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Heidegger and ethics: from Dasein as being-in-the-world to Dasein as ethical

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HEIDEGGER AND ETHICS:
FROM DASEIN AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD TO DASEIN AS ETHICAL

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

in

The Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

by
Eric Panicco
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To Hannah, Robert, Julie, and Elliot, for providing me with the inspiration and encouragement to undertake this project. You all have given me much to write about in these pages. Your love and devotion have informed me in countless ways, for which I am extremely grateful. I hope that this dedication is only the smallest of ways in which I can express my gratitude for your love in my life.

“Men are scoundrels; they can get used to anything!”

- Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov

Fyodor Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*

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ABSTRACT

The thought of Martin Heidegger is considered to make a drastic change from modern philosophical thought which begins with Descartes. The reason for the strong distinction that Heidegger makes between those philosophers and his own thought is a result of the way in which his understanding of the kind of being we have (Dasein) is different from conceptions of the human subject. Because traditional approaches to ethics incorporate this understanding of the human subject, an investigation of ethics from Heidegger's presentation of Dasein is poised to lend new insights into what it means to be ethical. The point of this thesis, though, is not to find those ways in which Heidegger's presentation of Dasein can add to our understanding of ethics. Instead, it is first to suggest that an understanding of Dasein can make sense of ethical language.

In order to make the case that Dasein is ethical, it will first be required that we present those elements of Dasein's being which are central to its distinction from the traditional human subject. The next task will be to examine this depiction of Dasein in relation to traditional ways ethics has been carried out. If we are able to find a connection between some key elements of Dasein's being and what we traditionally think to be ethical, then we will have a strong base off of which to build a case for thinking that Dasein can be understood as an ethical kind of being. We will argue that there are such elements which give us strong reason to consider Dasein as ethical. Finally, it will be our task to show how these key elements interact with one another and are constitutive of Dasein's being. We will argue that this can be done and that Dasein can be made the focus of a further ethical investigation.

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to show that we can understand Dasein as ethical. In order to do this we first need a reason to think Dasein might be ethical. Heidegger certainly never gives anything resembling a positive account of ethics. It is extremely rare for him to even bring up ethics. So then, why should we think that his characterization of Dasein should be ethical? As an initial answer, our interest stems from Dasein as fundamentally engaged in the world. For Heidegger, being-in-the-world is the fundamental way in which Dasein is related to the world:

And even though Being-in-the-world is something of which one has pre-phenomenological experience and acquaintance, it becomes *invisible* if one interprets it in a way which is ontologically inappropriate...For what is more obvious than that a 'subject' is related to an 'object' and *vice versa*? This 'subject-object-relationship' must be presupposed. But while this presupposition is unimpeachable in its facticity, this makes it indeed a baleful one, if its ontological necessity and especially its ontological meaning are to be left in the dark.¹

It will be argued that this subject-object dichotomy is at least not necessary for ethics. If this is not required of ethics, then it is possible that Dasein can be understood ethically. This, though, only constitutes a way in which Dasein is different from traditional approaches to ethics. It does not answer why we should have reason to think Dasein is ethical; however, it is important to that answer.

In traditional approaches to ethics, there is something peculiar about the way in which we have to check to see if we have found a good ethical theory or not. In the sciences we observe the relevant phenomena so that when we hypothesize in order to explain why certain things happen while others do not. We can check this hypothesis in other instances to find out whether it is good

¹ Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial/Modern Thought, 2008), 72. Hereafter all citations referring to this work will be provided parenthetically in the text with the abbreviation BT as well as the abbreviation SZ which will refer to the pagination in the original German text (*Sein und Zeit*), e.g. (SZ 46, BT 72).

enough to become accepted theory. In ethics, though, whether or not an action is right or wrong, whether or not it does or does not conform to the good is not something to be empirically observed as a property in the same way of empirical observation. This is nothing ground-breaking. What is interesting for justifying the need to investigate Dasein as ethical is that we are left to appeal to our pre-theoretical intuition.² Our intuition is exactly that element of our understanding that does not give us precise reasons, but that we nevertheless still take as giving us some reason.³ If attempts in ethical theory are even going to use the intuition about right and wrong as an important factor for whether or not an ethical theory is plausible, then this will for us constitute an acknowledgment that there is something more fundamental to what Heidegger presents as being-in-the-world. So, while this does not constitute anything like a proof that Dasein is ethical, it at least gives us the prompt we need to begin an investigation to find out if Dasein can be understood as ethical.

In order to find out if there might be a connection between Dasein and ethics we must investigate those elements which are central to understanding the kind of being that Dasein is. This will be our method of investigation for the second chapter. We will consider Dasein's "mineness," "being-in-the-world," "readiness-to-hand," "presence-at-hand," "being-with," "*das Man*," "anxiety," and "authenticity." This understanding of the kind of being that Dasein is will serve as the point of departure. Insofar as we will show how Dasein differs from the traditional ethical subject, we will subsequently be able to consider traditional ethical approaches and similarities that they might have with Dasein.

² Appealing to intuitions is a very common strategy in ethical theory. One recent instance of this can be found in Derek Parfit's *On What Matters*. Therein, Parfit considers a wide variety of ethical dilemmas in order to find where the line falls that separates right and wrong. This allows him arrive at and then defend his version of universal acceptance rule consequentialism. What is important for us is that for every one of these examples, Parfit asks the reader to consider what our ethical intuition tells us. This is the method for checking whether or not to reject or accept all of the proposals he considers.

³ In using the term 'intuition' it is also important to note that I am not using it in any phenomenological way. I am merely using it to capture the way in which we would check a proposed ethical theory by considering one of its principle in a given context

As a gauge for determining whether or not Heidegger's depiction of Dasein leaves a space for it to be ethical we will compare it against three major traditional approaches to ethical theory. First we will consider Immanuel Kant, for whom our major point of comparison will be the formula of humanity in relation to Heidegger's presentation of concerns and solicitude. We will show that the two ways in which Kant outlines the possibility of interacting with humanity are strongly connected to, if not the same as, the two modes of care that Heidegger outlines for Dasein. Second, we will consider Aristotle, whose strongest point of connection to Heidegger is to be found in the element of readiness-to-hand. We will show that due to the nature of his virtue ethics as a cultivation of virtues that are put into action in a ready-to-hand manner, there is plenty of common ground for Aristotle and Heidegger. Finally, we will show how thought of John Stuart Mill is related to Heidegger's depiction of Dasein by looking at the way Mill's utilitarianism isolates happiness as the key mood for ethics. This will lead us to an investigation of what Heidegger calls *Mitbefindlichkeit*, which we can understand as the manifestation of how Dasein is essentially being-with.

Insofar as the third chapter accomplishes the task of finding those elements of Dasein's being that are most likely to be ethical, the fourth chapter subsequently aims to come to a better understanding of those specific elements when taken in relation to Dasein's being as a whole. To do this, the passage in which Heidegger first introduces *Mitbefindlichkeit* will provide the focus for our investigation. The reason for this is two-fold: first, it has not been considered as relevant to Dasein as ethical in Heidegger scholarship; and second, we will show that the analysis Heidegger gives of *Mitbefindlichkeit* will provide a deeper understanding of the other elements found to be relevant to Dasein and ethics: concern, solicitude, and readiness-to-hand.

Before beginning, though, it is necessary that we make clear the nature of this project in ethics. Insofar as this is a work in Heideggerian phenomenology, we will not be arriving at any ethical laws or prescriptions that can be considered as what Dasein “should” do. Because this is a phenomenological investigation it will be purely descriptive, merely using the analyses provided by Heidegger to find a way in which they may pertain to the ethical.

Thus our treatise does not subscribe to a 'standpoint' or represent any special 'direction'; for phenomenology is nothing of either sort, nor can it become so as long as it understands itself...The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on which science is to be conducted, all the more primordially is it rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves, and the farther is it removed from what we call "technical devices", though there are many such devices even in the theoretical disciplines. (SZ 27, BT 50)

For Heidegger, traditional ethical approaches represent an instance of those theoretical disciplines. So, our investigation will find similarities neither in the prescriptions made by theories nor in the directions they represent. Instead, this investigation is marked by the distinction between how Dasein is ethical and how Dasein deserves to be treated. This distinction means that we will not jump from the first assumption, that we are ethical, to finding a way to secure the right kind of ethical theory for Dasein.

Indeed, implicit in all ethical theory is the first assumption that we are the kind of being that is an ethical being. There would be no need to figure out what is the right thing to do if we were not the kind of being that could be concerned with doing the right thing. This clarifies the way in which this investigation takes the word ethical to be a description of the kind of being that we are. So, traditionally we have made the assumption that we are the kind of being that is concerned with being in accord with the good. This means that, because we are interested in asking whether Heidegger's depiction of Dasein is ethical, that we have two options: 1) if we find Dasein is not

ethical, then all of the intuitions that get ethics started in the first place are wrong or 2) Dasein is not a good phenomenological account of the kind of being that we are. We will assume that the first cannot be an option at all,⁴ so it is the second that will be at stake in our investigation.

Throughout this investigation what will tie everything together is the initial analysis of being-in-the-world. We will show that Dasein's characteristic relationality is fundamental to Dasein's being-in-the-world. For us, relationality will represent an invaluable tool for understanding the essential characteristics of Dasein's being. Because of this tool we will be able to conclude that, if Dasein is an ethical notion then it must be ethical through and through; Dasein must be essentially ethical. If we can reach this conclusion, it will be a strictly Heideggerian one because, as Heidegger puts it in *Being and Time*, "The object we have taken as our theme is *artificially and dogmatically curtailed* if 'in the first instance' we restrict ourselves to a 'theoretical subject', in order that we may then round it out 'on the practical side' by tacking on an 'ethic'" (SZ 316, BT 363-364).

⁴ The fact that the problem of akrasia is significant in the history of ethics does not count toward thinking that we are not ethical in the sense that I am arguing for. Again, the meaning of the term 'ethical' is critical. We do not mean by ethical that we will always do what we believe to be right as judged by some ethical theory. Instead, we mean that, in interacting with one another, we have expectations for how we will treat one another. In other words, prior to any ethical theory there is an implicit ethics that governs our interactions with one another. This is what we appeal to when a particular ethical prescription is considered to be right or not. To say that we are not ethical in this way while still holding that we can be expected to act in accord with a system of ethics seems contradictory.

2. DASEIN AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD: LEAVING THE SUBJECT BEHIND

In raising anew the question of being, Heidegger attempts to make a break from the tradition of western philosophy. Part of this break includes his treatment of the subject. Early in *Being and Time* Heidegger claims that, “if we posit an ‘I’ or a subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein” (SZ 46, BT 72). Accordingly, he provides a phenomenological account of the kind of being we are, Dasein, in order to move past the baggage inherent in the history of thinking in terms of the subject. In considering modern rationalism and the presuppositions it brings to our understanding of the human subject Charles Taylor writes: “The result was a picture of the human thinking agent as disengaged,” and that, “Heidegger had to struggle against this picture to recover an understanding of the agent as engaged.”⁵ Subsequently, it is the duty of phenomenology to bring no presuppositions to its descriptions. Thus, instead of referring to subjects Heidegger moves through multiple phenomenological analyses providing an account far different from those of the traditional human subject.

This point of considering the human in terms of its kind of being, Dasein, rather than in terms of the subject will be critical to understanding ethics in terms of Dasein. Preliminarily we understand this to mean that, as a phenomenological investigation, the approach to ethics will be different from a traditional approach. As François Raffoul puts it, approaching ethics through an understanding of Dasein, “will not be an issue of ethics as an applied discipline or even as normative, but rather as an originary phenomenon.”⁶ Through an investigation of Dasein, we will bring out the differences between Dasein and the subject, or the ‘I’. To do so, we will present the characteristics of Dasein as given by Heidegger: mineness, being-in-the-world, the ready-to-hand,

⁵ Charles Taylor. “Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 203.

⁶ François Raffoul. *The Origins of Responsibility* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 220.

the present-at-hand, being-with, *das Man*, anxiety, and authenticity. This understanding of Dasein will be the ground for the subsequent investigation into how Dasein is ethical.

2.1 MINENESS

In *Being and Time*, the first way in which Heidegger brings Dasein to light is via a discussion of “mineness”.⁷ Heidegger makes clear that what is important about Dasein’s characteristic of mineness is not anything to be considered solipsistic or possessive. Instead, it is that the essence of Dasein lies in its ‘to be,’ in its existence, and consequently, that Dasein is that being for which its very being is an issue (SZ 42, BT 67). This point is central to Heidegger’s break from traditional ontological approaches. Indeed, these characteristics of Dasein’s being do not allow it to be seen as merely another being out there in the world. Instead, Dasein’s being constitutes the possibility of the world as being-in-the-world. This will be centrally important to the phenomenological investigation that Heidegger is carrying out.

In discussing the relationship between care, mineness, and Dasein’s being, Raffoul points out that, “as Being-in-the-world with others, Dasein in itself thus lies, from the outset, beyond the opposition between the individual I and the other (the non- or alter-ego), beyond the opposition between egotism and altruism”.⁸ Furthermore, he continues to argue, that being-with and mineness are not opposed to one another, but rather that they are co-extensive with one another. This is

⁷ The German term is ‘*Jemeinigkeit*’ meaning that which is in each particular case mine. This is a change in term from ‘*Jeweiligkeit*,’ which Heidegger uses in his lecture course on the history of the concept of time only two years before. In the term ‘*Jeweiligkeit*’ we have the emphasis on a particular while, and there is no property of ‘mineness’ to be found. In this thesis we will not attempt to find the ways in which Heidegger’s project is altered by choosing one term over the other. Instead, both of them will be read together as two possible descriptive tools to get at the phenomenon Heidegger is describing (in fn. 13 below, there is a defense for reading these two terms as having the same meaning through Heidegger’s presentation of relationality). In doing so, we are emphasizing the temporal nature of a being grounded in care, such that one can only experience a care over a particular while and insofar as the being has the possibility of mineness.

⁸ François Raffoul. *Heidegger and the Subject* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1998), 213.

precisely the way in which Heidegger's description of Dasein is un-differentiated. It does not follow the logic of the tradition which makes use of differentiable categories: "it is important that Dasein should not be interpreted with the differentiated character of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered in the undifferentiated (*indifferenten*) character which it has proximally and for the most part" (SZ 43, BT 69). Instead, Heidegger employs existentials in his phenomenological attempt to discover Dasein in its being.⁹ Categories are still employed for use with beings that are not Dasein. However, for Dasein, these categories are insufficient because, in the most foundational way, they fail to capture the way in which Dasein is the being for which its very being is an issue. It is from this initial trajectory, then, that Heidegger will proceed in his investigation into the being of Dasein.

2.2 BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

In discussing worldhood Heidegger states that, "this characteristic phenomenon of in-being and its characteristic of defining Dasein in its very being must be...kept in view as an a priori of every particular relationship to the world."¹⁰ Another way Heidegger puts this is to say that the world is nothing like those beings which are within-the-world. Instead, the worldhood of the world is the possibility of encountering beings in an absorbed concern (SZ 72, BT 102). This is, of course, directly opposed to Descartes's notion of world. Heidegger characterizes Descartes's understanding of world as such: "Substantiality means extantness, being on hand, which as such is in need of no other entity" (HCT 172). This is the world thought of as the collection of things out there. Yet,

⁹ In an attempt to avoid the mistakes of traditional notions of the subject which use the same categories that any other object would, Heidegger employs 'existentials' as the necessary alternative to 'categories'; as the way for undifferentiated description of Dasein. This is because, as was stated above, the essence of Dasein lies in its existence—it cannot be understood in the same way as beings which are not Dasein.

¹⁰ Martin Heidegger. *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 159-160. Hereafter all citations referring to this work will be provided parenthetically in the text with the abbreviation HCT, e.g. (HCT 159-160).

this is even what Husserl is moving away from by focusing on intentionality in order to do away with the distinction between subject and object. Thus, we have still not arrived at Heidegger's own understanding of the world.

Moreover, Heidegger claims, "this peculiar principle, that being for itself cannot be experienced by us in the entity because it does not affect us, is perhaps, without Descartes knowing it and also perhaps without Kant ultimately understanding it in his thesis, the most clear-cut formulation of the being of the entity which we call world" (HCT 175). Heidegger acknowledges that both Descartes and Kant had a pre-understanding of the connection between world and being. However, the point that is important in distinguishing Heidegger's position is that he is thinking of 'world' in the way the tradition has thought of 'being.' Subsequently, Heidegger points to further problems that arise through such traditional interpretations: Descartes and Kant conceive of the world in relation to God as well as calculative measurement (HCT 175, 181). For Heidegger, both of these participate in a concealment of the temporal nature of Dasein's being because they are only a further instance of the way in which philosophical inquiry has failed to provide an account of our being as one that is primarily engaged.

Additionally, Heidegger shows that this results in a misconception of Dasein's being insofar as it is a misappropriation of a direction onto the being of Dasein. He makes it explicit that, "the Dasein is not to be taken by setting some sort of aim or purpose for it" (HCT 154). For Heidegger, this is what traditional philosophy has done by setting a precise direction for understanding Dasein through the use of concepts inappropriate for understanding the kind of being that Dasein has. As soon as this is done, there is an atemporal understanding of Dasein. Thus, we begin to see the richness of Heidegger's project when we see Dasein as that being which is constituted as being-in-the-world insofar as it is that kind of being which *sets its own direction*.

It is at this point that Heidegger claims a point of departure from Husserl because, by claiming that there is a pole of consciousness, Husserl has already set a direction for Dasein—Heidegger’s project rests on the claim that positing a pole of consciousness is not a pure description, but rather a false direction put onto Dasein. Consequently, Heidegger insists on using the term ‘directionality’ instead of ‘intentionality’ in an attempt to eliminate any thinking of something definite on the “subjective end”. It is this set of characteristics that constitute Dasein as being-in-the-world.¹¹

2.3 THE READY-TO-HAND AND THE PRESENT-AT-HAND

For Heidegger, readiness-to-hand is the point around which his break from Husserl is most pronounced. The defining feature of its import is that the phenomenology Husserl has given fails to consider how things can appear when they do not appear as present-at-hand. Heidegger’s claim is that there is a distinct difference between the way the table appears when one observe its properties and the way the same table appears when one is carrying a heavy pile of books and would like a place to set them down. In introducing the way gear is ready-to-hand, Heidegger states that, “our concern subordinates itself to the “in-order-to” which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become” (SZ 69, MR 98). In this relationality of work, Heidegger claims that the mode of readiness-to-hand is more foundational than that of the present-at-hand. It is only when there is a breakdown of the ready-to-hand that the item of gear then shows itself in a way that is present-at-hand.

¹¹ While this does not constitute a full presentation of the characteristics of being-in-the-world, it provides the necessary starting point to move into the following section. In considering readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand we will still be presenting how it is that Dasein is being-in-the-world. The connection between these two sections is that we will still be presenting how it is that Dasein can be concernfully engaged.

This moves us to the way in which the mode of the present-at-hand is for Heidegger a founded mode, founded on the mode of the ready-to-hand. In this way we can further fill out our understanding of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world as constitutive of Dasein's being means "to reside alongside," "to be familiar with," "to be absorbed in the world" (SZ 54, BT 80). Accordingly, Dasein is the being that is in the world, up to something, and for Heidegger this is what is foundational to Dasein's being. This is made clearer as Heidegger states that, "'Being alongside' the world never means anything like the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur. There is no such thing as a 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'" (SZ 55, BT 81). So, the present-at-hand—the way in which a phenomenon presents itself in its properties—is secondary to the ready-to-hand—the way in which phenomena present themselves as useful to a certain purpose as Dasein is engaged in the world and up to something.

In order to get a clearer understanding of the relationship between the two, let us consider the way that Niels Ole Bernsen gives the distinction between the two modes of experience. Bernsen defines the ready-to-hand as "entities experienced as having some kind of significance or other to man in his complete identity".¹² This focus on identity is in accordance with an understanding of the 'I' as informed by the world of possibilities that present themselves because, as Heidegger claims: "in each case, Dasein *is* its possibility" (SZ 42, BT 68). Consequently, this connection between the ready-to-hand and identity seems, at first, to be a good fit. However, Bernsen places critical importance on the term "significance" in his definition. He understands that significance should be strictly confined to the ready-to-hand, leaving no room for any significance in phenomena showing themselves as present-at-hand. As a result, Bernsen claims that if the pure theoretical

¹² Niels Ole Bernsen. *Heidegger's Theory of Intentionality* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1986), 74.

contemplation of the present-at-hand is to be devoid of significance then there cannot be a form of experience that is present-at-hand. This would completely unravel Heidegger's key insight that there is more than one way in which the same phenomenon can show itself.

Therefore, if we are to rescue the distinction between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand, then we must show that Bernsen's definition of the ready-to-hand is unfounded. To do so, let us examine the breakdown of the item of gear to understand how it moves from showing itself as ready-to-hand to showing itself as present-at-hand. Let us take the example of biking. In Heideggerian terminology, when one is biking to work the bike is ready-to-hand in-order-to get to work for-the-sake-of finishing the project that one has been working on for the past week. If one of the pedals comes loose and falls off there would be an awkwardness in trying to continue to ride the bike. This is because, to use Heidegger's terms, it has suddenly become unready-to-hand. Instead of continuing, one must stop, retrieve the pedal, and pull the pedal wrench out of the toolkit in one's bag. The pedal is then made present-at-hand in trying to figure out how to reattach it. Various features of the pedal, the crank arm, and the pedal wrench are noticed in order to find out how to reattach the pedal.

Despite the phenomena showing themselves in a way that is present-at-hand, it is not the case that one is all of the sudden no longer in-order-to reattach the pedal. Additionally, though, the fact that there is still an "in-order-to" does not mean that one is not having the type of experience that is present-at-hand. Instead, it means that the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand are not two mutually exclusive kinds of experience. In other words, and this point is centrally important for the rest of our investigation, the relationality of being-in-the-world is not different for the present-at-hand mode of presentation as well as the ready-to-hand mode. Heidegger makes this point explicit in terms of these modes of presentation:

The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand. But the ready-to-hand is not thereby just *observed* and stared at as something present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. (SZ 74, 104)

In other words, possibility of phenomena showing themselves as present-at-hand is not possible without a relation to the ready-to-hand. Insofar as the present-at-hand is a founded mode of Dasein's being-in-the-world, it is "bound up" in the ready-to-hand. Additionally, we find further justification for this relationship when Heidegger puts the same point in terms of praxis and theory: "just as *praxis* has its own specific kind of sight, theoretical research is not without a *praxis* of its own...however 'uninteresting' and 'obvious' such components of scientific research may be, they are by no means a matter of indifference ontologically" (SZ 357, BT 408). So, if in referring to pure theoretical experience present-at-hand Bernsen means that experience is completely removed from facticity to the point of being a "view from nowhere," then he is correct to say that this would not constitute an experience. However, this also does not constitute something showing itself as present-at-hand.

As Heidegger puts it, the present-at-hand is a founded mode of experience (SZ 59, BT 86), and because it is founded on the ready-to-hand, the relationality that allows phenomena to show themselves as ready-to-hand cannot vanish when some element of the work becomes present-at-hand. If this were the case, then it would also have to be true that the two would be independent of one another. The ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, then are both distinct ways for phenomena to show themselves and are both only possible because of the relational character of the worldhood of the world.¹³

¹³ Above (ftn. 7), we mentioned that *Jeweiligkeit* and *Jemeinigkeit* would not be read as significantly different. At this point we have seen why that is the case. If the one stresses the 'mine' nature of Dasein's being-in-the-world and the other stresses the element of a 'particular while,' then what we have just shown with Dasein's relationality provides a clear way to understand them both in the same way. Dasein's relationality is what provides the foundation for it to

2.4 BEING-WITH AND *DAS MAN*¹⁴

Now we can examine in close detail the way in which Dasein is constituted by being-with and how, in Dasein's fallenness, it manifests itself as *das Man*. This will be done using the groundwork pertaining to the organization of relational totalities. At the start of the chapter in which Heidegger discuss being-with and *das Man*, he makes clear that this is a continuation of the analyses of being-in-the-world and the ready-to-hand. So, we must continue to think of Dasein as, "absorbed in the world" (SZ 113, BT 149). In this section we will show that the relationality that is paramount for understanding Dasein's being-in-the-world as ready-to-hand and present-at-hand is just as important in understanding Dasein's being-with. This means that, just as the organization of concerns in Dasein's relationality makes possible the ready-to-hand as a mode of engagement in the world, so too is this organization what makes possible Dasein's fallenness in *das Man*.¹⁵ This does not mean that the ready-to-hand is somehow necessarily connected to fallenness—as it is not the case that when Dasein is no longer constituted in *das Man*, that it will no longer experience possibilities in readiness-to-hand.

participate in concerned engagement over time and to do so in a way that is 'mine.' Subsequently, this allows for an engagement in which Dasein does not distinguish itself from that with which it is ready-to-hand. The reason for the two different terms is because such an abstract notion is difficult to name and so, can be glimpsed by two seemingly different terms.

¹⁴ Throughout this paper we will neither translate "*das Man*" nor "*Man-selbst*" from the German. MacQuarrie and Robinson translate *das Man* as "the they" while others translate it as "the one" or "the anyone". In translating *das Man* as "the they" we can fall prey to both thinking that 'I' am not one of 'them' and also that we are talking about a particular group of them. Upon closer examination this merely participates in the distantiality (SZ 126, BT 164) which, for Heidegger is the most fundamental characteristic of *das Man*. For this reason care will be taken in order to speak in terms of "what one does" in order to keep from participating in this distantiality while attempting to make it clearer. Referring to *das Man* as the one is insufficient as it gives the impression of *das Man* as a self-contained whole which is also inappropriate. The anyone seems to be the best translation, but it seems to lack of force of highlighting the way in which *das Man* is an existential of Dasein's being (it is the case that *das Man* highlights the way in which one acts this way as anyone does and as everyone does; there is a way in which we could translate it as the 'any-every-one,' but this does not seem to a good option either). Therefore, *das Man* and *Man-selbst* will remain untranslated. Though, when speaking of the way in which Dasein is toward its world, we will phrase it in terms of the 'one' or the 'anyone' by phrasing the example as "what one does" or "how anyone would act".

¹⁵ Heidegger uses the term fallenness in order to highlight the way in which Dasein, in *das Man*, has not taken over its own possibilities but has merely taken over possibilities as anyone does. In so doing, Dasein misunderstands its kind of being. In not living up to the possibility of its being, Dasein is fallen to the concerns of *das Man*.

First, we must begin by coming to an understanding of the organization of *das Man*. The term ‘organization’ is used to capture the way in which there is something presupposed in *das Man*’s appropriation of Dasein; Dasein always already finds itself with particular ontic possibilities, and these possibilities that Dasein finds itself engaging with represent directions it is moving in, but insofar as Dasein only understands itself in terms of these directions, its being is concealed from itself. In the *History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger elucidates this connection between those referential relations that constitute Dasein’s being-in-the-world and Dasein’s fallenness in *das Man*:

The manifold of things encountered here is not an arbitrary manifold of incidental things; it is first and only present in a particular *correlation of references*. This referential contexture is itself a *closed totality*. It is precisely out of this totality that, for example, the individual piece of furniture in a room appears. My encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one thing after another and put together a manifold of things in order then to see a room. Rather, I primarily see a referential totality as closed, from which the individual piece of furniture and what is in the room stand out. Such an environment of the nature of a closed referential totality is at the same time distinguished by a specific *familiarity*. The closed character of the referential whole is grounded precisely in familiarity, and this familiarity implies that the referential relations are *well-known*. Everyday concern as making use of, working with, constantly attends to these relations; *everyone dwells in them*.¹⁶ (HCT 186-187)

So, in those closed totalities that we ourselves are in, we understand that there is an organization to the system of gear. This organization informs the possibilities that present themselves to one. This means that because in everydayness Dasein’s possibilities are understood in terms of the particular instances of organization that it finds itself in, Dasein’s possibilities are merely those possibilities which everyone has. Another way Heidegger puts this is: Dasein is fallen in *das Man*.

While this passage makes explicit Dasein’s fallenness in *das Man*, there is something more fundamental at stake: the way in which Dasein as being-in-the-world is being-with. The basic way

¹⁶ My own emphasis.

in which Dasein, as relational, is constituted in being-in-the-world means that what makes possible this participation in common totalities at all is Dasein's being as essentially being-with:

The phenomenological assertion that "Dasein is essentially Being-with" has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not seek to establish ontically that factually I am not present-at-hand alone, and that Others of my kind occur. If this were what is meant by the proposition that Dasein's Being-in-the-world is essentially constituted by Being-with, then Being-with would not be an existential attribute which Dasein, of its own accord, has coming to it from its own kind of Being. It would rather be something which turns up in every case by reason of the occurrence of Others. Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factially no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's being-alone is being-with in the world. The Other can *be missing* only *in* and *for* a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very possibility is the proof of this. (SZ 120, BT 156-157)

If we understand this account of Dasein's being-with as an existential attribute of its being in combination with the former account in which we connected Dasein's being-in-the-world as relationality with the way in which this makes possible participating in *Man-selbst* as one does, then it becomes clear that in Dasein's being, being-with is a foundational characteristic. In *The Origins of Responsibility* François Raffoul puts it this way: "This is what the determination of being-with as an existential of Dasein makes clear—the other is inscribed in the structure of selfhood. It is on the basis of this primordial openness of Dasein that a relation to others can occur."¹⁷ From this understanding of being-with we will be able to understand more clearly how it is that *das Man* is a condition of fallenness as inauthentic Dasein and subsequently what it means for Dasein to be authentic.

In *das Man*, there is a dual nature of organization (direction and concealment). The organization of *das Man* is made possible by the relationality of Dasein and is appropriated for the concerns of *das Man*; Dasein's loses itself in the concerns of *das Man* by failing to understand itself as the possibility for its own concern. In Heidegger's words, inauthentic Dasein has not realized

¹⁷ Raffoul, *Responsibility*, 256.

that, it is the basis for a nullity. The way in which this organization is presupposed leads to a misunderstanding of the kind of being which Dasein is. Inauthentic Dasein does not understand that it is the relationality which is the basis of our being Dasein as the worldhood of the world.

The way in which there is something presupposed in the organization of *das Man* is grounded in Dasein's relationality. This is the same relationality which is the ground for the structure of the ready-to-hand. In Heidegger's exposition of relationality, he states that, while the present-at-hand is founded in the ready-to-hand, the ready-to-hand is "founded in the non-emergence of referential relations, and in turn again in the intimate presence of what is of concern" (HCT 196). Thus, this more primordial level of what is of concern is the level from which we find relationality, and it is only upon this that there is the possibility for organization to take place. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger will say that "'meaning' signifies the 'upon-which' of the primary projection of the understanding of Being" (SZ 324, BT 371). The "upon-which" is "woraufhin" and differs from the "wherein" which is "worin." Thus, the "auf," makes this the 'on,' the 'to,' the 'onto,' the 'upon,' the foundation of the wherein as that primary projection of the understanding of Being: Dasein's primordial directionality. Again, this constitutes Dasein's potentiality-for-being-a-whole and is what is taken away from Dasein by its dispersion in *das Man*.

Additionally, we must further explain the way in which *das Man* is constituted by an essential ignorance to Dasein's temporal nature. Insofar as *das Man* provides relational totalities which Dasein participates in, *das Man* allows Dasein to misunderstand its being by understanding itself as partaking in a common concern, the direction of which has already been decided by *das Man*. In this way Dasein is able to understand itself a-temporally. This means that Dasein understands itself as these dispersed directions while claiming a supposed constancy. Put another

way, Dasein understands itself in terms of categories and not existentials. In doing so, Dasein fails to understand its kind of being as the possibility of directionality.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger understands the relationship between time and Dasein thusly: “Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such makes possible the constitution of the structure of care” (SZ331, BT 380). In considering this relationship, Robert J. Dostal points out that if Dasein’s being is constituted in care and time is what makes care possible, then time is prior to Dasein.¹⁸ Thus, the point of understanding Dasein in terms of atemporal categories has its failure shown more clearly. Heidegger continues to make clear what this entails for Dasein’s being: “temporality is essentially ecstatical. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite” (SZ331, BT 380). Thus, time in its finitude is made understandable with respect to the finitude of cares and the finitude of Dasein’s possibilities. So, it is not that the common totalities are closed that is problematic for Dasein; rather, it is that that Dasein’s participation in them is merely as anyone participates in them. This merely focuses on the present and does not allow Dasein to understand its temporal nature as finite.

This stretching out of the present for Dasein in *das Man* means that it has a tranquilizing effect. Understanding this tranquilizing effect is paramount to understanding the difference between the way in which authentic Dasein is constituted in its worldhood and the way in which inauthentic Dasein is constituted in its worldhood. About this tranquilizing effect Heidegger states, “seductive tranquilization in its very sense is alienating, so much so that Dasein leaves no possibility of being open for itself other than that of being in *das Man*” (HCT 281). In order to make our case stronger, we can show how this seduction is filled out by an explanation given in terms of the way

¹⁸ Robert J. Dostal. "Time and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger," in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles B. Guignon (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 144.

possibilities present themselves to Dasein. In order to do this we must start with the way in which Dasein, in *das Man*, is no longer open for itself.

The way in which Dasein is not open for itself is found in everydayness. Heidegger finds the central element of Dasein's everydayness to be the inconspicuousness of the "distantiality"¹⁹ of Being-with-one-another:

In one's concern with what one has taken hold of, whether with, for, or against, the Others, there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that difference is merely one that is to be evened out, whether one's own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and wants to catch up in relationship to them, or whether one's Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed. (SZ 126, BT 163-164)

In checking to see where Dasein is in relation to others, Dasein is apt to re-situate itself by participating this relational totality or that. Dasein can concern itself with taking up this common concern or that one. With this there is a possibility of a semblance of authenticity. Because in *das Man* Dasein is able to participate in multiple relational totalities with multiple directions or common concerns, Dasein experiences a semblance of authentic temporality insofar as these directions are dispersed and Dasein rotates through them unknowingly.²⁰ Insofar as we engage in *das Man* in this way, "*Das Man* does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death" (SZ 254, BT 298).

¹⁹ 'Distantiality' (Abständigkeit) is Heidegger's attempt to describe the way in which, in everydayness, Dasein is concerned with its relationship in regard to others. It is a distance of where one fits in in relation to them. In this way its being is treated not as a possibility to be decided for itself but rather as that possibility that has already been decided by everyone else so that the only possibility is to negotiate one's place amongst others.

²⁰ As pointed out above, the ready-to-hand operates at the level of particular relational totalities. This is how the 'I' is dispersed among different relational totalities: it is only ever understood in one relational totality at a time. This movement that rotates through relational totalities is inauthentic temporality. It is temporal precisely because Dasein moves through its possibilities as it moves through time. This is inauthentic insofar as Dasein does so unknowingly. Dasein does not understand itself as the possibility to move through concerns in this way.

Heidegger states: "Curiosity is futural in a way which is altogether inauthentic, and in such a manner, moreover, that it does not await a *possibility*, but, in its craving, just desires such a possibility as something that is actual. Curiosity gets constituted by a making-present which is not held on to, but which, in merely making present thereby seeks constantly to run away from the awaiting, in which it is nevertheless 'held'...Through the awaiting which leaps after, on the other hand, the making-present is abandoned more and more to itself. It makes present for the sake of the Present. It thus entangles itself in itself, so that the distracted not-tarrying becomes a *never-dwelling-anywhere* (*Aufenthaltslosigkeit*)" (SZ 347, BT 397-398). This 'never-dwelling-anywhere' and 'leaping' captures well how Dasein, in *das Man*, moves in an inauthentic temporality.

Or, another way Heidegger puts it: this is how we exhibit a, “constant fleeing in the face of death” (SZ 254, BT 298). Similarly, Heidegger points out that the ‘I’ is used in a “fugitive” way: “The *Man-selbst* keeps on saying “I” most loudly and most frequently because at bottom it is *not authentically* itself, and evades its authentic potentiality-for-Being” (SZ 322, BT 369). It is anxiety that is Dasein’s ability to stop fleeing from its authentic possibility. The experience of anxiety and its connection to authenticity will subsequently be the next topic for our investigation.

2.5 ANXIETY AND AUTHENTIC DASEIN

To arrive at the full presentation of Dasein’s being we must come to an understanding of what Heidegger means by anxiety and subsequently authenticity. As Dasein is the kind of being for which its being is at issue, authentic Dasein understands correctly the possibility of its being. We will show this through Heidegger's discussion of "being-a-whole." We have already shown that Dasein, as it is constituted by that which is closest to it and that which it does not differentiate itself from, understands itself in terms of the relational totalities in which it participates. These relational totalities are grouped by common concerns insofar as Dasein move concernfully in the relational totality. In other words, we can say that there is a directionality involved in the relational totality which is in the direction of the common concern. These relational totalities have been handed over to Dasein in *das Man*. In this way, Dasein is fallen in *das Man* insofar as it participates in the relational totalities “as one does.” As Heidegger puts it, “The self of everyday Dasein is *Man-selbst*, which we distinguish from the authentic Self... As *Man-selbst*, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into *das Man*” (SZ 129, BT 167). Thus, there is a lack of unity for Dasein insofar as it must participate in several relational totalities “as one does.” In other words, the

directionalities of these different relational totalities have Dasein moving in different directions; Dasein is dispersed²¹.

Anxiety is the fundamental mood which is distinctive of Dasein and will allow Dasein to pull itself together out of its dispersion. It is taken as fundamental to Dasein's being because anxiety, as a mood, emphasizes Dasein's being as being-in-the-world. It is not any theoretical investigation that discloses Dasein in its being. It is a mood, which has the ability to disclose for Dasein how its being is going for it. In anxiety, "that in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite," and "the world has the character of completely lacking significance" (SZ 186, BT 231). This means that Dasein is no longer able to engage in readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand as modes of presentation of phenomena. Instead, "the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety" (SZ 187, BT 231). Thus, Dasein is no longer able to understand its being in terms of the present-at-hand or ready-to-hand possibilities it has heretofore understood itself as. Instead, both of these methods of presentation of phenomena are constituted by Dasein as relational. Because we have shown how Dasein's relationality is central to its being as being-in-the-world, this means that, "being-anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world" (SZ 187, BT 232). Given that anxiety discloses Dasein in its being, authenticity is the way in which Dasein re-engages with the world.

The first way that Heidegger approaches authenticity in *Being and Time* is in terms of being-a-whole (*Ganzsein*). Initially, it is important to appreciate that for Heidegger the possibility of being-a-whole means never actually being a whole. Heidegger states that, "it is essential to the

²¹ The German term Heidegger uses, which we have been translating as 'dispersed,' is 'zerstreuen.' This, though, is not a fully functioning translation of the term. Insofar as the previous uses of the term have been regarding the dispersed directions of inauthentic Dasein, it has been sufficient. However, it falls shorter when using the term to describe Dasein. To describe Dasein, rather than Dasein's directionality, it is best to translate 'zerstreuen' as 'strung-out.' With 'strung-out' we do not get the sense of a homogeneity. Instead there is more a sense of parting and perhaps even fracturing. This better captures the way in which, in its being, inauthentic Dasein does not exercise its potential.

basic constitution of Dasein that there is *constantly something still to be settled*” (SZ 236, BT 279). Consequently, the only case when there is no longer anything to be settled for Dasein is in death. Yet, in death, Dasein no longer *is there*. Heidegger calls this “no-longer-Dasein” (*nichtmehrdasein*) (SZ 237, BT 281). So, then there must be a different explanation for how it is possible for Dasein to be a whole.²²

It is being-towards-death. Because being-a-whole means both death as well as being no longer Dasein, the only way for Dasein to be a whole is to make a resolute decision about that kind of being that it will be. This resoluteness means that Dasein is answering for its kind of being. The way in which we have just shown Dasein’s constitution as Being-in-the-world through an understanding of relational totalities provides a way to answer this. Initially, we can offer that it is in the face of Dasein’s finitude that Dasein realizes that none of the common concerns of its relational totalities (which Dasein has come to through *das Man*) can answer for its finitude. In attempting to flee in the face of the call of conscience Dasein can try to appeal to a concern that is common to its entire worldhood and the worldhood of other Dasein. This, though, is still not being-a-whole because there is still a distasteful element insofar as the concern is common. On the contrary, Dasein might try to appeal to what we can call a world-uniting-concern.²³ This, is what Heidegger means by authentically being-a-whole. It is not able to take away the power of anxiety because Dasein, as being-there is its own basis:

Dasein is not itself the basis of its Being, inasmuch as this basis first arises from its own projection; rather, as Being-its-Self, it is the *Being* of its basis. This basis is

²² This connection between being-a-whole and death shows one of the reasons why Heidegger also uses the terminology of “being-towards-death”. This will be important to filling out our understanding of authentic Dasein.

²³ Insofar as each relational totality is organized around a common concern, a world-common-concern would be a way of organizing one’s relational totalities in which Dasein participates in a way that they all line up with a common directionality. This direction, though is still a direction which Dasein has not chosen. This constitutes the major distinction between a world-common-concern and a world-uniting-concern as we have presented it here. The latter is a direction that Dasein recognizes cannot be grounded by appealing to the concerns of others (or as will be shown below, the co-certainty of others).

never anything but the basis for an entity whose Being has to take over Being-a-basis. (SZ 285, BT 330-331)

What this means in relation to what we have just shown in terms of a world-uniting-concern is that authentic Dasein, in organizing itself around a direction that all of its concerns participate in.²⁴ In doing so Dasein is able to take over being-a-basis. The directionality of this world-uniting-concern is not the basis for Dasein but instead is the way in which Dasein is able to take over its being-a-basis.

Consequently, we can consider and be critically aware of resoluteness being characterized as, “a way of reticently projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and *exacting anxiety of oneself*” (SZ 305, BT 353).²⁵ We must make sure to understand that a continual exacting of anxiety is the only way in which Dasein can maintain a claim to authenticity. Dasein which merely has anxiety as an experience in its past is no longer authentic but has fallen again. Dasein is fallen when it understands anxiety as no longer present. On the other hand, authentic Dasein as Dasein constituted by anticipatory resoluteness is “ready-for-anxiety.” It is not merely part of Dasein’s past; it is Dasein’s possibility; it is Dasein’s having been; it is the way in which possibilities are presented to Dasein in the world.

Given that we began by considering the relationship between an understanding of Dasein and an understanding of subjectivity, it will be useful now to turn back to Heidegger’s treatment of the ‘I’ and consider its place in authentic Dasein. In considering the way in which “I say this” or “I do this” or “I am this” we can consider the relationship between the subject and predicates of

²⁴ Above (ftn. 21) we suggested that strung-out is an additional way of translating *zerstreuen* when it is used to describe Dasein as inauthentic. Now that we are characterizing Dasein as authentic by language of aligning its concerns in a common direction, we can also suggest using ‘strung-together’. This could be further developed, possibly with a robust defense for using these terms in this way, but here I just want to suggest them as additional tools for contrasting authenticity and inauthenticity, not using as primary way of proceeding. I am grateful to Gregory Schufreider for bringing to my attention this connection between ‘strung-out’ and ‘strung-together.’ I hope later to fully develop it in another project.

²⁵ My own emphasis.

these sentences. The way in which Heidegger is arguing against the relationship between subject and world can be seen in reevaluating the relationship between subject and predicate. Indeed we cannot claim that any of these sentences are analytic or synthetic because of the way in which Dasein and world are no longer distinguished from one another (ontically we say “I am this” and ontologically we say “Dasein is being-in-the-world”).

We can also point out, though, that “one says this” “one does this” “one is this” in such a way that one’s ‘I’-hood has been taken over by *das Man*. Thus, we find in the ‘I’ both a connection to Dasein’s authentic possibility and its inauthentic possibility. The former is what Heidegger has in mind when he considers in *Being and Time* that “I am” must be different from “you are” and again distinct from “it is” (SZ 42, 116; BT 68, 152). In this way Heidegger points us to the “who” of Dasein which he distinguishes sharply from the “what” of other beings. While Heidegger uses this example of the ‘I’ to show the possibility of authenticity in the ontological constitution of Dasein, it can also show us to the way in which Dasein understands itself in everydayness. That every-one is ‘I’ allows every-‘I’ to say what one says, to do what one does, to be what one is. This is only another of the countless ways in which Dasein is fooled by a semblance of its authenticity: one thinks one can be authentic by way of being responsible for who one is ontically (concerning myself with that which is closest to me), but in doing so, one fails to understand that one is merely saying what one says, doing what one does, being what one is. This constitutes a misunderstanding of uniqueness for owning up to the kind of being that Dasein is.

In order to more fully understand authenticity we must present more clearly what is meant by saying that authentic Dasein does not merely take responsibility of who it is ontically. By saying that inauthentic Dasein takes responsibility to itself ontically we mean that it has concern for what

kind of concerns it has. This is the way in which inauthentic Dasein has its being at issue.²⁶ In that it sees itself in these particular concerns, one is able to think of them as qualities that are representative of the kind of being one is. Dasein is emboldened by a claim to truth when it takes such observations as grounds for believing that it is such a particular kind of being. Or, as Heidegger puts this in *Being and Time*: “as a constant possibility of Dasein, irresoluteness is *co-certain* (*mitgewiß*)”. This co-certainty is a kind that allows Dasein to place itself “uniquely” amongst the concerns of other Dasein, allowing one to have both a reassurance in one’s comparative distance from others as well as a feeling of being responsible for one’s concerns. In this way, there is a self-prescription to Dasein’s being that is pre-understood (because due to the way in which it is worthy to be something, then it must be something that can be chosen or disavowed). Indeed, this mirrors the way in which there is a self-prescribed resoluteness for authentic Dasein. However, authentic Dasein understands this self-prescription as its possibility based on the kind of being that it is. On the other hand, inauthentic Dasein, to the extent that it has a different set of concerns from anyone else’s, understands this self-prescription as its possibility to be a different kind of being. This is because it takes its being as the set of concerns itself. This set of concerns is the basis that it wants. But, again, we already say how Dasein is not its basis. It is the being of its basis.

With this understanding of the characteristics of Dasein’s being we will be able to proceed to an investigation of how it is that Dasein might be ethical. To do this our strategy will be to consider how these elements constitutive of Dasein’s being may have similarities with traditional approaches to ethics. This will allow us to take a closer look at those elements which seem to allow us to think of Dasein as ethical.

²⁶ It is important to be aware that we are still showing Dasein to take issue with its being. As we know, this is the defining feature of the kind of being that Dasein has. In this way, it is not that its being is not at issue for inauthentic Dasein, it is merely that inauthentic Dasein misunderstands its being.

3. DASEIN AND TRADITIONAL ETHICS

3.1 HEIDEGGER AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION

The task of getting a grasp on ethics in Heidegger's work is one that must be considered carefully. Heidegger at no point undertakes a project in ethical theory.²⁷ It looks as if Heidegger fails on multiple accounts to be concerned with ethics. However, Heidegger will mention ethics on rare occasions. We will take one of those instances as our starting point. In his *Letter on Humanism* he gives us this account of ethics:

Along with "logic" and "physics," "ethics" appeared for the first time in the school of Plato. These disciplines arose at a time when thinking was becoming "philosophy," philosophy *episteme* (science), and science itself a matter for the schools and academic pursuits. In the course of a philosophy so understood, science waxed and thinking wanes. Thinkers prior to this period know neither a "logic" nor an "ethics" nor "physics." Yet their thinking was neither illogical nor immoral.²⁸

Thus, what we will be trying to think throughout this chapter is not an ethical theory. Instead, we can begin by asking ourselves this question: how did ethics become a science at this time? As Heidegger points out it is not because there was an absence of the ethical prior to Plato. Just as Heidegger is concerned with something beyond ethical theory, so too will this investigation proceed in order to get to the foundations of ethics by looking to the foundational elements of Dasein's being.

Subsequently, we must clarify the two different ways in which ethics is considered in the previous passage. The ethical science that Heidegger refers to, which we have called ethical theory,

²⁷ Making matters worse for those interested in finding the ethical in Heidegger's work is his involvement in the Nazi party, for which he fails to provide any kind of explanation. The relevance of his Nazism to his thought is perhaps an interesting topic, but it is one that falls outside the scope of this project. It is worth mentioning in order to acknowledge the relevance to the project here. However, insofar as there is no necessary connection between anything in the *Being and Time*, which is the principle text for this investigation, and National Socialism, it does not seem productive in asking whether or not Dasein is an ethical kind of being.

²⁸ Martin Heidegger. "Letter on Humanism," in *Basic Writings: from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)*, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1993), 256.

Joanna Hodge calls ‘ethics’. Hodge places it in quotes because such a science, “supposes that the question of the metaphysical status of human beings can be settled first”.²⁹ Against this, Hodge places ethics without quotes. Thus, for Hodge, ethics is the event of Dasein, “in which ontological inquiry is revealed as ontically grounded, in which *Dasein* can own itself in owning its own limitations.”³⁰ This is the ethics founded in Dasein’s being, the ethics to be found in a pre-understanding of being, like that of the pre-Socratics Heidegger mentions above.

Finally, Hodge settles on those aspects which she considers to be most important to foundational ethics, and she finds three central concerns:

The call of conscience opens up a kind of ethical concern prior to any division between a concern with judgement and with action. While Heidegger claims that the analysis of *Dasein* is neutral, it is all the same a description of what it is to be human for which there are three central ethical concerns: taking responsibility for oneself, refusing the temptation to take responsibility for others, with the structures of *Dasein*, and recognizing differences between self and others.³¹

Let us take a closer look, though, at the use of “self” and “others” in this passage. Our analysis in the second chapter has shown us that if we are going to answer to how it is that Dasein is ethical, must not incorporate this vocabulary. Even though Heidegger himself uses the terminology of “self” and “others,” he does so only in relation to the Dasein as authentic or inauthentic. So, while this is an important element of his analysis of Dasein, it is not the most foundational, and we cannot be sure that this is where our ethical investigation should end up.³²

We should not assume that there should be a necessary link to ethics through the distinction between the authentic and inauthentic, as Hodge does. So, while it is the case that Hodge proceeds,

²⁹ Joanna Hodge. *Heidegger and Ethics* (London: Routledge, 1995), 177.

³⁰ Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics*, 177.

³¹ Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics*, 202.

³² Because of the importance of emphasizing the lack of subjectivity in the being of Dasein, and because we do not want to overlook those more fundamental characteristics of Dasein’s being, we cannot jump to the language of self and others in our investigation. We will pay close attention to the relationality of Dasein as being-in-the-world in order to keep from overlooking key elements of Dasein’s being that might otherwise be missed.

both by a vocabulary of the ontological constitution of Dasein—as that being for which being is at issue—as well as by a vocabulary of self and other, such a strategy will not suffice for this project. Instead, the descriptions of Dasein will be filled out. Building off the analysis given in *Being and Time*, we will look for clues in the basic constitution of Dasein to inform us of how it is that Dasein is ethical.

So, just as we will take up the task of showing a pre-understanding of being in the history of ethics, conversely, this investigation aims to show a pre-understanding of ethics in Heidegger's preliminary investigation into being. To be more specific, this will not involve limiting ourselves to the way in which we can see how ethics is already built into a combination of metaphysics and ontology. Instead, we will attempt to find a connection between the ontology of Dasein and the what we would consider as the ethical interactions between the self and others.³³ The path of this fine line will take us to the characteristics of Dasein's being and will allow us to investigate how it is that Dasein is ethical. In other words, we will investigate the connection between the foundational elements of Dasein's being and how it is possible for Dasein to be ethical.

Before we begin, though, we must recognize that all ethical theories, because of their metaphysical positions, will fail on a Heideggerian reading. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is not necessarily to provide a thorough Heideggerian refutation of each particular theory considered. Instead, it is important to see in what ways each theory involves similarities to Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. Heidegger's strategy is to look for signs of a pre-understanding of being. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to look at previous attempts at providing ethical theories, and in examining these theories and comparing and contrasting them with the being of Dasein, we will attempt to uncover

³³ The investigation that restricts itself to abstract ontology is an answer to the question "Why is it possible for Dasein to be ethical?" and the investigation into the particular ethical interactions of Dasein is an answer to the question "How should Dasein be ethical?" Instead, we are interested in asking the question "How is Dasein ethical?" in an attempt to make a connection between Dasein's being and ethics.

such a pre-understanding. Thus, we will examine three distinct and historically prominent views in ethics to find these similarities and differences. These historical figures are Kant, Aristotle, and Mill. It is first necessary to pick an appropriate starting point. Indeed, Heidegger emphasizes that what is disclosive of Dasein in its being is the mood of anxiety, and, as this is central to Dasein's being, it provides such a starting point.³⁴ In anxiety Dasein is removed from its engagement in the world. And, insofar as Dasein finds itself in its being in this disengaged state, we can take as our starting point the work of Immanuel Kant, as it captures the ethical agent outside of instrumentality.

3.2 KANT

3.2.a Similarities with Heidegger

At the outset of the *Groundwork*, Kant is embarking on the task of locating a principle that will later allow him to derive obligations that we have to one another. Central to this is his conception of the good will. For Kant the good will is absolutely good: "A good will is good not because of what it effects, or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some intended end, but good just by its willing, i.e. in itself".³⁵ This way in which the good will allows Kant to focus on the human subject as ethical has striking similarities to what Heidegger claims about the mood of anxiety:

Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance. In anxiety one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement. (SZ 186, BT 231)

³⁴ Also important to this starting point of anxiety is that it is neither authentic nor inauthentic. As we suggested, it is best to begin from a point that does not suggest either side. Instead, anxiety suggests Dasein uncovering its being—disengaged, not taking up an concerns, neither authentic nor inauthentic.

³⁵ Immanuel Kant. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 10.

To this Kant would be able to say that even in anxiety, as Dasein is disengaged from the world, one should have a value as an end in oneself that cannot be taken away. Not only does this seem to connect with our moral intuition—as it seems strange for our worth to decrease based on a state of anxiety—but, insofar Heidegger upholds this as the key disclosure of Dasein’s being, this particular instance of Dasein should at least be afforded no less worth.

To continue, let us consider the version of the categorical imperative which most exhibits a pre-understanding of being: the formula of humanity. It states that you should, “act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”.³⁶ First, we see that this formulation of the categorical imperative continues with the notion of treating others as ends, reaffirming the way in which the human has a kind of being that is different from that of other beings. However, what is also interesting here is that the qualification which places us in the law comes as, “act that you use humanity.” This means that, for Kant, the ethical is only governed when humanity is in use. This use points us to an instrumental depiction of the ethical subject, one that has common ground with Heidegger’s depiction of Dasein as engaged in the world.

Additionally though, there is one final clue to be found here that can link us to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein: that humanity can be treated as both a means and an end. Under the ontological structure of care Heidegger gives two ways in which Dasein can exhibit care: concern and solicitude.³⁷ If we can show that these two types of care can be linked to the two ways in which

³⁶ Kant, *Groundwork*, 41.

³⁷ For Heidegger, “Dasein-with” covers the way in which Dasein are related to one another. So, insofar as being-with is the ontological structure of Dasein’s relation to others in general, Dasein-with is the ontological structure of Dasein’s relation to others in particular. This particular relation is filled in, for Heidegger by two types of care (*sorge*): solicitude (*fürsorge*) and concern (*besorge*).

Kant's formula of humanity understands the use of humanity, then we will have found another potential link to ethics for Heidegger.

3.2.b Concern and solicitude

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger characterizes concern as designating, "the being of a possible way of being-in-the-world" (SZ 57, BT 83). This means that concern is an existential of Dasein's being and is foundational to the way in which Dasein is being-in-the-world. Heidegger, again emphasizes that, "because being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world is essentially concern" (SZ 57, BT 84). Consequently for Heidegger, concern designates the existential of being-in-the-world whereas care denotes the existential for Dasein's being itself.

Before following up with Kant, in order to conclude whether or not this provides Heidegger with a connection to what Kant calls using humanity as a means, we can consider the distinction Heidegger makes between concern and solicitude:

Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, even though Being-with, like concern, is a *Being towards* entities encountered within-the-world. But those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to gear ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of *solicitude* (SZ 121, BT 157).

So, the key distinction then, between concern and solicitude is that concern is reserved for the kind of care that is manifest when an object shows itself as gear to be used in a ready-to-hand manner and solicitude is reserved for the kind of care that is manifest in dealing with a kind of being whose being is not what is of concern but rather whose being allows for an engagement through a participation in similar concerns. Specifically, solicitude is what is constitutive of Dasein-with.

This means that there is an element of direct utility on the object which is of concern while this is not the case for the being with whom one experiences solicitude. This links directly to Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative as treating humanity always as an end and never merely

as a means. This is the case because concern as conceived of in terms of utility is the relationship of mere utility. However, as Heidegger points out, encountering a being in solicitude means that it does not have the kind of being of gear to be thought of in terms of utility.

Moreover, Heidegger makes use of yet another distinction regarding solicitude. He outlines two extremes of what could perhaps be a spectrum of solicitude: the first is jumping in for the other. In doing so Dasein takes over the concern of the other: “it can, as it were, take away ‘care’ from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can *leap in* for him” (SZ 122, BT 158). On this extreme Dasein takes care away from the other in order to attend to the concern itself and give it back to the other as something finished. Heidegger acknowledges that in this kind of solicitude there is domination and dependence. On the other end of the spectrum, “is a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as *leap ahead* of him in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time” (SZ 122, BT 158-159). So, while Heidegger does not make the same normative claim that Kant is making, we still have plenty of reason to think they share a common understanding of the way in which possibilities are presented.

In the former instance of “leaping in” there is not a genuine sharing of similar concerns. There is what Jean-Luc Nancy refers to as a “common occupation” that allows for substitution of concerns as a “mere cooperation”; against this he gives the characterization of “leaping ahead” as a “co-proprietation,” a “pre-occupation,” or being genuinely concerned.³⁸ Additionally, we find a further similarity with Kant when we think of the two different kinds of imperative: hypothetical and categorical.

Now, all *imperatives* command either *hypothetically*, or *categorically*. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving

³⁸ Jean-Luc Nancy. “The Being-with of Being-There,” in *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2008), 119.

something else that one wants (or that at least is possible for one to want). The categorical imperative would be the one that represented an action as objectively necessary by itself, without reference to another end.³⁹

So, because solicitude as “leaping in” is a mere cooperation, it fits quite well with Kant’s understanding of a hypothetical imperative, which is conditioned on something else one wants to achieve. This leaves solicitude in terms of “leaping ahead” to be the counterpart for the Kantian categorical imperative, which is done without intention for an alternative end, but treats the other as an end in herself.

What this means for us is just that we have been able to show that the elements which allow Kant to provide an account of ethical obligations to one another are also elements that are directly involved in Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein. It is a first step in the direction of arguing for Dasein as an ethical kind of being.

3.3 ARISTOTLE

3.3.a Similarities with Heidegger

From the very beginning of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle takes up a drastically different approach from Kant’s. He envisions the human, not always merely as an end but as that which is always aiming at the good. So, for Aristotle what is good is not humanity in itself—as the possibility of rationality to be treated as an end in itself—but rather, it is the employment of reason; it is reasoning well as realizing human excellence. His conception of ethics is not solely concerned with the person having a present-at-hand knowledge of what is right in each situation, as was the case with Kant. Aristotle points out that for those things we acquire by nature, such as the senses, we first acquire the potentiality for using them before later using them. For instance, we have eyes

³⁹ Kant, *Groundwork*, 28.

with the potential for sight before we are actually able to see. Against this, he contrasts the way in which we acquire human excellences. It is not the case that we first have the potentiality for human excellence; instead, we must practice them in order to learn by doing.⁴⁰ This element of practice is in line with the Heideggerian notion of the ready-to-hand

This allows us to say two things about the ready-to-hand. First, as it regards an item of gear showing itself as useful toward some end that one is up to, we can say that for Aristotle, the more we practice employing the virtues, the more they will show themselves as relevant to being used in different circumstances. This would also mean that we become better at recognizing those situations in which it is best to use certain virtues instead of others. Second, is that the ready-to-hand has the character of inconspicuous familiarity (SZ 104, BT 137). In this way, the person who has cultivated the virtues will no longer need to think of them explicitly but will use them understandingly while they are inconspicuous.

So, we have suggested that there is both an element of presence-at-hand in the cultivation of virtue as well as an element of readiness-to-hand in the habitual use of virtue. This connection between Heidegger and Aristotle is finally cemented when considering this passage of Aristotle's: "Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them *as* just and temperate men do them."⁴¹ It is not enough, then, to be ready-to-hand with acting justly. To have justice show itself as a possibility is insufficient to being just. Instead, the possibility must show itself as it would to someone who is just. Or, in other words, it must show itself as a possibility insofar as this possibility discloses the human excellence of the individual in

⁴⁰ Aristotle. "Nichomachean Ethics," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 4th ed. (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1991), 1742.

⁴¹ Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics," 1746.

this circumstance. Accordingly, as we have shown relationality to be foundational to both the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, this allows us to examine an understanding of relationality as it might apply to ethical engagement.

3.3.b The relationality of ethical engagement

In the second chapter it was shown that there is a relationality to the way in which Dasein is engaged in the world. We showed that this relationality permeates Dasein's world insofar as it makes possible the ready-to-hand, the present-at-hand, and plays a fundamental role in our understanding of Dasein as both authentic and inauthentic. Given this, it is clear that such relationality will be quite important when talking specifically about ethical engagement, as well. The nature of *das Man* as the way in which Dasein merely does what one does was stressed as well. This means that Dasein, as being-with, is constituted by having the same possibilities present themselves in an everyday manner. This happens in such a way that, for Dasein, there is a readiness-to-hand with what one does. Additionally, insofar as the ready-to-hand operates in a way in which Dasein does not distinguish itself from that with which it is ready-to-hand, the nature of *das Man* remains hidden.

With this understanding of the ready-to-hand, we can now direct our attention to how it operates in the ethical engagement. In doing so we can keep in mind what Heidegger says in regard to Dasein's being as being-with allowing for the understanding of Others:

Being-with is such that the disclosedness of the Dasein-with of Others belongs to it; this means that because Dasein's Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. This understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being, which, more than anything else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible. Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially. (SZ 123, BT 160-161)

This understanding of others comes from being-with precisely because Dasein, as we saw in the second chapter, is constituted as being-in-the-world. Thus, there is no possible way that being-with cannot be a central element of Dasein's being. There is no need to even begin a discussion here of particular Dasein being linked up by being-with. Dasein is a particular kind of being, not a particular being.

With this in mind we must venture into the experience of ethical engagement.⁴² The scenario involves a very good friend of mine whom I have known for years. When interacting with this person, there is plenty which I understand. I have an understanding about the ways in which we have acted with one-another in the past. As a result I understand how I expect myself to act with my friend. I understand how I expect my friend to act. I even have an understanding how my friend expects to act, and how my friend expects me to act. Of course, this is clearly not an understanding which is present-at-hand; I most certainly do not analyze the properties of our friendship before acting with and reacting to my friend. Instead, the understanding is ready-to-hand when I am engaging with my friend. It is already allowing for our engagement from the beginning of my first interaction with this person and then built on.

Similarly, when I see my friend I experience a change in disposition as we draw near to one another. It might be as subtle as preparing to respond to our common concerns. Or, depending on our last encounter and whether or not in the meantime there has been news that is immediately relevant to our common concerns, I may suddenly find myself glad to see my friend in order to give congratulations. Just as easily, if I see my friend in a cast I will suddenly find myself with a

⁴² In isolating ethical engagement as the focus for investigation here it is necessary to consider specific examples which would be considered by the tradition as individuals, subjects, ethical agents, etc. However, in considering these examples it is of great importance to focus on the engagement and the characteristics of Dasein's being that make it possible. This will require considering the relational totalities of each particular individual, but it is important that we keep in view, the way in which a relational totality is not something that is possessed by any one person. Instead, it is the particular way in which the relationality of Dasein plays itself out and is what allows for this ethical engagement at all.

concern. These states of care are ways in which the encounter with my friend is ready-to-hand. They are the way in which I will be engaged in the encounter with my friend, and, depending on how my friend might act in response to me, my disposition will change and the way in which the encounter shows itself as ready-to-hand will vary.

With this being said, it is not the case that the encounter did not show itself as ready-to-hand when I met my friend for the first time. Depending on where and when we met, we each had expectations of how a new acquaintance should act in this encounter. From there, our subsequent interactions informed our expectations further, and the way in which I have been ready-to-hand with my friend has undergone a transformation in the same way that my understanding of readiness-to-hand with a tool changes as I become more experienced with it. There is, of course, a particular difference between the readiness-to-hand of engaging with a friend and using a tool. Insofar as the being of the type of being which is interacted with is different, the ways in which they appear as objects for engagement are likewise different. I can meet another Dasein, not as the object of concern, but as another being whose experience is also structured in concern. I can meet Dasein in solicitude. In this way, this encounter will allow a diversity of moods as engagement with the encounter of another Dasein.⁴³

Moreover, we can consider this encounter strictly in terms in relationality. We have shown that *das Man* allows for anyone and everyone to participate in the encounter as one does, and this means that Dasein is given in the self of *Man-selbst*. The way in which my friend and I are able to treat one another as something other than mere objects of concern is due to the way in which we are both Dasein as relational beings. This, however, is not sufficient for friendship. Friendship

⁴³ Below will be an investigation into the way in which dispositions can be participated in as a part of ethical engagement. Heidegger uses the term “*Mitbfindlichkeit*” which will be central to this attempt to build up the ethical power of Heidegger’s description of Dasein.

requires a particular set of similar concerns are shared between my friend and I. It requires participating in the same self. This is what our relationality allows us to do, but which is not necessarily based on relationality alone. The ability to participate in a particular self that is common to both of us is what allows for friendship. This is most readily understood regarding what we have said about inauthentic Dasein participating in *Man-selbst*. However, it is crucially important that this self common to us both is neither necessarily authentic nor necessarily inauthentic. It is merely the common ground between the particular concerns that shape the relationality of each of us. Again, we reiterate: “knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially” (SZ 123, BT 161). For Heidegger, it is precisely the element of relationality that makes this possible.

3.4 MILL

3.4.a Similarities with Heidegger

Heidegger’s analysis in *Being and Time* takes the route of finding a mood which reveals Dasein in its being. Thus, as mood is critical to Dasein, we should inquire into the relationship of mood to ethics. Moods keep us attuned with how things are going for Dasein. As Heidegger puts it, there is a, “primordial disclosure belonging to moods, in which Dasein is brought before its Being as ‘there’” (SZ 134, BT 173). This is the starting point from which utilitarianism proceeds. It sees happiness to be a mood which shows that Dasein’s being is going well for it. While Heidegger does not entertain happiness in his own project, we can consider happiness to fit the general definition of mood insofar as the insight of the utilitarian is to see happiness as a sign of a pre-understanding of the way in which things are going well in one’s being. The conclusion then, for the utilitarian, is that happiness should be maximized. Thus, we find a pre-understanding of the

way in which a certain mood is made central to an ethical theory.⁴⁴ This is the path that John Stuart Mill takes in outlining his version of utilitarianism.

On a sympathetic reading, there is plenty from Mill's thought that seems to provide a better response to the difficulties for act utilitarianism. The first is that rule utility accepts a temporal understanding of ethical engagement. Instead of focusing on how to produce the most amount of pleasure in each instance, Mill acknowledges that there is an interest of security, so that the rules that maximize happiness are those that should be adhered to by everyone.⁴⁵ Thus, because of the way in which Dasein is the kind of being which is directed toward its possibilities, rule utilitarianism seems to improve upon act utilitarianism which requires that every circumstance needs its own calculation to determine which act has the most utility. As Mill puts it, this security goes, "beyond the passing moment; since nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of everything the next instant".⁴⁶

The utilitarianism Mill is defending does exemplify an additional way in which the pre-understanding of the nature of Dasein's being through the ready-to-hand and subsequently the temporal nature of Dasein; however, it still refers to a set of rules which are present-at-hand and can be called upon to evaluate one isolated action. Mill, though, is willing to fight this conception of ethics, showing further pre-understanding of the nature of Dasein's being by attempting to connect his notion of rule utilitarianism to our everyday understanding of ethics. In concluding his proof for utilitarianism, Mill reminds us again that the will is initially constituted solely by seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Subsequently, it is through the initial engagement with pleasure and

⁴⁴ Though it is the case that defining Dasein as a pleasure-maximizing kind of being is for Heidegger a terrible misappropriation of Dasein's being, the similarity of taking a singular mood as central is what is paramount here and will allow us to overlook such a striking dissimilarity between the thought of Mill and Heidegger.

⁴⁵ John Stuart Mill. "Utilitarianism," in *Utilitarianism and the 1868 Speech on Capital Punishment*, ed. George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), 54.

⁴⁶ Mill, "Utilitarianism," 54.

pain, we tend to cultivate virtues that become habitual. Yet, it is this mood of happiness that is made central⁴⁷ in Mill's utilitarianism. The fact that it is taken as a mood that can be compared between people can be understood in terms of "*Mitbefindlichkeit*," which is the focus of our next section.

3.4.b *Mitbefindlichkeit*⁴⁸

In using the term *Mitbefindlichkeit*, Heidegger attempts to get at the way in which it is possible for Dasein, in the structure of its being, to fear for someone else. This he distinguishes from fearing about someone else. "Fearing about" is the more general way in which Dasein is afraid for itself. Because it is the condition for fearing, "one can 'fear about' without 'being afraid.'" Yet when viewed more strictly, fearing about is a being-afraid-for-oneself" (SZ 142, BT 181). This is because, as constituted in being-with, Dasein is afraid about the possibility of being torn away. "Fearing for," then, in a more particular way, "is a way of having a [disposition-with] with Others, but not necessarily a being-afraid-with or even a fearing-with-one-another" (SZ 142, BT 181).⁴⁹ This allows for what Heidegger points out in the nature of "fearing for": "this fearing for the Other does not take away his fear. Such a possibility has been ruled out already, because the Other, *for* whom we fear, need not fear at all on his part. It is precisely when the Other is *not* afraid and

⁴⁷ Even though we are considering both pleasure and pain, they are not both made central insofar as the former is given the place of priority over the latter. The happiness of pleasure is the central element of utility. It is the reason that pleasure and pain are used as opposites in order to determine which most promotes the former.

⁴⁸ The German word *Mitbefindlichkeit* is only used three times in *Being and Time* and only then in Heidegger's analysis of fear. So, it will be necessary to show quite clearly how this is not only a powerful way for us to describe Dasein's constitution but also one that will get us on the track of

⁴⁹ The best way to translate *Mitbefindlichkeit* is "disposition-with." *Befindlichkeit* is best captured by "disposition" because it is able to show well its nature as the ontological counterpart of mood. *Befindlichkeit*, then, is the way in which Dasein is attuned to its world and this then shows itself in a mood. Subsequently, the term "with" has been chosen instead of choosing "co-disposition". The purpose of this is only to emphasize that it is not a case of two individual Dasein linking up or sharing in the same disposition. Instead, the way in which we will phrase statements relating to *Mitbefindlichkeit* will be in terms of "participation in common concerns".

charges recklessly at what is threatening him that we fear most *for* him” (SZ 142, BT 181). Thus, in characterizing the nature of *Mitbefindlichkeit*, we are not in any way making a statement about a kind of group experience that everyone experiences simultaneously. Instead, it is the case that *Mitbefindlichkeit* is an existential element of being-with.

Consequently, this allows us to see more clearly the way in which Dasein-with is a mode of Dasein’s being. Insofar as Dasein is given as being-in-the-world, the possibility of Dasein-with is not given by a linking up between Dasein. Instead, it is by a participation in similar concerns. Again, we must emphasize that this analysis has nothing to do with the present-at-hand in Dasein’s understanding. It is of course possible that in participating in a similar concern with another, Dasein makes something present-at-hand; however, this is the common concern of *Mitbefindlichkeit*. In doing so, the way in which the concern is being shared is not what is being made present-at-hand. Even if one were to turn one’s attention to the relationship and the way in which concerns are shared, there would still be a participation in *Mitbefindlichkeit* insofar as Dasein is engaging the particular elements that are shared. Thus, any kind of engagement with the other has the character of a *Mitbefindlichkeit*.⁵⁰

This is precisely what makes possible Dasein’s constitution as being-with. In the second chapter, we saw how there is a relationality to the presentation of phenomena as both ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. This relationality was then shown to explain how, as being-with, Dasein has certain possibilities as anyone does. Thus, as Heidegger shows that, “a [disposition] always has its understanding” and, “understanding always has its mood” (SZ 143, BT 182), then *Mitbefindlichkeit*

⁵⁰ Again, what allows us to claim that any “kind of engagement with the other” means having the character of *Mitbefindlichkeit* is that it has nothing to do with a linking up concerns or an equal presentation of concerns to Dasein. As Heidegger says, “the Other need not fear.” So, if we are engaging with the other at all in Dasein-with, then we are encountering concerns, not as “I” and “you” separate from one another, but we are participating in the self common to us both—whether authentic or inauthentic—and experience a *Mitbefindlichkeit*.

will be a key element to discovering the understanding(-with)⁵¹ that constitutes Dasein as being-with. It is precisely with this emphasis that we see how pivotal a full explanation of *Mitbefindlichkeit* is to the possibilities of Heidegger's project in *Being and Time*. *Mitbefindlichkeit* is foundational to Dasein's constitution as being-with.

⁵¹ Heidegger's use of understanding-with (*Mitverstehen*) will be taken up explicitly in section 4.1.d

4. DASEIN AS ETHICAL: TOWARD A PRELIMINARY OUTLINE

We have now made our way through the presentation of those characteristic elements of Dasein's being and subsequently considered them in relationship to major ethical theories from the history of philosophy while looking for similarities. This examination yielded three major aspects of Dasein's being that are central to these ethical theories. The first of these aspects is related to concern and solicitude. Insofar as Kant's formula of humanity requires the ethical subject be treated in a way which is not solely instrumental it constitutes a strong connection to the distinction Heidegger makes between concern and solicitude. The second element is relationality that is fundamental to Dasein's engagement in the world as being-in-the-world. Aristotle's virtue ethics displays this relational element because virtues are cultivated through practice in a way that shapes the way particular concerns show themselves in one's relationality. Moreover, and to a lesser extent, Mill's utilitarianism displays an understanding of readiness-to-hand because of the way his presentation of security coincides with Dasein as ready-to-hand in the relationality of everydayness. Finally the third element, is *Mitbefindlichkeit*. It is exhibited in Mill, as he isolates the mood of happiness and uses it as a mood that can be compared between all ethical subjects.

Again we should bring to our attention the guiding question of this investigation: "How is Dasein ethical?" These three elements represent the starting point for drawing out how we can think of Dasein as ethical. Thus, we will consider again the first instance in which Heidegger uses the term *Mitbefindlichkeit*. This is because the particular example Heidegger uses takes into account all three of these elements we have keyed in on. As a result, the analysis of this passage in the following sections illuminates these aforementioned elements and further informs how Dasein may be ethical.

4.1 FEARING-FOR

4.1.a Fearing-for as a case foundational to Dasein

In section thirty of *Being and Time*, Heidegger considers fear as a mode of disposition. Accordingly, he outlines several points relevant to the possibility of fear for Dasein. That which is detrimental must “show itself within a context of involvements,” it must take place in a definite region that is well known but in which something does not quite seem right, it must be close but not yet within striking distance, and it must still have the possibility of passing us by (SZ 140-141, BT 178-180). As Heidegger points out, there would be nothing to fear if that which is detrimental is already at hand or will certainly occur. So, because fear is always a way of disclosing entities within the world and being-in, “fear is a mode of disposition” (SZ 141, BT 181). In other words, as a mode of disposition, fear discloses to Dasein how things are going for it as being-in-the-world.

The following passage outlines Dasein’s possibility of fearing for others. It represents a fundamental case for establishing the ethicality of Dasein.

One can also fear about (*fürchten um*) Others, and we then speak of “fearing for” (*fürchten für*) them. This fearing for (*fürchten für*) the Other does not take away his fear. Such a possibility has been ruled out already, because the Other, *for* whom we fear, need not fear at all on his part. It is precisely when the Other is *not* afraid and charges recklessly at what is threatening him that we fear most *for* him. Fearing for is a way of having a disposition-with (*Mitbefindlichkeit*) with Others, but not necessarily a being-afraid-with (*Sich-mitfürchten*) or even a fearing-with-one-another (*Miteinanderfürchten*). One can “fear about” (*fürchten für*) without “being afraid”. Yet when viewed more strictly, fearing-about (*fürchten für*) is “being-afraid-for-oneself”. Here what one is “apprehensive about” is one’s Being-with with the Other, who might be torn away from one. That which is fearsome is not aimed directly at him who fears with someone else. Fearing-about (*fürchten für*) knows that in a certain way it is unaffected, and yet it is co-affected in so far as the Dasein-with for which it fears is affected.⁵² (SZ 141-142, BT 181)

⁵² There is another passage in *Being and Time*, in which Heidegger brings up the notion of empathy (*Einfühlung*). It is merely important here to explain its absence. Given that we are interested in an understanding of pre-theoretical ethics, empathy might prove to be fruitful for our purposes. While this may be true, in relation to our current interest in filling out the way in which Dasein can be ethical, empathy simply does not aid in providing a better understanding of Dasein. Heidegger introduces it only insofar as to say that, when thought of in terms of a bridge between subjects, empathy is opposed to Dasein’s characteristic of being-with. So, while it may be the case that further investigation of

In fearing-for the other as concern, one is afraid of having one's being-with with the other taken away. The reason it is fearsome is not because Dasein's being as being-with will be taken away. Instead, Dasein must still be there as being-with without the possibility of being with the other. In other words, the particular relationship with the other can be taken away while Dasein's being as essentially being-with is unaffected. To understand this more fully we can consider what this means for Dasein in terms of those three elements of its being that we have found to be most relevant to ethics.

4.1.b Concern and solicitude in fearing-for

We have established that Dasein-with has its foundation in the shared relationality of Dasein's worldhood. Furthermore, insofar as this means that Dasein is able to participate in similar concerns and is able to experience a readiness-to-hand with them, then the possibility of solicitude is founded, not on two individuals meeting up together, but rather on a self that is not distinguished from one another. This self is the self that is constituted in relationality. Furthermore, because *das Man* is the way in which Dasein does not distinguish itself from common concerns in merely doing what anyone does, we know already the power of the way in which Dasein's selfhood is constituted in the organization of its relationality.

What is most striking about this passage, though, is that having a *Mitbefindlichkeit* is distinguished from being-afraid-with and fearing-with-one-another. This is because the possibility of taking up a concern for the other does not depend on the other actually having a similar concern. So, does this mean that the kind of care that is taking place in *Mitbefindlichkeit* is merely concern and not solicitude? It does not. This is the case because it would not be possible to take up the

Heidegger's thought might find the work of David Hume, Adam Smith, and others of great interest, such an undertaking lies outside the scope of our current investigation.

others' concerns for her without experiencing care in the mode of solicitude. In fearing for the other as solicitude, Dasein takes up the concern of the other as its own.⁵³

4.1.c The relationality of fearing-for

Subsequently, because Dasein can take up the concern of the other as its own based on participation in the common self—the self that we get from Dasein's being-with as grounded in the relationality of being-in-the-world—it follows that Dasein is ready-to-hand in its engagement with these possibilities in this relationality. There are two important points to make about this relationality. The first is that, because the relationality is constituted by similar concerns,⁵⁴ they both can have the concern appear as a possibility. However, this does not mean that the possibilities that present themselves will be the same for both. Insofar as the relationality of Dasein is not the same network of reference relations⁵⁵ as the other's network of relations, the possibilities that present themselves do not need to be the same. As we pointed out above,⁵⁶ the basic characteristic of *das Man* is its distantiality, meaning that it is concerned with what Nancy calls the “exteriority”⁵⁷ of concerns.

This concern with its distance in relation to others means that Dasein exhibits both evening out its relation to others as well as prioritizing itself in its relation to others. The former is Dasein's possibility when, “it has lagged behind Others and wants to catch up in relationship to them,” and

⁵³ In section 3.2.b we saw that Nancy express this as a “common engagement” or “co-proprietation”

⁵⁴ The particular concerns are similar because they are given by participation in what Heidegger calls a common totality. What is characteristic of the common-totality is that even if Dasein is not familiar with it, Dasein can move about it (HCT 188).

⁵⁵ This phrasing of a “network of stable signifying relations” is used by Heidegger in the *History of the Concept of Time* in order to describe the way in which relations are the same in a common totality. The point here is not in contrast to Heidegger. Instead, it merely acknowledges, with an understanding of *Mitbefindlichkeit*, that the possibilities that present themselves are not necessarily presented in the same way.

⁵⁶ Section 2.4

⁵⁷ Nancy, “Being-with,” 119.

the latter is Dasein's possibility when, "Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed (SZ 126, BT 163-164). Therefore, the self common to Dasein and the other can be participated in even though the network of signifying relations does not show itself in the same way because the relationality is understood differently by Dasein and the other. As Heidegger puts it, "'One' moves in a world with which 'one' is familiar without thereby being conversant with the particular environing world of the individual and being able to move in his world" (HCT 188). Thus, the way in which Dasein is able to fear-for the other is delimited by both the distasteful element of being-with-one-another and the way a common totality can present itself.

4.1.d *Mitbefindlichkeit* in fearing-for

At this point, the analyses of concern, solicitude, and readiness-to-hand have contributed a great deal to filling out our understanding of *Mitbefindlichkeit*. It will be useful now to consider its second use in *Being and Time*. It is in considering communication that Heidegger again brings up *Mitbefindlichkeit*. Specifically, Heidegger is considering communication to the extent that the assertion communicates as a speaking forth: "Letting someone see with us shares with the Other that entity which has been pointed out in its definite character. That which is 'shared' is our *Being towards* what has been pointed out—a being in which we see it in common" (SZ 155, BT 197). Already the element of a common concern is present in this depiction of the assertion as communication.

So, to the extent that Heidegger claims the assertion is ready-to-hand (SZ 224, BT 267), and the common concern implies a solicitude, we can already see the way in which Heidegger will be able to make the connection between communication and *Mitbefindlichkeit*. Specifically, Heidegger claims that, "in this more general kind of communication, the Articulation of Being with

one another understandingly is constituted. Through it a disposition-with (*Mitbefindlichkeit*) gets ‘shared’, and so does the understanding of Being-with” (SZ 162, BT 205). In this way, *Mitbefindlichkeit* is now not only understood as an element of the basic mood of fearing-for but also as an element of Dasein’s general kind of communication. Thus, it is not merely a secondary element of the picture of Dasein as ethically engaged. Because Heidegger uses it in relation to two particular instances of Dasein-with and because we have been able to show that *Mitbefindlichkeit* is founded in readiness-to-hand and solicitude—two elements which are constitutive of Dasein’s being-in-the-world—we can now conclude that if it is the case that Dasein is ethical then the way in which it participates in *Mitbefindlichkeit* will be central to an ethical understanding of Dasein.

The final instance of *Mitbefindlichkeit* in *Being and Time* occurs immediately following this most recent one. In the same paragraph while still discussing the general kind of communication in which Dasein makes assertions, Heidegger states that, “communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a disposition-with (*Mitbefindlichkeit*) and an understanding-with (*Mitverstehen*)” (SZ 162, BT 205). Understanding for Heidegger is an existential of Dasein’s being, one which allows Dasein to project itself on its possibilities (SZ 148, BT 188). Therefore, we understand *Mitverstehen* as the possibility for Dasein to project itself on possibilities in common totalities with the other. This means then, because we have shown *das Man* as given in common totalities, that *Mitverstehen* actually makes possible Dasein’s fallenness in *das Man*.

This does not mean we have added anything new to Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein. It merely means that this is another way that we can fill out his characterization of Dasein by pointing to connecting these elements of Dasein’s being through their connection to Dasein’s

relationality as constituted by being-in-the-world. What it does suggest, though, is that, if *Mitbefindlichkeit* is a way for Dasein to take up a mood for the other, then it might be possible for Dasein to experience the mood of anxiety for the other. In other words we might be able to come to an understanding of anxiety as an anxiety-for.

4.2 ANXIETY-FOR

Upon first glance, suggesting “anxiety-for” seems quite foreign to Heidegger’s thinking. This is because, as we have shown, Heidegger presents anxiety as that which individuates Dasein. So, how could it be possible for there to be any possibility for anxiety-for? However, we will argue that the reason it seems odd is just that, a mere semblance. Looking to Heidegger’s own words as he lays out what anxiety means for Dasein’s being, we will show that thinking of anxiety as anxiety-for is actually exactly what Heidegger means and does not represent a change in the way we think about Dasein and anxiety. This means that we will not be arguing against Heidegger’s claim that anxiety individuates Dasein. Instead, it is precisely to those passages in which he does discuss Dasein’s individualization that we turn to in order to try to understand this claim in relation to what we have just shown in our analysis of *Mitbefindlichkeit*.

In the first major passage in which Heidegger tries to give an explanation for anxiety as that which individualizes Dasein he states:

But in anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein (and Dasein is in each case mine) show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves—undisguised by entities within-the-world, to which, proximally and for the most part, Dasein clings. (SZ 190-191, BT 235)

The individualization that Heidegger is referring to is in relation to Dasein’s possibilities. So, the individualization is understood as such because Dasein in understanding its possibilities comes to

the realization that these possibilities have not been chosen by itself. Rather, they have been chosen by the self of *das Man*. In other words, in recognizing itself as the possibility of being-in-the-world, Dasein recognizes that it can now be the author of its own possibilities. The case for anxiety as individualization is strengthened as Heidegger makes the connection between anxiety in the face of which Dasein's potentiality for being is its own possibility and anxiety in the face of death. As Nancy puts it, "my death is that for which no one else can substitute his or her own care" but, this leads Nancy to a worry: "Whatever the case may be, the outcome is the same: absolute solitude in death. In this sense, there is an essential limitation to the principle of the essentiality of the *with*."⁵⁸ Our goal will not be to fully engage Nancy on this point; however, in providing a way for Heidegger to think of anxiety-for, this will constitute a partial response to Nancy.

It is the case that Dasein cannot gain an experience of the other's death, but neither can Dasein gain an experience of its own death. So, the only way Dasein can be towards death is by answering for its death by anticipating it.⁵⁹ However, this has only removed the possibility of experiencing death at all. Insofar as Heidegger makes clear that fearing-for is neither a being-afraid-with nor a fearing-with-one-another (SZ 142, BT 181), the fact that we can have neither being-anxious-with nor anxiety-with-one-another will not impact whether or not we can have anxiety-for. So, while we have not yet shown that anxiety-for is completely in accord with Heidegger's statements about individualization, we have at least shown that they are not opposed to one another.

Consequently, it is now our task to show that anxiety-for does coincide with Heidegger's assertions of anxiety as the individualization of Dasein. To do this we will stick close to the text. First, let us consider that, in anxiety, "what oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation

⁵⁸ Nancy, "Being-with," 120.

⁵⁹ This was shown in section 2.5

of every-thing present-at-hand; it is rather the *possibility* of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself” (SZ 187, BT 231). This shows us, then, that a central element of anxiety is that Dasein is oppressed by its constitution of worldhood as being ready-to-hand in the world. In other words, what becomes clear to Dasein is the way in which its being-in-the-world has the character of relationality and that this relationality is fundamental to all of its experiences.

With this we can move on to consider making a positive case for anxiety as anxiety-for. It is in discussing the fallenness of Dasein in everydayness that Heidegger mentions anxiety and its relationship to fear:

Thus the turning away of falling is not a fleeing that is founded upon a fear of entities within-the-world. Fleeing that is so grounded is still less a character of this turning-away, when what this turning-away does is precisely to *turn thither* towards entities within-the-world by absorbing itself in them. *The turning-away of falling is grounded rather in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible.* (SZ 186, BT 230)

What is centrally important in this passage is that anxiety is what makes fear possible. If that is the case, then as we just saw that Heidegger gives us an analysis of fearing-for then it cannot be the case that anxiety is devoid of an element of anxiety-for. Similarly, because Heidegger shows that Dasein exemplifies a *Mitbefindlichkeit* which pertains to fearing-for and because, again, fearing-for is grounded in anxiety, then there must be a way in which anxiety-for exemplifies a *Mitbefindlichkeit*.

This is possible because, as Raffoul shows, this individuation is not a Cartesian solipsism. Of course, the idea of a subject as disengaged from the world is exactly what Heidegger has been working to combat throughout this entire phenomenological project. So Raffoul concludes that, understood as an existential solipsism, the individualization of Dasein demonstrates that “responsibility for self will not be exclusive of a responsibility to others” which further means that

“anxiety isolates Dasein, but *as being-in-the-world and being-with-others*”.⁶⁰ It is in this way that we see that anxiety does not change Dasein’s essential constitution as being-with. Nor does it change Dasein’s possibility of Dasein-with. Additionally, because we have also shown that anxiety-for is a kind of *Mitbefindlichkeit*, then because *Mitbefindlichkeit* is a particular way in which Dasein can participate in Dasein-with and because Dasein-with is made possible because of Dasein’s being as being-with, we have found another way to show that Dasein as essentially being-with does not undergo any changes in anxiety.

Thus far, the analysis of this chapter has shown us that concern, solicitude, relationality, and *Mitbefindlichkeit*—those elements which were found to be similar to elements important to traditional ethical accounts⁶¹—are not merely superficial elements of Dasein’s being. Instead, they are elements of Dasein’s being that are considered by Heidegger to be co-original:

To say that they are co-original means that they always already belong with and to the phenomenon of care. They are ingrained in it even when they do not come to the fore-ground. These structures are therefore not optional additions to something which might from the start be akin to care without them. Nor do we have something which could be shaped into what we have called the phenomenon of care by putting these structures together. But if our inquiry is pointed toward the being of Dasein, as we have constantly done here, then whenever Dasein is interrogated, it is always already meant in the co-originality of these structures. (HCT 305)

While the structures emphasized herein are not listed by Heidegger in relation to this passage, we have worked to show that they are indeed co-original elements in Dasein’s being. So, because we have also shown that they have the ability to makes sense of traditional ethical approaches, we have provided the groundwork for a subsequent investigation into whether or not Dasein is ethical.

⁶⁰ Raffoul, *Responsibility*, 258.

⁶¹ Our analysis in chapter 3 yielded three major ways in which Dasein’s being provides grounds for productive similarities with traditional approaches to ethics.

5. CONCLUSION

We began this investigation wondering whether there might be an ethical element to Dasein. Because Dasein is meant to be an account of the kind of being that we are and because we seem to be concerned with how we treat one another, it seemed that if our understanding of Dasein cannot account for this ethical nature then it might not be a very strong account of the kind of being that we are. So, our task became threefold: to lay out the basic characteristics of Dasein's being; to find a pre-understanding of being in the history of ethics; and to show a pre-understanding of ethics in Heidegger's preliminary investigation into being.

We took as our starting point the role of intuition in ethical theory. Because the evaluation of ethical theories makes use of instances in which the act that is required of us is at odds with our ethical intuition, and because we take this as evidence against these theories, there may be some room for Heidegger's account of Dasein to explain this. Assuming that our ethical intuition does not come from any theoretical understanding of ethics, we have attempted to bring forth a proto-ethical element in Dasein's being. This pre-theoretical element was laid out in terms of Dasein's being-in-the-world first by way of the ready-to-hand and then in terms of Dasein's relationality. Thus, just as Heidegger claims that we do ontology, not because we decide to but because it is essential to the kind of being we are, we might also say that Dasein does not choose to do ethics. Accordingly, we have suggested ways in which ethics can be seen to be part of Dasein's primordial being-in-the-world. Thus, giving our ethical intuition the position of judging the value of ethical theories means admitting that the present-at-hand way in which an ethical theory prescribes what is right is a founded mode based on Dasein as being-in-the-world as relational. This admission cleared a space for our investigation to consider to what extent we can find a common ground between Dasein and ethical theory.

Because, as Heidegger claims, we cannot simply believe our pre-ontological understanding, so too we cannot accept uncritically our pre-ethical understanding that gives our intuitions. Instead, our line of inquiry pursued how it is that Dasein as being-in-the-world can even have something like a pre-theoretical understanding of ethics. While Dasein's characteristic of being-with has been an element utilized by many interested in Heidegger and ethics, our course aimed to fill-out what that would mean for Dasein. We found concern, solicitude, relationality, and finally *Mitbefindlichkeit* to offer a way into further understanding the ethical possibilities of Dasein. This allowed for new insights into Heidegger's presentation of fearing-for that lead to a novel understanding of anxiety-for. Its novelty was the way it added to what Heidegger states explicitly about anxiety. By pulling out of the text the relationship between fearing-for, fear, and anxiety, we were able to account for anxiety-for. In doing so, we showed that this does not undo any of Heidegger's analysis of anxiety, but rather, enhances it.

A significant reason for our arrival at anxiety was our insistence on leaving out any implicit assumptions about what ethics might mean for Dasein. We were careful to side neither with the way that Dasein finds itself in relating to others in everydayness nor with the way that Dasein finds itself relating to others in authenticity. In doing so, we explored those existential and essential characteristics of Dasein's being that are prior to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Because anxiety is that which discloses Dasein in its being—it discloses the possibility of Dasein's being-in-the-world—if we were to take Dasein as ethical then this defining feature of Dasein would also be important to Dasein's possibility for being ethical. There is perhaps a very fruitful investigation to be had regarding anxiety and choice in furthering an investigation of Dasein as ethical. Being able to choose not just between right and wrong but perhaps even choosing

what is right and what is wrong could be taken into consideration. In other words, a connection between anxiety and prescription may provide a way forward.

So, because we have shown that theoretical ethics and Heidegger do at least share certain similarities in elements important to each, we have shown that such an investigation is worthwhile and potentially fruitful. If it is fruitful, the attempt would then be to learn not just the ways that Heidegger's thought overlaps with other traditional figures, but rather, it would allow us to come to a new understanding of ethics from an analysis of Dasein. In this thesis the groundwork for such a project has been laid out.

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VITA

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