. Together, she and her family began opening and cleaning the coolers.

Civic organizations seemed to have been a successful consideration during the implementation of the NSLP during the storms. Donations to the Cameron Parish SFA after Hurricane Rita were made through civic organizations, churches, and privately. She added that
they came from “all over the nation.” The donated food and money was able to provide snacks to the students who attended an extended day school schedule. America’s Second Harvest donated two truckloads of food to the East Baton Rouge Parish SFA.

The National Guard assisted the Director of the New Orleans diocese SFA Director clean out and remove cooler freezers. They were also helpful to the Tangipahoa Parish SFA. The Director noted that “they were very helpful in helping us to distribute the food.” The schools’ food was used to “serve hospital patients and everything. We helped [the community].”

The St. Charles Parish SFA was able to assist the community also. The SFA donated supplies to the St. Charles fire department. They were unable to purchase items “like paper plates. So anything that they needed, we gave to them.”

**Barriers during Implementation**

The most often identified barriers that administrators faced during implementation of the NSLP during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were pre-storm preparedness/experience, communication, infrastructure damage, budget constrictions, and food loss or availability. A summary of the barriers reported is shown in Table 10.

**Pre-storm Preparedness.** Several of the SFA’s interviewed mentioned that there was little hurricane preparedness prior to the storms. The SFA from the New Orleans diocese said that “things [were] in place more for bio-terrorism.” She called it a “limited plan.” The SFA from St. James Parish noted that the only disaster planning was “whatever guidelines are required in 1196.1”

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1 Title 28, Part XLIX of Bulletin1196 is a board approved manual of the policies of operation for the food and nutrition programs in Louisiana schools.
When asked what parts of Bulletin 1196 were left to the parish, district or school, the director of the New Orleans diocese said, “I would say 100% of it had to do at the district level, ‘cause we are the ones who establishes that policy and implemented it at the school. The schools had to take the initial action and there was no communication.”

The St. Charles SFA said that the parish had evacuation instructions for the students and the employees; however, few logistics were planned as staff and families expected to return home and to work. The interview with the SFA Director from Tangipahoa added that the main pre-disaster planning the parish did was “mainly with commodities.” Both the Director of the Food Distribution Division and the State Office emphasized that the relationship with the Red Cross was the major preparedness activity prior to Hurricane Katrina. The Director of the SFA in St. James Parish added that “it was a wake-up call.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFA</th>
<th>Barriers</th>
<th>Hurricane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of School Food Services (state office)</td>
<td>Communication, Increased student enrollment</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Distribution Division</td>
<td>Trucks and transportation</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron Parish SFA</td>
<td>Infrastructure damage, communication, storage, food accessibility, budget</td>
<td>Rita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Charles Parish SFA</td>
<td>Communication, Employees, Food and milk availability</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA</td>
<td>Food accessibility, garbage pick-up, labor, communication, employees, vendors, budget</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangipahoa Parish SFA</td>
<td>Loss of food, food accessibility</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James Parish SFA</td>
<td>Availability of milk, communication, vendors</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Martin Parish SFA</td>
<td>Influx of students</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette diocese SFA</td>
<td>Food availability, communication</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Baton Rouge Parish SFA</td>
<td>Influx of students, communication, employees were unavailable, budget</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Communication. Another major barrier to the implementation of the NSLP after the storms was the inability to communicate through telephone, cellular service, e-mail, or fax. The SFA of the Archdiocese of New Orleans described the first attempts at text messages through the cell phones after Hurricane Katrina. Contacting employees was a major challenge. SFA Directors and supervisors needed to know if the staff was safe, where they were, and when they could return to schools once they opened.

A SFA supervisor noted that she had difficulties contacting the state office for information. The New Orleans diocese moved her office to the Baton Rouge diocese with the archbishop. The director “had to…call them personally” and added that it was “me calling them.”

The Director of School Food Services noted that “it wasn’t so much anyone’s fault. It was just that we couldn’t get through to people via phones tied up, always busy, their email bouncing back.” The director added that for a short period of time she had to rely on “people getting in touch with us somehow someway before we could help.” The Director of School Food Services added that the DNA set up “five systems that if they had any questions, needed anything, whatever, they had his number, his e-mail, his cell phone. He was the contact point for anything.”

Communication with food and milk vendors was difficult. While trying to contract with a vendor with refrigerated trucks, the St. Charles she “waited in line in a FedEx and faxed him this hand written contract that I made up. It probably took 17 times just to get through.” The SFA supervisor from the Archdiocese of New Orleans noted that “communication with employees and vendors was one of the largest challenges.” The St. Charles SFA supervisor added that because she had a 225 (Baton Rouge metro area code) area code she was able to contact vendors
faster than if she was located in a 504 (New Orleans metro area code). This also allowed her to purchased food with other available food contractors.

**Food Losses and Availability.** Buying food to serve to the students in the schools was a problem for nearly all of the parishes. During the interview with the Director of School Food Services, she said that “they [the schools] did definitely have a loss of food. They had higher enrollments and commodities were depleted. The demand for food was high. It was just all over the board.” Referring to moving commodities to the affected parishes and schools, the Director of the Food Distribution Division for Louisiana said, “transportation was difficult to come by anywhere in the country.” The director added, “…if you could drive by [Target ®] and there must have been 200 or 300 18-wheelers just sitting there. And those trucks weren’t able to haul anything that we needed or a lot of other people, you know. FEMA was a big suckin’ family. They sucked up every bit of asset that was around. It’s hard to get stuff in and that was frustrating.”

The Cameron Parish SFA supervisor said that getting groceries and supplies was a major challenge in preparing to restart food services to students. She added once she was able to find a supplier who could provide food, storage became a problem. “We had 18-wheelers show up at our door and say, ‘okay, we’ve got a fresh truck full of food. Now where do you want it?’ So we unloaded a lot into our gyms, just for temporary storage.” She included that while we did have a cooler truck and a freezer truck, she needed additional food storage.

The availability of food for St. Charles Parish was a problem and school food service became the only source of food for some families. “The biggest problem was not in the schools. The biggest problem was there was no food in the stores and not stores open for families to eat, and so they relied heavily on the schools to prepare meals for their kids.”
Challenges were similar for the Lafayette diocese SFA. “Getting sugar, meat- chicken” was difficult since the sugar mills in New Orleans were down. She added that as a result, “some prices did go up. The diocese lost several thousand dollars of food.”

The New Orleans diocese SFA supervisor said that “food deliveries were an issue, just trying to get anything delivered.” They lost their entire inventory. She added that the problem was compounded because, “vendors lost food; they lost trucks, they lost employees. So they had challenges delivering items to us. We had to work with other distributors during the emergency situation.” New Orleans diocese lost about $270,000 in purchased foods and $93,000 in commodity foods. There was a $5 million dollar lost in equipment. One million dollars was allocated for equipment purchase during the 2006 summer.

Tangipahoa Parish lost about $300,000 worth of food, which was “our frozen food inventory.” Loss of food in the St. Martin Parish SFA was limited to one case of milk, they were required to make an emergency purchase “from the Lafayette vendor to get [food] so we could operate the rest of September [2005].” She added that “FEMA told me since commodities were purchase with federal funds, we couldn’t claim the use of commodities.” The purchase was “significant.” When probed for a dollar amount, she added that in was “five digits. Anything over three in food service is a lot.” A summary of losses in located in Appendix I.

**Infrastructure Damage.** Some parishes included in the study were more devastated physically than others. For example, the New Orleans Archdiocese and Cameron Parish were the most adversely affected from the physical impacts of the hurricanes.

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans diocese provided lunches in 110 sites. This included “89 cooking schools.” When the 2005-2006 school year ended, the New Orleans diocese was operating in 77 sites. A majority of the lost sites were satellite schools, which were described as, “small schools that didn’t have kitchens. And we cooked for them and had the food
sent over.” The number of satellite kitchens decreased from 21 prior to Katrina to 13 after the storm. Schools with full kitchens dropped from 89, prior to Hurricane Katrina to 69 operating kitchens. The director noted that “we’re down 20 cooking schools.”

At the time of the interview, new kitchens for Mount Carmel and Our Lady of Lourdes in Slidell, LA were going to be gutted and refurbished. Mount Carmel “had water to the rooftop.” The school reopened in December 2005, but operated without a lunch program. Our Lady of Lourdes was “wiped off the map completely.” Plans for a kitchen to be built in a trailer were underway. The Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA Director added, “You have priorities in school. And it’s number one, educate the kids, and then we’ll feed the students.” The director noted that pre-Katrina, “we were doing about 36,000 lunches a day. Post-Katrina in September we dropped to a low of 9,000 a day.”

When asked about how the staff and schools handled challenges with infrastructure damage, she provided two examples. “Two schools in St. Tammany, Margaret Mary, [which] used to serve last year, ’04-’05, served 550 lunches. And down the street was Our Lady of the Lourdes in Slidell, two elementary schools, and they served about 320 lunches. Our Lady of the Lourdes was destroyed, completely. So all of the children went to Margaret Mary. This was a school that was built for 500-600 and now they had 800-900 kids. The two kitchen staff now had to move into one kitchen. So you had more people than you were used to in a small kitchen. And the school food service delivered the meal to every single student in the classroom. Could not serve anyone in the cafeteria because the cafeteria was being used by students for classes and things like that because there were so many kids.”

The Archdiocese of New Orleans SFA Director provided another example. Because trucks could not access certain parts of the city, “in certain areas, we had to…vendors get a drop. They would go to one school and do a drop for three or four or five schools, and our employees
had to go get the food and haul it back to their school. The vendors only had one driver and they just gave us what they could.”

Cameron Parish faced an influx of students after Hurricane Katrina, but most of its infrastructure damage occurred during Hurricane Rita. Geographically, Cameron Parish is the largest parish in Louisiana, but one of the most scarcely populated. Prior to Hurricane Rita, there were six schools in operation. They included Grand Lakes, Hackberry, Johnson Bayou, Cameron Elementary, South Cameron Elementary, and South Cameron High School. Following Hurricane Rita, the four schools were completely destroyed, leaving only Hackberry and Johnson Bayou to serve the students and families in Cameron Parish (Figures 1-2). Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the total student enrollment for the parish was 1910. After Hurricane Rita, student enrollment decreased by 55% to 1042 (free lunch = 671, reduced lunch = 236, total = 907). At the time of the interview, student enrollment was 1510 (free lunch = 1504, reduced = 2, full price = 4).

Prior to the start of the interview, the Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor presented a power point slide show that included photographs of the schools and the devastation after Hurricane Rita (Figures 5-6). During an explanation of the image in one of the photographs, she noted that “I had no way of contacting any of my managers, because all of their homes no longer existed and cell phone towers were out. I ended up having to get my family to come back with me just to take all of the food out of the coolers and freezers of the two schools that remained.” She added that at the time of the interview she had “not found any signs of that walk-in cooler. It got a forty-foot tidal surge through it.”
The Cameron Parish SFA Supervisor continued, “The biggest problem we had after the storm, and getting going again, we had to have a sanitation review on Grand Lake and Hackberry in order to reopen.” The review was scheduled on October 26, 2005 and the school was scheduled to reopen on October 31, 2005. Food deliveries were contingent upon approval from the sanitation review.
When asked about how the parish handled instances where physical damage prevented normal operation, the supervisor described the food service at the two operating schools. “They have longer days. They go ‘til 5. 7:30 [in the morning] until 5, to make up time. They are going through 2½ days each of food. I just don’t have adequate storage for that much [food].” She added that because of the extended days, all meals weren’t reimbursable. A waiver was submitted, but wasn’t approved by the USDA. Fortunately, “the nation brought food. Churches were bringing supplies.” The donated food was used for snacks served later in the day.

**Budget.** When asked about how re-budgeting will affect Louisiana’s ability to offer free and reduced lunch, most SFA supervisors and directors responded that they would still be able to provide the service, but that budgets were profoundly affected. Most of the parishes maintained staff schedules and kept and paid all managers while schools were closed. Although income was down and kitchens were unable to facilitate all of the staff, salaries were maintained and hours were often increased. The Director of the Lafayette diocese SFA noted that she “paid out more money because we were adding hours to our staff, but it was needed.”

The Director of the New Orleans diocese SFA said that her district “receives no local funds. So [we were] running a budget in extremely tight.” She added that after Katrina there were a lot of expenses, but at the time of the interview no federal or state funds had been allocated to replace any of the lost food or equipment. While facing massive budget restrictions, wages were increased due to the wages that FEMA were paying. “We’ve had to increase wages because fast food restaurants are offering [higher wages] and the FEMA is paying a very high rate for employees. So it’s actually made our job harder to find employees. And that has been true for some of our vendors. A lot of people have quit their jobs after 12 years to work for FEMA.”
The Assistant Director of the East Baton Rouge Parish SFA explained the competition between employees commuting to New Orleans to work at “Wendy’s for $10.00 or go to work in EBR and make $6.00 an hour as a day-by-day.” She added that there were 30 vacancies for food service employees. At the time of the interview, those vacancies were staffed by day-by-day employees.

**Changes in Enrollment**

Although the USDA relaxed the enrollment reporting requirements for the NSLP after the storms, students receiving free and reduced lunches were documented and published. Their system had the ability to track the meal status of the students in each parish in the state. In addition, they were able to track and report students who attending a different school because they were displaced from the storms.

The Archdiocese of New Orleans and the Lafayette diocese were not tracked for enrollment changes. Data regarding the detail the enrollment in the participating parishes and districts before and after the storms is in Appendix I.

**Participants’ Suggestions for Future Disaster Policy**

The responses by the interviewees when asked about future disaster policy, many of the barriers were addressed. Topics that were most often mentioned were USDA response and communication. All of the SFA and the Director of School Food Services said that the waivers should be replicated for future disasters. Since the storms, some SFA have purchase two-way radios and have formatted emergency contact documents. Moreover, due to current limits in technology, there is little that they SFA thought that could be done about this problem.
Figure 8: Identifying factors of the NSLP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita summarized in the Proceed Model.
Food Stamp Program

Interviews were conducted with 7 regional, state, and local administrators from the FSP. The characteristics of the interviews are shown in Table 11.

Table 11: Seven FSP interviews conducted with title of participant, date, location, and length of interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Length (hour:min:sec)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section Chief, Food Stamp Program Integrity and Nutrition Section</td>
<td>Southern University Baton Rouge, LA</td>
<td>March 14, 2006</td>
<td>33:18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Assistance Program Policy Section Manager</td>
<td>LA state office, Baton Rouge, LA</td>
<td>July 18, 2006</td>
<td>59:01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Stamp Nutrition Education Program Director</td>
<td>LA state office, LSU AgCenter, Baton Rouge, LA</td>
<td>August 16, 2006</td>
<td>43:01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Benefits Transfer Section Manager</td>
<td>LA state office, Baton Rouge, LA</td>
<td>August 22, 2006</td>
<td>52:17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Manager Orleans Region I Metairie, LA</td>
<td>August 30, 2006</td>
<td>(not taped)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Manager Lake Charles Region VI, Lake Charles, LA</td>
<td>August 29, 2006</td>
<td>(not taped)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Manager Thibodaux Region IV, Thibodaux, LA</td>
<td>August 31, 2006</td>
<td>1:05:48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Successes during Implementation

The enabling factors identified by the interviewed FSP administrators were the attributed to the dedication of the community and staff, and waivers issued by the USDA. The USDA waivers were issued from a federal level and disseminated to the state office. The waivers that were mentioned as the most helpful during implementation of the FSP during the storms were those regarding eligibility, benefits, and verification requirements.

A summary of enabling factors are shown in Table 12.

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2 Not taped at the request of the participant
3 Not taped at the request of the participant
Table 12: Summary of enabling factors during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as reported by FSP administrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFA</th>
<th>Enabling Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USDA Regional Manager</td>
<td>USDA Waivers, Dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Sections Manager</td>
<td>USDA Waivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBT Sections Manager</td>
<td>USDA Waivers, Dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Nutrition Education</td>
<td>Dedication of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Charles Regional Manager</td>
<td>USDA Waivers, Dedication of staff and Community, Out-of-state volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans Regional Manager</td>
<td>USDA Waivers, Dedication of staff and Community, Out-of-state volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thibodaux Regional Manager</td>
<td>USDA Waivers, Dedication of staff and Community, Out-of-state volunteers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**USDA Waivers.** After the arrival of Hurricane Katrina, the USDA released a waiver on September 2, 2005, that initiated the FNS’ disaster FSP. The Sections Manager described a disaster food stamp program as a series of waiver requests to operate a program. The waivers released by the USDA after Hurricane Katrina are summarized in Appendix I. There was not an evacuee policy for Hurricane Rita. Waivers from Hurricane Katrina were extended to include those affected by Hurricane Rita.

The FNS Regional Manager attributed the success of the implementing the Disaster FSP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to the immediate response of the USDA. She said, “We came out with a National Evacuee Policy and that was to aid evacuees everywhere, not just in Louisiana. It was a huge caseload on any state that had a large amount of evacuees.” The EBT Manager attributed success of the program to the waiver that allowed evacuees to apply and receive benefits in any parish. The Sections Manager agreed and said that this was the number one factor in enabling the success of the program after the storms. The New Orleans and Lake Charles Regional Managers agreed. The Sections Manager added that it all of the parishes that requested disaster status were approved.
**Staff and Community Dedication.** The USDA Regional Manager reported that staff from the regional office in Dallas who worked over the weekend and all week after Hurricane Katrina. She added that “we were working seven days a week, not quite 24 hours a day.” The Thibodaux Regional Manager explained that disaster program was originally approved for one week only. During this time her office went to a 24-hour operation. Her staff was divided into 2-12 hour shifts. She said that the staff was exhausted, but the applicant demand was there. When asked how long the 24-hour operation ran, she said, “I just don’t remember. It’s sort of all blurred together.”

The director added later in the interview that after Hurricane Katrina, 100% of her staff was dedicated to serving the needs of those applying for disaster relief. The Director of Nutrition Education said that her agents turned their attention from Nutrition Education to food security and food access. The director added that the staff “manned desks, did applications, processed applications, were caseworkers. We literally joined in the ranks of the food stamp offices because they were completely inundated and swamped with people.”

In addition to dedication from the FNS employees working in their pre-Hurricane Katrina office, many employees went to work at offices in areas where they had evacuated. The USDA Regional Manager noted that many Louisiana DSS employees who were displaced from New Orleans would “show up at one of the office and say ‘I’m here to work if you need me.’” She wasn’t sure if it was mandatory. The EBT Manager noted that employees relocated voluntarily to assist parishes that needed assistance.

The Thibodaux Regional Manager stated that she had quite a few state office employees helping in her office. She also sent employees to the New Orleans and Slidell areas when the offices began to open. “At another point, I sent staff to Lake Charles after Hurricane Rita because we just weren’t having the volume that they were.”
The Policy Sections Manager added that there were 2 employees displaced from New Orleans working in the state office. He added that “New Orleans doesn’t have half the caseload it had prior to the storm, so some of the staff are being moved around to ease the burden in other places.” The New Orleans Regional Manager noted that since the storm her staff has decreased. Pre-Katrina there were about 420 agents working in the region for the FSP. At the time of the interview (August 30, 2006), about 250 FSP agents worked in the region.

In addition to the dedication and commitment from the staff, outside volunteers came to Louisiana to help in whatever capacity that they could. The New Orleans Regional Manager explained that some of the out-of-state volunteers brought equipment for the FSP to have and use. This included computers, paper, pens, and water for the crowds. She added that the National Guard contributed the success of the program by aiding those who waited in line to either apply or receive benefits. Senators, the New Orleans mayor, and area police officers made a presence and an effort to make the situation more comfortable. She added that “people were passing out. We needed to find places were they could go inside, use the restroom, get a drink of water.” In addition to this, portable restrooms, water, and ice were all donated to the FSP office.

Wal-Mart donated water to the Thibodaux Regional Manager’s office and was distributed to the applicants waiting in lines. The Council on Aging set up a special application site at one of the senior homes in Baton Rouge. The city police “got the media to put out an appeal for people to just donate umbrellas that we could pass to the crowd. They could stand under the umbrellas.” The Thibodaux Regional Manager added that “some young folks from the Church of Scientology showed up” and offered to help.

FEMA also assisted the disaster program efforts. Temporary issuance sites were set up since many of the office were damaged or completely destroyed. The Thibodaux Regional
Manager used the FEMA sites and “piggybacked on their resources.” FEMA had access to security, electricity, and sometimes Internet.

**Barriers during Implementation**

The most often identified barriers that administrators faced during implementation of the FSP during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were infrastructure damage, increased client volume, vendor availability, client identification. A summary of barriers are shown in Table 13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSP Administrator</th>
<th>Barriers</th>
<th>Hurricane</th>
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<tr>
<td>USDA Regional Manager</td>
<td>Magnitude of Storm</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
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<td>EBT Benefits Manager</td>
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<td>Director of Nutrition Education</td>
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<td>Orleans Regional Manager</td>
<td>Infrastructure Damage</td>
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**Infrastructure Damage.** The most often identified barrier by the interviewed FSP administrators was infrastructure damage. Within the Lake Charles Region, the Broad Street office in Lake Charles was completely destroyed. To accommodate the DFSP applicants, the office was temporarily moved to a church. Cameron Parish lost all of their records and were require to “start from scratch.” Many offices in the Orleans Region were required to start from scratch as well. Moreover, the entire region was redistricted to accommodate the different enrollment needs of the area. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Region was divided into
parishes and districts. They included Algiers district, four offices in the East Bank of New Orleans, Jefferson Parish, Plaquemines Parish, and St. Bernard Parish. After the storm, the region was redistricted: one office in New Orleans, St. Bernard, Mid-town, and a combined office for Gentilly, Mid-town, and Uptown (4 total).

Finding sites to accommodate the masses of people proved to be a major challenge for all of the regional managers. At one point, hauling in an-18 wheeler was in discussion for the Thibodaux Regional Manager.

**Increased Client Volume.** Regardless of having a place to accommodate the large number of people applying to the disaster program, assisting the increased client volume proved to be a major challenge. Although Louisiana did not run out of EBT cards, the Policy Sections Manager had to personally drive everyday to pick-up and deliver a stock of cards. The vendor JPMorgan supplied cards everyday to accommodate the volume of applicants.

The increase of applicants caused major traffic and parking problems. Lines wrapped through the parking lots and into the streets. There weren’t enough parking spots in the parking lots, so cars overflowed from the lots into the streets.

**Vendor Availability.** Many of the vendors that were set up to accept EBT cards were damaged, destroyed, or unable to maintain operating hours due to the lack of employees. So, although applicants were approved and received the EBT cards, there were not always vendors who could sell them food. The USDA did respond by allowing some prepared foods to be purchased with disaster program benefits. The New Orleans and Lake Charles Regional Managers said this as a huge problem for the benefit recipients.

**Client Identification.** Many DFSP applicants evacuated without the identifying documentation required for benefit approval. The EBT Manager said that there were “several” incidents where people had “nothing.” In response to this problem, the Louisiana Department of
Motor Vehicles offered replacement driver’s licenses or ID cards to those with photos on file. When this happened, the New Orleans Regional Manager accepted “collateral statements” and accepted whatever the applicants had. When possible, they accepted personal references. She added that often neighbors and extended families were in lines together. The Lake Charles Regional Manager agreed by adding that many of the requirements were waived and they were forced to “take their word.”

**Magnitude of Storms.** This was the first time that the USDA released an evacuee policy in response to initiating a disaster program. The magnitude of the storm was unexpected. The EBT Benefits Manager agreed that this was a barrier to a normal disaster food stamp program. The Orleans Regional Manager added to this concept when asked what barriers faced after Hurricane Katrina. The Director of Nutrition Education and USDA Regional Manager stated that the combination of Hurricane Katrina and Rita was massive and that everyone was “working around the clock” to implement the program and serve the applicants.

**Participants’ Suggestions for Future Disaster Policy**

When asked about fraud prevention efforts, responses were directed to the Fraud and Recovery department. Although, fraud and application design were not mentioned when asked about the barriers to the successful implementation of the program, they were the most often suggested for future policy. Moreover, the interviewees who responded to this question offered information as to what was currently in effect after the end of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita’s disaster food stamp program. Outside of the waivers released for the DFSP, the USDA Regional Manager was not sure how to improve disaster response in the future.

Both the Policy Sections Manager and the Thibodaux Regional Manager described a matrix that was designed by FNS staff in Louisiana to specifically define requirements for a

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4 Fraud and Recovery Department was not permitted to participant in the study.
parish to be declared a disaster area. The criteria to decide which parishes will be included in future programs (one of three must be met):

- 50% of homes in parish are without power 48 hours after the disaster
- Damage to the parish as a result of wind velocity greater than or equal to 96 miles per hour
- 25% of the residential structures on the parish are affected by flooding. Flooding is defined as water actually entering the structure.

They added that applications will not be processed in areas where a mandatory evacuation is in effect. Staff will resume accepting applications when the evacuation orders have been lifted. In addition, at least 10% of the approved EBT vendors must be able to operate. If not, the FDD will come in and distribute commodities to households. The Policy Sections Manager added that this was designed for a hurricane, not “an ice storm, flood, or terrorist bombing.”

The EBT Benefits Manager suggested that the disaster policy was enhanced so that it requires information on all household members. This way multiple benefits cannot be received within the same family and thus reducing fraud. The Orleans Regional Manager suggested that each social security number of each member of the household be required during the application process.

During this disaster program, denied applications were not kept on file. The EBT Benefits Manager added that when some people became savvy at the application process, they could have “taken advantage” of this. “Double checks” could decrease the amount of work. It was suggested further that one way to double check was with a quality assurance team that could monitor the issuance sites. The Lake Charles Regional Manager suggested that personnel from the Office of Fraud and Recovery should be responsible for the checks and balances that should be required. She thought that they could be an asset in helping employees and volunteers make
sure that the policies and procedures were followed accurately. The Orleans Regional Manager agreed.

The manager mentioned additional security-minded suggestions for future policy. In addition to adding checks and balances to the application process, she wanted to see increased information required on the application. In her experience, she witnessed many affluent families “taking advantage” of the system. She thought that families were choosing not to provide identification, suggesting that “lack of proof of ID was selective.” In addition, she would like to see more time pass between the time of application and approval; noting further that, “these people aren’t starving. There is time.”
Figure 9: Identifying factors of the FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita summarized in the Proceed Model.
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

This project was designed to gain insight to the overall experience of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Interviews were conducted to obtain predisposing, enabling, and reinforcing factors study participants faced while implementing the programs and their suggestions for future disaster policies and procedures.

Administrative Assessment

The first objective of this study was to obtain an administrative assessment of the policies and circumstances of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This assessment includes pre-disaster program administration procedures how they may have changed in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although not asked in the NSLP and FSP interviews, the extent of involvement during the Hurricane “Pam” drill as follow up question would gain insight to the hurricane preparedness of the programs. From this, a comparison between how much was replicated during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and what was unable to be predicted could have been drawn.

National School Lunch Program

SFA supervisors said that the disaster plans mainly “dealt with commodities” and “not logistics” dealing with procedures that would contribute to feeding children after disasters. Based in the discussions with the SFA supervisors, the CNP director did not provide the district a report designed from Bulletin 1196 (Appendix A), detailing the 20 Disaster Relief Feeding Plan objectives. Moreover, the state CNP director may have assumed it was the responsibility of the individual SFA.

In the interview with the School Food and Nutrition Services of New Orleans SFA Director, it was stated that “we [the SFA supervisors] are the ones who establishes that policy
and implement it at the school[s].” The comment from the St. James Parish SFA director, “whatever guidelines are required in 1196” suggests that objectives outlined in Bulletin 1196 were provided, but that a Disaster Relief Feeding Plan was not.

This barrier has led to some SFA supervisors to update the emergency contacts sheet. Since the hurricanes, the SFA supervisor for St. James Parish has developed a detailed Emergency Readiness Plan designed to meet the specific needs of the St. James Parish school foodservice operation. Emergency Response Team Coordinators were designated and duties assigned to each role.

The waivers for the NSLP released by the USDA after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita temporarily changed policies and procedures and enabled the implementation of the NSLP after the storms. For example, verification of income was temporarily suspended for the 2005-2006 school year and the Free and Reduced Lunch Claims report deadline for August 2005 was extended from November 31, 2005 (Appendix G). While the primary goals of the waivers was to enable the SFA supervisors to feed the children, they also resulted in decreased administrative burden which further facilitated the implementation of the program.

Louisiana’s NSLP has a sophisticated reported system that is implemented by the SFA supervisors, regardless of disaster. Although reporting was less rigorous after the storms and for the remainder of the 2005-2006 school year, the same reporting mechanism was used to count students receiving free and reduced lunch. Reporting is discussed further as it relates to the enablers of implementation.

**Food Stamp Program**

The massive Disaster Food Stamp Handbook published in May 1995 extensively details pre-disaster planning, response, and follow-up (59, 61). In addition, FNS published an EBT Disaster Manual (36-39).
Surprisingly, when asked what pre-disaster preparations were in place, the handbook was mentioned only by the Southwest Region Section Chief. The EBT Disaster Manual was mentioned only by the EBT Sections Manager; however neither of the guides was mentioned as enablers to the implementation of the DFSP. This suggests that either the guides were used as reference for state and regional administration, but not at the sites where disaster food stamp benefits were being administered.

The Thibodaux Regional Manager said that after Hurricane Rita a statewide committee was formed to come up with recommendations, processes, and procedures. It was added that this was written by the OFS Policy Sections Manager. When interviewed, the Policy Sections Manager stated that because the DFSP policy was a federal program, Louisiana administrators could not make any changes to it. Addressing this issue after the hurricanes, the OFS administration added a basic disaster policy to the regular FSP. In May 2006, the state office held a training class for all of the department staff.

In remains unclear whether or not the handbooks were used in response to the hurricanes. They were mentioned by state staff, but not detailed by regional managers implementing the program directly. Both the Thibodaux and Lake Charles Regional Managers explained that the staff had experience with other DFSP after Hurricanes Lily and Ivan, but neither of the storms was of the magnitude of Katrina or Rita. It is unclear as to whether the experience reported by the regional managers refers to familiarity using the handbooks as a policy to guide implementation of the programs or if the reported experience refers to the overall disaster response. It is plausible that if the disaster manuals, both the DFSP and the EBT, were used thoroughly, then the regional managers and experienced staff would mention them as either aids or hindrances during our discussions. A sensible alternative to this theory is that the state administrators were the primary implementers of the program, relaying only significant
procedure information to the regions specific to the hurricanes, as opposed the manuals. This topic warrants further study.

It appears that from the national level, the FSP had a more detailed pre-disaster and disaster response guide than the NSLP; although, the extent of the use and from whom is vague, because it wasn’t mentioned in the interviews with regional managers. On a state level, the NSLP seemed to have more pre-disaster planning resources available than the FSP. The responsibility for the development and use of Chapter 31 in Bulletin 1196 is also unclear. In both cases, many of the SFA supervisors and FSP regional managers have taken steps to update or develop a procedural guide specific to their area of jurisdiction.

**Enabling and Reinforcing Factors of the Disaster Plans**

The second objective of the study was to obtain the successes of the disaster plan implementation by associating the enabling and reinforcing factors with program policy, budget, reporting, and administration delivery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Results from the study indicate that there were some similarities and differences between the enabling and reinforcing factors of the NSLP and the FSP.

**National School Lunch Program**

The waivers released by the USDA were the enablers most often mentioned during interviews with administrators from the NSLP. The waivers primary purpose was to relax eligibility, meal pattern requirement, reporting and verification, consequently increased reimbursement and decreased the massive administrative burden caused by the catastrophic impact of the storms. The dedication of the staff and community was also a reinforcing factor of the NSLP after the storms.

The annual income requirements set by the FNS were redefined after Hurricane Katrina and extended after Rita so that school aged children from households receiving disaster food
stamp benefits and families displaced by the storms were automatically eligible for free lunches. Children paying full price for lunches prior to Hurricane Katrina were reimbursed $.23 for reimbursable meals purchased. The reimbursement rate for many children increased to $2.40 after Hurricane Katrina (16). While it was reported that the schools in Cameron Parish and the School Food and Nutrition Service of New Orleans endured the most infrastructure damage, almost all of the schools in south Louisiana were closed for some period of time after either or both of the storms. As a result, the SFA lost income. The increased number of reimbursable meals helped the schools recoup some of the financial losses due to school closures. The SFA with the greatest cost associated with hurricane recovery, Archdiocese of New Orleans, suggested that this waiver stay effective for a longer period of time so that more losses could be recouped. If the USDA opted to extend for a longer period of time, the definition of “displaced” would have to be reconsidered and specifically described.

The waiver released by the USDA resulting allowing flexible meal patterns and extend reporting deadlines were also mentioned as enabling factors. However, it is what resulted from the flexibility that truly enabled the state and local state to spend more time on activities that would feed the children. These activities included locating vendors who have food, operable trucks, and staff to make deliveries and meal deliveries to schools where kitchens were destroyed.

While not mentioned in the interviews with the administration from the NSLP, it can be assumed that after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, SFA were forced to compete for resources. Surprisingly, only the Lafayette diocese and St. Martin Parish SFA directors pooled resources to share food deliveries. Although, the consortium of southwest SFA includes Cameron Parish, pooling resources was not mentioned in the interview with the Cameron Parish SFA supervisor. Allowing meal flexibility may have helped alleviate some of the competition. For example,
parishes may have been able to access substitute food choices quickly and cheaply from a nearby vendor. Alternatively, some foods were not available, as many vendor operations were adversely affected by the storms.

A total of 38 parishes in Louisiana were declared disaster areas by FEMA and were relieved of the NSLP income verification requirement from the USDA. In addition to alleviating administrative burden, it can be assumed that eliminating the paperwork associated with verification, also eliminated the space and equipment required to maintain the records.

For these reasons, it is possible that the abolishment of verification requirements may have led to increased incidents of fraud. With little or no detection, a school food service employee may have chosen to ignore verification requirements from the applicants. Alternatively, families who were aware of the post-disaster policies may have purposely left income statements, knowing the application would be approved based on the income that they verbally declared.

This concept contradicts a primary reinforcing factor reported by the SFA supervisors and state administration. Dedication of the staff and community contributed to strength of the program and its successful implementation during the vulnerable response phase of the disaster. As reported by many SFA supervisors, staff, families, churches, and civic organizations cleaned out refrigerators, made donations, and “just did everything.” This response is consistent with current literature (66). As mentioned by Paton and Johnson, resilience to a disaster is related to the ability of a community to combine abilities and experiences to face the related changes and challenges. They add that this can lead to growth within the community and the organization. Therefore, it is possible to conclude the dedication of the staff and community was a factor contributing to the overall shift from the response phase of disaster management to the recovery phase.
Food Stamp Program

The waivers released by the USDA and the dedication of the staff were most frequently mentioned as enablers during interviews with administrators from the FSP (Appendix I). The Southwest Region Sections Chief noted that it was the speed with which the waivers were released by the USDA that enabled the implementation of the program. The Sections Chief added that the National Evacuee Policy was implemented by the USDA to aid the evacuees residing outside Louisiana and designed for states that were not concurrently operating a disaster program.

Interestingly, the Policy Sections Manager said that the release of the National Evacuee Policy confused some applicants and staff members. The policy treated evacuees differently depending on whether they had evacuated. Louisiana requested a waiver not to include these regulations and was approved. However, applicants who came to issuance sites after researching eligibility from the FNS web-site may have been faced with conflicting information at the issuance sites in Louisiana. Louisiana’s income requirement for the DFSP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was not published on the web-site and wasn’t discussed during the interviews with FSP administrators. To gain more insight to this topic, a follow up question could elicit how the benefits administrators approved or denied applications.

Prior to and unrelated to Hurricane Katrina, the DSS changed the state policy allowing Louisiana residents to apply for food stamps in any parish in Louisiana. The policy was originally designed to help families who lived close to an OFS office in a neighboring parish. Although, this was not related to a DFSP, state administrators realized that this could be beneficial during a disaster. It proved to be a fundamentally enabling factor while implementing the disaster plan because many residents of south Louisiana were unable to return home for several weeks or months (18).
Both the NSLP and FSP attributed the success of the programs to the dedication of the staff and the waivers released by the USDA. Both of these enabling factors led to a decreased administrative burden that resulted in an increase of activities to support food security.

Barriers to the Implementation of the Disaster Plans

The third objective of this study was to gain understanding of the barriers faced while trying to implement the disaster NSLP and FSP programs and how they led to changes in policies or procedures associated, budget, reporting, and administration activities. The study revealed similarities and differences between the programs.

National School Lunch Program

Frequently mentioned barriers to the implementation of the NSLP in the wake of the storms were pre-disaster pre-preparedness, communication, and availability of food. From the discussions with the NSLP administrators, understanding of who was responsible for which roles of the pre-disaster planning was ambiguous.

Communication was a barrier faced during the implementation of the NSLP during the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. NSLP administrators had limited ability to communicate with the state office, regional staff, and vendors. Although the CNP director in the state office set up five different mechanisms for contact, little could have been done without electricity or cellular service. Under these circumstances, there is little that individual SFA or states can do to alleviate this barrier. The expense of satellite phones is not justifiable.

The only reliable form of communication is face-to-face interaction. This can involve driving long distances to relay important disaster information. Face-to-face interactions are more costly than telephone calls, e-mails, faxes, and text messaging, and require more time to accomplish, but in some cases it may be the only mechanism to communicate.
Food availability due to the loss of food as a result of a storm or the inability to obtain food because of damage to infrastructure and resources was a major barrier that the NSLP faced during the implementation of a disaster plan. Although Cameron Parish was running an extended day program, the USDA did not approve a waiver for snacks to be reimbursable.

Without the support from the outside community, Cameron Parish would have been unable to feed students. The reason why the waiver was not approved was not disclosed during the interview; however, the failure of the USDA to approve the waiver under these specific circumstances hindered the principal role of the federal food assistance programs- to reduce hunger by increasing food purchasing power (1).

**Food Stamp Program**

Statements mentioned by the OFS administrators suggested that increased client volume and lack of client identification were barriers while implementing the DFSP. Additionally, many of the store owners and their businesses were adversely impacted by the storms which hindered access to food in some areas.

**Future Suggestions**

The fourth objective of this study was to relay suggestion from the NSLP and FSP administrators for future disaster policies and procedures. In some cases, enablers and barriers of program implementation were addressed by the participants.

**National School Lunch Program**

Topics that were most often mentioned for future policies were the USDA and communication. All of the NSLP SFA supervisors and state staff agreed that the USDA waivers released by the USDA should be replicated for each disaster. Most suggested that communication was an important topic to be addressed, but technological barriers seemed insurmountable.
Unexpectedly, many of the NSLP regional managers did not mention strengthening or further detailing disaster policies and procedures; although some had mentioned steps taken to eradicate future problems. For example, SFA supervisors made keys to all of the kitchens so that after a disaster the kitchens could be accessed immediately.

**Food Stamp Program**

In contrast to the National School Lunch Program, the Food Stamp Program administrators addressed barriers as well as issues that were not discusses previously in the interview, such as fraud and applications. It was suggested administering a more security minded application after a disaster may reduce fraudulent activities. However, the stories of massive lines and applicant discomfort suggest that lengthening the application process may not be feasible. It is possible that some of the changes that Louisiana’s FSP is trying to implement, for example, the Disaster Matrix for hurricanes may alleviate some of the client demand, but, additionally, it can not be predicted how the next disaster will affect the region. Because little information was available, it is difficult to determine what information from the application was most critical in establishing disaster food stamp benefits eligibility.

**Changes in Enrollment**

The study tracked the changes in enrollment of the NSLP and FSP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The results of the enrollment changes are located in appendices J-L.

**National School Lunch**

Appendix J charts the yearly enrollment of the NSLP from October 2002-2005 and then from December 2005-May 2006 (the end of the 2005-2006 SY and when all of the NSLP disaster waivers expire) for Cameron, St. Martin, East Baton Rouge, St. Charles, St. James, and Tangipahoa Parishes only. Unlike, the DFSP application system, the system used by the schools to input student data requires the same details for normal and disaster circumstances. A
breakdown of the socioeconomic demographics, including: gender, race, grade, and free or reduced meal status in the parish can be tracked during disaster response and recovery. The accuracy of the information relies on the person who inputs the data. During disaster circumstances, when time and manpower are limited, as asserted by the SFA supervisors, coupled with decreased verification and reporting requirements may lead to erroneous reports; and therefore inaccurate budgets, purchase orders, and reimbursement rates.

Based on the waivers released by the USDA, the increase in students receiving free lunch is expected. All of the reported parishes exemplified enrollment changes based on the waivers: an increase in the number of students enrolled in the school and participating in a meal program.

Although, these patterns were not recorded for the Archdiocese of New Orleans, who also experienced a sharp decline in student enrollment, the enrollment trends for Cameron Parish exemplified the experience. In October 2005, no students were reported because four of the six schools were destroyed and closed for the entire month. The remaining two schools were being cleaned and prepared for all of the students to start school at the beginning of October. When the schools opened, the SFA supervisor reported all of the students free until the end of the 2005-2006 school year.

Food Stamp Program

Because the subsystem designed for the DFSP is abbreviated, less information can be extrapolated and interpreted. Surprisingly, reports published by the OFS do not reveal of which parish the applicant is a permanent resident, or how many applications were processed and approved in each parish (Appendix K). In a follow-up question directed to the Policy Sections Manager, it was determined that this information is not readily available. However, information regarding the total number of households served and the amount benefits allocated was provided. The current reports by the OFS estimate that 496,587 households received approximately
$409,387,689 in DFSP benefits in Louisiana from after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita from September 2005 through November 2005.

However, an insight to the movement of recipients of the regular FSP may be extrapolated from the published information (Appendix L). In October, after Hurricane Rita, the average benefit increased. It can be concluded that during this time, recipients of the regular FSP received a supplement to increase the benefits to the maximum amount allowed by the number in the household.

Appendix K highlights the number of total households, recipients and cased closed as a result of the recipient moving out of the state for regular FSP recipients. After Hurricane Rita, there is a sharp increase in the cases closed as a result of recipients moving out of the state and a steady decrease in total enrollment. This suggests that families within the income bracket to be eligible for regular food stamps were moving out of Louisiana and not returning. The permanent relocation out of Louisiana may be a result of the federal government and Louisiana’s responses and recovery efforts after to the storms. This is consistent with the population reports from Birmingham, Houston, and Atlanta (23-26).

**Disaster, Food Assistance Programs and Future Directions**

This study will add to the minimal research on the relationship between disasters and federal food assistance programs and creates a foundation for follow-up studies. Development of an instrument to quantify and correlate federal food assistance disaster programs and food security would be an asset to both the NSLP and FSP. If designed, a concrete and definitive report could be used to support or oppose policy updates. Additionally, tracking and measuring incidents of fraud may strengthen the integrity of future disaster programs.
National School Lunch Program

A collaboration of local and state supervisors to define the roles and responsibilities of each department during a disaster may enable future disaster responses. Bulletin 1196 and the Stafford Act should be guides to design a disaster plan. Kitchen managers in each district should use the storm experience to design a detailed and complete disaster manual. Disaster manuals from each kitchen should be collected and approved by the SFA supervisor. In turn, using the information from the kitchen managers and the experience of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, each SFA supervisor in Louisiana should customize a detailed disaster policy and procedure guidebook which should be approved by the state. To enforce both the state and local policy, yearly trainings should be enforced for all school food service employees; additionally, as the literature suggests, these responsibilities and procedures should be revisited often (64-64).

Key components to the updated disaster plan should include communication and environmental hazards, such as mold and food salvage. When telephone and cellular service is unavailable, an alternative communication system should be highlighted in the manual. For example, neighboring parishes could design a relay system to disseminate information from the state office in East Baton Rouge Parish.

The results of the study link the experiences of the participating parishes. State administrators and SFA supervisors should evaluate the experiences of their colleagues. At this time, plans to pool resources during a disaster can be arranged.

Food Stamp Program

A follow-up study should be conducted to determine the extent to which the FNS Disaster Manual was used in state, regional, and local capacities and to what degree the manual enabled program implementation. The unusual circumstances of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
most likely created scenarios that were not discussed in the manual. This should result in an updated guide to include procedures on more disaster scenarios.

Quantities of applications at individual issuance sites and within parishes should be investigated and reported. If possible, this information could be linked to the applicants’ home parish and city. Geographical information from this information should be quantified. As a result, patterns of movement can be tracked and used to select a location for future disaster issuance sites.

The abbreviated DFSP applications and subsystem should be considered and weighed against crowd control, time, and fraud. A system that requires more details, but is more time effective should be designed.

Limitations

There were several limitations to this study. First, the amount of time that elapsed between the hurricanes and the interviews may have changed the perceptions of the events. Several of the participants did not remember events surrounding the hurricanes and responded “I don’t remember” or “everything was such a blur” to the questions. This may not have happened if the interviews were conducted immediately after the event. This may not have been practical because the hurricanes were traumatic and the administrators needed time to recover. However, it proved to be a limitation to gaining the overall experience of the NSLP and FSP in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and Rita.

Second, a snowball sampling technique was used to find participants. Because the sample was not randomly selected, the results of the study may not give an accurate depiction of south Louisiana’s experience. The enabling factors and barriers to the implementation of disaster plans may not reflect all of the parishes affected by the storms. To address this limitation, an attempt was made, primarily with the NSLP, to invite SFA supervisors with varying experiences to
participate. Interviews were concluded when the patterns and themes emerged and no new information was learned.

It is probable that the experiences of SFA supervisors from the Orleans Public Schools SFA, St. Bernard Parish School Board, St. Tammany Parish School Board, Jefferson Parish Public School System, and Livingston Parish School Board would have contributed to the research. The key informants listed were profoundly impacted from the storms and may have contributed deeper understanding the response of the NSLP after the storms.

Additionally, key informants from the FSP did not participate in the study. In this case, the interviews were stopped when all of the possible participants were exhausted. Permission to interview the directors of the Fraud and Recovery Section, Field Operations Section, Budget Section would have greatly increased the perspective of the barriers and enabling factors during the implementation of the DFSP after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Two Regional Managers from the OFS opted not to have the interviews recorded. In contrast to the taped interviews, the only data source from the discussions with the Lake Charles and Orleans regional managers were the field notes taken at the interview. It can not be determined whether this impacted data analysis of the DFSP.

Conclusion

The effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita of Louisiana and the Gulf Coast region in the US were catastrophic. As a result, much of Louisiana remains lurking in the recovery phase of disaster. It is apparent that both the NSLP and the FSP were successful during the response phase, when immediate and speedy assistance is critical (49). The national, regional, and local administrators of the NSLP and FSP implemented urgent solutions which ultimately and profoundly helped families and thus communities access food resources through school lunches and food stamp benefits.
One of the fundamental successes of the implementation of the programs was the enduring focus on the mission of the respective programs. As mentioned in the interviews, the NSLP and FSP administrators took initiative to make sure that kitchens were cleaned, sanitation reviews were passed, food was served, and disaster food stamp benefits were dispensed. This concept compared to the response of the federal government suggests that more disaster preparedness details and clarity of roles and responsibility may lead to increased bureaucracy and a less effective response to the immediate needs of the community. Experience will widen the line between the necessary disaster roles, responsibility and procedures and impromptu activities that are required for an effective and immediate response.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita presented a catastrophic situation in Louisiana and the Gulf Coast region that led to massive disruption of social and economic systems. While it appears that decreased burden on administration coupled with the availability of resources is the formula for successful NSLP and FSP disaster response, this represents only part of the formula. Equally as important, are the people that even under exhausting and overwhelming conditions committed to the challenges that emerged with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
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APPENDIX A
TITLE 28, PART XLIX, BULLETIN 1196
to the Louisiana Department of Education, to ensure compliance with federal audit requirements.

1. Circular A-133 Subpart A §105 defines recipient or sub-recipient. The main criteria for determining if a sponsoring institution is a recipient or a sub-recipient of federal funds is compliance with federal program requirements as a criteria of receiving and expending the federal funds.

C. While a sponsoring institution that does not meet the annual federal expenditure threshold of $300,000 is not required to have an audit of such funds, records must be available for review or audit by appropriate officials of any federal, state, or local government agency.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.

Chapter 31. Disaster Feeding

§3101. Release of USDA Commodity Foods for Disaster Feeding: The Recipient Agency’s Role in a Disaster

A. Disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, and chemical spills may generate a need for congregate (mass) feeding. Any food donated by USDA to School Food Authorities (SFAs) can be used in disaster feeding. Other organizations having USDA commodities must cooperate fully and make these foods available to designated agencies involved in disaster feeding activities.

B. The American Red Cross is the primary disaster organization; but the USDA, directly and through SFAs, will provide foods to any recognized agency equipped to serve disaster victims. The Salvation Army, civic organizations, and others are able to provide food preparation for congregate service. USDA has no foods specifically designated for disaster feeding, and must depend on foods in state warehouses and at the SFAs. Commodity foods are not always available in quantity to fill all needs, but they do provide a good supplement to those provided by the designated agency.

C. Prior to providing commodity foods to disaster organizations, SFAs are required to get prior approval from the Food Distribution Division. Upon contacting the Food Distribution Division, SFAs should give the following information to the extent possible:

1. a description of the major disaster or emergency situation;
2. the number of people requiring meals and the congregate meal service period;
3. the quantity and type of food needed for the congregate meal service;
4. the number and location of sites providing the congregate meal service.
D. It is necessary for the Food Distribution Division to report the above information to the USDA Southwest Regional Office within 24 hours. Prompt reporting will help with replacement of commodities used.

E. Accurate records must be kept of all USDA commodities provided or used for disaster feeding. Signed receipts must be kept for all USDA commodities transferred to eligible disaster feeding organizations.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.
HISTORICAL NOTE: Promulgated by the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, LR 27:2205 (December 2001).

§3103. Statement of Understanding Between the American School Food Service Association and the American National Red Cross with Respect to Emergency Feeding in Disaster

A. The American School Food Service Association (ASFSA) and the American National Red Cross desire to cooperate in meeting human needs growing out of natural disasters. To effect coordination that will ensure maximum cooperation and utilization of the resources and efforts of both organizations, the associations have prepared this statement of understanding. Its purpose is to define the fields of responsibility in which the ASFSA and the American Red Cross will cooperate and to serve as a guide for membership of both organizations.

B. Experience shows that it is frequently necessary for the Red Cross to use school buildings for shelters and for mass feeding in a community emergency. The kitchen, cafeteria facilities, and experienced food service staff provide a resource of vital importance in such an emergency.

C. The Red Cross recognizes that school buildings are the property of local school districts and that permission for use of these buildings must be obtained from local school officials.

D. The ASFSA has membership engaged in the supervision and management of the nation’s school food service programs. The Red Cross recognizes that this membership has special and expert knowledge of mass feeding that is valuable in disasters. Personnel are trained and experienced in quantity food production, and have knowledge of state and local sanitary regulations.

E. The ASFSA recognizes that one of the primary responsibilities of the American Red Cross, as a quasi-governmental agency, is the relief of human suffering resulting from natural disasters. This responsibility has been placed upon the American Red Cross Act of Congress (36 U.S. Code Section 1 and following), assigning as one of its duties:

1. “to continue and carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same.”
2. This responsibility has also been recognized in Public Law 93-288, the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.
§3105. Types of Assistance

A. Subject to the approval of local school officials, the American National Red Cross prefers the following type of personnel and facilities for disaster feeding:

1. participation in Red Cross division and chapter predisaster planning for emergency feeding;

2. utilization, with Board of Education approval, of school food service facilities as central feeding stations or as central food preparation stations for fixed or mobile feeding;

3. utilization of food and supply, inventories on hand, including USDA commodities;

4. participation of regular school food service personnel for supervision of the use of school lunch facilities;

5. participation of school food service personnel in the preparation and service of food on premises other than the school cafeteria.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.


§3107. Responsibilities Assumed

A. The American Red Cross responsibilities will include the following activities:

1. assume financial responsibility for the cost of feeding persons in need as a result of disaster after appropriate clearance with an authorized Red Cross representative;

2. retain administrative control of all financial commitments made in connection with the utilization of school cafeteria facilities for Red Cross feeding;

3. provide additional food through the cooperation of USDA to augment other food supplies needed in the feeding program;

4. replace, upon request, foods provided by USDA as well as foods purchased by individual schools when such foods are utilized in authorized Red Cross disaster feeding programs;

5. provide identification for facilities being utilized with primary recognition of the School Lunch Program;

6. provide additional volunteers to assist school food service personnel throughout the disaster feeding operation as needed.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.


§3109. Disaster Relief Feeding Plan

A. The state recommends that a Disaster Relief Feeding Plan be developed and written by the CNP director along with other local Emergency Preparedness Organizations.

B. The disaster plan should be distributed to all schools and should include the following information:

1. names and emergency telephone numbers of suppliers, school officials, local government agencies, law enforcement, etc.;

2. organizational line chart indicating names and telephone numbers of emergency relief officials;

3. names and telephone numbers of contact people from the Red Cross, Salvation Army, or other agencies that will assist in managing shelters;

4. a list of buildings to be used as shelters with their addresses, telephone numbers; the order in which shelters will be opened; the names/positions/telephone numbers of managing personnel; layout of the school indicating which areas may be used to place evacuees; electrical, water and gas shut-off; and emergency telephone procedures, keys, etc.;

5. emergency shut down procedures for SFS;

6. emergency procedures to secure school food service vehicles check as well as to locate refrigerated vendor trucks for a possible storage, if needed;

7. staffing assignment for schools to be used to prepare meals- include a morning and afternoon team;

8. identification cards for school food service staff who will work at shelters so they will have access to shelters, SFS office, and any restricted areas;

9. procedures the transportation department will implement to ensure delivery of food, supplies, and personnel to the shelters;

10. training program for personnel managing the shelters;

11. procedures for safeguarding food, supplies, and equipment against theft or misuse;

12. instructions for using USDA commodities;

13. a set of small equipment and supplies needed for shelters and SFS office;

14. procedures for delivery of food to shelters (include food handling, temperature control);

15. preplanned menus using USDA commodities and convenience foods normally in stock;

16. procedures for recording food, supplies and labor used at shelters and SFS office;

17. a map of evacuation routes;

18. emergency communications system (cell phones, radios, etc.);

19. procedures for cleaning school and disposing of spoiled items, etc. after disaster is over;
20. procedures for billing agencies for food and labor costs after the disaster is over.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.


§3113. Procedures to Follow during Operation of Shelter

A. In the event of an emergency, the designated disaster organization operating in the parish must contact the SFA if assistance is needed. The designated disaster organization and the SFA should determine which school locations would be open to provide relief. The size of kitchen and cafeteria, amount of inventory on hand, size and condition of equipment, and available staff should be considered in determining locations.

B. After a school site has been selected, the following guidelines for the SFA are suggested.

1. Keep accurate records concerning the labor hours of employees, including breaks.

2. Plan meals consisting of a meat component, fruit and vegetable components, a bread component and a milk component if possible. However, if a meal that does not have all the components is served, the disaster organization shall reimburse or replace the food that was used.

3. Revise the menu to use up any perishable items.

4. Incorporate larger portions for adults.

5. Keep current day's menu and serving times posted outside the cafeteria entrance.

6. Lock storerooms, refrigerators, and freezers at all times to prevent theft.

7. Issue food and supplies one to two times per day.

8. Record all borrowed foods from other schools and complete transfer slips as time permits.

9. Keep accurate records of all counts, food and supply issues, etc. The Cost of Food Used Form could be used to document this information. The amount of food prepared and the number of individuals served per meal must be kept for reimbursement or food replacement from the disaster organization.

10. Satellitng food to a location increases the number served to 100 percent; if serving meals in the cafeteria, expect approximately 60 percent participation.

11. Request additional food items if the disaster extends over a long period of time. Contact the Louisiana Food Distribution Division at (225) 922-1255 if additional USDA commodity items are needed. Contact neighboring parishes or vendors that already have bid awards for purchased items.

12. Prepare coffee for 15 to 20 hours per day.

13. Bag and freeze ice in pint bags for people who require refrigerated medication.

14. Keep sinks full of clean water between use in case the water service is disrupted. Fill the washing machine and sanitized trash cans with water.

15. Place a microwave in the cafeteria for the convenience of those housed there.
16. Use paper towels or disposable wipes, not dish towels.

17. Use disposable utensils to prevent permanent silverware theft.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.


§3115. Procedures to Follow after the Shelter Closes

A. Complete and submit the commodity forms to Food Distribution Division within 24 hours after site closure.

B. Complete the required reimbursement forms. Each organization has different forms; the forms may have changed from the previous year.

C. Calculate reimbursement monies for food, supplies, and labor used during the disaster.

D. Follow-up on all reimbursements.

E. When school resumes following a disaster, the LDOE may temporarily allow schools to serve, for reimbursement, lunches that do not meet the meal component/meal option requirements. Prior approval from the LDOE is required. Contact the Division of Nutrition Assistance, School Food Service Programs, Baton Rouge office at (225) 342-3720.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.


§3117. Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness

A. The Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness is a state disaster organization that can be reached at 1-800-256-7036 or (225) 342-5470.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.


§3119. Food Salvage at School Sites

A. Contact the local public health department for any questionable items.

B. In case of floods, destroy all foods that may have come into direct contact with floodwaters. Unless exposed to floodwaters (through seepage into freezer), solid frozen foods are usually safe. Intact (not dented or bulging) canned foods can be salvaged by removing labels and scrubbing the surfaces with hot soapy water. Rinse cans with clean water and soak in chlorine solution for 90 seconds. Mark the can with its content name and expiration date.

C. In case of fire, all canned, refrigerated and frozen foods should be discarded depending on the severity of the fire, the effect of smoke, and toxic chemicals used to fight the fire. Smoke, toxic fumes, and intense heat can penetrate almost any packaging and can create off-odors in stored foods. Any foods directly exposed to these toxic chemicals should be disposed of and the cookware decontaminated.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.


§3121. Power Outages

A. Refer to Chapter 19 Sanitation.

AUTHORITY NOTE: Promulgated in accordance with R.S. 17:191-199.


Chapter 33. Financial Management and Accounting for Child and Adult Care Food Program Family Day Care Homes (FDCH)

§3301. Purpose

A. Child Care Registration for Participants in the Child and Adult Care Food Program. In compliance with R.S. 46:1441.4.B, the following rules and regulations are hereby established to carry out the provisions of this Chapter for those family child day care homes and group child day care homes which participate in the federal Child and Adult Care Food Program.

1. Definitions. As established by R.S. 1441.1 and as used in these rules and regulations, the following definitions shall apply unless the context clearly states otherwise.

   Child—a person who has not reached the age of 13 years. The words child and children are used interchangeably in this Chapter.

   Child and Adult Care Food Program—the federal nutrition reimbursement program as funded by the federal Department of Agriculture through the Department of Education.

   Department—the Department of Health and Hospitals or the Department of Social Services or the Department of Education in accordance with 7 CFR Part 226, as indicated by the context.

   Family Child Day Care Home—any place, facility, or home operated by any institution, society, agency, corporation, person or persons, or any other group for the primary purpose of providing care, supervision, and/or guidance of six or fewer children.

   Group Child Day Care Home—any place, facility, or home operated by any institution, society, agency, corporation, person or persons, or any other group for the primary purpose of providing care, supervision, and/or guidance of seven but not more than 12 children.

   Sponsoring Agency—any private, public, for profit or nonprofit corporation, society, agency, or any other group approved by or contracted with the Department of Education to coordinate family child day care homes and group child day care homes participating in the federal Child and Adult Care Food Program.
APPENDIX B
FOUR PHASES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Figure 1: Four phases of disaster management (Adapted from Rodrigues AS, et al. and Ambrose S, et al.)
APPENDIX C
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
SUBMITTED FORM

Abstract:
The purpose of the proposed study is to describe the response and evaluate the resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program in the wake of and in the months shortly following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I will be recording interviews conducted with state administrators from the two aforementioned agencies.

Instruments:
The interview questionnaire for the Food Stamp Program and the National School Lunch Program are attached. The questions in both interviews were designed by the principle investigator and approved by Dr. Carol O’Neil and Dr. Annrose Guarino in the LSU School of Human Ecology.

Study Specifics:
The use of human subjects is necessary for two reasons. A human perspective of the response and resiliency of the Food Stamp Program and the National School Lunch Program is crucial to the design of the study and therefore requires human participation. Secondly, the interview will ask questions that have not yet been publicly documented.

Specific Sites of Data Collection:
1. Department of Education (National School Lunch Program)
2. Office of Family Support- local offices (Food Stamp Program)
3. Southern University (Food Stamp Program)

No invasive procedures will be used.

Physical, Psychological, and Social Risks: There are no known physical, psychological, and social risks to the proposed study.

Recruitment Pool: Experts informants were selected by job title and through recommendations from Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program administrators.

Vulnerable Population: No known vulnerable population will be included in the study.

Informed Consent: The interview will begin with an oral explanation of the study purpose and design. The informants may choose to discontinue the interview at anytime.

This study is not confidential and informants will be directly sited in the thesis project.
Thank you for taking time today to help me gather information about how Hurricanes Katrina and Rita impacted the National School Lunch Program in Louisiana in the wake of the disasters and in the months shortly following.

I am going to ask you several questions. These questions will be the same for all of the interviews conducted with personnel working with the National School Lunch Program.

I would like to use a tape recorder to document our conversation. Are you comfortable with this? I also take notes as we talk. Usually I am writing a question or topic that I would like to learn more about.

The discussion today will consist of several open ended questions. At the end, I will ask you if you have any further comments that you think are important to consider that I did not ask.

Are you ready to get started?
1. With regard to the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), what emergency/disaster preparations did the Louisiana Department of Education (LADOE) have in place prior to the arrival of Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005?

2. Following both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the LADOE made an effort to ensure that students were fed. What enabled the success of the program after Hurricane Katrina?

3. What barriers did the Louisiana Department of Education face while trying to implement the NSLP disaster plan after Hurricane Katrina?

4. Did these post-Hurricane Katrina barriers lead to changes in policy prior to Hurricane Rita?

5. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?

6. Did the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005 compound or reinforce any changes to Louisiana’s NSLP?

7. What enabled the success of Louisiana’s NSLP after Hurricane Rita?

8. What barriers did the LADOE face while trying to implement the NSLP disaster plan after Hurricane Rita?

9. Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in policy?

10. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?

11. What parts of the NSLP disaster/emergency policy, if any, were designed for decisions to be made by the parish? District? School? How was this dependant on the nature or degree of the disaster or emergency?

12. With regard to the Louisiana National School Lunch Program, did Hurricane Katrina require the Louisiana Department of Education to re-budget federal and state NSLP funds among parishes?
13. Did the revised budget change with the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005? If so, how?

14. If yes, how did re-budgeting affect Louisiana’s ability to offer free and reduced lunch in the 2005-2006 school year?

15. Will the changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future national, state, or local disaster policy? If so, how?

16. Will these changes in the NSLP policy and budget affect Louisiana’s ability to feed school-aged children in the future?

17. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by parish/city public school districts?

18. Were Louisiana NSLP employees relocated to other parishes after Hurricane Katrina to help relieve schools that were short-staffed?

19. Was personnel shifted between parishes after Hurricane Rita?

20. How did school foodservice and administration handle instances where employees could not be located? For example:
   a. Did new foodservice personnel have to be temporarily assigned or hired?
   b. Were out-of-state volunteers recruited to assist? In-state volunteers?

21. In parishes where schools were operating after the hurricanes, I can imagine that infrastructure damage or a change in student attendance prevented schools from executing their normal foodservice operation. Some schools were completely destroyed. Some kitchens were flooded and others were not large enough to prepare meals for the newly enlarged student population. In other cases, roads to and from affected areas were damaged. What are some examples of how some schools’ foodservice handled these challenges?

22. What effects did the hurricanes have on Louisiana’s NSLP food access and inventory?

23. Were there costs associated with NSLP personnel and infrastructure changes, shifts in student enrollment, or the actual physical loss of food?
24. It is my understanding based on the August 2005 Louisiana Food and Nutrition Program Policies of Operation Part XLIX. Bulletin 1196, the American Red Cross and the USDA collaborate during natural disasters. How was the Red Cross able to assist Louisiana with the delivery of school food service after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

25. Which and to what capacity were other civic organizations able to assist the NSLP in Louisiana after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

26. If so, did this contribute to the Louisiana Department of Education’s ability to meet the needs of the National School Lunch Program?

27. On August 31, 2005, the USDA e-mailed a memorandum to Special Nutrition Programs in all regional and state Agencies and Child Nutrition Programs in all states titled *Emergency Feeding of School Children in Areas Devastated by Hurricane Katrina*. What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated students and families know that they were automatically eligible for free lunches? How was the state effort different from the local and national efforts?

28. Do you have any suggestions for future NSLP disaster policy in Louisiana or in the United States?

29. Are there any other additional comments that you would like to add that you feel are important to include with regard to the National School Lunch Program in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

30. Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview?
APPENDIX E
NSLP CONSENT FORM
The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Emily Whelan  
Work: (225) 578-8816  
Cell: (713) 502-1142

1. Study Title: The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program (FSP) and National School Lunch Program (NSLP) following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

2. Participants: Regional, state, and local FSP and NSLP administrators

3. Performance Site: Offices of FSP and NSLP administrators

4. Investigators: The following investigators are available for questions about this study, M-F, 8:00 AM-4:30 PM
   
Emily Whelan (225) 578-8816

Dr. Carol O’Neil (225) 578-1631

Dr. Annrose Guarino (225) 578-1425

5. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to explore Louisiana’s FSP and NSLP response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and assess pre-disaster plan and post-disaster implementation in order to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response.

6. Number of subjects: 30

7. Study Procedures: Qualitative questions will be asked during an interview between the principal investigator and the administrator. The interview will be taped and transcribed verbatim. Impressions provided by the expert informant will be used to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response.

8. Risks: There are no known physical or psychological risks associated with this study. None of the questions are of a personal or clinical nature.
9. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time. Participants may also choose not to answer specific questions from the interview.

10. Privacy: Results of the study may be published. Identifying information will be included in the publication and are not confidential. Results will be released to the participants of the study and may be used in a presentation.

The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Michael Keenan, LSU AgCenter Institutional Review Board, (225) 578-1708. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent form.
11. Study Title: The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program (FSP) and National School Lunch Program (NSLP) following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

12. Participants: Regional, state, and local FSP and NSLP administrators

13. Performance Site: Offices of FSP and NSLP administrators

14. Investigators: The following investigators are available for questions about this study, M-F, 8:00 AM - 4:30 PM

   Emily Whelan (225) 578-8816
   Dr. Carol O’Neil (225) 578-1631
   Dr. Annrose Guarino (225) 578-1425

15. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to explore Louisiana’s FSP and NSLP response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and assess pre-disaster plan and post-disaster implementation in order to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response.

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______________________________________________________________
Signature of Subject                                          Date

______________________________________________________________
Signature of Interviewer                                     Date
Thank you for taking time today to help me gather information about how Hurricanes Katrina and Rita impacted the Food Stamp Program in Louisiana in the wake of the disasters and in the months shortly following.

I am going to ask you several questions. These questions will be the same for all of the interviews conducted with personnel working with Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program.

I would like to use a tape recorder to document our conversation. Are you comfortable with this? I also take notes as we talk. Usually I am writing a question or topic that I would like to learn more about.

The discussion today will consist of several open ended questions. At the end, I will ask you if you have any further comments that you think are important to consider that I did not ask.

Are you ready to get started?
1. With regard to the Food Stamp Program, what emergency/disaster preparations did the Louisiana Department of Social Services (DSS) have in place prior to Hurricanes Katrina on August 29, 2005?

2. Following both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Louisiana DSS made an effort to ensure that residents of disaster areas had access to the Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP). What enabled the success of the program after Hurricane Katrina?

3. What barriers did the Louisiana DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after Hurricane Katrina?

4. Did these post-Hurricane Katrina barriers lead to changes in policy prior to Hurricane Rita?

5. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?

6. Did the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005, compound or reinforce any changes to Louisiana’s DFSP?

7. What enabled the success of Louisiana’s DFSP after Hurricane Rita?

8. What barriers did the Louisiana DSS face while trying to implement the DFSP plan after Hurricane Rita?

9. Did these post-Hurricane Rita barriers lead to changes in disaster policy?

10. If so, were these changes temporary or permanent?

11. Did Louisiana adapt the national Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP) application or use a state-specific application? If Louisiana used a state-specific application, how was the DFSP application adapted for Louisiana? Hurricane Katrina? Hurricane Rita?

12. Were adaptations to the DFSP application dependent on the nature or degree of the disaster?
13. Will any of these changes permanently affect the eligibility or disaster policy?

14. With regard to the DFSP, did Hurricane Katrina require the LA DSS re-budget federal and state funds among parishes?

15. If so, how did the revised budget change with the arrival of Hurricane Rita on September 24, 2005?

16. How did the re-budgeting affect Louisiana’s ability to offer non-Disaster Food Stamps in the 2006 fiscal year and in the near future while rebuilding of Louisiana’s Gulf Coast?

17. How will changes in the policy and budget after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affect future national, state, or regional disaster policy?

18. How will the changes in the policy and budget effect Louisiana’s ability to provide nutrition assistance during the next emergency?

19. Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, how was participation and eligibility reported by cities? Parishes? State?

20. What steps did the state administrators take to let evacuated families know that they were automatically eligible for the DFSP? How was the state effort different from the local and national efforts?

21. Were Louisiana DSS employees relocated or reassigned to other parishes after Hurricane Katrina to help relieve increased administration burden?

22. Were temporary application/issuance sites coordinated in any parishes in Louisiana in order to increase access to the DFSP?

23. If so, where in Louisiana were the temporary application/issuance sites set up?

24. How did Louisiana’s DSS handle instances where OFS Family Assistance employees could not be located? For example:
   a. Did new personnel have to be temporarily assigned or hired?
   b. Were out-of-state or in-state volunteers recruited to assist?
25. How were food stamps issued to Louisiana residents affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita when Social Security cards, verification of identity, proof of residence, and income information were not available?

26. In parishes where OFS offices were operating, I can imagine that infrastructure damage may have prevented agents from normally executing operations. Some offices were completely destroyed. Others were flooded or not large enough to accommodate increased traffic. In other cases, roads to and from affected areas were damaged. What are some examples of how DSS handled these challenges?

27. Facing the same infrastructure damage, how were EBT cards acquired and physically distributed?

28. What fraud prevention efforts did the Louisiana DSS administer after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

29. How did the federal staff of the Disaster Response Assistance Team (DART) assist Louisiana’s DFSP?

30. Do you have any suggestions for future DFSP policy in Louisiana or the United States?

31. Are there any additional comments that you would like to add that you feel are important to include with regard to the DFSP in Louisiana following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita?

32. Do you have any recommendations for others with whom I should interview?
APPENDIX G
FSP CONSENT FORM
The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program and National School Lunch Program following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Emily Whelan
Work: (225) 578-8816
Cell: (713) 502-1142

School of Human Ecology
LSU AgCenter
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
Email: ewhela1@lsu.edu

21. Study Title: The Resiliency of Louisiana’s Food Stamp Program (FSP) and National School Lunch Program (NSLP) following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

22. Participants: Regional, state, and local FSP and NSLP administrators

23. Performance Site: Offices of FSP and NSLP administrators

24. Investigators: The following investigators are available for questions about this study, M-F, 8:00 AM- 4:30 PM

Emily Whelan (225) 578-8816

Dr. Carol O’Neil (225) 578-1631

Dr. Annrose Guarino (225) 578- 1425

25. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to explore Louisiana’s FSP and NSLP response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and assess pre-disaster plan and post-disaster implementation in order to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response.

26. Number of subjects: 30

27. Study Procedures: Qualitative questions will be asked during an interview between the principal investigator and the administrator. The interview will be taped and transcribed verbatim. Impressions provided by the expert informant will be used to provide insight to the strengths and weakness of the disaster response.

28. Risks: There are no known physical or psychological risks associated with this study. None of the questions are of a personal or clinical nature.
29. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time. Participants may also choose not to answer specific questions from the interview.

30. Privacy: Results of the study may be published. Identifying information will be included in the publication and are not confidential. Results will be released to the participants of the study and may be used in a presentation.

The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Michael Keenan, LSU AgCenter Institutional Review Board, (225) 578-1708. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent form.

______________________________    ______________________________
Signature of Subject             Date

______________________________    ______________________________
Signature of Interviewer         Date
Summary of Instructional Waivers and Policy Changes for the NSLP as Released by the USDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release Date</th>
<th>Waiver Title</th>
<th>Policy Changes</th>
<th>Dates Effective</th>
<th>Hurricane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| August 31, 2005 | **Emergency Feeding of School Children in Areas Devastated by Hurricane Katrina** | 1. Schools unable to maintain normal accountability systems, but that are able to operate will be allowed to serve all meals free.  
2. Meal pattern flexibility is allowable. Schools may be exempt from milk and other component requirements.  
3. Households certified for emergency food stamps are automatically eligible for free school meals.  
4. When a large number of homeless children are attending the school, due to loss or damage of property, schools may keep a list to document free meal eligibility in lieu of individual applications.  
5. Displaced families may be considered homeless. However if they are staying with a host family, will have to submit a revised application to be eligible. | September 30, 2005 | Katrina   |
| September 7, 2005 | **School Meals Programs: Verification Procedures and Hurricane Katrina** | 1. Local educational agencies that are in jurisdictions which are federally declared disaster areas are not required to do any verification.  
2. Local educational agencies that have experienced an influx of students from areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, State agencies have the authority to extend the deadline and completion of claims to later in the school year or to waive it if warranted.  
3. Families who have been displaced due to Hurricane Katrina are not subject to verification because they are considered homeless. | August and September claims may be submitted by December 31, 2005, without a request for waiver of the 60-day deadline due Verification was not required for the remainder of the 2005-2006 school year | Katrina   |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Release Date</th>
<th>Expiration Date</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 15, 2005</td>
<td>Extension of 30 Day Limit for Initial Carry-over of Previous Year’s Eligibility due to Hurricane Katrina</td>
<td>Extension of waiver released on August 31, 2005</td>
<td>Additional 30 days (60 days total: October 30, 2005)</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| September 22, 2005 | School Meals Programs: Extension of Waivers Due to Emergency Conditions Caused by Hurricane Katrina | 1. Extension of waiver released on August 31, 2005  
2. Extension of waiver released on September 7, 2005 | November 30, 2005  
October Claims: Jan. 31, 2006  
November Claims: Feb 31, 2006 | Katrina |
| September 26, 2005 | School Meal Programs: Hurricane Rita: Extending Waivers from Hurricane Katrina | Extension of waivers issued as a result of Hurricane Katrina to areas affected by Hurricane Rita. | November 30, 2005  
October Claims: Jan. 31, 2006  
November Claims: Feb 31, 2006 | Rita |
| October 28, 2005 | Revised – Replacement of This memorandum supersedes the October 19, 2005 release of the FNS Commodity Program | Submission of commodities used for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita |
## Commodities due to Natural Disasters

Disaster Manual: States affected by hurricanes are to follow the procedures outlined below to replace commodities lost or made unfit for consumption as a result of the disasters.

1. **Commodities Used for Congregate Feeding and Household Distribution**: FNS will replace commodities from inventory that were used for approved disaster congregate feeding or FNS-approved household distribution. FNS cannot replace non-USDA commodities used for these purposes, nor to reimburse organizations for the other costs, including labor costs.

2. **Lost or Damaged Commodities**: FNS does not have the authority to replace USDA or non-USDA commodities that are lost, destroyed, contaminated or otherwise rendered unusable in a disaster due to flooding, fire, wind, power outage, or other cause.

### School Meals Programs: Second Extension of Waivers Due to Emergency Conditions Caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>November 29, 2005</th>
<th>Extension of waivers following a presidentially-declared disaster and schools that are phasing-in operations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Schools may serve all meals free to attending children if unable to maintain normal accountability systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Schools have meal pattern flexibility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Normal accountability systems defined: pre-hurricane system that were not operable

Homeless defined: any child who was designated homeless by the liaison is eligible for free meals for the school year and are not subject to the 45-day re-evaluation. Children certified by school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States may extend the above provisions until February 28, 2006, as needed, on a school by school basis.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools in either the disaster areas or that were closed due to use as shelters may extend the eligibility from the previous school year an additional 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hurricanes Katrina and Rita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX I

**NSLP SUMMARY OF SFA LOSSES BY PARISH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Loss in Dollars</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Charles SFA</td>
<td>$110,000</td>
<td>Food and labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Baton Rouge Parish SFA</td>
<td>$20,000, $5,000, $3,000, $50,000, $100,000</td>
<td>Food, Overtime for appliance repairs, Appliance Parts, Labor per day while schools were closed, Revenue per day while schools were closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangipahoa SFA</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td>Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James SFA</td>
<td>$2,000, $1,700</td>
<td>Food (Katrina), Food (Rita)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans diocese SFA</td>
<td>$5 Million, $270,000, $93,000</td>
<td>Large equipment, Purchased food, Commodity Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron SFA</td>
<td>$28,000 (example), $42,000</td>
<td>March reimbursement income, Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette diocese SFA</td>
<td>Several thousand dollars</td>
<td>Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Distribution Division</td>
<td>$16,000-$20,000</td>
<td>Commodities foods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX J
FSP WAIVER SUMMARY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Release Date</th>
<th>Waiver Title</th>
<th>Policy Changes</th>
<th>Population Included</th>
<th>Dates Effective</th>
<th>Hurricane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2, 2005</td>
<td>LA DSS Offers Emergency Food Stamp Assistance</td>
<td>1. Description of disaster assistance</td>
<td>Those living or evacuated from the affected area</td>
<td>One week</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| September 7, 2005 | National Evacuee Policy                    | 1. Food stamp benefits are available and certifiable under the state where evacuee is currently living  
2. State agencies are to certify evacuees from areas affected by the disaster under expedited service rules.  
3. The applicant and | Evacuated families.                                                              | Apply thru October 31, 2005 and benefits for 3 months including month of application. Beginning January 2006 | Katrina   |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>his/her family may be certified as a household separate from whom they are living and purchasing and preparing food</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Temporary exemption from the work rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>issuances, participating households must satisfy non-disaster verification requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX K
NSLP ENROLLMENT CHANGES

Yearly: October 2002-October 2005  

**Cameron Parish Student Enrollment Patterns from October 2002-May 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Pre-storms)</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
<th>Free Lunch</th>
<th>Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Displaced Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October, 2002</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>516 (27.58%)</td>
<td>224 (11.97%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2003</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>548 (29.61%)</td>
<td>250 (13.51%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2004</td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>573 (31.09%)</td>
<td>276 (14.98%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>1,437 (99.31%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td>1,455 (99.05%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>1,495 (99.73%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>1,495 (99.80%)</td>
<td>2 (.13%)</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>1,508 (99.80%)</td>
<td>2 (.13%)</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>1,492 (99.60%)</td>
<td>2 (.13%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Cameron Parish Student Enrollment](image.png)
### East Baton Rouge Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Student Enrollment</th>
<th>Free Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Free Lunch</th>
<th>Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Displaced Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October, 2002</td>
<td>52,530</td>
<td>31,624</td>
<td>60.20%</td>
<td>4,194</td>
<td>7.98%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2003</td>
<td>46,910</td>
<td>30,332</td>
<td>64.66%</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>7.13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2004</td>
<td>46,928</td>
<td>30,031</td>
<td>63.99%</td>
<td>3,273</td>
<td>6.97%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2005</td>
<td>51,864</td>
<td>37,734</td>
<td>72.76%</td>
<td>3,173</td>
<td>6.12%</td>
<td>5,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 2005</td>
<td>50,681</td>
<td>36,308</td>
<td>71.64%</td>
<td>3,124</td>
<td>6.16%</td>
<td>4,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 2006</td>
<td>50,320</td>
<td>35,665</td>
<td>70.88%</td>
<td>3,098</td>
<td>6.16%</td>
<td>4,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 2006</td>
<td>50,022</td>
<td>35,066</td>
<td>70.10%</td>
<td>3,082</td>
<td>6.16%</td>
<td>4,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 2006</td>
<td>49,142</td>
<td>33,942</td>
<td>69.07%</td>
<td>3,044</td>
<td>6.19%</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 2006</td>
<td>48,580</td>
<td>33,254</td>
<td>68.45%</td>
<td>3,021</td>
<td>6.22%</td>
<td>3,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 2006</td>
<td>48,339</td>
<td>34,989</td>
<td>72.38%</td>
<td>2,898</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>3,769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EBR Parish Student Enrollment Patterns

- **Total Students**
- **Free Lunch**
- **Reduced Lunch**
- **Displaced Students**
St. Martin Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month, Year</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
<th>Free Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Free Lunch</th>
<th>Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Displaced Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October, 2002</td>
<td>8,715</td>
<td>5,169</td>
<td>59.31%</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>9.81%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2003</td>
<td>8,774</td>
<td>5,312</td>
<td>60.54%</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>9.85%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2004</td>
<td>8,632</td>
<td>5,226</td>
<td>60.54%</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>9.08%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2005</td>
<td>9,010</td>
<td>5,704</td>
<td>63.31%</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>8.27%</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 2005</td>
<td>8,808</td>
<td>5,505</td>
<td>62.50%</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>8.50%</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 2006</td>
<td>8,803</td>
<td>5,478</td>
<td>62.23%</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>8.49%</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 2006</td>
<td>8,730</td>
<td>5,502</td>
<td>63.02%</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>8.36%</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 2006</td>
<td>8,675</td>
<td>5,456</td>
<td>62.89%</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>8.39%</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 2006</td>
<td>8,623</td>
<td>5,429</td>
<td>62.96%</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>8.36%</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 2006</td>
<td>8,578</td>
<td>5,388</td>
<td>62.81%</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>8.36%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
St. James Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month, Year</th>
<th>Total Student Enrollment</th>
<th>Free Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Free Lunch</th>
<th>Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Displaced Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October, 2002</td>
<td>4,155</td>
<td>2,586</td>
<td>62.24%</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>6.84%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2003</td>
<td>4,156</td>
<td>2,707</td>
<td>65.13%</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>6.79%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2004</td>
<td>4,113</td>
<td>2,706</td>
<td>65.79%</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>6.76%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2005</td>
<td>4,293</td>
<td>2,609</td>
<td>60.77%</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>6.29%</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 2005</td>
<td>4,231</td>
<td>2,655</td>
<td>62.75%</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>6.45%</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 2006</td>
<td>4,197</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td>63.16%</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>6.46%</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 2006</td>
<td>4,180</td>
<td>2,653</td>
<td>63.47%</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>6.48%</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 2006</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>63.51%</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>6.52%</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 2006</td>
<td>4,153</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>63.57%</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>6.45%</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 2006</td>
<td>4,159</td>
<td>2,642</td>
<td>63.52%</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>6.44%</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tangipahoa Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month, Year</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
<th>Free Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Free Lunch</th>
<th>Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Displaced Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October, 2002</td>
<td>18,022</td>
<td>10,727</td>
<td>59.52%</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>8.24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2003</td>
<td>18,571</td>
<td>10,982</td>
<td>59.14%</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2004</td>
<td>18,654</td>
<td>11,316</td>
<td>60.66%</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>8.22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2005</td>
<td>19,580</td>
<td>11,648</td>
<td>59.49%</td>
<td>1,429</td>
<td>7.30%</td>
<td>1,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 2005</td>
<td>19,409</td>
<td>12,004</td>
<td>61.85%</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>7.43%</td>
<td>1,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 2006</td>
<td>19,282</td>
<td>12,134</td>
<td>62.93%</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>7.49%</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 2006</td>
<td>19,150</td>
<td>11,955</td>
<td>62.43%</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>7.51%</td>
<td>989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 2006</td>
<td>19,120</td>
<td>11,890</td>
<td>62.19%</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>7.53%</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 2006</td>
<td>19,116</td>
<td>12,221</td>
<td>63.93%</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>7.31%</td>
<td>991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 2006</td>
<td>19,014</td>
<td>12,178</td>
<td>64.05%</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>7.28%</td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Tangipahoa Parish Student Enrollment Chart](chart.png)
St. Charles Parish student enrollment patterns pre- and post- Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Student Enrollment</th>
<th>Free Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Free Lunch</th>
<th>Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Percent Reduced Lunch</th>
<th>Displaced Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October, 2002</td>
<td>9,757</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>38.54%</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2003</td>
<td>9,757</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>38.54%</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2004</td>
<td>9,797</td>
<td>3,806</td>
<td>38.85%</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>8.82%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 2005</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>4,283</td>
<td>42.83%</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>8.26%</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 2005</td>
<td>9,977</td>
<td>4,206</td>
<td>42.16%</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>8.21%</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 2006</td>
<td>9,945</td>
<td>4,152</td>
<td>41.75%</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>8.15%</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 2006</td>
<td>9,885</td>
<td>4,075</td>
<td>41.22%</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>8.16%</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 2006</td>
<td>9,846</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>8.18%</td>
<td>4,020</td>
<td>40.83%</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 2006</td>
<td>9,775</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>7.26%</td>
<td>4,161</td>
<td>42.57%</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 2006</td>
<td>9,761</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>7.20%</td>
<td>4,144</td>
<td>42.45%</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX L
### FSP ENROLLMENT CHANGES

Total FSP cases by household, total recipients, average benefit, and percentage of case closed due to recipient moving out of state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total FSP Households in Louisiana</th>
<th>Total FSP Recipients in Louisiana</th>
<th>Average Received Benefit</th>
<th>Percentage of Cases Closed **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>232,422</td>
<td>612,442</td>
<td>$233.84</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>247,310</td>
<td>646,446</td>
<td>$237.28</td>
<td>2.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td>258,093</td>
<td>669,067</td>
<td>$239.89</td>
<td>1.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>268,877</td>
<td>664,544</td>
<td>$243.47</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>276,308</td>
<td>706,561</td>
<td>$251.47</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2005</td>
<td>278,311</td>
<td>728,311</td>
<td>$247.50</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>288,412</td>
<td>731,524</td>
<td>$290.49</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>292,476</td>
<td>740,319</td>
<td>$316.51</td>
<td>18.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>281,150</td>
<td>707,252</td>
<td>$294.63</td>
<td>25.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>261,709</td>
<td>654,568</td>
<td>$270.83</td>
<td>21.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>258,251</td>
<td>642,222</td>
<td>$249.90</td>
<td>31.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>256,373</td>
<td>635,855</td>
<td>$249.34</td>
<td>7.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>254,835</td>
<td>632,240</td>
<td>$248.47</td>
<td>3.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>251,710</td>
<td>624,623</td>
<td>$247.99</td>
<td>3.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>241,724</td>
<td>597,370</td>
<td>$245.44</td>
<td>2.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>237,754</td>
<td>588,486</td>
<td>$253.51</td>
<td>2.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** This number represents the number of cases closed because the recipient moved out of the state of Louisiana.
### Total Monthly FSP Cases by Thibodaux Region and Parishes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Region</th>
<th>Ascension</th>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>Lafourche</th>
<th>St. Charles</th>
<th>St. James</th>
<th>St. John</th>
<th>Terrebonne</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2003*</td>
<td>17,555</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>3,701</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>2,174</td>
<td>4,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004*</td>
<td>18,590</td>
<td>2,570</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>3,945</td>
<td>1,649</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>5,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2004*</td>
<td>20,348</td>
<td>2,819</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>4,249</td>
<td>1,821</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>2,625</td>
<td>5,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2005*</td>
<td>21,085</td>
<td>2,972</td>
<td>1,634</td>
<td>4,530</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>2,634</td>
<td>6,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>22,011</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>4,720</td>
<td>1,970</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>2,786</td>
<td>6,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>22,557</td>
<td>3,294</td>
<td>1,804</td>
<td>4,736</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td>2,978</td>
<td>6,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>21,648</td>
<td>3,274</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>4,550</td>
<td>1,834</td>
<td>1,433</td>
<td>2,820</td>
<td>5,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>21,921</td>
<td>3,359</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>4,604</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>5,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>21,951</td>
<td>3,309</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>4,648</td>
<td>1,917</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>5,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>21,963</td>
<td>3,326</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>4,699</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>5,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>21,940</td>
<td>3,328</td>
<td>1,769</td>
<td>4,729</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>2,852</td>
<td>5,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>21,612</td>
<td>3,270</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>4,634</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>2,821</td>
<td>5,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>20,646</td>
<td>3,147</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>2,739</td>
<td>5,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>20,449</td>
<td>3,142</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>4,418</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>1,361</td>
<td>2,674</td>
<td>5,437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Region was redistricted for FY 2005. September 2003-January 2005 totals for the Thibodaux Region do not include St. Mary’s Parish, which prior to FY 2005 was included in the Thibodaux Region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Monthly FSP Cases by Lake Charles Region and Parishes*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The regions and parishes were restricted for FY 2005-2006. Those parishes that were not included in the region after FY 2005, were not included in the table.
## Total Monthly FSP Cases by Orleans Region and Parishes/Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Region</th>
<th>Jefferson Westbank</th>
<th>Orleans Midtown District</th>
<th>Plaquemines Parish</th>
<th>St. Bernard Parish</th>
<th>Jefferson Eastbank</th>
<th>Orleans Algiers District</th>
<th>Orleans Uptown District</th>
<th>Orleans Gentilly District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2003 †</td>
<td>61,839</td>
<td>9,434</td>
<td>11,210</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>5,492</td>
<td>4,591</td>
<td>11,974</td>
<td>8,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004 †</td>
<td>64,747</td>
<td>10,142</td>
<td>11,759</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td>5,814</td>
<td>12,148</td>
<td>7,365</td>
<td>8,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2004 †</td>
<td>65,838</td>
<td>10,320</td>
<td>12,058</td>
<td>1,251</td>
<td>2,719</td>
<td>6,109</td>
<td>4,724</td>
<td>11,961</td>
<td>9,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2005 †</td>
<td>68,749</td>
<td>11,197</td>
<td>12,761</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>2,909</td>
<td>6,290</td>
<td>4,990</td>
<td>12,485</td>
<td>10,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>68,880</td>
<td>11,902</td>
<td>13,977</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>6,339</td>
<td>5,145</td>
<td>13,649</td>
<td>13,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>67,694</td>
<td>11,771</td>
<td>13,729</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>2,951</td>
<td>6,249</td>
<td>5,071</td>
<td>13,374</td>
<td>13,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>61,440</td>
<td>11,396</td>
<td>12,478</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>2,694</td>
<td>5,956</td>
<td>3,739</td>
<td>12,186</td>
<td>11,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>38,364</td>
<td>8,218</td>
<td>6,563</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>4,718</td>
<td>3,295</td>
<td>6,377</td>
<td>6,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>35,726</td>
<td>8,765</td>
<td>6,963</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>4,829</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>4,923</td>
<td>4,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>34,496</td>
<td>8,894</td>
<td>7,473</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>5,033</td>
<td>3,302</td>
<td>3,940</td>
<td>3,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>34,084</td>
<td>9,373</td>
<td>13,617</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>5,162</td>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>32,892</td>
<td>9,304</td>
<td>12,614</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>5,081</td>
<td>3,492</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>30,168</td>
<td>8,915</td>
<td>11,137</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>4,773</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>27,789</td>
<td>8,440</td>
<td>9,658</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>4,496</td>
<td>3,408</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* After Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Region was redistricted and the Orleans Uptown and Gentilly Districts were redesigned to be included in other districts.
† Includes Total reflects the city of New Orleans including the Orleans Downtown District office which was eliminated in FY 2005.
VITA

Emily Sashel Whelan was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on January 13, 1977, to parents Thomas and Bobbie Whelan. Emily graduated from Episcopal High School in Houston, Texas in May of 1995. She attended Texas Christian University. Emily received her Bachelor’s degree in nutrition and dietetics with an emphasis in Spanish from Texas Christian University in May of 2000. She worked as the Director of Client Services in New York, New York before return to Louisiana to begin her Masters program. During her tenure as a graduate student, Emily completed a Family Nutrition Program Graduate Assistantship under the supervision of Dr. Annrose Guarino. Emily plans to graduate from her Master’s program in December of 2006. Currently, Emily is a personal cook for a Baton Rouge family all of whom have special dietary requirements. Emily hopes to complete a culinary certificate program prior to starting a dietetic internship August 2007. Once she completes an internship program, she will sit for the Registered Dietitian exam so that she can be a Registered Dietitian.