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# EMPIRICAL TESTING AND NOVELISTIC BECOMING Joseph Glanvill's Evidence Concerning Witches and their Familiars

Dawn Morgan

*J*ulian Cox was an old woman of seventy when she was tried and convicted of witchcraft in an English assize court in the summer of 1663. The evidence proving her to be “a Witch in general” had to do primarily with her relationship to non-human creatures. A “Huntsman” swore he received the shock of his life on chasing down a hare near Cox’s house:

[A]t last the Huntsman perceiving the Hare almost spent, and making towards a great Bush, he ran on the other side of the Bush

to take her up, and preserve her from the Dogs. But as soon as he laid hands on her, it proved to be Julian Cox, who had her head groveling on the ground, and her globes (as he exprest it) upward. He knowing her, was affrighted, that his hair on his Head stood on end.<sup>1</sup>

When the astonished hunter spoke to Cox, the old woman was out of breath and could not speak, and so offered no explanation of how she came to be under the bush at that precise moment. A second witness testified that on making a neighbourly visit to Cox, and crossing “the Threshold of her Door,” he sat down only to find “a monstrous great Toad betwixt his Leggs,” which he could not kill, despite cutting it into “several pieces” (388). Cox was unperturbed and even seemed to defend the toad, assuring her neighbor “it would do him no hurt” (388). A third witness swore that Cox made marks on the ground one day as she passed by his barnyard where he was milking his cows. As Cox “scored upon the ground,” the farmer reported that his cows “ran mad, and some ran their heads against the Trees, and most of them died speedily” (389). Suspecting his cattle of being bewitched by Cox, he is “advised to this Experiment . . . viz. to cut off the Ears of the bewitched Beasts and burn them, and that the Witch would be in misery, and could not rest until they were plucked out” of the fire. Sure enough, on burning the ears of his dead cows, Julian Cox came back to his house “raging and scolding,” and was quieted only after taking the ears out of the fire (389).

Such a “marvelous Magick Sympathy” (396) with creatures is typical of court testimony supporting prosecutions and journalistic accounts of suspected witches that, after “relative quiet” during Charles I’s reign, flared up in England during the civil war period before diminishing entirely in the eighteenth century.<sup>2</sup> Many of the witchcraft stories and much of the

<sup>1</sup> Joseph Glanvill, *Saducismus Triumphatus: or, Full and Plain Evidence Concerning Witches and Apparitions. In Two Parts. The First Treating of their Possibility. The Second of their Real Existence*, 3rd ed. (Rpt. London: Tho. Newcomb, for S. Lownds at his Shop by the Savoy-Gate, 1689), ed. Coleman O. Parsons, ed. (Gainesville: Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints, 1966), 387–88. Further page references to this work will appear in the text immediately following the quoted material.

<sup>2</sup> William E. Burns, *Witch Hunts in Europe and America: An Encyclopedia* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003), 74–75. The last execution for witchcraft in England took place in 1685; the last person convicted of witchcraft was pardoned in 1712; and the last witch trial, in Leicester in 1717, was halted by a judge’s ruling of “no true bill.” See also Ian Bostridge, *Witchcraft and Its Transformations c. 1650–c. 1750* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Stuart Clark, *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford

evidence repeats material from earlier periods, betraying their status as what we would call urban legend, and therefore their operation as genres circulating increasingly in literary form, as in the 1634 play by Thomas Heywood and Richard Brome, *The Late Lancashire Witches*, a work that contains some of the detail from the story of Julian Cox. That version derives from court evidence presented in 1633 in the legal "sequel" to the 1612 trial of ten women in Lancashire, all of whom were sentenced to hang.<sup>3</sup> Julian Cox's story is here drawn from among more than thirty "relations" of witchcraft and apparitions collected from English, Irish, and Scottish court records by Joseph Glanvill (1636–1680), an Anglican clergyman and founding member of the Royal Society. Glanvill's opening relation, an "enlarged Narrative of the Daemon of Tedworth" (321–38) also enjoyed a literary afterlife in Joseph Addison's comic drama, *The Drummer, or the Haunted House* (London, 1715), and in William Hogarth's engraving, *Credulity, Superstition, and Fanaticism*.<sup>4</sup> Like Glanvill himself, his work, *Saducismus Triumphatus*, stands at the exact intersection of modern science and the novel, yet falls outside the categories and discourses of either as they are subsequently defined.<sup>5</sup> It poses interpretive

University Press, 1997. Rpt. 2005); Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra, Brian P. Levack, and Roy Porter, *Witchcraft and Magic in Europe: The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (London: Athlone Press, 1999); Alan Charles Kors and Edward Peters, eds., *Witchcraft in Europe, 400–1700: A Documentary History*, 2nd ed., revised by Edward Peters (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); and Darren Oldridge, ed., *The Witchcraft Reader*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2008).

<sup>3</sup> Burns, *Witch Hunts*, 166–7. See also Laird H. Barber, *An Edition of the Late Lancashire Witches by Thomas Heywood and Richard Brome* (New York: Garland Press, 1979).

<sup>4</sup> See Georges Edelen, "Joseph Glanvill, Henry More, and the Phantom Drummer of Tedworth," *Harvard Library Bulletin* X (1956): 186–92.

<sup>5</sup> The title translates as "triumph over the Sadducees," that is, those who do not believe in the existence or reality of witchcraft. "Sadducism," closely allied [in Glanvill] to atheism and materialism, was the doctrine of the ancient Jewish Sadducees, who had denied the reality and immortality of the soul." Burns, *Witch Hunts*, 119. The 1681 edition of Glanvill's work appeared posthumously in the year of his death and was reprinted in 1689, 1700, and 1726. The 1689 reprint of the 1681 edition was chosen for facsimile reproduction because it is the last edition which Glanvill's colleague Henry More (1614–1687) could have corrected, and because of its continuous pagination. The following is a list of other versions and editions, all published in London, by short titles: *A Philosophical Endeavour Towards the Defence of the Being of Witches and Apparitions* (1666); *Some Philosophical Considerations Touching the Being of Witches and Witchcraft* (1667); *A Blow at Modern Sadducism* (1668); *A Blow at Modern Saducism . . .* (4th ed., 1668, a different printing from the preceding); *Saducismus triumphatus* (in some editions spelled *Sadducismus*) (1681, 1689, 1700, 1726). The reprint in Glanvill's *Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion* (London, 1676) is called "Against Modern Sadducism in the Matter of Witches and Apparitions."

difficulties both for historians of science and historians of the novel that I address through use of the “novelistic,” or, really, in Glanvill’s case, the pre-novelistic, since for him and his readers, there are no novels. I do not claim that he is a novelist or even a proto-novelist. Instead, I locate novel-like elements in this work, and find them to function in novel-like ways. Such a reading makes Glanvill comprehensible as a writer constrained to do with his material the same thing that novelists will have to do in order to gain authority for their claims to knowledge of subjective conditions.

Marion Gibson considers early modern English witch persecutions through the genre of the pamphlet. She distinguishes two types. One is predominant before 1590 and emphasizes or reproduces court records or other legal documentary sources. The other type, prevailing between 1590 and 1604, is primarily narrative re-creation of events and trials. Gibson’s concern is to calculate the literary shaping of historical events in order to produce a truer account of reality, while my concern is rather the opposite. I assume the rhetorical construction of events and attempt to specify an aspect of an historical account of the novel. Glanvill’s “Relations” are hybrids of Gibson’s two kinds of witch pamphlets. Glanvill’s text reproduces testimony from court records that is shaped to meet particular rhetorical needs.<sup>6</sup> What I offer here, then, is a reading of Glanvill as working out generic preconditions for the novel. The co-emergence of science and the novel in early modern England is widely recognized, yet mechanisms of their co-generation are rarely addressed, much less specified. The work of Michael McKeon goes furthest in locating the stabilization of the “conceptual category” of the novel in its “unrivalled power” to formulate and explain historical instabilities regarding what he characterizes as analogous “questions of virtue” and “questions of truth,” and their convergence in posing “problems of signification.”<sup>7</sup> McKeon’s preoccupation is the articulation of these instabilities in the formation of the modern novel, and development of the dialectical theoretical approach enabling such analysis

<sup>6</sup> See Marion Gibson, *Reading Witchcraft: Stories of Early English Witches* (London: Routledge, 1999), 113–17. On the development of legal genres as a precondition of the witch hunts, see Brian P. Levack, *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe* (Harlow, Essex, UK: Longman, 1987; rpt. 1995).

<sup>7</sup> *The Origins of the English Novel, 1600–1740* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 19–20. I make use also of McKeon, ed., *Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

of the operation of genres in historical context. He borrows and diverges from the work of Mikhail M. Bakhtin on the novel, finding Bakhtin more useful (that is, most dialectical) "on the microlevel, in the description and analysis of novelistic discourse," than on the "macrolevel of genre history."<sup>8</sup> In the reading of Glanvill's natural history of witches and apparitions that follows, I am able to locate the coincident appearance and mutual reinforcement of rhetorical and generic preconditions of science and the novel, not as mere coincidence, but as effects produced in the particular linguistic and sociohistorical circumstances.<sup>9</sup> I do so with the general benefit of McKeon's work, and more particularly through the use of two form-giving principles proposed and modeled in Bakhtin's "micro" analyses of the modern novel form.<sup>10</sup> The principles are (1) location of the chronotope, the representational time/space, of human character in a dynamic state of becoming, rather than as a finished or static type; and (2) location of a narratorial voice and perspective which claims to have knowledge of subjective experience, but whose uncertain access to such knowledge is productively engaged rather than suppressed. Doubt generates the possibility of alternative points of view, and even a multiplicity of perspectives, on characters and events. The narrator's claim to have access to subjective knowledge is indeed the matrix of the category of "fiction," and at the same time the basis of the novel's claim to realism, since the realist novel puts to work the fact that subjective experience really is unavailable, except as a textual operation and fictional effect. The novel's acknowledgment of doubt authorizes testing—obsessive and repeated—of the narrator's authority to tell the tale, which is then incorporated into the narrative as material. With the combination of characters represented in dynamic states of becoming, and the testing of perspectives, rather than acceptance

<sup>8</sup> McKeon, *Origins of the English Novel*, 14. McKeon discusses Glanvill in the section titled "Apparition Narratives" (83–89).

<sup>9</sup> Clark, *Thinking with Demons*, refers to Glanvill's work as "'scientific' demonology" (296 n.7), citing Jackson I. Cope, *Joseph Glanvill: Anglican Apologist* (St. Louis: Washington University Press, 1956): 62–5, 91–103.

<sup>10</sup> Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981); *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, Caryl Emerson, ed. and tr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); and *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, eds. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist and trans. Vern W. McGee (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986).



of them as given, life and its events, in the words of Bakhtin, "no longer serve as a touchstone, a means for testing a ready-made character . . . now, life and its events, bathed in the light of becoming, reveal themselves as the hero's *experience*, as the school or environment that first forms and formulates the hero's character and worldview."<sup>11</sup> Testing and becoming are thoroughly and effectively combined in the eighteenth-century novels by Defoe, Fielding, Richardson, and Sterne conventionally cited as originals of the modern genre in English. Testing of the naïf (*Robinson Crusoe*), the idealist (*Joseph Andrews*), the chaste (*Pamela*), and the eccentric (*Tristram Shandy*) "does not result in a naked exposure of them as such in the novel, but rather facilitates their becoming more like real thinking people; in these novels life is not only a touchstone, but a school."<sup>12</sup>

The recasting of individual biography as form-giving experience that Bakhtin describes had its correlative in the historical separation of the terms "experience" and "experiment" in the seventeenth-century development of experimental natural philosophy. In the work of Glanvill, as well as that of Robert Boyle and other practitioners of the new philosophy, "experience" has moved (or is moving) from forming the ground of original premises or prior assumptions to constituting the final measure, and confirmation or falsification of findings.<sup>13</sup> The received model of Aristotelean scientific demonstration had derived "conclusions deductively from premises that were already accepted as certain," as what everyone knows to be true (from experience). "[T]here was no question of testing conclusions against experience." But through the course of the seventeenth century, modern scientific method took shape in the relocation of experience to "the end of the process of deduction from the initial hypothesis."<sup>14</sup> This altered conception of experience builds in a dynamic

<sup>11</sup> Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 392-93.

<sup>12</sup> Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 393.

<sup>13</sup> Peter Dear, "Narratives, Anecdotes, and Experiments: Turning Experience into Science in the Seventeenth Century," *The Literary Structure of Scientific Argument*, ed. Peter Dear (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 135-63. On Boyle's role in developing experiment as scientific practice, see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). The classic exposition of the logic by which scientific method operates negatively to falsify its own results is Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson, 1959).

<sup>14</sup> Dear, "Narratives," 143.

instability because the necessity and possibility of testing never ends. Tests themselves can and must be tested, linked as they are to observational positioning. Conditions of measurement are calibrated with and sensitive to human testing and change. Experience thus validates the findings of (ongoing) testing through experiment, a historical shift that, among other things, necessitates differentiation of the two terms, "experience" and "experiment," in English. The English distinction between "experience," as exploited by the novelistic, and "experiment," as put to work by emergent experimental science, is "not terminologically represented—or in the same way—in many other European languages."<sup>15</sup>

The reformulation of experience registers visibly in the many seventeenth-century works that are neither scientifically modern nor novels, but that operate as laboratories in which the implications of the changed status of experience is worked out as a matter of genre. My central idea here is to propose a reading of Glanvill's work as just such a laboratory, in which historical processes of the development of generic potentials become visible and available to quite differing realms of discursive and material practice, such as novels and scientific experimentation. Genres ready-to-hand, such as the natural history in which Glanvill writes, are deformed by the changed conception of experience and experiment. In Glanvill and in works by his contemporaries, such as Thomas Browne's *Pseudodoxia Epidemica*, known in English as *Vulgar Errors* (1646), and Walter Charleton's *Natural History of the Passions* (1674), natural history becomes a genre whose own terms have become problematic, a genre that cannot take for granted but seeks out the boundaries of "nature" and "history," thereby permitting their separation in breaking with scholastic doctrine and alchemical objectives, on the one hand, and with epic, allegory, and romance, on the other hand.<sup>16</sup> In narrative court testimony as well, for example when Thomas Browne was consulted as a medical expert witness in a witch trial in Bury St. Edmunds in 1662, Browne offers his opinion

<sup>15</sup> Peter Dear, *Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 13n.4. Dear notes also the convergence of problems regarding the status of legal evidence and of experimental knowledge (124–5). See also Rose-Mary Sargent, "Scientific Experiment and Legal Expertise: The Way of Experience in Seventeenth-Century England," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 20 (1989): 19–45.

<sup>16</sup> My reading of productive tensions shaping seventeenth-century natural history is derived from Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, intro. George Steiner, trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 1998), especially 177–85.



on whether the victims "swooning Fits were Natural," thereby helping to determine the boundary between "natural" and "supernatural" phenomena.<sup>17</sup> Glanvill's contemporary Matthew Hale, as Lord Chief Justice, was similarly concerned with the boundaries of nature. In the preface to his own collection of witchcraft relations, Hale states his purpose as showing how witches' powers are "limited [that is, bounded by] the admirable providence of God."<sup>18</sup> Glanvill's colleague, Robert Boyle, like Browne and Hale, was explicit about the uncertainty regarding the boundaries of nature and the need to remain open as to where those boundaries lay. In a letter to Glanvill, he wrote that "some of the particulars you mentioned to me, as (especially) those of the insensible marks of witches, and the way of detecting them, may suggest odd speculations to a naturalist, and help to enlarge the somewhat too narrow conceptions men are wont to have of the amplitude and variety of the works of God; since, if it appear, that there are intelligent agents that are able to increase; whereas men can but determine the motions of the parts of matter, the discovery of it may advantageously enlarge our knowledge."<sup>19</sup>

Thus natural history in its seventeenth-century form was everywhere concerned to isolate "nature."<sup>20</sup> By implication, the genre sets off "history"

<sup>17</sup> Bostridge, *Witchcraft*, 80. On Thomas Browne's role in the trial, see Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England* (London: Penguin, 1973/1971), 524-25. On Browne's interesting ambivalence about witchcraft, see his *Religio Medici and Other Writings* (1642), intro. M. R. Ridley (London: Dent Everyman's Library, 1965), 34-5.

<sup>18</sup> Quoted in Bostridge, *Witchcraft*, 83. Hale's work is *A Collection of modern relations of matter of fact, concerning witches and witchcraft upon the persons of people. To which is prefixed a meditation concerning the mercy of God, in preserving us from the malice and power of evil angels. Written by the late Lord Chief Justice Hale, upon occasion of a tryal of several witches before him* (1693).

<sup>19</sup> Boyle, Letter to Glanvill (Sept. 18, 1677) in *The Works of Robert Boyle*, 6 vols, ed. Thomas Birch (Rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1966), VI: 58-59. The typically convoluted syntax of Boyle's writing, as represented in the above quote, is a feature of seventeenth-century English prose usage that I believe reinforces my argument about the productivity of the lack of (modern) clarity in revisioning and revising the boundaries of nature. Drawing on Bakhtin's vocabulary, I characterize below such language use as the "baroque discourse of pathos."

<sup>20</sup> While earlier or later scepticism about witchcraft, such as Reginald Scot's *Discovery of Witchcraft* (1584), may function in the same way to isolate nature from history, the epistemological shift seems to occur only with the preponderance of authors and works of which Glanvill's work is a part and their linkage to the Royal Society's development of material practices that follow from and legitimate the newly constrained and enabled discourse of science.

as the exclusive sphere of human action and events, but with humankind becoming distinct in a new way from animals and nature, the necessary condition for the formation of a scientific medicine, for example, able to objectify the human body for treatment, and more generally, the science that "masters" nature, or the human relationship to nature.<sup>21</sup> A telling feature that distinguished the carrying out of the witch hunts in England from those on the continent is that "the English were much more likely to associate witches with familiar spirits and animal familiars" than were people elsewhere in Europe. "In some ways, a suspected witch's relationship with the familiar occupied the place in English witchcraft belief that on the Continent and in Scotland was occupied by the relationship of the witch and the Devil."<sup>22</sup> Apparently only the Basques similarly emphasized the animal "familiar," but for them it was nearly always a toad. English familiars were sometimes toads but more commonly cats, dogs, ferrets, rats, or insects. Part of the explanation of this English emphasis on animal familiars may be that it enabled the transfer of persistent beliefs in fairies into a form more easily accommodated (however negatively) by Christianity in the context of religious sectarian conflict. Emma Wilby notes similarities in descriptions of familiars and fairies, with witches most closely resembling "fairy hobmen."<sup>23</sup> A more philosophically profound

<sup>21</sup> On the generic preconditions for establishing medicine on a scientific footing, see my "The Motions of Laughter: Allegory and Physiology in Walter Charleton's *Natural History of the Passions* (1674)," *Intersections: Yearbook for Early Modern Studies*, Vol. 9: *Spirits Unseen: The Representation of Subtle Bodies in Early Modern European Culture*, eds. Christine Göttler and Wolfgang Neuber (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2007): 293–312. The distinction between mastery of nature and mastery of the human relationship to nature is an important one but cannot be elaborated here. It is cited in Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 82–83, and derives from Walter Benjamin, "To the Planetarium" (1928) in *One-Way Street*, trans. Edmund Jephcott *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Volume I: 1913–1926*, eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 486–87. And, writing on Glanvill's work on the phenomenon of witchcraft specifically, McKeon notes how the "great and tireless argument of a supernatural reality is maintained within a succession of narrative frames and articulated there by a complex pattern of circumstantial and authenticating details—names, places, dates, events, eye- and earwitnesses, attentiveness to stylistic 'sincerity,' confirmations of good character, denials of special bias—all of which subserve the crucial aim to a natural existence; that is, to historicity" (*Origins*, 85).

<sup>22</sup> Burns, *Witch Hunts*, 74.

<sup>23</sup> Emma Wilby, "The Witch's Familiar and the Fairy in Early Modern England and Scotland," *Folklore* 111 (2000): 283–305.

element of the explanation is explored by Giorgio Agamben's critique of the form of modern "humanity" as "obtained only through a suspension of animality."<sup>24</sup> When Agamben asks "in what way—within man—has man been separated from non-man, and the animal from the human," we might recognize Glanvill's experimental demonology, and indeed the historical witch hunts themselves, as among the ways in which this separation was accomplished in early modernity. Since the human is not "a biologically defined species,"<sup>25</sup> we might see Glanvill's relations and the witch hunts as redrawing the line between human and animal, a fundamental distinction on which scientific modernity rests. For the present purposes, I develop from Agamben's suggestive work my conception of animal familiars functioning as thresholds, or markers of the threshold(s), sought by Glanvill, his fellow natural philosophers, and the received genres in which they worked—those thresholds between matter and spirit, the natural and the supernatural, nature and history, animal and human. Glanvill dwells on the case of Julian Cox at some length in an "Advertisement" following his "Relation" of her story.<sup>26</sup> In this postscript, he elicits the language

<sup>24</sup> Agamben, *The Open*, 73. Agamben's project is also political in its development of Michel Foucault's notion of "biopolitics" (15), which distinguishes Agamben's treatment of the relationship between human and animal from that of historian Keith Thomas. In *Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800* (London: Penguin, 1983), however, Thomas concurs that a "reader who came fresh to the moral and theological writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could be forgiven for inferring that their main purpose was to define the special status of man and to justify his rule over other creatures" (25). Relevant to Agamben's consideration of the "mobile border within living man" which separates human from animal, and pertinent to my study of Glanvill, Thomas notes also that it "was no accident that the symbol of Anti-Christ was the Beast, or that the Devil was regularly portrayed as a mixture of man and animal. When people saw . . . what they thought were evil spirits, it was usually in the guise of some animal: a dog, a cat, or a rat; one diarist noted the case of a man 'heaved into the water by one in the shape of a bull' " (36–37).

<sup>25</sup> Agamben, *The Open*, 12.

<sup>26</sup> The 1681 edition to which I refer, as noted, comprises, in Part II, twenty-eight "Relations" of sightings of apparitions and prosecuted cases of witchcraft, taken from court records. The "Relations" are numbered with Roman numerals from I to XXVIII. Some of the "Relations" appeared in previous editions and in some cases further testimonies and commentary are added. The 1681 edition includes also a "Continuation" to Part II. It adds six more "Relations," which begin new numbering from I to VI, constituting thirty-four "Relations" in total. Glanvill, or, in some cases, his editor, Henry More, provides narrative continuity within the "Relations," and in the more or less brief "Advertisements," variously ranting and defensive, that follow each "Relation." The "Advertisements" provide the sources of the material, the times and dates of events, where available and if they are not provided in the "Relation" itself.

of fantastic metamorphosis, then sets it aside, or rather, he disaggregates Cox's apparent transformation into operations and effects of potentially distinct forces and/or beings, distinguished on the basis of whether they are perceptible to the senses and subject to empirical detection, or whether they remain beyond the reach of physical causes and therefore susceptible to spiritual or theological explanation.<sup>27</sup> We see how his natural history seeks the threshold, the boundary between matter and spirit, nature and history, animal and human, in defending the Huntsman's testimony against skeptics and scoffers:

But that those half-witted People thought he swore false, I suppose was because they imagined that what he told implied that Julian Cox was turned into an Hare. Which she was not, nor did his report imply any such real Metamorphosis of her Body, but that these ludicrous Daemons exhibited to the sight of this Huntsman and his Dogs the shape of an Hare, one of them turning himself into such a form, and others hurrying on the body of Julian near the same place, and at the same swiftness, but interposing betwixt that Hare-like Spectre and her Body, modifying the Air, so that the scene there, to the beholders sight, was as if nothing but Air were there, and a shew of Earth perpetually suited to where the Hare passed. (393)

Note how the "Daemons" separate into "the shape of an hare" and "others hurrying on the body of Julian," that then interpose themselves "betwixt that Hare-like Spectre and her Body, modifying the Air," and throwing up "a shew of Earth," and so on, drawing now on a received vocabulary of

The "Advertisements" may also include additional commentary on the evidence presented, and further assessment of the character and credibility of the narrator-witnesses. Of the total thirty-four "Relations," only eight are accounts of witchcraft.

<sup>27</sup> Glanvill is assisted by his conviction that he practiced a proper and productive skepticism as elaborated in his earlier work, *Sceptis Scientifica: or, Confest Ignorance the Way to Science: in an essay of The Vanity of Dogmatizing, and confident Opinion: with a reply to the exceptions of the learned Thomas Albius* (London: Printed for E. Cotes, for Henry Eversden, 1665). The classical history of science with an account of Glanvill's apparently contradictory procedure and dilemma is by Moody E. Prior, "Joseph Glanvill, Witchcraft, and Seventeenth-Century Science," *Modern Philology* 30 (November 1932): 167-93. See also Stuart Clark, "The Scientific Status of Demonology," in Brian Vickers, ed., *Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 351-74.

pre-modern natural history that includes "Daemons," "Metamorphosis," and a "Spectre," then disaggregating terms into constituent elements or forces, separating the hunter's sight from what is seen, for example, and the substances of air and earth, which undergo alterations and mark the site of the event, the very site of dispute, attestation, and investigation.

The defensive tone of Glanvill's commentary—his address to "those half-witted People" who found humor but not truth in the testimony against Julian Cox—is addressed in Bakhtin's discussion of the baroque novel. I take Bakhtin's analysis to be relevant also to extraliterary baroque genres, such as Glanvill's natural history, because what Bakhtin calls the baroque "discourse of pathos" is the effect of historical conditions that impact on any and all language use of the period, in which "real-life historical forces begin to utilize abstract idealization and abstract polemics for the realization of tasks that are more concretely polemical and forensic."<sup>28</sup> Such tasks would include, of course, the legal prosecution of witches, and in Glanvill's case, the use of such forensic material to shore up the category of "spirit" in his polemic against the new authority of "matter" and "materialism." In this context, Glanvill is compelled and constrained to apply empirical method to immaterial phenomena; his writing is therefore aptly characterized as a discourse of pathos, a form of hidden polemic that is elsewhere in Bakhtin referred to and translated more colorfully as the "word with a sideward glance":

Baroque pathos is determined by modes of *apologia*, and polemic. It is a prosaic pathos, one that continually senses the resistance offered by alien discourses, alien points of view; it is the kind of pathos associated with justification (self-justification) and accusation.<sup>29</sup>

The nonphysical status and empirical inaccessibility of the precise sites of reported bewitchment or apparition—the threshold of the spiritual and material spheres on which Glanvill attempts to maintain his focus—forces him to concentrate on what *can* be empirically located: the

<sup>28</sup> Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 386.

<sup>29</sup> Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 394. The "word with the sideward glance" is discussed in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 195–97. Hidden polemics and the chronotope of the threshold are discussed together throughout the latter work (for example, see 138, 154–55).



time and place of *reported* bewitchment or ghostly encounter, and the reporting itself, the vehicle or mechanism of knowing it. He labors to locate the means for materializing such times in space in just such a discourse of pathos. His "Advertisements," as we saw above, are more or less rants and harangues against the disbelievers, sometimes referred to as "Hagg-advocates" (371), which is what he calls defenders of those prosecuted for witchcraft, such as his rival, John Webster.<sup>30</sup> Because his subject matter is the very problem of locating the boundary between "matter" and "spirit," between that which is material and representable, and that which exists only as an immaterial operation of thought, the time/spaces Glanvill's natural history locates are, precisely, "thresholds," sites where one thing is about to transform into another, which is how Bakhtin characterizes the special chronotope of becoming, the time/space of "crisis and break," the instant of change in a life, in which time "becomes instantaneous, as if it has no duration and falls outside the normal course of biographical time."<sup>31</sup> Bakhtin posits the "threshold" chronotope in the context of carnivalization, the transformational symbol-system that enters literature as it disappears from the historical public square. The time of carnival is the "moment of unfinalized transition" that becomes representable through such unstable and transitional spaces as "the stairway, the threshold, the foyer, the landing."<sup>32</sup> Such spaces take on the meaning of a point where crisis, radical change, an unexpected turn of fate takes place, where decisions are made, where the forbidden line is overstepped, where one is renewed or perishes." In threshold spaces, "the only time possible is crisis time, in which a moment is equal to years."<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> John Webster (1610–1682) was a radical protestant and a physician. He drew on Paracelsianism and Hermeticism in attributing cases of reported possession to the "natural magic" of illness or melancholy rather than to demons. Webster is the chief target of Glanvill's *Saducismus Triumphatus*. Church authorities initially denied a publication license for Webster's book, *The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft*, but Webster was, like Glanvill, a member of the Royal Society; it granted the license for the work's publication in 1677, although Glanvill and More were generally considered to have won the debate about the existence of witchcraft. On that debate, see Thomas Harmon Jobe, "The Devil in Restoration Science: The Glanvill-Webster Witchcraft Debate," *ISIS* 72 / 263 (1981): 343–56; and see James Sharpe, *Instruments of Darkness: Witchcraft in Early Modern England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).

<sup>31</sup> Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 248.

<sup>32</sup> Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 167, 169.

<sup>33</sup> Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 169.



Examination of Glanvill's "full and plain evidence" shows, first, that the witches and apparitions commonly appear at physical threshold points of entry and exit, such as gateways, doorways, and stiles, and at temporal thresholds in the change from day to night, work to rest, summer to autumn, and so on. In the repetition of such facts—the only elements that *can* be factual in nature<sup>34</sup>—and the subsequent weight they must bear in the determination of innocence or guilt, Glanvill establishes the site and threshold of encounter as the chronotope of "becoming," the representational plane of the individual at or on a threshold and therefore in an unstable, dynamic state. Of the thirty-four "Relations" that make up the "Evidence," fully two-thirds locate the encounter between human defendants or witnesses and animal or immaterial agents of some kind at an actual physical threshold that is materialized spatially, as with the neighbor startled by the toad on stepping over "the Threshold" of Julian Cox's door. In an Irish ghost story, an unnamed gentleman is threatened with being carried away by waiting spirits should he "put one Foot over the Threshold, several [spirits] standing by" on the other side (424); the story of a haunted house in Sussex concludes with the apparition of a man violating the threshold of the house on horseback. Putting "spurs to his horse," he "rode into the House up Stairs into a long Gallery" where he vanishes into a fire (434). A David Hunter, who is relentlessly pursued by an apparition, finally speaks to it on "going over a Hedge into the Highway." The threshold encounter liberates the apparition's power of speech and allows its statement of reasons for haunting him (460). Thomas Goddard similarly meets the apparition of his father-in-law "at a Style on the Highway" (399); a dead man appears to his brother "at the stile" with a certain request (417); a Deptford housemaid named Alice is persuaded to follow the apparition of her recently dead mistress "over a style into a large Field," the ownership of which prompts the corpse's return to the land of the living (419). Other threshold chronotopes include encounters at doorways and windows (Relations II, XXII, XXVI, and IV, V, and VI of the "Continuation"), gateways (Relation III: 352),

<sup>34</sup> Glanvill uses the phrase "matter(s) of fact" or "thing(s) in Fact" throughout *Saducismus Triumphatus* (73, 77, 87, 107, 273, 334, 337, 484), including at least twice in "Relation I" on the Drummer of Tedworth. On Boyle's concern also with "matters of fact," with what constitutes a fact, and the function of "matters of fact" in the development of experimental method, see Shapin and Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump*, Chapter 2.

"the Churchyard at night" (Relation IV:358), and several at the nighttime bedside (X, XII, XIII, XIX, XXIV, and I and II of the "Continuation").

These unstable zones of becoming combine with testing when the events of bewitchment or the sighting of apparitions necessarily appear to a third, usually unrelated and innocent party, who is the eyewitness, but whose testimony must be tested in turn for its independence and authority. Here Glanvill formulates the problem of the novelistic narrator who poses as a witness to the subjective experience of others, and he works out a solution in the form of a peculiar positioning and testing of the narrator. The third party's knowledge of details of the bewitched person's life, and often of the dead's unfinished business, reinforces and also complicates the narrator's credibility in testifying to the story. The question arises and must be addressed, again and again: how does he know? The narrator's credibility is thereby directly engaged and tested in the text in novelistic fashion. Typical in opening the narrator-witnesses to doubt is "Relation XIV," the account of an apparition rather than witchcraft, which indicates the preoccupation with "becoming" and "testing" in both kinds of narratives in Glanvill's collection (414-16). The ghost of a murdered man appears to the cell mate of two men suspected of killing him. The story consists chiefly of testing the credibility of the cell mate, called the "third Man." His innocence of the crime and of the accusation of guilt against his fellow inmates must be established, as does the innocence and reliability of all subsequent narrators who stand between the original ghostly vision and the narrative of the court record. More and more doubts are raised in the enumeration of proofs, however, including the fact that the first legal representative to hear the case, a justice of the peace, is the slain man's cousin, and the fact that the third man is in jail in the first place because he is a "Rogue." The atmosphere of doubt is especially highly charged because third party knowledge of secrets of the dead is elsewhere itself a mark of possession, and the third man in this case uncannily offers a more accurate description of the dead man and his fatal wounds than could someone who knew him.<sup>35</sup> The very source of this narrator's credibility, then, is the source of doubt about his motives and abilities. In this problematic relation of the narrator to the devilish material, Glanvill's

<sup>35</sup> D. P. Walker lists such knowledge among the widely accepted marks of possession in *Unclean Spirits: Possession and Exorcism in France and England in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 12.

stories, in what we can recognize retrospectively as novelistic fashion, engage their own historical preconditions in continually testing their ability to tell the tale. I refer not only to the flagrantly unreliable narrator but also to the earnest narrators of *Robinson Crusoe* and *Pamela*, whose identities are unstable and in play, rather than stable and presumed as a given, a dynamism that is engaged in the narrative and that I take to be a defining feature of the novel in its modern form.

Several kinds of testing are deployed in Glanvill's relations, the first two of which have literary antecedents in accounts of saints' lives and other genres of Christian narrative. The idea of trial in narrative, according to Bakhtin, "underwent a change in early Christian legend, saints' lives and confessional autobiographies, where it was usually united with the idea of crisis and rebirth":

The organizing idea of trial was given specific content in the enormous hagiographic literature of early Christians, and later in medieval lives, on the one hand by the Christian idea of martyrdom (trial by suffering and death) and on the other hand by the idea of temptation (trial by seduction) . . . As the novel continues to develop, the idea of trial preserves its overwhelming organizational significance, filling up with various ideological content depending on the era and all the while maintaining its links with tradition—but with now one, now another line of development predominating (ancient, hagiographical, Baroque).<sup>36</sup>

The first and most recurrent kind of testing in Glanvill's "Relations" derives explicitly from such Christian sources and involves the Devil or other immaterial agent, a witch possessed or a ghost, approaching and knocking at the door with a specific request, usually for food. The analogue is the New Testament's "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares" (*Hebrews* 13:2), the test of charity that Christians must be prepared for at all times. This test is nearly always linked to the second kind of testing, that of the trial by punishment and torment resulting from turning away the stranger and wrongly denying the request. The trial is survived only through steadfastness and consistency in confronting various torments whose sources are more or less mysterious,

<sup>36</sup> Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 388-89.

and that therefore give rise to a third sort of testing with antecedents both in Christian narrative and in the annals of witch persecution from the Middle Ages, but that takes a distinctive shape in its linkage to the seventeenth-century form of experiment. It involves the testing and exposure of the relationship between the accused and the victim or physical matter, and between the accused and sacred texts. A fourth, related kind of testing involves replication of such effects at will, also an articulation point with early modern empirical method.<sup>37</sup> A fifth kind shifts attention away from the subjects, objects, and events, and toward the witnesses whose *experience* attests to the veracity of the account as well as the events' occurrence. This idea of "testing the hero, of testing his discourse, may very well be the most fundamental organizing idea in the novel, one that radically distinguishes it from the epic," writes Bakhtin. By contrast, "in the epic world, an atmosphere of doubt surrounding the hero's heroism is unthinkable."<sup>38</sup>

The chronotopes of becoming and all of the above kinds of testing are present in the notorious case of Florence Newton's witchcraft upon a young woman, Mary Longdon, a case Glanvill takes from Irish court records of 1661.<sup>39</sup> The time of the first meeting between Newton and Longdon is the Christmas season of 1660. Newton, a poor, elderly woman, knocks at the door where Longdon works as a servant and asks for food. Longdon potentially fails the test of charity by refusing to give away "her Master's" food (373). Some time later, Newton confronts Longdon at the threshold site of a well where the younger woman fetches water, and Newton kisses Longdon against the younger woman's wishes. Longdon suspects Newton of bewitching her when she subsequently begins to suffer strange symptoms. Throughout the ensuing preoccupation of testing Newton for the practice of witchcraft, Longdon too is tested through her

<sup>37</sup> Such tests proliferate, as we shall see, and were similarly inconclusively dwelt upon in the 1662 Bury St. Edmunds case for which Thomas Browne was consulted, according to the court record published in pamphlet form as *A Tryal of Witches Held at the Assizes held at Bury St. Edmunds* (1691). The problems of evidence that I find to be so productive in terms of genre and modern subjectivity likely contributed to the decrease in witch persecutions toward the end of the seventeenth century, which was "accompanied by a rise in judicial doubts, not so much about the existence of witchcraft but about the possibility of proving it in court." See Burns, *Witch Hunts*, 75.

<sup>38</sup> Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 388.

<sup>39</sup> "Relation VII," the account of Florence Newton and Mary Longdon, appears between 372–86. Newton was first imprisoned in Youghal, County Cork, on March 24, 1661. She was tried, apparently for the first time, at the Assize Court on September 11, 1661.

suffering, for did she turn away an angel or a demon? Indeed, the focus of testing switches back and forth between the two principals, or antagonists. Newton is examined for marks on the skin, such as warts on the nose, where the Devil might be presumed to be sucking or infusing his "Familiar," and she is asked to recite the Lord's prayer. A true witch will be unable or will refuse to utter the words, "and forgive us our trespasses" (377).<sup>40</sup> A witness named Edward Perry, having "read of a way to discover a witch," testifies that he proceeded to try it out on "Goody Newton," in the course of which is discovered the telltale unnatural relationship between the accused and physical materials to which she is in close proximity:

And so they sent for the Witch, and set her on a Stool, and a Shoemaker with a stong Awl endeavoured to stick it in the stool, but could not till the third time. And then they bad her come off the Stool, but she said she was very weary and could not stir. Then two of them pulled her off, and the Man went to pull out his Awl, and it dropt into his hand with half an Inch broke off the blade of it, and they all looked to have found where it had been stuck, but could find no place where any entry had been made by it. (388)

The absence of any mark left by the awl is suspected of being related to the proximity of Florence Newton, but of course the absence of the exact linkage or of a visible sequence of cause and effect means that the test simply provides more material requiring testing: the stool, the awl, its blade, and all the witnesses who can testify to the physical change in the awl blade and the absence of any other visible cause for such a change, the "association" of Newton with the blade, and the very sequence of events. Such unending testing of physical material opens up because of the failure or breakdown of what we might call the received dogmatics of signs. For Glanvill and his readers, the damaged awl blade potentially portends the uncanny or unnatural manipulation of matter by Florence Newton. The meaning of the sign of the damaged blade appears not as a certainty, but as a possible meaning that must be tested further.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Julian Cox had trouble pronouncing the passage, "Lead us not into temptation." Glanvill dismisses the prayer recitation test. He found it unreliable because of the variance of biblical passages that caused difficulties for different witches (398-99).

<sup>41</sup> Medical practice similarly was put on a modern scientific basis only once this received



The fourth kind of testing, the willful replication of effects, is the most crucial for the investigator of witches because the most potentially decisive in terms of legal proof, key to the link between empirical testing and the novelistic narrator, and, often in Glanvill's stories, to Agamben's "caesura" that separates "animality from the humanity which takes bodily form in it."<sup>42</sup> This kind of testing involves determining whether bewitchment has taken place by reproducing at will the relation between the witch and the bewitched. Replication would seem to be decisive in proving the operation of immaterial spirits in and on natural phenomena, yet it becomes problematic because the human subjects, both witch and bewitched, straddle the divide of natural and supernatural phenomena (that is, they are physical creatures with an immortal soul), and because the narrator of results and effects is subjectively inaccessible. In this well-known case, Mary Longdon turns pale when ordered to look at Newton in the court room (373) and collapses when Newton, "betwixt the heads of the By-Standers that interposed betwixt her and the said Mary," returns the gaze (375). According to a Roger Moore and a Thomas Harrison, whose credibility is laboriously attested to, Newton makes an "angry violent kind of motion . . . as if she would intend to strike at her," and mutters, "now she is down" (375). Longdon duly falls into a fit or trance and is removed to a nearby house, away from the eyes of the court, where she vomits pins, straw, and wool that are returned to the courtroom as further physical evidence to be examined and categorized as either "natural" or "supernatural," or as evidence of the linkage between the two. Mary recovers only when, without her knowledge ("as witnesses affirm"), Newton is put into bolts, whereas previously she had been held only by manacles (376).

While all of these incidents would seem to be conclusive, it is precisely in the relation of such repeatable and reciprocal effects that Glanvill's narrator registers novelistic unease in the narration. More and more proof is called for to verify the credibility of more and more witnesses and the proofs offered. The text is generated—it gets longer and longer—in the repetition

system of signs was rendered opaque rather than telling, and so subject to testing, as it is in Robert Boyle's 1663 essay, "Containing Some Particulars Relating to the Semeiotal part of Physick," in *Some Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *The Works of Robert Boyle*, 6 vols, ed. Thomas Birch (Rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1966), II: 89–103.

<sup>42</sup> Agamben, *The Open*, 12.



and elaboration of such proofs. For even though the effects on Longdon and Newton seem to be externally verifiable evidence of bewitchment, as they are intended, still they are based on Longdon's word and the testimony of witnesses to her symptoms as externally observed. Longdon's testimony remains a subjective interpretation of subjective experience, and is therefore never entirely trustworthy on its own. This section of the narrative is riddled with qualifying comments in parentheses that point to the problem, such as "as the Deponent was told" (375), "as was seen and observed by W. Aston" (375), and "as was sworn by some that observed her" (376). Even Longdon herself must rely on the reports of family and neighbors for confirmation and explanation of the part of her bewitchment that transports her, without her knowledge, from her own bed into other rooms, into other beds, into chests, and even onto the roof beams of the house (374). Precisely this atmosphere of doubt means that further testing is required both of the "evidence" and the narrator(s) of the testimony.

Yet another test, in an increasingly grisly and carnivalesque proliferation of witnesses and examinations, is devised by a Nicholas Pyne and the already-mentioned Edward Perry. These two men, along with others, remove a tile from the prison wall next to where Florence Newton languishes. They take the tile to Mary Longdon's house, where they put it in the fire until it is red hot, "and then dropt some of the Maid's water [urine] upon it" (380). The witch, back in her prison cell, "was then grievously tormented, and when the Water was consumed she was well again." But this test does not stand on its own merits, as Edward Perry and several other witnesses are called on to verify Pyne's relation of the story. Each witness adds details to the account. None deal with the question of how Newton's reaction was observed if all the witnesses were, as they say, in Mary Longdon's house with the sizzling wall tile. Even though no one deals with this problem, Perry and a few others go so far as to say not only that Newton was tormented when the "Maid's water" was dropped onto the tile, but also that in response to the torment it caused, Florence Newton confessed.

But no matter—a confession is just another piece of evidence that must be tested. Still another test is concocted and described by a Mr. Wood, a Minister, who, it is explained, heard of Longdon's case, met with her brother, and then accompanied him to see Mary on the occasion of her next fit (382). (The question arises: why was he interested? Because he, like Edward Perry, had a theory about witches?) Wood wants to test Longdon's story by bringing Newton into her presence and observing the effect. Newton, however, refuses to come. The mayor of the town (whose name, handily, but somewhat

suspiciously, is the allegorical "Richard Mayr") appears just then, presumably because he has the authority to cause Newton to be brought to Longdon's house. When the two women are once again in close proximity, Longdon immediately falls into a fit, as the narrator reports:

And still when the Witch was out of the Chamber, the Maid would desire to go to Prayers, and he [Mr. Wood] found good affections in her in time of Prayer, but when the Witch was brought in again, though ever so privately, although she could not possibly, *as the Deponent conceives*, see her, she would be immediately senseless and like to be strangled, and so would continue till the Witch were taken out, and then though never so privately carried away, she would come again to her senses. (382; italics added)

Wood testifies that he tries this several times "with all possible privacy, and so as none could think it possible for the Maid to know either of the Witches coming in or going out" (382). The mayor ("Mayr") verifies this and other elements of the witnesses' stories. He adds a description of a similar test he carried out on Newton concerning "three Aldermen in Youghall, whose children [Newton] had kist, *as he had heard them affirm*, and all the Children died presently after" (383; italics added).

While this evidence is quite enough, finally, to convict Florence Newton, the legitimacy of convicting her is apparently still in need of justification. Glanvill provides it in a concluding account of David Jones, a gentle sceptic who voluntarily stands guard outside Newton's prison cell one night, a month after her conviction, in order to "see whether he could observe any Cats or other Creatures resort to her through the Grate, as 'twas suspected they did" (385). The appearance of these creatures was an agreed upon sign of the witch's guilt, but Jones's initiative a full month after Newton already had been convicted and imprisoned indicates how all such signs now serve to invite more testing. Jones's wife and the man who accompanied him on the night-watch testify that after Jones attempted several times without success to teach Newton the Lord's prayer through the grate, she "feigned" gratitude to him "and told him she had a great mind to have kist him, but that the Grate hindred, but desired she might kiss his Hand" (385). Jones lets her kiss his hand, which gives him a "great pain in that Arm" (384), as if Newton "had him now by the Hand, and

was pulling off his Arm" (386).<sup>43</sup> Jones ends up condemning Florence Newton, and the narrator-witness reports his words: "Do you not see the Old Hag how she pulls me? Well, I lay my Death on her" (386). Two weeks later, Jones is dead. Newton is again indicted, at least in Glanvill's text, and the "Relation" ends with testing beginning all over again, with four different witnesses attesting to Jones's story.

Having opened and reopened seemingly infinite prospects of testing, Glanvill's "Relations" typically end more or less inconclusively, as here, and often without reference to the fate of the accused, the victims, or the witnesses, as if to acknowledge that their occupation—their materialization—and testing of the threshold between matter and spirit, nature and history, animal and human, is of greater significance, as I believe it is, than any alleged witchcraft or its consequences. The case of Florence Newton, the "Witch of Youghal," is one of the best known Irish cases, yet Newton's fate is undocumented and remains unknown.<sup>44</sup> Based on the present reading, we could conclude David Jones's story by noting how Jones, or at least the pain in his arm, survives the historical demarcation of matter and spirit in a fictional, novelistic sense as a character at the threshold, in a state of becoming. Like the apparent interchangeability of Julian Cox and the hare, the appearance of the great toad "betwixt the Leggs" of Cox's visitor, and the milk cows dashing their brains against trees, Jones's sore arm and deadly encounter mark the threshold that Glanvill seeks to locate, verify, and stabilize. The fly that sucks at the "Poll" of Elizabeth Styles each afternoon at four (351), the hedgehog that sucks Christian Green's breast at 5 p.m. (365), and the cat that visits Alice Duke daily at dusk (361) also materialize the threshold and leave wounds, like the pain in Jones's arm, that mark the sites to be dwelled upon, worried over, tested as evidence. On examining the head of Elizabeth Styles, where the fly was found to be sucking, a Nicholas Lambert testified that he found the spot to be "very red, like raw Beef" (357). Then an Elizabeth Torwood and four other women testified that they too examined Styles's head and found "a little rising which felt hard like a kernel of Beef" (357). The identification and

<sup>43</sup> The page numbers cited are out of sequence due to my quotation from versions by two different witnesses within the "Relation."

<sup>44</sup> Burns, *Witch Hunts*, 145. Newton might have been executed, she might have died in prison, as Elizabeth Styles seems to have, before an execution could take place, or she might have been released in a cloud of forensic doubt.

naming of these witnesses, indeed their seemingly endless proliferation, their physical verification of the wounds, and the concomitant doubts about that verification and the quality of the character of such witnesses, is the point of intersection of empirical testing and novelistic becoming, a mechanism of the co-generation of modern science and the novel.