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The Impact of Individuals on Foreign Policy Decision Making.

Robert Scott Crichlow

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUALS ON FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor in Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by

Robert Scott Crichlow
B.S.F.S., Georgetown University, 1993
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1996
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ABSTRACT

In this project I investigate how the psychological characteristics of key political leaders, their beliefs and personality traits, affect foreign policy. I use a multi-method approach. This includes both statistical analyses involving quantitative measures of leaders' psychological characteristics and policy preferences, as well as qualitative case studies of foreign policy decision making. I investigate two primary questions. First, what relationships exist between the psychological characteristics of political leaders and their policy preferences in times of international conflict? Second, how are the views of presidents and prime ministers reconciled with those of their key advisors in the creation of a national foreign policy? I investigate these questions through an examination of sixteen foreign policy decisions that were made by eight governments in three countries, the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom.

I find a number of linkages between the psychological characteristics decision makers and their policy preferences. Having personality characteristics like high levels of distrust and a high need for power made it more likely that a decision maker would support conflictual policy options. Individuals who saw the world around them as more cooperative, were more willing to take risks, and perceived themselves as having the ability to affect historical development were more likely than others to favor cooperative policy options, as were those who saw the world as basically predictable. The dominant analogies that decision makers relied on when making decisions and their images of their opponents appear to have affected their policy preferences as well. The linkage between

psychological characteristics and policy preferences appears to be particularly strong for those decision makers who have expertise in foreign policy and a well-developed belief system about the nature of world politics. These same psychological characteristics and policy preferences in turn affect the proposals that decision makers choose to adopt as official state policy.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

If the general public has a popular image of the manner in which foreign policy is created, surely one aspect of that understanding is that top-level decision makers who are charged with setting and implementing foreign policy have the ability to make a powerful personal imprint on world politics. There seems to be a general belief that many of the decisions that have shaped our world could have turned out quite differently if different people had been setting policy during key periods. This belief about the way foreign policy is created is quite understandable. Most of the books the average person might have been exposed to on the topic, including well-known titles like *The Best and the Brightest* (Halberstam 1972), *The Wise Men* (Isaacson and Thomas 1986), and innumerable memoirs and biographies focusing on the behaviors of high-level government officials, have conveyed the idea that the world we live in is largely shaped by the individuals who lead us. Much of the news media focuses on this influence on world affairs as well.

This viewpoint has been reinforced by the fact that in some cases the actions advocated by leading government officials, men who largely guided national policies during periods of international upheaval, seemed so unique from those pursued by their contemporaries, and appeared to be closely tied to their personal characteristics. One is left wondering how history might have developed differently if other individuals had been in charge of setting policy. For example, the decision to land United Nations troops at Inchon, the Israeli policies leading up to the invasion of Lebanon, and the course of U.S.

policy in Vietnam have been attributed largely to plans pushed by Douglas MacArthur (de Rivera 1968), Ariel Sharon (Maoz 1990), and Henry Kissinger (Walker 1977), respectively. Questioning how differently world politics might have developed if different individuals had been in these decision makers' positions of authority leads to all sort of interesting counterfactuals (Fearon 1991; Lebow 2000; Tetlock and Belkin 1996), some with seemingly small impact on history, but others with potentially enormous consequences. Take, for example, the counterfactual that Woodrow Wilson lost his reelection race in 1916, a highly plausible counterfactual given that he won with the narrowest Electoral College victory of any presidential candidate between 1876 and 2000. Given that "all his successors have been Wilsonian to some degree, and subsequent American foreign policy has been shaped by his maxims" (Kissinger 1994:91), one is left to wonder how differently our world might be now if he had not played his influential role at the conclusion of World War I.

Adherents to this school of thought, that individual decision makers have a highly personal effect on world politics, believe that if we want to understand why decision makers favor particular policies and order the specific actions that the states and organizations they lead carry out, we should investigate variation in the personal characteristics of political leaders. By examining what type of people hold high office, the nature of their backgrounds, their beliefs, their images of other political actors, and other similar characteristics we can better understand and predict the behavior of foreign policy decision makers (Neustadt and May 1986). Since decision makers "never respond to the actual event or situation", but instead to their own view of it (de Rivera 1968:31),

it is worthwhile to study who they are and how they see the world if we hope to understand why they act as they do.

There are many examples of research supporting the position that in order to understand foreign affairs we must understand the individuals who make policy decisions. Some scholars have even gone so far as to bring up what might appear to many to be the minutiae of the daily lives of past decision makers to underline their point that the political behavior of powerful individuals' was powerfully affected by certain core personal characteristics. For example, knowing that the Marquis of Salisbury was "overweight and rumpled in physical appearance" (Kissinger 1994:178), or that Robert McNamara attended the University of California at a time when rationalism and scientific methodologies dominated academic discourse in Berkeley (Twing 1998) might not immediately appear to add to our understanding of their behaviors in office. But in so far as such characteristics are symptomatic of the way that decision makers think about the world, their particular set of goals and motives, and the strategies and tactics that they wish to use to achieve those goals, presenting such attributes can still be used to colorfully illustrate the point that world affairs are highly dependent upon the particular individuals charged with directing a country's foreign policy. While the Marquis of Salisbury's personal appearance may not have been important in and of itself, it was indicative of his behavior as a traditional, status quo Tory peer, and understanding how he saw himself and wanted others to view him informs us of the types of things he hoped to achieve in office. Understanding how Robert McNamara learned to think informs as to how he thought about, framed issues, and evaluated competing policy options during his tenure as Secretary of Defense.

Of course, one does not necessarily need to accept a particular author's asserted reasoning as to the source of a key decision maker's belief system and personality traits to be moved by the basic concept of foreign affairs being primarily determined by the personal characteristics of those individuals charged with making national decisions. This is an idea that resonates with many people. But while it is a popular concept, is foreign policy really made this way?

One would have good reason to doubt this proposition. While the idea might be popular in the general public, much of the academic literature in international relations holds that other factors direct foreign policy. The major theories of international relations tend to greatly prioritize the influence of broad forces. These include structural, societal and organizational influences such as the balance of power and alliance systems (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Huth 1996; Layne 1993; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979), a state's need to maximize its security or power (Gilpin 1984; Morgenthau 1948), the pressures of bureaucratic influences (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999; Betts 1977; Halperin 1974) and domestic politics (Hagan 1987; James and Oneal 1991; Milner 1997; Morrow 1991; Snyder 1991), cultural affinities and regime types (Dixon 1994; Doyle 1986; Lai and Reiter 2000; Maoz and Russett 1993; Moravscik 1997; Rummel 1983; Weart 1994), ethnic similarities and differences (Cottam and Cottam 2001; Henderson 1997), and international institutions (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995; Keohane and Nye 1977; Young 1986). Theories focused on these factors are premised on international behavior being the product of group interests or systemic attributes. Consequently, they have either given

little weight to the impact of decision makers on foreign policy, or ignored them altogether.

However, a growing literature has provided increasing support for the position that world politics is significantly affected by the psychological characteristics of the men and women who make foreign policy decisions. Some of these works follow in the long tradition of descriptive case studies that stress the personal characteristics of leaders and how they affect the political behavior of key decision makers (Cottam 1992; Khong 1992; Larson 1985; Starr 1984; Swansbrough 1994; Twing 1998). There is also a growing body of literature, heavily influenced by work in psychology, in which scholars are finding considerable support for this linkage between psychological characteristics and foreign policy behavior by rigorously testing quantitative models of decision making (Herrmann 1986; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Suedfeld and Bluck 1988; Walker and Schafer 2000; Walker, Schafer and Young 1998). This work has so far been quite promising. This project adds to this growing literature by providing a systematic test of the linkage between the psychological characteristics of decision makers and foreign policy behavior. I test this relationship across a diverse set of cases and a diverse sample of decision makers, including not only national executive leaders, but also their top foreign policy advisors.

Existent Literature on the Influence of Decision Makers' Psychological Characteristics on Foreign Policy

More and more research is being produced that suggests focusing solely upon the influence system or state-level variables, or upon group interests like class, nationality, ethnicity or bureaucratic affiliation, excludes a key set of factors in the creation of

foreign policy. This work holds that international behavior may be powerfully influenced by the psychological attributes of key individuals in world politics. This position may not appear shocking. After all, “state action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers” (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1969:202). But providing precise, systematic evidence that leaders are more than simply the personification of some larger force has been contingent upon creating reliable, valid measures of leaders’ key personal characteristics. That process has been slow to come to fruition, and is further complicated by the fact that it is often impossible for scholars to directly observe and analyze the psychological characteristics of national political leaders. But over time a body of literature has begun to form that provides theoretical and empirical support for the validity of a number of measures of leaders’ personal attributes, as well as preliminary findings linking these characteristics to particular preferences and behaviors.

Scholars interested in the role that the psychological characteristics of key decision makers have in shaping international affairs have approached this subject from a number of angles. Some of these studies have been aimed at explaining the behavior of a single individual, while others have focused on the behavior of a particular administration, and of course some have examined large numbers of decision makers to test the generalizability of these effects. The effects of a wide variety of influences have been investigated. Some investigators have focused primarily on cognitive phenomena, topics like beliefs and perceptions that provide insights into how individuals consciously structure the world around them. Others have studied the impact that the personality traits of decision makers have on their political behavior.

Another divide in this literature concerns the methodologies used by the practitioners examining these topics. Some investigators, particularly trained historians, have used traditional content analysis techniques that involve an extensive review of primary sources to provide detailed descriptions of the backgrounds and behaviors of key leaders and their advisors. These measurement techniques are particularly associated with investigations of a number of psychological characteristics that seem to be best subdivided into categorical groups. Three prominent examples of these characteristics are briefly described below.

Several investigators have stressed the importance that analogies have on the development of foreign policy. By focusing on the impact of analogies researchers are focusing on the way individuals structure the world around them and turn to particular past events as reference points to guide them in making decisions about the future. Scholars investigating why international leaders acted as they did in a wide variety of situations and across a broad range of issue areas have found evidence that their behavior was substantially influenced by the historical analogies they relied upon to try and better understand the situations they faced (Goldgeier 1994; Hemmer 1999; Hybel 1990; Khong 1992; Jervis 1976; May 1973; Neustadt and May 1986; Smith 1972). Seeing an event as similar to one in the past, their preferences and actions were affected by the lessons each “learned” from that past event. Studies in this area can provide key insights into the causes of past political events. But they can also provide important information that can help us predict future political behavior as well. If we understand the personal perceptual lens of a current decision maker, and the analogies they are likely to rely on,

this literature suggests that we will have a key clue to the choices and decisions they are likely to make in the future.

Another vein of this research involves the effect that the images of leaders have on international affairs. An image is a political actor's "view of itself and its universe" (Boulding 1959:120). "Once formed, these cognitive constructions become filters through which information passes" (Young and Schafer 1998:81). Having different images of another political actor can lead to attributing it with quite different motives and interacting with it in opposite ways. Leaders' images have been found to impact international relations in a variety of settings including relations between the US and the USSR, US actions in Latin America, and relations between Iran and Iraq (Blanton 1996; Cottam 1986; Herrmann 1986, 1988; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Holsti 1970).

A decision maker's interpersonal style has also been connected to the political behavior they exhibit in office. This characteristic represents the manner in which an individual interacts with others. This involves a variety of facets of interpersonal behavior, for example, whether a person is introverted or extroverted. Grounding their research in interpersonal generalization theory, Lloyd Etheredge (1978) and Graham Shepard (1988) have found evidence that patterns of intra-elite policy disagreements at the highest levels of the U.S. government from 1900-1984 were at least partially the product of the interpersonal styles of key leaders. Etheredge (1978) and Graham (1988) found that officials with high-dominance personalities were more likely than others to advocate the use of force. Additionally, Etheredge (1978) found that extroverts were more likely than others to advocate cooperative policies.

Other scholars interested in the effect that the beliefs and personality traits of national leaders and their key advisors have on political behavior have investigated the issue using a somewhat different approach. Drawing upon work in a variety of disciplines, notably political science, psychology and communications, these investigators built quantitative measures of several key psychological characteristics. These new tools allow us to measure an individual's core beliefs and personality traits much more reliably than we were able to previously. This advance also allows us to include these measures in statistical models. We are therefore able to rigorously test the effects of these variables while controlling for the impact of other influences on political behavior. It is fair to say that the creation of these new measures has revolutionized the study of the impact that the psychological characteristics of political leaders have on their behavior.

Much of the early work in this area was necessarily focused on establishing the validity of the operationalizations of these measures of decision makers' psychological characteristics. Therefore, inquiries into this topic have frequently been aggregate studies, focusing upon a large group of elite individuals such as US senators (Tetlock 1981), a collection of heads of government (Hermann 1980, 1984) or members of the British parliament (Tetlock 1983). This approach has been used so that the findings can be established as largely generalizable. But some of these tools have also been refined in studies designed to enrich our substantive knowledge of particular political leaders such as George H. W. Bush (Schafer, Young and Walker 1996; Winter 1993), Jimmy Carter (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998), Bill Clinton (Schafer and Crichlow 2000), Mikhail Gorbachev (Winter, Hermann, Weintraub and Walker 1991), John F. Kennedy (Marfleet

2000), Lyndon Johnson (Walker and Schafer 2000), Shimon Peres (Crichlow 1998), Yitzhak Rabin (Crichlow 1998), and Ronald Reagan (Weintraub 1986).

Measures have been created to scale a variety of leaders' psychological characteristics. These include both cognitive phenomena, such as one's beliefs, perceptions and how they consciously structure the world around them, and personality attributes. Personality attributes include leaders' psychological needs and other matters related to emotional predispositions. These involve unconscious impulses that affect individuals' social interactions and political choices. Below I discuss the most prominent cognitive and personality characteristics that have been examined in this literature. I include all of these measures in the analyses I conduct later in this work.

One area of this research that deals with the impact of leaders' cognitive processes is the literature on leaders' operational codes. A leader's operational code essentially represents his or her answers to a set of questions about the fundamental nature of international affairs. Some of these questions deal with the leader's views about the basic nature and characteristics of the political universe. For example, is the political universe basically cooperative or conflictual? Or to what degree is history shaped by chance? Other questions address issues dealing with an individual's tendency to rely on particular behavioral tendencies when confronting challenges in the realm of foreign policy (George 1969). For example, what strategies and tactics does an individual tend to favor? While once chiefly applied to the study of collective bureaucratic and political organizations (Merton 1940; Leites 1951; Leites 1953), for example the Soviet Politburo, it has come to be firmly associated with the study of individual leaders. This approach has been used to study a wide variety of political

leaders such as Dean Acheson (McLellan 1971), George H. W. Bush (Schafer, Young and Walker 1996), Bill Clinton (Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Schafer, Young and Walker 1996), Frank Church (Johnson 1977), John Foster Dulles (Holsti 1970), Lyndon B. Johnson (Walker and Schafer 2000), John F. Kennedy (Marfleet 2000), Henry Kissinger (Starr 1984; Stuart and Starr 1981; Walker 1977), and Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin (Crichlow 1998). Leaders' operational codes have been found to have a key influence on their behavior. For example, in a study of U.S. policy creation during the Vietnam War (Walker 1977), the pattern of decisions by the United States to pursue more aggressive or conciliatory tactics at particular times was found to closely mirror predictions based on the preferences and beliefs of Henry Kissinger. In another study (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998) changes in the foreign policies of the Carter administration over time were found to reflect changes in Carter's operational code. This included finding a predicted pattern of change by issue area. Carter's beliefs changed over time to reflect new information he learned as he interacted with other political actors.

Several researchers interested in the role of key individuals on foreign policy have focused on the impact of a leader's conceptual complexity. This variable is focused on how an individual structures his or her cognitions. It differentiates between individuals according to whether they have a complex understanding of the world that allows for a considerable amount of ambiguity or whether they rely upon a few set categories to classify their surroundings. Variation in this characteristic has been linked to a wide variety of phenomena. Several studies have shown that decision makers who exhibit lower levels of complexity are more likely than others to prefer conflictual policy

options, while more complex decision makers are more likely to favor cooperative behavior (Hermann 1977, 1980, 1984; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Suedfeld, Wallace and Thachuk 1993; Tetlock 1981). These findings have been augmented by research showing that situations that led to military conflict were preceded by periods during which the complexity level of government officials involved in choosing to launch attacks declined (Suedfeld 1981; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977; Suedfeld, Tetlock and Ramirez 1977; Wallace, Suedfeld and Thachuk 1993). Additionally, once forced into a fight, the complexity levels of decision makers in nations that have suffered from surprise attacks fall after their country has been assaulted (Suedfeld and Bluck 1988). National leaders who have low levels of complexity are more likely to create advisory systems that are formal, hierarchical, and stifle intra-administration dissent, while those with higher levels of complexity are more likely to favor more open advisory processes (Preston 1997). This can have an important impact on international relations as investigations into the groupthink phenomenon have found that more closed decision-making structures that limit the consideration of a broad range of information and policy options are more likely than more open groups to adopt conflictual policy decisions (Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Schafer and Crichlow 1996). One study (Suedfeld, Corteen and McCormick 1986) of battles in the U.S. Civil War has found that victory on the battlefield can be predicted according to the relative complexity of the generals involved in a conflict. The general with the higher complexity level was victorious in the battles these researchers examined. An examination of negotiating behavior during crises (Santmire, Wilkenfeld, Kraus, Holley, Santmire and Gleditsch 1998) found that groups with more homogeneous levels of complexity were more likely to be able to reach

mutually beneficial outcomes. This is believed to occur as having a common complexity level apparently assists negotiators' ability to understand their adversaries' goals, and helps them avoid missteps in communication. Another study (Suedfeld and Rank 1976) found a strong link between the long range success of revolutionary leaders and their conceptual complexity. This was an examination of 19 leaders involved in the English Civil War and the American, Russian, Chinese and Cuban revolutions. The results showed that the eleven men in the sample who were able to retain positions of power until their voluntary retirement or death all appeared to have low complexity levels during the revolution, when having a single-minded approach to problem solving might have been somewhat desirable, but their complexity levels rose as they became engaged in the consolidating the legitimacy of their new governments in the post-revolutionary period. The eight leaders in the sample who were forced out of power showed no shift in their complexity levels between the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period.

Much of the work investigating whether or not the personality traits of key decision makers affect their political behavior examines those individuals' motives. An individual's motives are that person's primary psychological needs. These are things that a person is unconsciously driven to possess. While the effects of a number of different motives have been studied, two of the most commonly researched are need for power, and need for affiliation. These two motives "repeatedly emerge as the two fundamental dimensions of social behavior and interpersonal traits" (Winter 1987). A leader's need for power represents his or her need for impact and prestige in social relationships (Winter and Carlson 1988). Need for affiliation is associated with a deep concern for maintaining friendly relationships with others (Winter and Carlson 1988). These motives

have been linked to a variety of preferences and behaviors. The power motive has been linked to aggressiveness and risk-taking (Winter 1973, 1993; Winter and Stewart 1977), as well as to holding strong nationalist sentiments (Hermann 1980, 1984). In a study of U.S. presidents from Washington to Reagan it has been found to be strongly related to whether or not the country entered a war during that president's administration (Winter 1987). The affiliation motive can have an important impact on the way decisions are made as it has been linked to relying on the opinions of friends as opposed to experts. Individuals with a high need for affiliation have a tendency to interact with those who are similar and a tendency to avoid those who are dissimilar (Winter and Carlson 1988). This motive has also been shown to influence individuals to respond unusually aggressively if they feel they have been betrayed by a friend (Winter 1993). The effects of these variables have been observed in both aggregate studies examining a broad spectrum of decision makers, and in research projects that have focused on just a few well known individuals, such as Saddam Hussein, Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon (Weintraub 1986; Winter 1993; Winter and Carlson 1988; Winter, Hermann, Weintraub and Walker 1991).

Another personality attribute that has been found to affect the behavior of political leaders is their distrust of others. This characteristic represents an individual's tendency to doubt or suspect the motives and actions of others. It conveys a person's level of unease toward others in their environment (Hermann 1980:21). As trust is a key component in creating cooperative relationships (Ostrom 1998) it is not surprising that heads of government who have high levels of distrust have been found to be less willing than other leaders to make commitments with others in the international arena. These

leaders also tend to exhibit high levels of nationalism and have a high need for power (Hermann 1980). In terms of issue-specific effects, leaders who have higher levels of distrust have been found to be more likely than others to oppose the removal of barriers to trade between states (Crichlow 1999).

Questions from the Literature on the Impact of Psychological Characteristics

The study of how the psychological characteristics of elite decision makers shape their political behavior is still a young research program. However, the examples listed above illustrate that research into a wide array of psychological characteristics has produced promising results. These seem to confirm that at least in certain circumstances these variables can have a powerful effect on political behavior. These characteristics have been found to affect such matters as leaders' tendencies toward conflict or cooperation, their strategies and tactics in international relations, how they frame and interpret international events, and how they structure their advisory systems. The subfield has progressed to a stage where even a few prominent exponents of more traditional, systemic approaches to explaining international relations have begun incorporating rudimentary measures representing individuals' psychological characteristics in their models (Bueno de Mesquita 1985; Huth, Bennett and Gelpi 1992; Huth, Gelpi and Bennett 1993).

But while this literature has reached a stage where it appears that further systematic inquiries into the political effects of leaders' psychological characteristics are a promising, potentially important area of study if one hopes to gain a better understanding of the creation of foreign policy, it would be misleading to argue that this literature has moved far beyond that stage. Several pieces of this research suffer from

one or more notable weaknesses. Some of it can be criticized on the basis of methodological shortcomings. For example, some of these analyses (Hermann 1977, 1984) rely on correlations to support causal relationships between personal characteristics and political behavior, or theoretical linkages among psychological characteristics. An even more common weakness is the use of individual case studies. For example, research into the impact of leaders' images of other political actors has included works on Carter administration policy toward Nicaragua (Cottam 1992), President Reagan's views of El Salvador (Blanton 1996) and the Truman administration's perception of the Soviet Union (Larson 1985). While these works definitely have their merits, it is difficult to establish the generalizability of a phenomenon in this way. This problem is exacerbated when the dependent variable, the behavior of the state or the preferences of key individuals, is measured in an imprecise manner, as has frequently been the case. Also, several of these studies have focused solely upon the impact of a single psychological characteristic. This does not allow for the consideration of how these variables may interact to affect policy preferences, nor does it allow for an examination of the relative power of these characteristics.

And there is an additional weakness in the previous literature that is highly relevant to this project. Much of it has been based solely on studies of predominant leaders and other heads of government. If one hopes to find broader support for the proposition that elite individuals are key in shaping foreign policy, more research needs to be done that includes key advisors in addition to the head of government. That early research studying the impact of individuals on foreign policy focused on predominant leaders was understandable. It was most likely that individuals' psychological

characteristics would be key when one individual controlled the policy-making process. But the degree to which the behavior of other decision-makers is affected by these variables is still unclear. Presidents and prime ministers have been found to have been affected by their psychological characteristics -- but what about their advisors and ministers? Some have suggested that the views of senior advisors may be principally affected by other factors, for example the particular institutions they represent in the decision-making process (Allison 1971). But it has also been argued that the behavior of those holding key strategic positions in a government is more likely to reflect their personal predispositions than that of other officials (Greenstein 1969). Settling this disagreement is important. In many cases high level advisors have played at least as central a role in shaping foreign policy as the head of the national executive has. So understanding why they favor the policies that they do can be just as significant as understanding the reasons behind the preferences of presidents and prime ministers.

Additionally, there remains a need for further systematic research into how the psychological characteristics of leaders and advisors shape the policy-making process. Recently a number of enlightening works have been written on this subject (Burke and Greenstein 1989; Hargrove 1993; Preston 1997). These have included the presentation of theoretical models that explicitly link underlying psychological influences on decision-group members with administrative and bureaucratic dynamics. While this is certainly not a new position (George 1980; Janis 1972), they have expanded the focus of this argument and have provided important support for their positions through their own qualitative research. But more work in this area is needed. While it seems clear some psychological characteristics are important in this process, which these are is not entirely

clear. No one has yet conducted a quantitative analysis disentangling the effects of these variables so that we can learn which have the most influence.

This project builds upon the previous work in this area by providing an unusually comprehensive test of the relationships between the psychological characteristics of political leaders, including both heads of government and their senior advisors, their preferred policy options, the dynamics of the policy-making process, and the official policies adopted by the state. I test the effects of twelve psychological characteristics, including both cognitive and personality factors. I test these relationships through an analysis of sixteen foreign policy decisions made by eight different governments in three countries across a forty year period using a multi-method research design. This systematic, rigorous approach provides a thorough investigation of the role of the psychological characteristics of elite decision makers in shaping foreign policy across a relatively large and varied set of cases. More generally, this project adds new and important findings to the ongoing debate about the impact of elite individuals on foreign policy decision making.

The remaining five chapters are organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 is a detailed research design. In this chapter I address issues such as case selection and the operationalization of the independent and dependent variables. In Chapter 3 I investigate questions dealing with factors affecting the personal policy preferences of decision makers. For example, do their psychological characteristics affect their personal policy preferences? Do these effects vary by country? How do decision makers who play different bureaucratic roles differ from one another? In Chapter 4 I investigate questions related to the creation of official state policy. For example, does official state policy

generally mirror the personal policy preferences of the national executive leader? How do the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect the process of decision making? In Chapter 5 I present two short case studies, one dealing with the Iran Hostage Crisis and one dealing with the Gulf War. In this chapter I use process-tracing methods (George and McKeown 1985) to more fully illustrate some of the relationships between decision makers' psychological characteristics and their foreign policy behavior that were shown to exist in the quantitative analyses in chapters 3 and 4. These case studies also allow me to investigate the impact of some other psychological variables that I was not able to include in the quantitative analyses. In Chapter 6 I summarize this project's findings.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of this study is to provide a systematic investigation of the effects of the psychological characteristics of political leaders upon foreign policy decision-making. It is designed to produce a uniquely broad and rigorous test of this relationship. The actions, preferences and characteristics of heads of government and their key advisors in three countries, the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, are examined through both quantitative and qualitative analyses. By examining decision-making in sixteen cases in which governments weighed engaging in international conflict in a variety of settings, this project sheds new light on how the psychological characteristics of political leaders shape their own policy preferences, and that of their state, as well as the patterns of policy creation that exist at the highest level of government.

While this research investigates a variety of matters related to the link between leaders' psychological characteristics and the creation of foreign policy, two questions are central to this study. First, what relationships exist between the psychological characteristics of political leaders and their policy preferences in times of international conflict? Second, how are the views of presidents and prime ministers reconciled with those of their advisors in the creation of a national foreign policy? In particular, do the psychological characteristics of these individuals play an important role that process?

Research Method

This is a multi-method project that includes both quantitative and qualitative sections. The reason for this is straightforward. While a key feature of this work is its

use of reliable quantitative measures, it remains the case that the foreign policy-making process is often affected by other factors that are not easily quantified. Including a qualitative analysis section allows for an examination of the effects of these variables. Therefore, in addition to a statistical section, this project features two case studies of foreign policy decisions in order to investigate the impact of such factors as the key analogies used to frame leaders' understanding of a situation, and the interpersonal rapport that existed between key decision-makers.

The statistical analysis includes tests of two data sets. The first is designed to address the question -- How do the psychological characteristics of leaders and advisors affect their choice of a preferred policy option? In investigating this question the unit of analysis is the individual, that is, each head of government and each advisor in every case of decision ($N=55$). So, for example, President Carter during the Hostage Crisis in Iran is one unit, Defense Secretary McNamara during the Cuban Missile Crisis is another unit, Defense Secretary McNamara during the Six Day War is another unit, Prime Minister Begin during the invasion of Lebanon is another, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir during the invasion of Lebanon is another, and so on. Each data line includes the leader's preferred policy option at the time of the decision, which in this analysis is the dependent variable. Each data line also includes all the indices representing each subject's psychological characteristics, and five control variables.

The second data set is used to investigate the following question -- How are the policy preferences of a state created? Here the unit of analysis is each state decision ($N=16$). The data line includes the level of conflict represented by the action taken by the state (the dependent variable), and control variables representing the quality of

information processing conducted by the decision-making group, the level of conflict instigated by the state's opponent, and the level of perceived threat to national interests. It also includes the variables representing the psychological characteristics and policy preferences of the head of government and the advisors involved, and variables representing the mean of the advisory team for each psychological characteristic as well as the mean level of conflict the advisors favored.

This section of the study addresses a variety of questions dealing with the relationship between heads of government and their top advisors, and more generally with the impact key individuals have on the creation of foreign policy. Among them are the following. Do the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders significantly affect the level of conflict a state implements in pursuit of its foreign policy agenda? How close are the preferences of heads of government to those of their advisors? Do the views of advisors impact a state's actions when they differ from those of the leader of the national executive? How much influence does the head of a state's foreign ministry have on its foreign policy? Whose policy preferences matter more, those of the head of government or those of advisors?

The qualitative analysis section includes in-depth case studies of two of the cases of decision included in the project: the failed attempt to rescue the American hostages held in Iran in April of 1980 and the Gulf War. These cases were selected since they provide for an examination of the psychological effects of leaders across decision groups that are widely perceived to have believed in different ideologies.

Beyond providing descriptive detail about each decision, the case studies provide another means of gathering information that may support or challenge the hypotheses

investigated in this project. They provide for the ability to consider the influence of factors including additional psychological characteristics of leaders that are difficult to quantify or whose attributes are difficult to compare across cases, but that still have an important influence on the course of decision making. For example, it is through these case studies that I assess the influence of the analogies that were prevalent within discussions among the members of a particular decision-making group. It would be quite difficult to include meaningful analogy variables in my statistical data set as the analogies that are likely to be prevalent in a case vary according to which country is acting, and I include decisions made in three countries in my analysis. The case studies also provide a good venue to consider how interpersonal dynamics among decision makers affected their behavior. It is with these limitations in mind that case studies are included in the project in order to provide a comprehensive investigation of the effects of individuals on the creation of foreign policy.

Case Selection

This project includes an analysis of sixteen cases of decision. In order to examine foreign policy decision making in a wide variety of contexts, it focuses on decisions made by eight different administrations in three countries. I examine two cases of decision per administration. All of these cases involved major events affecting international relations in which policy was set by the top-level decision makers in a state. However, for each administration I coded one case that was clearly a “high stakes” decision, and one case that was a relatively “low stakes” decision. A case was considered “high stakes” if decision makers saw an exceptionally serious threat to national interests, and the possibility of engaging another country’s ground forces or

navy in international combat was actively considered by a country's leadership. Cases which involved less immediate or severe threats to the national interest, and in which using one's army was not seriously considered by top-level decision makers, were considered to be relatively "low stakes". This is done as previous research (Janis and Mann 1977; McCalla 1992) has shown that patterns of decision making differ depending on the level of the threat to national interests that is involved in a situation. These cases include variation in the time period of the decision, the form of government of the state involved and the ideological leanings of the parties in power. The eight administrations and the sixteen cases I include in the analysis are listed below in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Cases Included in the Analysis

Head of Government	Decision Event
1. John F. Kennedy	1. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
2. Lyndon B. Johnson	2. The Conflict in Laos, 1961
	1. Operation Rolling Thunder, 1965
3. Jimmy Carter	2. The 6 Day War, 1967
	1. The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, 1980
4. Ronald W. Reagan	2. The Ogaden War, 1978
	1. The Invasion of Grenada, 1983
5. George H.W. Bush	2. Negotiations to Remove Noriega, 1988
	1. The Gulf War, 1990
6. Bill Clinton	2. The Yugoslavia Civil War, 1992
	1. The War in Bosnia, 1995
7. Menachem Begin	2. Reinstating Aristide in Haiti, 1994
	1. The Invasion of Lebanon, 1982
8. Margaret Thatcher	2. Bombing the <i>Osirac</i> Nuclear Plant, 1981
	1. The Falklands War, 1982
	2. Sanctioning South Africa, 1985

The cases were selected as follows. First, I conducted an extensive review of the foreign policy actions considered by each of these governments by reading reputable case

studies focusing on these administrations and the memoirs of key participants involved in these decisions. I then made a list of possible cases to include in the analysis. To make this list a case needed to have been the subject of enough reputable descriptive analyses so that it would be possible to code the views of participants and the nature of the surrounding geopolitical situation both before and during the foreign policy decision-making process. It also needed to show evidence of at least some degree of variation in the preferences of the key leaders involved in setting policy. This need not have been intense disagreement, but the case should have included some variation in decision makers' views of the situation at hand and possible responses to it. Once this list was created two cases were selected to investigate for each administration. This was done somewhat randomly, but with two caveats. First, once the first case was selected, if it was clearly a "high stakes" case or a "low stakes" case, other cases of that magnitude of seriousness were excluded from being selected with the second choice given the point made above about the different way such challenges are dealt with. Secondly, if there were any cases closely tied to the case that was selected first, those cases were excluded from also being included in the analysis. So, for example, once the decision to include the launching of the Operation Rolling Thunder was included in the analysis, no other Vietnam-related decision could be the second case included for the Johnson administration. This was done to try and lessen the chances that an administration's scores would be skewed by focusing solely upon what might be a single anomalous policy area.

The number of individual decision makers who were examined during each case varied depending upon the actual number of top decision makers involved in the process,

and whether or not materials existed that could be used to determine their psychological characteristics. Who I included depended upon who were the key principals in each decision; those who were most active in setting state policy and whose personal preferences in each case of decision are known and may have affected other leaders. When possible I made sure to include members of the decision-making team who held contrasting opinions on the appropriate action that the nation should take in order to increase variance in the dependent variable. The decision makers I chose to focus upon were generally those filling the most senior positions in the government, though in some cases lower level advisors were also coded if they played an important role in the decision-making process. I coded the national executive leader (the president or prime minister) in every case. I also coded the head of the State Department or Foreign Ministry in every case as those individuals are generally considered to be the national executive leader's top foreign policy advisor, and they tend to play a very active role in most of their country's dealings with other countries. The other individuals included in the analysis held a variety of positions in government. These included Defense Secretary (or Minister), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Advisor, Vice President, Treasury Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State, among others. In most cases I coded the national executive leader and either two or three or his top advisors.

The Dependent Variables

I investigate two primary dependent variables, though both are derived using the same measure. I first test whether the psychological characteristics of leaders affect their policy preferences. I also investigate how the policy preferences of individual leaders are

aggregated into a national policy. Both dependent variables represent policy options and involve scaling levels of conflict or cooperation.

The measure I use to represent these various preferences and policies was developed to provide a continuous conflict/cooperation scale for World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) data. WEIS was created to provide a detailed, quantitative way of measuring international events around the world over time. While it was designed to classify events into one of 61 discrete categories, it was not constructed to provide for the coding of these categories along a common conflict/cooperation dimension. However, a number of such scales have nonetheless been created as they facilitate investigations of many different questions in the study of international relations. I will rely on the scale created by Joshua Goldstein (1992) as his research (Goldstein 1991, 1992; Goldstein and Freeman 1990) shows it to be slightly more accurate than similar scales (Andriole 1984; Vincent 1979; Walker, Bohlin, Boos, Cownie, Nakawaja, and Willson 1984), and since it is the only one to provide weights for all 61 WEIS event types. Examples of these weights, which I use as the dependent variables in my analysis are: military attack = -10.0, break diplomatic relations = -7.0, halt negotiation = -3.8, issue formal complaint = -2.4, express regret = +1.8, host visit = +2.8, promise material support = +5.2, extend economic aid = +7.4. Goldstein's scale was derived from a ranking of these categories performed by a panel of international relations scholars.

I use this scale to measure two variables. The first of these is an individual decision maker's personal policy preference. That is, the policy option they personally preferred at the beginning of the final stage of decision-making. I also use this scale to measure the official policy that is adopted by the state.

Decision Maker's Policy Preference

An individual's personal policy preference is coded as follows. First, the policy option (or options) they preferred at the beginning of the final decision-making period was identified through a reading of reputable case study material describing how leaders came to adopt an official state policy in the particular situation being studied. If they only favored one policy option they are given the Goldstein score matching that option. For example, if they wanted to pursue negotiations they are scored +3, if they wanted to send a military force to the area they are scored -7.6, or if they favored a blockade (seizing position and possessions) they are scored -9.2. If the individual favored a variety of policy options, but all were in either a cooperative or a conflictual direction, that individual's preference is scored using their most extreme policy preference. So, for example, if an individual favors both specific non-military sanctions (-5.8) and halting negotiations (-3.8), they are scored -5.8. The reason for this is that such an individual appears committed toward pursuing either a carrot or stick approach to dealing with the conflict at hand, and the most extreme position shows how far they are willing to move in that direction. I also retested my models substituting this personal policy preference score with one computed from the mean score of the various policies favored by individuals who favored multiple policy options in the event that all of those policies were in either the cooperative or conflictual direction. The results of these tests were quite similar to those produced using my initial scoring of this variable. Therefore, I chose to use the most extreme cooperation or conflict score as I felt that approach was more theoretically appropriate. However, in the instances in which an individual favored multiple policy options, options that included both cooperative and conflictual moves,

then that individual is scored according to the mean score of their policy preferences.

This is done since these individuals appear to believe that it is best to pursue a variety of policy avenues to produce one overall policy approach. Combining the scores of these policy options therefore reflects the intensity and direction of the general approach to international relations that an individual decision maker thinks is appropriate. So, for example, if someone believes that instituting both a blockade (-9.2) and starting negotiations (+3) is the approach their country should take, they are scored -3.1.

Official State Policy

Official state policy is coded in exactly the same way as personal policy preference, except that instead of scoring the policy preference of an individual I score the option or options that the key decision makers in the situation under study agreed to implement as their country's official policy.

The scoring of these two variables was verified by conducting a reliability check. This involved training another coder on the use of these scales and coding procedures. Once that was done, three cases were randomly selected. The second coder then coded the personal policy preferences of each participant and the country policy preference in those three cases. This check produced an intercoder agreement score of .88.

Measuring Decision Makers' Psychological Characteristics

The key data in this project are the measures of political leaders' psychological characteristics, and the measures of the policy preferences they, and eventually the state, adopt. Therefore, the data must accurately and precisely reflect the phenomena they purport to represent. With this in mind, the psychological characteristics of political leaders are measured with "at-a-distance" techniques (Winter, Hermann, Weintraub and

Walker 1991) that have previously been found to be valid indicators of key variables. At-a-distance measurements are done through quantitative content analyses of leaders' verbal utterances. Each psychological characteristic is measured by breaking down a leader's comments in a manner that is pertinent to the variable under investigation. For example, when measuring a decision maker's distrust of others one counts the number of times the speaker modifies his or her comments about other political actors in a way that conveys misgivings or unease. The number of such comments is then divided by the total number of statements a speaker makes about other political actors to determine their level of distrust. While some of the other measures use more complex formulas, the basic idea is the same with each variable. Decision makers' comments can be broken down into units and quantified in ways that give us reliable measures of core psychological characteristics.

This technique for measuring the psychological characteristics of leaders is built upon the assumption that verbal statements are indicative of their basic beliefs and personality traits. This connection can be found by examining certain patterns of language which are indicative an individual's basic psychological characteristics (Hermann 1980, 1984; Walker, Schafer and Young 1998; Weintraub 1986; Winter 1973, 1987, 1991, 1993). By examining the typical form of people's statements about themselves and others, or the manner and frequency with which they use particular words and phrases, it is possible to glean an understanding of their basic beliefs and traits. While some of these may fluctuate with situational changes, the characteristics that I am measuring using these techniques are fundamental attributes of an individual

and as such should remain somewhat constant. Therefore, it is possible to accurately measure these characteristics.

As another example, consider the concept of conceptual complexity. This characteristic represents the differentiation people see in the world around them. Does a person see his or her surroundings as complex, or are they easily categorized? This characteristic can be measured by computing the relative frequency with which one uses words and phrases that convey differentiation in the world as opposed to words and phrases that describe the world in narrow terms. So if a person shows a tendency to use words like “seems”, “maybe”, “possible” or “somewhat” more than words like “always”, “never”, “must” or “of course” they are considered to be cognitively complex. A continued reliance over time on words like the former set suggests that the speaker is cognizant of the existence of a complex and diverse set of factors shaping his or her environment.

Of course a frequent criticism of this approach as a way of measuring leaders' characteristics is that what decision makers say may not reflect who they are. Such critics generally are not suggesting that leaders are carefully crafting a public facade to hide their true intentions and beliefs. Doing so over a prolonged period of time can prove quite difficult. While such actions may occur on occasion, “leaders usually believe what they say and say what they believe” (Lagon 1994:24). The greater concern is that public comments are often the product of speech writers or are affected by previously planned “talking points”, and therefore do not reflect the psychological attributes of the individual leader who says them but instead represent the group that planned them. This concern about essentially ghost-written comments has led

researchers such as Margaret G. Hermann (1980, 1984) to rely solely upon spontaneous comments that are thought to better reflect the views of the speaker as they are not planned. Others have focused upon comments, that though prepared in advance, are known to be largely the product of the speaker. This is the approach often taken by David Winter, much of whose research involves the use of the State of the Nation Addresses of American presidents (Winter 1987). While there has been little research verifying this concern, some preliminary findings (Schafer and Crichlow 2000) suggest spontaneous comments may indeed better reflect the attributes of individual leaders, particularly in terms of their personality characteristics. Therefore I rely on spontaneous comments, such as press conferences and interviews, when coding leaders' attributes.

In order to employ at-a-distance measures of leaders' psychological characteristics I needed to obtain statements made by the leaders I examine. The number of these comments, and the time period from which they were gathered, necessarily depended on the availability of texts for coding. Ideally, when the existence of texts recording spontaneous comments allowed for it, codings were based upon verbal utterances made shortly before the final stage of decision making began, in order to have the most timely measurements possible. While large fluctuations in the core psychological traits of individual decision makers are unlikely, there has been some evidence that decision makers do learn from actions that occur in their environment and their core beliefs and traits shift accordingly (Schafer and Crichlow 2000). This being the case, using timely comments to measure leaders' characteristics is preferable. However, it should also be noted that it is important to exclude comments made by leaders during the actual decision-making process as they could be influenced by events

occurring during the case being studied, and thus the independent variables would actually be consequences of the dependent variables in my model (the endogeneity problem). While the lengthy time period over which some of the decisions included in the analysis were made does not make it practical to exclude all comments made during them, all the utterances used for coding purposes were drawn from time periods prior to the onset of the final stage of decision making that occurred in any given case.

When deciding on what time frame I should base my coding of decision makers' psychological characteristics, I was guided both by the desire to base my measurements on timely comments, and by the desire to base these measurements on a number of comments dealing with a variety of foreign policy issues. But my selection of a proper time frame was also affected by another factor. Recorded comments were much easier to find for some individuals than others. Therefore, I decided to use different temporal periods from which to base my measurements of the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and my measurements of the psychological characteristics of their key advisors. Since national executive leaders tend to make public statements on foreign policy with great regularity I code all of the spontaneous comments that they made on foreign policy issues during the month preceding the onset of decision making in a case. Since their advisors make fewer public comments of this sort I analyze all of the spontaneous foreign policy comments that they made during the two month period prior to the onset of decision making in a case. In the handful of cases in which a decision maker did not make a public spontaneous comment on foreign policy during these time frames I based my codings of their psychological characteristics on the last

such comment I could find that they made prior to the onset of the decision making process that met the necessary coding criteria.

Because of these concerns I had to settle on a date that marked the beginning of the decision-making process in each case. This was done by reviewing case study literature on each of the cases. In several cases this was a rather clear cut decision. For example, November 4, 1979, the day the hostages were taken, was used as the key date marking the beginning of the decision-making process in the Iran hostages case. In a few cases the decision was not as clear. In those situations, which usually occurred in cases that were part of protracted conflicts, I used a date that marked a salient act that set the final stage of decision making in motion. For example, I used the attack on Pleiku to mark intensification of the decision-making process that settled the decision to launch air attacks against Vietnam, and the Racak massacre as the key event that spurred American decision makers to settle on a new policy in Kosovo¹.

Once I set the relevant time frames I began to collect all spontaneous foreign policy comments that I could find that were made by the key participants in the decision-making bodies I am examining during these periods. Most of these were comments in the form of press conferences and interviews. These comments were drawn from a wide variety of sources. The sources I consulted most often in my search for these comments were *The Public Papers of the President*, the *State Department*

¹ The dates I used for the 16 cases were: Laos -- March 9, 1961; Cuban Missile Crisis -- August 22, 1962; Operation Rolling Thunder -- February 6, 1965; 6 Day War -- May 18, 1967; Ogaden -- December 31, 1977; Iran Hostage Crisis -- November 4, 1979; Grenada -- October 22, 1983; Negotiating with Noriega -- February 4, 1988; Gulf War -- August 2, 1990; Yugoslavia -- May 1, 1992; Haiti -- May 6, 1994; Kosovo -- January 15, 1999; Falklands -- March 31, 1982; Sanctioning South Africa -- June 21, 1986; Attacking Osiraq -- October 14, 1980; Invading Lebanon -- June 3, 1982.

Bulletin, the public affairs web sites of the White House, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense, interviews in *U.S. News & World Report*, the *Public Statements of the Secretary of Defense, Hansard* and *Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents*. In order to be included in the sample of comments that was used to measure decision makers' psychological characteristics these remarks had to be made during the relevant time frame, be spontaneous, address a foreign policy issue, and, because of the requirements of one of the coding systems I use, the Verbs in Context method, be at least 1500 words in length².

As discussed earlier, a number of psychological characteristics can be hypothesized to potentially affect one's tendency to support either conflict or cooperation in the conduct of world affairs. My analysis includes an investigation of the effects of twelve psychological characteristics that are hypothesized to affect foreign policy behavior. These characteristics can be accurately and precisely measured through quantitative content analysis techniques whose validity has been confirmed in previous research. The first four psychological characteristics I include are personality traits. These are measured using quantitative content analysis techniques drawn from the trait analysis work of Hermann (1980, 1987b). The remaining psychological characteristics I

² Finding spontaneous statements to use for Vice President Johnson in the Laos case and Vice President Humphrey in the Rolling Thunder case proved difficult. In each case they had just assumed an office in which they did not often have occasion to make public statements on foreign affairs, and I did not find that they had made spontaneous foreign affairs statements at the end of their service in the Senate that met the coding requirements. Therefore, in their cases I developed a base of comments to use to code their psychological characteristics by combining two foreign policy statements each had made during their final year in the Senate. Similarly, as I had difficulty finding sufficiently lengthy spontaneous comments made by Israeli ministers Burg and Shamir in 1980, I combined two statements made by those ministers in the months preceding the Osiraq decision in order to form a sample of comments from which to measure their psychological characteristics.

investigate are aspects of leaders' operational codes. The operational code variables are measured according to the procedures designed by Walker, Schafer and Young (1998). These variables are discussed below. For each variable I provide a brief description of what it represents, how it is hypothesized to affect the behavior of political leaders, and how it is measured.

I personally coded the decision makers' traits and beliefs according to the formulas listed below for eleven of these variables. I tested the reliability of my measurements of these eleven variables by cross-coding my scoring of the characteristics of seven decision makers with codings done by other trained coders. These produced intercoder agreement scores of .93 for Need for Power, .91 for Distrust, .88 for Need for Affiliation, and .92 for the operational code variables. Conceptual Complexity was measured using a software program specifically designed to measure such variables. As this method relies on set word dictionaries that distinguish between high complexity and low complexity statements, the reliability of these codings is not an issue.

Need for Power

Need for power represents an individual's "concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring one's power, i.e., one's impact, control, or influence over others" (Winter 1973:250). It is the underlying need of a leader to dominate social relationships, including maximizing his or her authority in the political arena. This concern with one's influence is also associated with narcissism (Fodor and Farrow 1979), and can lead individuals to ignoring moral considerations when making decisions (Fodor and Smith 1982). The index used to measure this characteristic is created from verbs for which the speaker, or a group with whom he identifies, is the subject. Specifically, it is the number

of these verbs which convey a strong forceful action, unsolicited assistance, or attempts to control, impress or influence relative to the number of these verbs which do not have such a meaning (Hermann 1987b:7-8). Individuals whose comments about themselves contain more references to taking forceful or influential actions are considered to have a higher need for power. Given that this variable includes impulses toward favoring the use of forceful action and securing control in a situation, I hypothesize that a high need for power is positively related to conflictual policy preferences. Previous research has produced support for this position (Winter 1980, 1987, 1993), though earlier literature also suggests that need for power may more strongly influence leaders' tendency to create dramatic, crisis-oriented foreign policies than it does their tendency to support conflictual policy options once they are involved in a crisis (Hermann 1980, Winter 1987).

Distrust

This variable represents an individual's level of "doubt, uneasiness, misgiving, and wariness of others -- that is, an inclination to suspect the motives and actions of others" (Hermann 1987a:125). It basically entails how suspicious an individual is of others in his or her environment. The index used to measure distrust of others involves nouns and noun phrases referring to people or groups with whom the speaker does not identify. Specifically, it is calculated on the basis of the number of these words and phrases that are modified to reflect misgivings, uneasiness, wariness, distrust or doubt about them from the speaker, relative to the number of these words or phrases that do not convey such feelings (Hermann 1987b:16-17). The particular modifiers that convey distrust include obvious words such as conniving and conspiratorial, but may also in

certain contexts include such words as inscrutable and enigmatic. I hypothesize that those who are more distrustful of others will be less willing to cooperate with them and hence will be more likely to turn to force as a means of settling international disputes. Previous research has found that decision makers who have higher levels of distrust are less likely to favor cooperative international policies (Crichlow 1999).

Conceptual Complexity

Conceptual complexity represents the degree of differentiation one recognizes in his or her environment. This includes finding differentiation in people, ideas and policies, among other things. More complex individuals see a variety of reasons behind a position, and are willing to consider the possibility of ambiguity existing in their environment. They are more flexible in reacting to other objects and ideas. More conceptually simple people tend to classify objects along good-bad, either-or dimensions. They are less willing to accept ambiguity (Hermann 1987b:12). Coding conceptual complexity is done on the basis of individual words. It is a ratio based on the number of words one uses that convey differentiation in one's surroundings relative to the number of words one uses that convey a world that can be divided into only a few categories. Examples of high complexity words include "maybe", "perhaps" and "seem". Examples of low complexity words include "absolutely", "every", and "indisputable" (Hermann 1987b:12-14). Following previous findings (Hermann 1977, 1980; Tetlock 1979) I hypothesize that leaders higher in complexity will be more willing to consider a broader variety of policy options and favor cooperative international policies. I expect they will be less likely to resort to force to solve international disputes.

Need for Affiliation

This variable represents individuals' need for close, friendly relationships with others (Atkinson 1958; Hermann 1980, 1984, 1987a; McAdams 1982), and may manifest itself in a "fear of being disliked" (Winter 1993:113). It is measured using a technique devised by Hermann (1987b) that focuses upon all the verbs in an individual's comments. A person's affiliation score is the number of verbs they use that convey a concern with affiliation divided by the total number of all the verbs they use. A verb is coded for affiliation if it fits in one or more of the following categories: shows a positive feeling for another person or country; shows a reaction to a separation or disruption of a relationship; represents companionate activities; shows nurturing acts. In line with the general thrust of the existing literature (Hermann 1980, 1984) my basic hypothesis is that individuals exhibiting a high need for affiliation will be less likely than others to support conflictual activities as they are likely to harm interpersonal relations between the parties involved. However, it should also be noted that previous research (Winter 1993) does suggest a certain type of situation in which a high need for affiliation may make leaders more conflictual. When a leader is responding to an act of bad faith by another individual or state with whom they perceived themselves as having had a positive relationship, a higher need for affiliation may make it more likely that they will respond with higher levels of conflict as they may feel a heightened sense of betrayal.

Strategy (Operational Code Instrumental Index I)

A leader's approach to goals conveys his or her beliefs about the most successful way to achieve their aims. It is their basic strategic orientation — their preferred means of acting in the political arena. This index shows whether a leader has a tendency toward

cooperative or conflictual behavior by placing them on a cooperative-conflictual continuum. It is measured on the basis of attributions individuals make about themselves and the groups with whom they identify. The index score equals the percent of actions attributed to the self that are positive or cooperative minus the percent of self attributions that are negative or conflictual. It varies between 1 (a completely cooperative orientation) and -1 (a completely conflictual orientation) (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:180). I hypothesize that leaders with a more conflictual approach to goals, seeing conflictual strategies as possessing more utility than cooperative ones, will be more likely to support conflictual policy options.

Tactics (Operational Code Instrumental Index 2)

This index represents the tactics a leader prefers to utilize. While Strategy represents the basic direction of a leader's preferred method of political interaction, Tactics is a measure of the intensity of this preferred orientation. This index is created by coding actions attributed to the self on a seven point conflict-cooperation scale. For example, verbal acts are considered to be less powerful indications of one's preferred tactics than one's physical actions (either cooperative or conflictual). The mean intensity of self attributions is then divided by three to create a scale ranging from -1 (most conflictual tactics) to 1 (most cooperative tactics) (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:180). I hypothesize that leaders who believe conflictual tactics are most effective will be most likely to support conflictual policy options.

Risk Orientation (Operational Code Instrumental Index 3)

This characteristic represents the variety of categories of action an individual uses in interacting with the political world around them. Decision makers who rely on only a

few categories of action as they attempt to achieve their goals are considered to be risk acceptant. They are opening themselves up to the risks that attend relatively predictable behavior. Those decision makers who use a wide variety of categories of action in their dealings are considered to be more risk averse. This index equals 1 minus the Index of Qualitative Variation for self-attributions (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:180). See the Political Future index for a definition of the Index of Qualitative Variation. This scale varies between 0 and 1. The higher a decision maker's number on this scale, the more predictable and risk-acceptant they are. I hypothesize that more predictable, risk-acceptant decision makers will be more likely than others to support cooperative policy options. I do this as I believe that in their comments about their own political actions, leaders of Western countries in the late twentieth century will tend to stress their good relations with other states and their desire for cooperative actions when discussing world affairs. It seems much more likely that individuals who rely on only a few categories of behavior will rely on cooperative categories more than on conflictual categories. I expect pursuing conflict to be the exception to the general course of events. Therefore I expect individuals who use a wide variety of types of action in world affairs, including both types of cooperation and types of conflict, are more likely than the average decision maker in my sample to have a preference for conflictual policy options.

Political Universe (Operational Code Philosophical Index 1)

This variable informs us whether a leader thinks the political universe is fundamentally cooperative, fundamentally conflictual, or where it fits on a cooperative-conflictual continuum if it is between those two poles. The index used to measure this variable is based upon the frequency and intensity of verbs used by the

speaker attributing others with particular actions. The scale is the percentage of verbs attributed to a person or group with whom the speaker does not identify that have a positive or cooperative connotation minus the percentage of verbs attributed to a person or group with whom the speaker does not identify that have a negative or conflictual connotation (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:178). I hypothesize that individuals who see their universe as fundamentally conflictual will see little utility in pursuing cooperative policy options since other actors will probably not reciprocate them. Therefore, those who see the political universe as conflictual will be more likely to advocate conflictual international policies than those who see the political universe in a more cooperative light.

Optimism (Operational Code Philosophical Index 2)

This variable reflects an individual's fundamental optimism or pessimism about the course of political events. It represents how likely an individual thinks it is that he or she will be able to achieve his or her basic political goals. This index is based on the mean intensity of cooperation and conflict attributed to others in the political universe. This is done as the chances for securing one's goals in a political setting are affected by the level of conflict or cooperation exhibited by other actors in one's political environment. Transitive verbs representing actions taken by "others" are scaled on a seven point index (-3 to +3). The mean attribution is divided by three to achieve an optimism/pessimism score between 1 and -1 (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:178). I hypothesize that those who are more pessimistic about realizing their values will be more likely to turn to the use of force as they see others around them engaging in negative, conflictual acts.

Political Future (Operational Code Philosophical Index 3)

This variable represents an individual's belief about the stability of the course of future political events. Does one face a world filled with constant change, or does one face a world in which events occur in a predictable fashion? To study this belief we observe the variety of acts an individual attributes to other political actors. If someone sees others only performing a few types of actions their behavior is considered to be somewhat constant and therefore rather predictable. However, if someone attributes other political actors with taking many different types of actions this suggests that they see the world as relatively uncertain and unpredictable. The index used to measure this characteristic equals 1 minus the Index of Qualitative Variation for other-attributions. "The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N (number of cases) and the same number of variable classifications" (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:179). The index varies between "0", a highly unpredictable future, and "1" a highly predictable future. I hypothesize that decision makers who see the world as a more predictable place will be more likely to support cooperative policy options. The development of closer ties and cooperative operations between states is to some degree dependent upon building common bonds of trust (Ostrom 1998). The development of such relationships is likely to be contingent upon following and building faith in certain patterns of behavior that are likely to be easier to maintain and observe in a more predictable world. Therefore I hypothesize that decision makers will be more cooperative in a predictable world that facilitates the building of bonds of trust and shared norms between states.

Control (Operational Code Philosophical Index 4)

This variable represents the degree to which a leader believes he can control historical development, specifically, political events. So we should expect that individuals who attribute most political action to themselves believe that they have more control over the development of history than individuals who attribute most political actions to others. Therefore, this index is measured according to the ratio of actions attributed to the self to actions attributed to others. The index equals the number of self attributions divided by the sum of self attributions plus other attributions. It varies between 1 and 0. Higher numbers connote the perception of having greater control over historical development (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998:179). I hypothesize that leaders who see themselves as having more control over historical development will be less likely to employ force to settle disputes than other leaders. Seeing themselves as controlling their surroundings they may be less likely to fear other political actors and feel the need to resort to the use of force to defend their positions and interests. This belief may be inversely related to a decision maker's need for power. Earlier work has shown that leaders who have a high need for power, a need to maintain control over their surroundings, are more aggressive than others (Winter 1973, 1987). So we may accept those who perceive themselves as having already secured such control may have less of a proclivity to turn to conflictual action to achieve their goals.

Chance (Operational Code Philosophical Index 5)

This characteristic represents the degree to which an individual believes that the world around them is the product of chance. This variable is of course related to the two preceding variables as the role of chance is a function of the predictability of events and

one's control over one's environment. The index score is created by subtracting the product of the Political Future and Control indices from 1. Scores vary between 0 and 1 with higher scores showing that an individual attributes chance with a greater role in the shaping of events. I hypothesize that decision makers who attribute a greater role to chance will be more likely than others to support conflictual policy options as they will seemingly be less trustful of others upholding the norms and agreements that exist between states that ameliorate international relations.

Control Variables

While the variables representing fundamental psychological characteristics of the political leaders charged with making decisions on official state policy are the matters of primary interest in this analysis, they are not expected to account for all of the variance in the dependent variables. The following variables are also included in my models to control for the effects of other influences that shape the preferences of individual decision makers and official state policy.

Country of the Decision Maker

I hypothesize that decision makers from certain states will be more likely than others to rely upon the use of force to achieve their political goals. Therefore I test three dichotomous variables to see if being from a particular country in my sample makes decision makers and their states more likely to pursue particular policies. I hypothesize that Israelis and Americans will be more likely to support conflictual policies. I do this because of the relatively weak geopolitical position of Israel and the large military force that American leaders have at their disposal. I hypothesize that British leaders will be

more likely to support less conflictual policy options given that country's lack of an equivalent military force that can be used to achieve its goals.

Level of Provocation

This variable represents the seriousness of the action taken by a state's opponent. It is hypothesized that the more serious the action taken against a state, the more likely it is that a state's leaders will respond by supporting conflictual foreign policy options. This variable is scored using a 1-5 scale. "1" represents a negative diplomatic action, for example denouncing an action taken by another state. "2" represents a violation of international norms. "3" represents an attack against an ally of a state. "4" represents a military buildup that threatens a state. "5" represents a direct military attack on a country.

Threat Level

The degree of commitment a leader or state is likely to make to a particular course of action is likely to be affected by the nature of the stakes at issue. Therefore the type of threat a state faces is included as another control variable. It is coded on a three point scale, "1" representing a threat to peripheral interests, "2" representing a threat to strategic interests, and "3" representing a threat to vital interests. I hypothesize that support for conflictual policies is positively related to higher levels of threat. Leaders are likely to be more willing to take the risks involved in engaging in international conflict if they perceive the situation at hand as particularly dire.

Type of Post (Diplomatic, Military)

While the bureaucratic politics approach to the study of political decision making (Allison 1971) has received a considerable amount of criticism (Art 1973; Bendor and

Hammond 1992; Krasner 1971; Rhodes 1994), it remains influential with even strong criticisms of it still finding the basic concept behind it compelling enough to merit further investigation (Welch 1992). Given that, two control variables are included in the model to represent the type of post decision-makers occupy. This is done to account for influences that leaders may feel from the segment of the government they represent to promote policy options that give their segment of the government the primary role in addressing international disputes. That is, I hypothesize that officials representing diplomatic interests will likely promote more cooperative tactics, policies they would be in charge of implementing, and leaders representing the military will be more likely to promote conflictual options that they would be in charge of implementing. While the argument that such bureaucratic influences will be more important in decisions made by the middle-level of the government (Rosati 1981) may well be true, “such conflicts can occur at any level of the political system and in high, as well as low, salience policy contexts” (Hart and Preston 1997:7). So two dummy variables are included in the model: Diplomatic Post (coded “1” for those representing a foreign office and “0” for others) and Military Post (coded “1” for those representing a defense ministry or military force and “0” for others).

Information Processing.

There is a good deal of evidence that the manner in which a group operates affects the policies it produces. Particularly prominent in this regard is the literature associated with the groupthink research program. While originally focused upon the potential detrimental effects of tendencies toward concurrence-seeking that often develop within groups in an effort to maintain a collegial atmosphere (Janis 1972, 1982),

the scope of this research has expanded and now it focuses upon a wider set of issues involving the quality of decision-making. One common finding in this broader research (Haney 1997; Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Schafer and Crichlow 1998) is that the quality of information processing significantly affects the outcomes that result. As many of the “errors” often found in information processing, such as biases toward particular types of information and stereotyping of the process or others involved in it, can exacerbate stress and feelings of ill will toward others during decision-making, I hypothesize that one of the outcomes of poor information processing is to make leaders more likely to adopt conflictual policy options when they come together to set official state policy. Schafer and Crichlow’s (1998) quantitative study of the process-outcome connection in foreign policy decision-making during the last quarter of the twentieth century has already provided some support for this hypothesis.

This control variable is scaled from 0-7 depending upon the number of potential errors that are present during the decision-making process. The list of potential errors is derived from Schafer and Crichlow (1998) and is based upon the work of a variety of scholars concerned with the quality of decision-making (George 1980; Haney 1997; Hart 1990; Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Janis 1982; Jervis 1976; Khong 1992; Thomson 1994). It includes: poor information search, biased information processing, survey of objectives, survey of alternatives, stereotype of situation, stereotype of out-group, and pressures toward uniformity. After reviewing case-study material on each decision event the case is coded by aggregating the total number of errors that occurred during the decision-making process.

It should be noted that I only include this variable in models aimed at explaining the official policy a state adopts. I do not include it in models aimed at explaining individual decision makers' initial policy preferences as these exist prior to the onset of the final stage of decision making. Hence they should not be affected by problems that occur during that stage of decision making.

CHAPTER 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND POLICY PREFERENCES

In this chapter I focus upon information that can be gleaned from a data set of the personal characteristics of 55 key individuals, including both national executive leaders and their top advisors, involved in setting national policy during 16 cases of decision. In particular, I am interested in the impact that the twelve psychological characteristics discussed in the preceding chapter had on their policy preferences. Did these characteristics affect the propensities of decision makers to favor cooperative or conflictual policy options when facing challenges to their interests in the international arena? If so, by showing that such relationships exist across a varied sample of decision makers facing a wide variety of policy decisions, including not only national executive leaders, but also the policy preferences of their senior advisors, these analyses will strengthen the argument that world politics is partially a function of the individuals who make foreign policy decisions. That is, that national policies are not solely the product of rational calculations of by a unitary state trying to maximize its interests, but reflect the predisposition, beliefs and emotional needs of the individuals who act in the name of the state.

As I am hypothesizing that psychological characteristics have important influences on political behavior, I am primarily interested in determining whether or not such effects exist. However, I am also interested in improving our knowledge of the nature of these effects. Therefore I also conduct analyses aimed at better understanding what variables may affect decision makers' psychological characteristics, and how these

characteristics fit together and are related to one another. Toward that end, after sections in which examine the psychological characteristic variables and their impact on the personal policy preferences of decision maker, I conduct analyses investigating whether or not there were cross-national differences between the psychological characteristics of decision makers. Additionally, I investigate the differences between the psychological characteristics of decision makers who held diplomatic offices and those who represented the military branch of government.

Variable Characteristics

I begin this analysis by first examining the key data, my measurements of the psychological characteristics of the decision makers included in the study. Given the central role that this data has in the following analyses I first present a few descriptive statistics in order to provide the reader with some basic information about these variables. These statistics are provided in Table 3.1.

Looking over the results posted in Table 3.1 we quickly learn a number of things about the decision makers included in my sample. For example, it appears clear that as a group they preferred to employ cooperative strategies and tactics. They appear to have been a largely risk-averse group. They believed that the political universe in which they acted was neither very cooperative nor very conflictual. Instead these decision makers saw it as essentially neutral. Similarly, these decision makers were not especially optimistic or pessimistic about achieving their political goals. While they tended to see the world as unpredictable with chance having a major impact on world events, they nonetheless saw themselves as having a considerable influence on historical development.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Measurements of the Psychological Characteristics of Decision Makers

Psychological Characteristic	Mean	Std. Deviation
Need for Affiliation	.450	.162
Distrust	.225	.160
Conceptual Complexity	.639	.059
Need for Power	.270	.104
Strategy, OCI1	.480	.321
Tactics, OCI2	.337	.238
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.142	.079
Political Universe, OCP1	-.013	.311
Optimism, OCP2	.042	.315
Political Future, OCP3	.143	.113
Control, OCP4	.679	.087
Chance, OCP5	.900	.089

Note: N=55

As I do not have other groups of decision makers to compare them against, one should be somewhat wary of attributing these scores with too much importance. This especially holds true of the four characteristics that are not part of the operational code literature. While the operational code measures are designed in such a way as to ascribe particular meanings to specific scores, it is more difficult to infer such meanings from the raw data on Hermann's (1987b) personality trait measures. Nonetheless, taken as a whole these scores would seem to imply that the sample of decision makers included in this analysis saw themselves as having the ability to shape a potentially malleable world in ways that fit with their interests and priorities. With this general perception of the world one would think that there is certainly room for the possibility that these decision makers may be affected by their own beliefs and internal drives when setting official policy for their respective governments.

I proceed by reviewing another aspect of these variables' attributes. Before delving into the effects that the psychological characteristics of decision makers have on their policy preferences, it is appropriate to consider their relationships to one another, and to the other variables I use to investigate the causes of foreign policy preferences. If any of these variables are too closely correlated with one another it would be improper to place them in regression equations together. This information is also useful in that seeing which variables are significantly correlated with one another lends us useful information that can add to our understanding of the exact nature of these variables. Correlation of course does not prove causation. These results will not tell us the reasons for the relationships that exist. But if these variables fit together in ways that match my hypotheses that would lend support for their validity as measures of decision makers' characteristics. In the following four tables, 3.2-3.5, I present matrices that show how closely the variables I use later in this chapter to represent various personal characteristics of individual decision makers are correlated with one another.

Looking over the results posted in Table 3.2 we see that in most cases the personality traits are related to the other independent variables in ways that match my hypotheses. Need for affiliation, a core desire for maintaining close, friendly relationships with others, is significantly correlated with nine other variables. Those decision makers who had a high need for affiliation were likely to show low levels of distrust and a low need for power. They were likely to favor the use of cooperative strategies and tactics and be highly risk-acceptant. They were likely to see the nature of the political universe as fundamentally cooperative and be optimistic about achieving

their basic political goals. Additionally those with a high need for affiliation were more likely to hold diplomatic posts than military posts.

Table 3.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Personality Traits

Variable	Need for Affiliation	Distrust	Conceptual Complexity	Need for Power
Need for Affiliation	1.000	-.450**	.124	-.498**
Distrust	-.450**	1.000	-.228	.529**
Conceptual Complexity	.124	-.228	1.000	-.015
Need for Power	-.498**	.529**	-.015	1.000
Strategy, OCI1	.774**	-.412**	.187	-.477**
Tactics, OCI2	.736**	-.397**	.172	-.494**
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.609**	-.288*	.049	-.523**
Political Universe, OCP1	.422**	-.696**	.068	-.367**
Optimism, OCP2	.449**	-.625**	.008	-.315*
Political Future, OCP3	.107	-.143	-.050	-.225
Control, OCP4	.068	-.370**	.071	-.195
Chance, OCP5	-.116	.195	.029	.254
USA Decision Maker	.065	-.378**	.520**	-.012
British Decision Maker	.000	.033	-.319*	-.001
Israeli Decision Maker	-.084	.454**	-.373**	.016
Diplomatic Post	.298*	-.255	.044	-.346**
Military Post	-.672**	.377**	.110	.428**

Note: N=55. ** = significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). * = significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

Decision makers' level of distrust, their level of wariness and misgivings about other political actors, was significantly correlated with eleven other variables. More distrustful decision makers tended to have a high need for power and a low need for affiliation. They tended to support conflictual strategies and tactics and be wary of taking risks. They tended to believe that the political universe is fundamentally conflictual and were pessimistic about achieving their political goals. They were likely to view themselves as having limited control over the course of political affairs. More

distrustful decision makers were more likely than others to hold military posts in government and be Israeli. Americans were less distrustful than the other decision makers included in my sample.

Conceptual complexity was not significantly correlated with any of the other psychological characteristics. However, the results show that decision makers in different countries differed on this scale. American decision makers had higher levels of conceptual complexity than Israeli and British decision makers. This discrepancy is one of the few instances in which decision makers from different countries have significant differences between their psychological characteristic scores.

The results presented in Table 3.2 for need for power, decision makers' need to have control over others, show that it is related to nine other variables. Decision makers with a high need for power were more likely than others to have a low need for affiliation and high levels of distrust. They tended to support conflictual strategies and tactics and to be risk-averse. They tended to see the political universe as fundamentally conflictual, and they tended to be pessimistic about achieving their political goals. They also were more likely to hold military posts in government, and were less likely to hold diplomatic posts.

Turning to the results reported in Table 3.3 we see that decision makers' preferred strategy was correlated with eight other variables. Those who favored cooperative strategies tended to have a high need for affiliation, and low levels of distrust and need for power. They were likely to support cooperative tactics and be risk-acceptant. They tended to see the political universe as a fundamentally cooperative place, and they were likely to be optimistic about realizing their political goals. Those

Table 3.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the
Operational Code's Instrumental Indices

Variable	Strategy OCI1	Tactics OCI2	Risk Orientation OCI3
Need for Affiliation	.774**	.736**	.609**
Distrust	-.412**	-.397**	.288*
Conceptual Complexity	.187	.172	.049
Need for Power	-.477**	-.494**	-.523**
Strategy, OCI1	1.000	.943**	.725**
Tactics, OCI2	.943**	1.000	.624**
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.725**	.624**	1.000
Political Universe, OCP1	.443**	.353**	.327*
Optimism, OCP2	.457**	.359**	.410**
Political Future, OCP3	.215	.162	.366**
Control, OCP4	.198	.217	.028
Chance, OCP5	-.234	-.184	.365**
USA Decision Maker	.119	.099	.026
British Decision Maker	-.023	-.089	-.076
Israeli Decision Maker	-.131	-.045	.037
Diplomatic Post	.294*	.268*	.209
Military Post	-.593**	-.630**	-.408**

Note: N=55. ** = significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). * = significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

decision makers who favored cooperative strategies were more likely than others to hold diplomatic posts and less likely to hold military posts. Given the extremely close relationship between strategy and tactics (Pearson's coefficient .943), an expected result given the way that these two variables are measured, it is not surprising that the relationships between decision makers' preferred tactics and the other personal characteristics essentially mirrored the relationships between their strategy and those characteristics.

Decision makers who had a high risk orientation score, those who were more risk acceptant, tended to have a high need for affiliation, a low need for power, and to be less distrustful than other decision makers. They tended to favor the use of cooperative strategies and tactics. They tended to see the political universe as fundamentally cooperative and to be optimistic about achieving their political goals. They tended to see the world as basically predictable with chance playing a relatively small role in foreign policy. These people also tended not to hold military posts in the government.

Table 3.4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the
Operational Code's Philosophical Indices

Variable	Political Universe OCP1	Optimism OCP2	Political Future OCP3	Control OCP4	Chance OCP5
Need for Affiliation	.422**	.449**	.107	.068	-.116
Distrust	-.696**	-.625**	-.143	-.370**	.195
Conceptual Complexity	.068	.008	-.050	.071	.029
Need for Power	-.367**	-.315*	-.225	-.195	.254
Strategy, OCI1	.433**	.457**	.215	.198	-.234
Tactics, OCI2	.353**	.359**	.162	.217	-.184
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.327*	.410**	.366*	.028	-.365**
Political Universe, OCP1	1.000	.911**	.226	.281*	-.266*
Optimism, OCP2	.911**	1.000	.245	.224	-.284*
Political Future, OCP3	.226	.245	1.000	.330*	-.986**
Control, OCP4	.281*	.224	.330*	1.000	-.444**
Chance, OCP5	-.266	-.284*	-.986**	-.444**	1.000
USA Decision Maker	.087	.038	.014	.136	-.034
British Decision Maker	.061	.050	-.130	.170	.092
Israeli Decision Maker	-.168	-.095	.102	-.330*	-.041
Diplomatic Post	.266*	.263	.044	-.101	-.048
Military Post	-.308*	-.326*	-.036	.063	.042

Note: N=55. ** = significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). * = significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

Looking over the results reported in Table 3.4 we see that the philosophical indices of the operational code generally fit together with other variables in ways that match my hypotheses. The way that decision makers viewed the political universe was significantly correlated with eleven other variables. Those who saw it as basically cooperative tended to have a high need for affiliation, a low distrust score, and a high need for power. They tended to support cooperative strategies and tactics and be risk-acceptant. They were optimistic about achieving their political goals. They saw themselves as having considerable control over the course of history, and attributed relatively little power to the role of chance. They were more likely than others to hold diplomatic posts, and they were less likely than others to hold military posts.

Optimism is extremely closely correlated with political universe (Pearson's coefficient score of .911) so the results for these two variables are quite similar. However, there are two notable differences. More optimistic decision makers did not vary from others in the sample in terms of their belief in their ability to control events. Also, they were no more likely than others to hold diplomatic posts.

The political future variable is only significantly correlated with three variables. Two of these are very predictable. Decision makers who tend to see the world as predictable are more likely to see themselves as having a high degree of control over the development of history, and are likely to attribute little influence to chance. The other relationship is perhaps more interesting. Decision makers who tend to see the world as predictable are more likely to be risk-acceptant. If you remember, both of these variables are basically measures of the variety of types of actions one takes in world affairs. However, one (the Risk Orientation variable) focuses on actions taken by the

self, while the other (the Political Future variable) focuses on actions taken by others.

So the variety of categories of action a decision maker is willing to take when interacting with the world around them is related to the number of categories of action employed by other political actors.

Control is significantly related to five other variables. Decision makers who viewed themselves as having a particularly high degree of control over their environment were less distrustful than other decision makers. They relied more upon cooperative strategies. Also, they were more risk-acceptant, perhaps being less fearful of the consequences of risks since they believed that they had great control over the outcomes that would result from their policy choices. Predictably, they viewed chance as having a relatively small effect in shaping their political world. Finally, Israelis were less likely than other decision makers to view themselves as having control over the course of historical development. This is not surprising given the unusual pressures affecting Israeli foreign relations during this time period.

Finally, decision makers' view of the role of chance was significantly correlated with five other variables. Those who attributed chance with large impact in shaping the world around them were likely to be less risk-acceptant than other decision makers. They were also likely to view the political world as being a relatively conflictual place, and to be pessimistic about achieving their core goals. They were more likely to see the world as unpredictable, and to believe that they have relatively little control over historical development.

Table 3.5 deals with the five control variables that are personal characteristics of the decision makers in my sample. These results show some connections between these

Table 3.5 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Decision Makers' Characteristics
Used as Control Variables

Variable	USA Decision Maker	British Decision Maker	Israeli Decision Maker	Diplomatic Post	Military Post
Need for Affiliation	.065	.000	-.084	.298*	-.672**
Distrust	-.378**	.033	.454**	-.255	.377**
Conceptual Complexity	.520**	-.319*	-.373**	.044	.110
Need for Power	-.012	-.001	.016	-.346**	.428**
Strategy, OCI1	.119	-.023	-.131	.294*	-.593**
Tactics, OCI2	.099	-.089	-.045	.268*	-.630**
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.026	-.076	.037	.209	-.408**
Political Universe, OCP1	.087	.061	-.168	.266*	-.308*
Optimism, OCP2	.038	.050	-.095	.263	-.326
Political Future, OCP3	.014	-.130	.102	.044	-.036
Control, OCP4	.136	.170	-.330*	-.101	.063
Chance, OCP5	-.034	.092	-.041	-.048	.042
USA Decision Maker	1.000	-.632**	-.700**	-.059	.064
British Decision Maker	-.632**	1.000	-.111	.062	-.027
Israeli Decision Maker	-.700**	-.111	1.000	.018	-.057
Diplomatic Post	-.059	.062	.018	1.000	-.372**
Military Post	.064	-.027	-.057	-.372**	1.000

Note: N=55. ** = significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). * = significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

individuals' nationalities and their psychological characteristics, but there appear to be more linkages between the roles they fill in government and their psychological characteristics.

Israelis had higher levels of distrust than the other individuals in my sample, while Americans had lower levels of distrust. Americans were more conceptually complex than the British and Israeli officials in my sample. Israelis perceived themselves as having less control over the course of historical development than the other decision makers in my sample.

Those holding diplomatic posts in government had higher levels of need for affiliation, favored more cooperative strategies and tactics, and saw the political universe as fundamentally more cooperative than others in my sample. Additionally, they had lower needs for power. Those holding military posts in government had lower needs for affiliation, higher needs for power, and were more distrustful of others than other decision makers. They favored more conflictual strategies and tactics, they were less willing to take risks, and they were more likely to see the political universe as fundamentally conflictual than other decision makers.

Psychological Characteristics and Personal Policy Preferences

I begin my investigation of the effects of leaders' psychological characteristics on state behavior by focusing first on the relationship between these characteristics and decision makers' personal policy preferences. In order to ascertain whether or not the psychological characteristics of key individuals affect their support for particular policy options, I first test for the presence of significant bivariate relationships between the psychological characteristic variables and decision makers' preferences. In these analyses I separately test the effect that each of the psychological characteristics had on the policy preferences of the individual decision makers in my sample. I include the direction of the hypothesized effect after the name of the independent variable. I continue to do this throughout the remainder of the analyses in this project in which I hypothesize a variable will have a directional effect in order to make it easier to interpret the tables. The results of these tests are displayed in Table 3.6.

Glancing over the results, we quickly see that at least before the influence of other variables is controlled for there seems to be noticeable support for the position that

Table 3.6 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Psychological Characteristics on Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Psychological Characteristic	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	2.301/3.815	.275
Distrust (-)	-5.817/3.745	.063
Conceptual Complexity (+)	5.590/10.459	.298
Need for Power (-)	-10.780/5.749	.033
Strategy, OCI1 (+)	.716/1.911	.355
Tactics, OCI2 (+)	.141/2.583	.479
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	13.380/7.535	.041
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	2.529/1.945	.100
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	1.232/1.944	.265
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	9.868/5.249	.033
Control, OCP4 (+)	19.638/6.513	.002
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-14.599/6.647	.016

Note: N=55.

the psychological characteristics of key decision makers affect their policy preferences.

Of the twelve psychological characteristics tested, seven are significantly related to

decision makers' policy preferences. Decision makers who are more distrustful of others

were more likely to support conflictual policy options. Decision makers who had a

higher need for power were more likely to support more conflictual policy options.

Decision makers who were more willing to take risks were more likely than others to

support cooperative policy options. Decision makers who saw the nature of politics as

fundamentally conflictual were more likely than others to support conflictual policy

options. Decision makers who saw the world around them as highly predictable were

more likely than others to support cooperative policy options. Decision makers who saw

themselves as having greater control over the development of the world around them

were more likely to support cooperative policy options. Decision makers who saw the

development of the world around them as being strongly affected by chance were more likely than others to support conflictual policy options. Five psychological characteristics were not found to have significantly affected decision makers policy preferences during the decision events included in my sample. These included decision makers' need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, the prospects of achieving their political values, their preferred strategy and their preferred tactics. While none of these variables had a significant effect, in every case the coefficient had the hypothesized sign.

I also conducted bivariate regression analyses testing whether or not the control variables hypothesized to affect decision makers' policy preferences did in fact affect those preferences. The results of these tables are seen in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Control Variables on Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Control Variables	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
USA Decision Maker	.555/1.520	.359
British Decision Maker	2.232/2.095	.146
Israeli Decision Maker	-2.811/1.914	.074
Diplomatic Post	1.038/1.309	.216
Military Post	.925/1.427	.260
Level of Provocation	-1.173/.429	.005
Threat Level	-1.872/.745	.008

Note: N=55.

Three of these variables had a significant effect. I found that Israeli decision makers were more likely than others to support conflictual policy options. Decision makers were more likely to support conflictual policies if their opponent had taken an especially serious, provocative action. Finally, decision makers were more likely to

support conflictual policy preferences if the action taken by their opponent resulted in a high threat to national interests. Being British or American did not significantly affect a decision maker's tendency to support cooperative or conflictual policy options. Whether a decision maker held a post in a military or diplomatic organization also did not significantly affect their tendency to support cooperative or conflictual policy options.

While these results are instructive and give us valuable insights into the impact of particular influences on the policy preferences of decision makers, to determine the true impact of these influences on the beliefs and behaviors of key political leaders the effects of other variables must be controlled for. Therefore, I next conducted multivariate regression analyses to further explore the impact of the psychological characteristics of leaders on the policies they supported.

In the first of these analyses I tested all of the psychological characteristics that I earlier found to have significant individual effects on decision makers policy preferences together in two multivariate models. In the first of these I excluded the third philosophical operational code index, the predictability of the political future, and in the second I excluded the fifth operational code index, the effect of the role of chance. I ran these separate tests because those two variables are highly correlated. The results of these analyses are displayed in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. In both of these tests only one of the psychological characteristics, an individual's belief in their ability to control historical development, is found to be a significant predictor of decision makers' policy preferences. In both analyses decision makers who believed they had greater control over the development of the world around them were more likely than other decision makers to support cooperative policy options.

Table 3.8 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effects of Psychological Characteristics on Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Psychological Characteristic	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	.575/5.719	.460
Need for Power (-)	-4.165/7.413	.289
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	9.334/9.279	.160
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	-.168/2.660	.475
Control, OCP4 (+)	17.667/8.061	.017
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-2.946/7.994	.357

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.106. F statistic=2.068 (prob.=.075).

Table 3.9 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effects of Psychological Characteristics on Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Psychological Characteristic	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	.571/5.714	.461
Need for Power (-)	-4.193/7.409	.287
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	9.304/9.259	.160
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	-.160/2.656	.476
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	2.268/5.878	.352
Control, OCP4 (+)	18.005/7.637	.012

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.106. F statistic=2.071 (prob.=.074).

I next ran a similar set of regression analyses. However, in these I tested not only the impact of the psychological characteristics of decision makers on their policy preferences but also three control variables, the seriousness of the opponent's action, the level of stakes that are threatened during the decision-making event, and whether or not the decision maker was from Israel. Given that the variables measuring the seriousness of an opponent's action and the variable representing the threat level are highly

correlated I chose to test their impact in separate models. The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 3.10 through 3.13.

Table 3.10 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	5.045/6.065	.205
Need for Power (-)	-7.433/7.109	.151
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	8.760/8.551	.156
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	1.363/2.531	.297
Control, OCP4 (+)	15.817/7.714	.023
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-5.743/7.486	.224
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.312/.424	.002
Israeli Decision Maker (-)	-607/2.195	.392

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.244. F statistic=3.176 (prob.=.006).

Table 3.11 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	5.113/6.073	.202
Need for Power (-)	-7.487/7.123	.150
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	9.065/8.550	.148
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	1.402/2.533	.292
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	3.694/5.527	.254
Control, OCP4 (+)	16.799/7.325	.013
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.296/.424	.002
Israeli Decision Maker (-)	-619/2.210	.391

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.241. F statistic=3.148 (prob.=.006).

As hypothesized, these analyses show that the level of provocation initiated by a state's opponent had a very great deal to do with why decision makers in my sample preferred to respond to an event with either cooperative or aggressive action. However,

Table 3.12 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	4.130/6.141	.253
Need for Power (-)	-8.302/7.235	.129
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	1.862/9.011	.419
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	-.164/2.561	.475
Control, OCP4 (+)	16.337/7.831	.022
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-10.375/7.869	.097
Threat Level (-)	-2.294/.812	.004
Israeli Decision Maker (-)	-.194/2.282	.467

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.222. F statistic=2.925 (prob.=.010).

Table 3.13 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	4.254/6.152	.297
Need for Power (-)	-8.391/7.257	.127
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	2.334/8.975	.398
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	-.073/2.561	.489
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	7.100/5.759	.112
Control, OCP4 (+)	17.809/7.464	.011
Threat Level (-)	-2.232/.805	.004
Israeli Decision Maker (-)	-.277/2.294	.452

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.218. F statistic=2.885 (prob.=.011).

this situational influence was not the only factor that shaped the policy preferences of individual decision makers. Even after controlling for the scale of an opponent's action at least one of their psychological characteristics was strongly related to their policy preferences. Decision makers who perceived themselves as having control over the development of historical events were more likely to support cooperative foreign policy

proposals than those who did not believe they have such an impact on events. While not statistically significant, it is worth noting that the Need for Power, Risk Orientation, Political Future and Chance variables neared significance and were in the expected direction in these models. However it appears that once other relevant variables were accounted for decision makers' distrust of others did not significantly affect their tendency to support cooperative or conflictual policy options. Neither did their perception of the fundamental nature of the political universe. Additionally, it appears that Israeli decision makers might not be as different from American and British leaders as they first appeared once other variables are controlled for.

But before we accept these results that seem to weaken the support for my hypothesis it is worth considering why these variables that at first seemed to have their own independent effect on decision makers' preferences no longer appear to have such effects. Is it because the inclusion of a variable representing the impact that the nature of the move taken by a person's opponent overwhelms the influence of their own preexisting perceptions and needs? In other words, were decision makers' responses shaped almost exclusively by the events that occurred around them? Or do some of these variables fail to attain significance simply because some of them are related to each other to a considerable degree and therefore including them together in the same model causes statistical problems that may understate their individual effects?

To get at this question I ran another set of regression models aimed at explaining the policy preferences of decision makers. In each of these analyses I only included two independent variables. In each case one of these was one of the psychological characteristic variables that failed to reach the .10 significance threshold in the last set of

regression analyses. The other variable was either Level of Provocation or Threat Level. I again ran separate analyses controlling for these two situational influences since these variables are highly correlated. These tests show whether or not each of these psychological characteristics had a significant effect on individuals' policy preferences after controlling for the seriousness of the action taken by one's opponent and the nature of the threat posed by the opponent. The results of these analyses are displayed in Tables 3.14-3.25.

Table 3.14 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	-5.044/3.564	.082
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.123/.427	.006

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.123. F statistic=4.804 (prob.=.012).

Table 3.15 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Power (-)	-12.106/5.374	.015
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.249/.415	.002

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.171. F statistic=6.556 (prob.=.003).

In ten of these twelve models the results of these analyses show that even when an important situational factor is controlled for, these key psychological characteristics still had a significant effect on the policy preferences of decision makers. These results would certainly seem to bolster the argument that who makes a state's foreign policy

Table 3.16 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	15.306/7.049	.017
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.255/.417	.002

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.165. F statistic=6.351 (prob.=.003).

Table 3.17 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	2.946/1.828	.057
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.227/.424	.003

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.133. F statistic=5.143 (prob.=.009).

Table 3.18 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	11.444/4.901	.012
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.274/.415	.002

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.176. F statistic=6.771 (prob.=.002).

decisions matters. Here we see that the policy preferences of decision makers, the preferences they took with them into the high level meetings where national policy was set, were partially a function of their beliefs and personality traits. This was found to be the case across a wide variety of disputants and types of disagreement.

Table 3.19 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-17.145/6.175	.004
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.317/.408	.001

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.207. F statistic=8.059 (prob.=.001).

Table 3.20 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	-3.980/3.708	.144
Threat Level (-)	-1.689/.763	.016

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.092. F statistic=3.745 (prob.=.030).

Table 3.21 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Power (-)	-10.494/5.477	.031
Threat Level (-)	-1.843/.727	.007

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.133. F statistic=5.155 (prob.=.009).

I conduct one final test before ending this section focusing on the effects that these variables have on policy preferences of all the decision makers in my sample. Ideally, to investigate these relationships I would simply test all of the psychological characteristics together in a multivariate model. However, as the tables presented at the beginning of this chapter show, several of these variables are highly correlated, and

Table 3.22 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	10.609/7.360	.078
Threat Level (-)	-1.255/4.17	.014

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.108. F statistic=4.263 (prob.=.019).

Table 3.23 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	1.820/1.892	.168
Threat Level (-)	-1.757/1.754	.012

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.089. F statistic=3.630 (prob.=.033).

Table 3.24 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	12.980/4.964	.006
Threat Level (-)	-2.251/1.721	.002

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.180. F statistic=6.926 (prob.=.002).

drawing conclusions from tests including several highly correlated variables is problematic. That is why up until now in this analysis I have relied on tests that include fewer independent variables. But given that a large multivariate test is ideal, it is appropriate to conduct one before leaving this section. The correlations between the independent variables require us to be wary of the results, but they are still informative.

Table 3.25 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-19.036/6.250	.002
Threat Level (-)	-2.337/.709	.001

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.213. F statistic=8.291 (prob.=.001).

In this model I include all but the most highly correlated variables. I exclude Tactics, Optimism and Chance given that they are exceptionally highly correlated with other psychological characteristics (Pearson's correlation coefficients above .8). I also include a variety of control variables that I hypothesize will have a directional effect on decision makers' policy preferences. These variables account for the impact of the role pressures these decision makers face, their nationality, and situational factors that may affect decision makers' preferences. The results of this test are seen in Table 3.26.

The results of this test are somewhat interesting. One is likely to immediately notice what appear to be strong links between the tendencies of decision makers to rely upon cooperative or conflictual policy options, their level of risk acceptance, and their perception of their control over their surroundings. Of course these variables were found to have important effects earlier in this chapter. We also see that decision makers are more likely to favor more conflictual policies when they face an especially provocative move by an adversary, and that decision makers who hold diplomatic posts are more likely to favor cooperative policies. Additionally, the F statistic shows that the overall model has a significant effect. However, other results point to serious problems

Table 3.26 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effects of Psychological Characteristics on Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	-2.619/6.000	.333
Distrust (-)	3.987/6.107	.259
Conceptual Complexity (+)	-.948/10.182	.463
Need for Power (-)	-8.400/7.016	.119
Strategy, OCI1 (+)	-7.015/3.289	.020
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	25.389/11.700	.018
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	1.348/2.620	.255
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	4.127/5.923	.245
Control, OCP4 (+)	22.003/7.658	.004
Diplomatic Post (+)	1.901/1.245	.068
Military Post (-)	.390/1.867	.418
Israeli Nationality (-)	.238/2.289	.459
Information Processing Errors (-)	-.271/.316	.198
Level of Provocation (-)	-.982/.581	.050
Threat Level (-)	-1.188/1.103	.144

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.328. F statistic=2.759 (prob.= .006).

using this sort of multivariate analysis given the nature of my data. Though I excluded psychological characteristic variables that were exceptionally highly correlated with other psychological characteristic variables, my data set still includes variables that are significantly correlated with one another. Additionally, the small size of my sample limits my ability to find statistically significant relationships. These limitations make interpreting the results of this test highly problematic. They may also largely explain why several of these variables not only fail to achieve significance, but why some of them have signs that are opposite from those that were hypothesized. But despite its limitations it is still instructive to know that this model, the most comprehensive in this section investigating the link between decision makers' psychological characteristics and

policy preferences, is highly significant and explains over thirty percent of the variation in the dependent variable.

How the Psychological Characteristics of Decision Units Affect Their Preferences

My analyses up to this point have focused upon my entire sample of 55 decision makers. However, in the next chapter I study the behaviors of three subsets of this sample that come to the fore in different decision-making systems. Therefore, it may be instructive to know the degree to which this linkage between the psychological characteristics of decision makers and their personal policy preferences holds up in each of these decision units. It necessarily becomes more difficult to establish causal relationships within these subsets of decision makers as I lose many degrees of freedom in my models. However, before I investigate matters such as the effect that the policy preferences of particular foreign policy makers have on state policy and the views of other decision makers, matters I study in the next chapter, it is appropriate to first investigate the factors that affect the policy preferences of these decision units.

In examining how states make decisions I focus on three different decision-making units that may come to the fore in different policy-making situations. The first of these is a situation in which foreign policy decision-making is guided by an active and interested national executive leader. The great majority of the research that has focused on political psychology and international affairs has dealt with how the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders, presidents and prime ministers, shape their countries' foreign policies. This is, of course, a sensible office to focus upon. As the chiefs of their governments they have final power over how to direct their countries' foreign policies. This would seem to be particularly true in marginally

democratic or totalitarian states that are not subject to the limitations on executive power that exist in democracies. However, one may expect this to also often be the case in democracies as the influence of foreign threats gives leaders an unusual degree of freedom from domestic political concerns and other political rivals when choosing how to best pursue their nations' interests (Hermann and Kegley 1995). In fact, democracies frequently "unleash foreign-policy actions before consulting popular representatives, and sometimes even after deliberately misleading them" (Merritt and Zinnes 199:227). And of course their institutional power is considerably greater than any other official who might wish to compete with them in their own government. As Morton Halperin (1974:17) has written of U.S. presidents, "His role and influence over decisions are qualitatively different from those of any other participant". Given their broad power over foreign affairs, it is not surprising that previous literature in this area has found that presidents and prime ministers produce a personal imprint on their countries' foreign affairs, with countries adopting policies that match the psychological needs and goals of their national executive leader.

However, a country's foreign policy is not always set by its president or prime minister. In some governments presidents and prime ministers rely heavily on recommendations from their top advisors when choosing which policy options to pursue. In some cases they rely heavily on one particularly favored aide. This is frequently their Secretary of State or Foreign Minister, the cabinet official specifically charged with overseeing a government's foreign policy. History is replete with instances of powerful Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers substantially shaping a state's foreign policy from Talleyrand and Metternich to Schuman and Kissinger.

In other cases the national executive leader relies heavily on the advice of his or her top aides, but there is no single especially influential advisor. In these cases an advisory group composed of a number of decision makers often comes together to settle policy challenges and then pass their recommendations along to the president or prime minister. In several governments, for example the Clinton administration, key departmental decision makers were frequently given great leeway in setting policy options. On major issues they were often expected to deal with disputes among themselves and establish something at least close to a consensus before forcing the president to come to a decision on the topic. This type of decision-making arrangement may be due to an executive leader who favors a generally hands-off approach and delegates authority in all areas. It may be due to the president or prime minister preferring to concentrate on domestic affairs. Or it could be the result of the president or prime minister lacking much experience in foreign affairs. Most national executive leaders are comfortable giving considerably responsibility their subordinates in setting national policy as they are likely to have appointed top aides with whom they share common beliefs, perceptions and ideas.

In investigating how the psychological characteristics of these decision units affect their preferences I first conduct a series of bivariate regression analyses in which the independent variables are the presidents' and prime ministers' psychological characteristics and the dependent variable is the decision unit's preferred policy option. While it would perhaps have been preferable to test these variables together in multivariate models, I opted not to do that since the operational code instrumental indices are highly correlated with one another. Several of the operational code

highly correlated with one another as well. The results of this set of analyses are presented in Table 3.27.

Table 3.27 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Psychological Characteristics of National Executive Leaders on Their Personal Policy Preferences

Psychological Characteristics	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	-.136/10.238	.495
Distrust (-)	-4.763/9.302	.309
Conceptual Complexity (+)	32.935/32.073	.161
Need for Power (-)	-9.397/16.929	.294
Strategy, OCI (+)	-1.214/5.514	.415
Tactics, OCI2 (+)	-1.258/7.909	.438
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	18.638/19.942	.183
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	-.848/5.746	.443
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	-3.355/6.477	.307
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	12.890/22.086	.285
Control, OCP4 (+)	33.541/15.925	.027
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-21.583/28.073	.228

Note: N=16.

The results of this set of analyses show that once the data set is divided this way there appears to be less support for the proposition that the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect their policy preferences. Of course this may be heavily affected by the fact that there are far fewer degrees of freedom in these analyses than those in the previous chapter (sample size of 16 versus sample size of 55). But if one does not take that into account, most of the psychological characteristics of presidents and prime ministers that I measure do not strongly predict these leaders' personal policy preferences.

The only variable that significantly affected the personal policy preferences of national executives was control. That this variable is significant is not surprising given

the strong effect it was shown to have across the whole sample of decision makers in the preceding chapter, even when controlling for the effects of other psychological factors and the seriousness of the action taken by a country's opponent. Presidents and prime ministers who saw themselves as having a high level of control over historical development were more likely than others to support cooperative policies. Additionally, conceptual complexity approached significance in the hypothesized direction, so it seems plausible to think that more complex leaders are indeed more likely to pursue cooperative policy options.

This effect appears even weaker when the influence of other variables is accounted for. I next tested whether or not a national executive leaders' perception of control continues to have a significant impact on their policy preferences when the opponent's action and the level of threat they face are controlled for. As you can see in Tables 3.28 and 3.29, this variable loses its significant effect when these influences are included in my model.

I next test whether or not the policy preferences of the advisory groups are affected by their psychological characteristics. I do this by first computing the mean scores of the president's or prime minister's advisors in a case. This includes all of the

Table 3.28 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Control and Level of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of National Executive Leaders

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Control, OCP4 (+)	15.976/16.745	.179
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.795/.878	.031

Note: N=16 Adjusted R-square= .337 F statistic=4.814 (prob.=.027).

Table 3.29 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Control and Threat Level on the Personal Policy Preferences of National Executive Leaders

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Control, OCP4 (+)	12.101/15.477	.244
Threat Level (-)	-3.719/1.386	.010

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.436. F statistic=6.803 (prob.=.010).

individuals I coded during a decision-making event, excluding the national executive leader. The results of this series of bivariate analyses are reported in Table 3.30.

Once again we see only a few significant relationships. The only variable to significantly affect the personal policy preferences of advisory groups was need for affiliation. Those groups whose members had high needs for affiliation were more likely to support cooperative policy options. This effect is somewhat interesting given that

Table 3.30 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Advisory Group's Psychological Characteristics on Their Mean Personal Policy Preference

Psychological Characteristics	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	12.344/5.726	.025
Distrust (-)	-4.920/7.001	.247
Conceptual Complexity (+)	3.862/15.077	.401
Need for Power (-)	-13.999/12.975	.150
Strategy, OCI (+)	2.668/3.680	.240
Tactics, OCI2 (+)	1.873/5.513	.370
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	6.752/13.103	.307
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	1.406/3.352	.341
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	-.575/3.110	.428
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	-3.406/12.351	.394
Control, OCP4 (+)	9.437/11.330	.265
Chance, OCP5 (-)	2.265/17.693	.450

Note: N=16

need for affiliation did not have a significant effect on the individual policy preferences of the full sample of decision makers. It should be noted that need for power, which I found to have a significant effect in the preceding analysis focused on national executive leaders, nears significance in the expected direction in this model as well.

I next tested whether or not the advisory group's need for affiliation maintained its significant effect when situational variables were controlled for. As seen in Table 3.31, this variable still meets the .10 significance level when the nature of the threat is controlled for. It also approaches significance in the model controlling for the impact of the opponent's move, as seen in Table 3.32. Even in this analysis, in which attaining a significant effect is difficult due to the small number of degrees of freedom, we see that

Table 3.31 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Need for Affiliation and Level of Provocation on the Mean Personal Policy Preferences of Advisory Groups

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	8.834/6.672	.106
Level of Provocation (-)	-.619/.580	.155

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.166. F statistic=2.290 (prob.=.147).

Table 3.32 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Need for Affiliation and Threat Level on the Mean Personal Policy Preferences of Advisory Groups

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	12.110/8.342	.087
Threat Level (-)	.145/1.212	.454

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.080. F statistic=1.568 (prob.=.252).

advisory groups whose members seek out close relationships with others are more likely than other groups to advocate cooperative policy options.

The final decision unit I investigate here are the Foreign Ministers and Secretaries of State. Again, I conducted a series of bivariate regression analyses in which the psychological characteristics of this group of decision makers are the independent variables and their personal policy preferences are the dependent variables. The results of these analyses are displayed in Table 3.33.

Table 3.33 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Psychological Characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers on Their Personal Policy Preferences

Psychological Characteristics	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	10.587/10.091	.156
Distrust (-)	-13.369/7.097	.042
Conceptual Complexity (+)	.751/20.998	.486
Need for Power (-)	-14.230/14.101	.165
Strategy, OCI (+)	7.503/5.568	.100
Tactics, OCI2 (+)	10.623/10.692	.169
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	14.514/15.774	.187
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	8.954/3.916	.019
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	6.765/4.534	.079
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	55.334/14.339	.001
Control, OCP4 (+)	31.677/10.137	.004
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-75.664/15.658	.000

Note: N=16.

Unlike the earlier analyses that make it appear that there is at best a weak link between the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and advisory groups and their policy preferences, Table 3.33 shows that several of the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers significantly affected their

personal policy preferences. In all, seven of these variables are significant at the .10 level. This includes their levels of distrust, their preferred strategy, and all five of the operational code's philosophical indices. People who held these positions and had higher levels of distrust were more likely than others to favor conflictual policy options. Those who believed that the best approach to goals (strategy) was to use cooperative means were indeed more likely to support cooperative policy proposals. Those who believed that the nature of the political universe was fundamentally conflictual were more likely than others to favor conflictual policy options. Those who were more optimistic about achieving their political goals were more likely to support cooperative policy positions. Those who thought that the political future was largely predictable were more likely to personally favor cooperative policies, as were those who believed they had a high level of control over historical development. Those who saw chance playing a major role in the development of events were more likely than others to favor conflictual policy proposals.

The results seen in Table 3.33 show what appears to be a strong link between the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers and their personal policy preferences. But to be sure that this relationship is indeed robust the effects of other variables must be accounted for. Therefore in Tables 3.34-3.40 I test whether or not these relationships still exist, controlling for the seriousness of the action taken by these advisors' opponents. The results of these tests show that six of these relationships remain significant and the seventh, the link between strategy orientation and the personal policy preferences of these Secretaries and Foreign Ministers just barely falls short of reaching the .10 level of significance. To be doubly sure of the robustness

Table 3.34 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Distrust and Level of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	-14.603/8.067	.047
Level of Provocation (-)	.348/.950	.360

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.089. F statistic=1.731 (prob.=.215).

Table 3.35 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Strategy and Level of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Strategy, OCI1 (+)	7.567/5.737	.105
Level of Provocation (-)	-.402/.907	.333

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.006. F statistic=.954 (prob.=.411).

Table 3.36 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Nature of the Political Universe and Level of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	8.974/4.160	.025
Level of Provocation (-)	.019/.848	.492

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.160. F statistic=2.428 (prob.=.127).

of these relationships I also test their effects controlling for the impact of the level of the threat that these advisors see to their national interest. The results of these tests are seen in Tables 3.41-3.47. Again, most of these relationships remain significant, though

Table 3.37 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Optimism and Level of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	6.679/4.840	.096
Level of Provocation (-)	-.070/.928	.471

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.005. F statistic=1.037 (prob.=.382).

Table 3.38 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Political Future and Level of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	62.836/15.589	.001
Level of Provocation (-)	.818/.708	.135

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.493. F statistic=8.291 (prob.=.005).

strategy and optimism, fail to reach the .10 level. These results indicate that the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers significantly affect their personal policy preferences.

Taken as a whole, these results are intriguing. Why are the personal policy preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers significantly affected by several of their psychological characteristics, when the linkage between the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and advisory groups appear to have a limited impact on their personal policy preferences? The design of this project does not allow us to answer this question definitively. However, it would seem possible that there may be

Table 3.39 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Control and Level of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Control, OCP4 (+)	31.654/10.424	.005
Level of Provocation (-)	-.362/.739	.317

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.333. F statistic=4.737 (prob.=.028).

Table 3.40 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Chance and Level of Provocation on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (+)	-80.474/16.594	.000
Level of Provocation (-)	.558/.607	.375

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.594. F statistic=11.967 (prob.=.001).

Table 3.41 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Distrust and Threat Level on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Distrust (-)	-13.008/8.134	.067
Threat Level (-)	-.171/1.636	.459

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.080. F statistic=1.654 (prob.=.229).

something special about holding that post, and having the expertise that job requires, that leads them to rely on their own perceptions and beliefs more than other decision makers.

If one is hypothesizing that factors like one's beliefs about the structure and operation of the international system are likely to affect their policy preferences, one is

Table 3.42 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Strategy and Threat Level on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Strategy, OCII (+)	6.674/6.023	.144
Threat Level (-)	-.731/1.627	.330

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.006. F statistic=.957 (prob.=.409).

Table 3.43 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Nature of the Political Universe and Threat Level on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Universe, OCPI (+)	9.205/4.574	.033
Threat Level (-)	.191/1.593	.454

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.161. F statistic=2.437 (prob.=.126).

Table 3.44 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Optimism and Threat Level on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	6.559/5.586	.131
Threat Level (-)	-.125/1.829	.473

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.005. F statistic=1.036 (prob.=.382).

presupposing that individuals have preexisting belief systems. All members of a national foreign policy decision-making team are likely to enter office with certain set beliefs about the nature of world affairs. But the degree to which decision makers will have organized their thoughts on these issues varies greatly. As Michael Brecher has noted,

Table 3.45 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Political Future and Threat Level on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	55.514/15.642	.002
Threat Level (-)	.045/1.214	.486

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.441. F statistic=6.916 (prob.=.009).

Table 3.46 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Control and Threat Level on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Control, OCP4 (+)	34.542/9.641	.002
Threat Level (-)	-2.006/1.167	.055

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.446. F statistic=7.042 (prob.=.008).

Table 3.47 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Chance and Threat Level on the Personal Policy Preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-74.392/16.412	.001
Threat Level (+)	-.437/1.026	.339

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.573. F statistic=11.083 (prob.=.002).

“few high-policy decision-makers have the time or inclination to formulate a coherent view of the world” (Brecher 1972:251). Many of those who have come to power with other priorities and with experience in other areas of government are likely to be less conversant with foreign policy issues, and less able to develop detailed understandings of how to achieve their preferences in this field than foreign policy specialists. Therefore,

considering the nature of the position and the typical background of those who fill it, those who are appointed to head foreign ministries are likely to have unusually well-developed belief systems about the nature of international relations, and how best to pursue one's goals in the international arena. It certainly seems likely that national executive leaders with little experience in foreign affairs like Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher would have a more malleable and less intricate understanding of the nature of global affairs than Cyrus Vance, George Shultz and Geoffrey Howe.

It would seem possible that the highly structured belief systems of foreign ministry chiefs may become even more elaborately structured as these individuals serve in their position and are bombarded with the intricacies of running complex bureaucracies charged with setting detailed policies in the midst of many competing interests. It can be postulated then that these individuals have unusually well-developed beliefs, ideas and opinions about international relations and will be more likely to rely upon them when evaluating policy options than decision makers who have less well-developed belief systems. They should be the most likely officials to consider themselves to have all necessary information before them when studying an international event. They are the most likely to have preexisting belief structures and detailed schemata that allow them to accurately process information, make more information accessible, and make informed decisions whose outcomes are likely to conform with their goals and ideals. All these attributes would seem to make Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers more likely than other government officials to rely upon their own personal perceptions and propensities when settling on a favorite policy proposal.

Additionally, it should be pointed out that if these cabinet members do in fact have more precise foreign policy belief systems it would also seem likely that measurements of their psychological characteristics may be more accurate than the measurements of others' psychological characteristics. Being surer of themselves and their preferences in a wide variety of policy domains, these cabinet members' comments are less likely to vary away from their true characteristics or to be influenced by the constraints placed upon them by uncertainty. That is, the measurements of their psychological characteristics may be relatively more valid than the measurements of those individuals with less fully developed belief systems.

Again, this is simply a supposition. But this, as well as the fact that presidents and prime ministers may be more dependent upon taking other political considerations into account when deciding which policy option to support, seems a reasonable explanation to explain why the initial policy preferences of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers are more a product of their psychological characteristics than those of national executive leaders.

National Differences

The analyses reported earlier in this chapter show that the policy preferences of individual decision makers are affected by both certain personal psychological characteristics and the nature of the actions taken by other political actors in their environment. But what other factors shape the policy options they choose to implement to address the foreign policy challenges that confront them? Given the results reported in Table 3.7 it appears possible that decision makers in certain countries may tend to be more cooperative or conflictual than decision makers in other countries. However, the

results reported in Tables 3.10-3.13 suggest that this may not be the case once the impact of other influences are considered. Obviously the design of this project does not allow for a comprehensive test of this question since it includes decision makers from only three countries. However, it is still worthwhile to investigate whether or not cross-national differences exist within this sample, and why Israeli decision makers appear to be more prone to support conflictual policy options than their British and American counterparts.

To begin to get at this question in more detail I test a model aimed at explaining individual decision makers' policy preferences that includes only the Level of Provocation and Israeli Decision Maker variables as independent variables. The results of this test are reported in Table 3.48. They show that once one controls for the action taken by a country's opponent, Israeli decision makers do not differ from the others included in the sample in terms of whether they tend to support cooperative or conflictual policy proposals. I ran a separate test controlling for Threat Level instead of Level of Provocation, and the impact of being Israeli appeared to be even weaker in that model. If at first Israeli decision makers appeared to be more conflictual than the other decision makers included in my sample, that appears to be explained by the fact that they have tended to face much more provocative moves by their enemies, and considerably greater threats to their national security, than American and British leaders have faced during the later decades of the twentieth century.

This does not necessarily settle this question though. While perhaps the simple matter of one's nationality does not have a direct effect on one's tendency to favor responding to challenges in international affairs through either cooperative or conflictual

Table 3.48 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Explaining
Decision Makers' Policy Preferences

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Israeli Decision Maker (-)	-1.335/1.942	.248
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.071/.456	.012

Note: N=55. Adjusted R-square=.098. F statistic=3.931 (prob.=.026).

means, it does seem possible that a decision maker's nationality may still matter in that it could have important indirect effects. Of particular interest to this study, it is possible that stable patterns of cross-national variation exist in the personality traits and core foreign policy beliefs of decision makers. While it may be difficult to get at the core reasons for such differences, for example, whether they result from differences in national popular cultures, the patterns of behavior that people adopt to move up in the political hierarchy of a country, or perhaps adaptation to a hostile environment, knowing whether or not such differences exist is still informative. And given the findings reported above showing that variation in some of these characteristics leads decision makers to support different types of political behavior, this investigation also could provide important information about why particular countries act as they do in the international arena. Therefore, below I run a series of bivariate regression analyses. In each I test whether being from a particular country affects the psychological characteristics of political decision makers. The independent variables are dummy variables noting a decision maker's nationality. The dependent variables are the twelve psychological characteristics. The results of these tests are presented in Tables 3.49-3.51.

Table 3.49 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect of American Nationality on Decision Makers' Psychological Characteristics

Psychological Characteristic	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation	.026/.054	.319
Distrust	-.150/.051	.002
Conceptual Complexity	.075/.017	.000
Need for Power	-.003/.035	.467
Strategy, OCI1	.094/.108	.194
Tactics, OCI2	.058/.081	.237
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.005/.027	.425
Political Universe, OCP1	.067/.105	.263
Optimism, OCP2	.029/.107	.393
Political Future, OCP3	.004/.039	.460
Control, OCP4	.029/.029	.162
Chance, OCP5	-.007/.030	.403

Note: N=55.

Looking over the results of these analyses we see that while a decision maker's nationality may not have a strong independent effect on their tendency to support either cooperative or conflictual policies, it may nonetheless have an indirect effect. There are significant differences between decision makers of different countries on a number of psychological characteristics.

American leaders are more conceptually complex than British and Israeli decision makers. This finding may at first not appear to be of great importance given that I did not find that variable to be significantly related to decision makers' tendency to support either cooperative or conflictual policy options. However, as a number of other works have linked low complexity scores to support for conflictual policies in international affairs (Driver 1977; Hermann 1980, 1984; Hermann and Hermann 1989), and given the earlier analyses in this chapter showed that this variable neared significance as a factor

affecting the personal policy preferences of national executive leaders, this cross-national difference could have substantive implications.

It is not immediately clear why this difference exists. It may be due to cross-national cultural differences. Another possibility is that in some cases foreign policy decision makers in the United States come from different segments of society than those in the United Kingdom and Israel. In particular, this may be due to the fact that an unusually high number of American foreign policy decision makers come from the academic community, and the decision makers who have the highest conceptual complexity scores in my sample, Harold Brown, Anthony Lake, Madeleine Albright and Zbigniew Brzezinski, all have that type of background in common. But whatever the reason, these findings would suggest that American decision makers think and cognitively structure the world around them in a way that is different from their Israeli

Table 3.50 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect of British Nationality on Decision Makers' Psychological Characteristics

Psychological Characteristic	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation	.000/.076	.499
Distrust	.018/.076	.405
Conceptual Complexity	-.064/.026	.009
Need for Power	-.000/.049	.497
Strategy, OCI1	-.026/.152	.434
Tactics, OCI2	-.073/.112	.260
Risk Orientation, OCI3	-.021/.037	.290
Political Universe, OCP1	.065/.147	.329
Optimism, OCP2	.055/.149	.358
Political Future, OCP3	-.051/.053	.172
Control, OCP4	.051/.041	.108
Chance, OCP5	.028/.042	.252

Note: N=55.

and British counterparts. Similarly, this analysis also shows that American decision makers were less distrustful of other political actors than the other decision makers included in the study. This tendency may have led them to be less likely to favor conflictual policies, given that earlier I found decision maker's level of distrust significantly affects their policy preferences.

Table 3.50 shows that British decision makers did not have psychological characteristics that were markedly different from those of the other decision makers in my sample. The only characteristic on which they significantly differed from other decision makers was conceptual complexity. This finding was expected given that American decision makers were found to be more complex than the others included in the analysis.

As seen in Table 3.51, Israeli decision makers were significantly different from the others in this sample in a number of ways. They were more distrustful, less complex, had a lower perception of their control over historical development, and it appears they likely saw the political universe as more conflictual as well. These results show that not all decision makers think alike. There are notably cross-national differences. The pattern of differences suggests that the earlier reported finding that Israelis supported more conflictual policies than the other decision makers included in this analysis may not have been solely a product of the unusually dangerous actions taken by Israel's opponents. They also reflected these decision makers' beliefs and psychological needs. While it is also possible that these characteristics were to a degree a function of the threats Israel's people faced during this period, they may have also been a product of different cultural and political norms in that country. Of course these two influences are not unrelated.

Table 3.51 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect Israeli Nationality on Decision Makers' Psychological Characteristics

Psychological Characteristic	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation	-.043/.070	.272
Distrust	.232/.062	.000
Conceptual Complexity	-.070/.024	.003
Need for Power	.005/.045	.454
Strategy, OCI1	-.134/.139	.170
Tactics, OCI2	-.034/.104	.373
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.009/.035	.395
Political Universe, OCP1	-.166/.134	.110
Optimism, OCP2	-.095/.137	.246
Political Future, OCP3	.037/.049	.229
Control, OCP4	-.092/.036	.007
Chance, OCP5	-.012/.039	.382

Note: N=55.

The fact that for many years militancy was “the norm in Israel’s behavior towards her Arab enemies” (Brecher 1972:247) was certainly related to the fact that its decision makers viewed their neighbors as barbarians “ineluctable” in their aggressive behavior (Cottam and Cottam 2001:111).

Bureaucratic Politics

The design of this project allows us to investigate the impact of another factor that has often been attributed with a great deal of influence over the positions taken by decision makers during the formation of foreign policy, the pressures of bureaucratic politics. This influence has frequently been referred to in the foreign policy decision making literature, and an increasing number of scholars are beginning to link this phenomenon to the work that has been done on the effects of individuals’ personal characteristics. Preston and Hart (1999) provide a good review of the literature on this

nexus. However, there has not yet been much rigorous, quantitative research into the relative psychological characteristics of decision makers representing different bureaucracies, and the policy implications of these differences, across a varied set of governments. Therefore in this section of this chapter I review literature associated with one particularly well-known aspect of the bureaucratic politics debate, Miles's Law, and then carry out statistical tests to investigate this phenomenon.

Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* (1971) has become one of the most cited books in the history of the study of international relations. This seminal work greatly increased interest in the impact of bureaucracies and small-group decision making on the creation of foreign policy. Much of the previous literature investigating these factors had taken a rather unsystematic, ad hoc approach. Allison sought to create a theoretical basis for these influences. He proposed three different models as explanations for a state's policy-making behavior. Model 1 focused on the state as a rational actor. Model 2 focused on the role of organizational process in the creation of policy. Model 3 focused on the impact of governmental politics, often referred to as bureaucratic politics. After laying out how he expected states would behave depending upon which of these competing conceptual approaches was used, he then tested his theories.

The book has probably become best known for calling for more attention to the study of decision making, and stressing the importance of bureaucratic influences in shaping state policies. The most frequently quoted aphorism in *Essence of Decision* (Allison 1971), "Miles's law", has become one of the most widely known phrases in the field of decision making. This proposition, "where you stand depends on where you sit" (Allison 1971:176), holds that decision makers' policy preferences depend upon the

position they hold in the bureaucracy. The creation of policy then becomes a game of “pulling and hauling” between actors most concerned with maximizing the goals desired by their organization.

There a number of reasons behind this belief in the influence of one’s bureaucratic affiliation on one’s policy preferences (Halperin 1974). Individuals have a great personal interest in their own success and that of their organization. Therefore it follows that one will frequently back policy options that will highlight the strengths of one’s own organization, and require more reliance on one’s organization in future situations. Career officials will often back policy options that favor their organizations in order to ensure future promotions. And even leaders who lack a long-standing allegiance to their organization may still be “captured” by that organization due to their reliance on advisors and information from their organization and a desire to maintain organizational morale.

But how well has this hypothesis held up especially over time? Is a leader’s organizational affiliation really a key determinant that explains their policy position? While perhaps the best known part of Allison’s book, this has also perhaps been its most frequently questioned proposition. Almost immediately it attracted serious criticism. Some of these noted that the behavior of the ExCom during the Cuban missile process, the case Allison uses to illustrate his position, did not conform to his expectations. Employing the proposition can be difficult. Some key individuals involved in policy-making discussions, for example Dean Acheson, do not “sit” anywhere. That is, they did not represent bureaucracies. Other leaders’ policy preferences, for example Secretary of Defense McNamara’s, did not match those of the bureaucracy they led

(Krasner 1972). One crisis scholar went so far as to note that, “random selection probably gives better or equal results in matching statements than does bureaucratic position” (Bernstein 2000: 156). One must wonder how strong a theory is if the case used to illustrate its validity fails to show much support for it. And over time many articles have questioned Allison’s analysis. Some focused on problems with Allison’s theories (Bendor and Hammond 1992; Caldwell 1977; Perlmutter 1974; Welch 1992), while others involve case studies investigating the proposition and finding little support for it (Khong 1992; Rhodes 1994). Allison himself noted that several other forces had an impact on decision makers’ policy preferences. And in a later edition of *Essence of Decision* the authors try to play down their adherence to the proposition by reworking it to say that “Where one stands is influenced, most often influenced strongly, by where one sits” (Allison and Zelikow 1999:307). But considering the number of factors that Allison has noted affect leaders’ preferences it may be impossible to know exactly under what conditions there should be a convergence between a leader’s policy preferences and those of his or her organization (Art 1973; Welch 1992).

But that does not mean that the reasoning behind Miles’s Law is entirely without merit. A number of works have shown a high degree of convergence between the policy preferences of decision makers and policy options favored by the bureaucracies that support them (Betts 1977; Jones 1994; Lebovic 1996). And while there have been many critiques minimizing the effect of governmental politics, most of those in government continue to attribute it with a powerful effect on policy creation (Allison and Zelikow 1999). So even if a clearly deterministic relationship does not exist between one’s stand and one’s “seat”, there do seem to be certain perspectives that are shared by those with a

common bureaucratic affiliation that divide them from those in other bureaucracies. These differences appear to be seen most often among the conflicting bureaucracies involved in setting national security policy. Given this, there needs to be a further examination of the nature of these differences and their effects on policy creation.

The design of this project allows us to look at two basic questions associated with this part of the debate over the effect of bureaucratic politics on foreign policy. First, do different types of people lead different organizations? That is, do leaders serving in different agencies and playing different administrative roles display different psychological characteristics and beliefs? The data in this project allow us to look at a variety of differences that exist between the personal characteristics of those serving in diplomatic positions and those serving in military positions. Secondly, do leaders in the military bureaucracy have markedly different policy preferences from leaders serving in diplomatic positions. Does one group prefer noticeably more cooperative or conflictual policy options than the other?

To investigate these questions I ran t-tests comparing the mean personal characteristic scores of those advisors in my sample who served in diplomatic roles with those who served in military roles. The results of these tests are displayed in Table 3.52. These results show that there were significant differences between the operational codes of leaders serving in military and diplomatic positions. For example, they saw the nature of the political universe differently. Military leaders tended to see the world in slightly conflictual terms, while diplomatic leaders tended to see the world as more cooperative. Similarly, military leaders tended to be more pessimistic about achieving their political goals and values than diplomatic leaders were. Diplomatic leaders pursued more

Table 3.52 T-Tests Investigating Differences between
Diplomatic and Military Decision Makers

Variable	Diplomatic Mean (N=18)	Military Mean (N=13)	t	prob. (2-tailed)
Need for Affiliation	.53	.26	6.601	.000
Distrust	.16	.33	-3.006	.005
Conceptual Complexity	.64	.65	-.578	.568
Need for Power	.21	.35	-3.828	.001
Strategy, OCI1	.63	.14	4.754	.000
Tactics, OCI2	.44	.07	4.997	.000
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.18	.08	3.129	.004
Political Universe, OCP1	.13	-.18	2.806	.009
Optimism, OCP2	.19	-.14	2.839	.008
Political Future, OCP3	.16	.14	.525	.604
Control, OCP4	.67	.69	-.585	.563
Chance, OCP5	.89	.91	-.546	.590
Personal Policy Preference	-5.32	-5.25	-.042	.967

cooperative strategies and tactics than military leaders, though military leaders still tended to support strategies and tactics that were slightly more cooperative than conflictual. While both groups were risk-averse, diplomatic leaders were significantly more risk-acceptant than military leaders. The one key aspect of the operational code where no significant difference was found was on these groups perceptions of their control over historical development. Both groups had roughly equivalent perceptions of their ability to affect the course of world affairs.

The results of the t-tests also show that there were significant differences between the personality traits of military leaders and those of diplomatic leaders. Diplomatic leaders showed a higher need for affiliation than military leaders. Diplomats were more concerned about maintaining close, friendly relationships with those political

actors with whom they wished to have future relationships. Military leaders were more distrustful of other political actors and groups than diplomatic leaders were. And military leaders showed a higher need for power than diplomats. No significant difference was found between the complexity levels of diplomatic leaders and military leaders.

According to the results of this analysis the military leaders in my sample of decision makers had beliefs and feelings about the nature international affairs that were notably different from those of the diplomats in my sample. However, do these differences and other differences produced by being immersed in different, often competing, bureaucracies lead these two groups to support different policy options? At least in terms of whether they tended to favor more conflictual or more cooperative proposals it appears that they did not. As seen in Table 3.52, there is not a significant difference between the mean score of the policy proposals personally preferred by members of these two groups. This result is quite surprising given the analyses earlier in this chapter showing how the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect their policy preferences.

But my finding that the personal policy preferences of military decision makers were not significantly different from those of diplomatic decision makers seems to contradict the idea that the policy preferences of decision makers vary depending upon difference in their psychological characteristics, this finding matches earlier investigations of bureaucratic politics. While one might expect military leaders to support the use of military forces more often than leading diplomats in order to strengthen their organization's place of precedence within the government, Betts (1977) found that

military leaders were only more likely to support the use of force after initial decisions to rely on that tactic had already been made. Until that initial tactical decision was made they were no more likely than other decision makers to favor higher levels of conflict in international relations. Reviews of intra-administration policy disputes have also failed to find a broad pattern of disagreement between the leaders of diplomatic and military bureaucracies on whether or not a country should enter into armed conflicts to achieve its goals. While in some cases Secretaries of State like Vance and Shultz generally opposed the use of force and Secretaries of Defense like Harold Brown and Caspar Weinberger generally favored the use of force. There have also been Secretaries of State like Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig who tended to support the use of force and Secretaries of Defense like Melvin Laird who tended to oppose it (Shepard 1988:121).

The results in Table 3.50 show some intriguing and significant differences between leaders of diplomatic and military bureaucracies. They are noticeably different groups. What explains these differences? Three possible explanations stand out.

First, it is possible that fundamentally different types of people assume posts within these two segments of the government. It may be that something about the way these leaders are selected leads one set of people to be chosen to serve in foreign ministries and another type of people to serve in military posts. In fact, it is entirely possible that individuals are selected for leadership positions in defense and foreign ministries precisely because they have certain characteristics and beliefs that will lead them to conform to the mind-sets prevalent in their organization (Smith 1994).

However, it is also possible that once an individual assumes a post in one of these bureaucracies they adjust their views to match of those generally associated with the

culture of their bureaucracy. While of course individuals who have spent their entire careers within their organization are likely to be especially tied to its viewpoints and frame situations in ways that are similar to other members of their bureaucracy, “even in-and-outers are sometimes “captured” by the organizations that bring them into government” (Halperin 1974:62). Finally, these differences may result from the ways that these variables are measured. It may be the case that members of these organizations tend to publicly discuss very different issues and use different speaking styles. If present, these differences could make these groups of individuals appear more different from one another than they actually are.

Of course given the finding reported in Table 3.52 that there was not a significant difference between the mean personal policy preferences of military decision makers and diplomatic decision makers it may appear that understanding the reasons for the differences in these two sets of advisors’ psychological characteristics has limited policy implications. But it should be stressed that that finding only applied to a subset of my overall sample of decision makers. When the results of this chapter are taken as a whole there is still considerable reason to expect that the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect their policy preferences and recommendations, so gaining a better understanding of the reasons why those selected to lead the military and diplomatic bureaucracies have significantly different psychological characteristics can help us better understand the reasons behind, and consequences of, intra-administration conflicts over foreign policy decision making. A further investigation into the reasons behind these differences is a project that should be carried out in the future.

CHAPTER 4

PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND STATE BEHAVIOR

The preceding chapter dealt with how the psychological characteristics of key decision makers are linked to their personal policy preferences. In this chapter I take this research a step forward, moving beyond the linkage between decision makers' psychological characteristics and their attitudes and preferences. Here I investigate linkages between decision makers' psychological characteristics, their personal policy preferences, differences in the structure of the decision-making group, and the official state policy decisions adopted during the sixteen cases I included in my sample. This includes directly linking the psychological characteristics of decision makers with consequential state actions that affected international relations.

I begin this chapter by first testing for direct relationships between the three decision units I investigated in the preceding chapter and the nature of the policies that were adopted by states in the sixteen cases of decision in my analysis. I then investigate indirect effects that the psychological effects of decision makers may have on policy making through the advisory process and the decisions that national executive leaders make when deciding who to appoint to high office. Finally, I investigate another way that the psychological characteristics of decision makers may indirectly affect policy making. I study the connection between the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and their advisors on the quality of decision making, that is, the likelihood that groups will use vigilant, systematic decision-making techniques versus the likelihood that decision makers will adopt behaviors that impair careful decision making.

The Direct Effects of the Psychological Characteristics of Decision Units

I begin my investigation of how the psychological characteristics of decision makers affected state behavior through the adoption of official policies by conducting a series of bivariate regression analyses. In these analyses the dependent variable is the official policy adopted by a state's decision makers in each of the sixteen cases in my analysis. The independent variables are the psychological characteristic scores of each of the three decision units I examined in the preceding chapter, national executive leaders, Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers, and advisory groups. Again I determined the psychological characteristics of the advisory groups by taking the mean of all the national executive leaders' advisors on each psychological characteristic. The results of these regression analyses are reported in Tables 4.1-4.3.

Table 4.1 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Psychological Characteristics of National Executive Leaders on Official State Policy

Psychological Characteristics	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	.191/7.330	.490
Distrust (-)	-7.956/6.376	.233
Conceptual Complexity (+)	25.083/22.848	.146
Need for Power (-)	-19.801/11.051	.048
Strategy, OCI1 (+)	.581/3.952	.443
Tactics, OCI2 (+)	1.855/5.646	.374
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	11.007/14.419	.229
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	-.434/4.115	.459
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	-1.445/4.665	.381
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	8.709/15.833	.296
Control, OCP4 (+)	21.351/11.773	.046
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-14.243/20.162	.246

Note: N=16.

The analyses seen in Table 4.1 show limited support for the position that the psychological characteristics of presidents and prime ministers have a direct effect on the official foreign policies that their states adopt. While ten of these variables fail to have a significant direct effect, both need for power and control are significant at the .05 level. Countries whose presidents and prime ministers had a high need for power were more likely than others to adopt conflictual national policies. Countries whose presidents and prime ministers saw themselves as having a high level of control over historical development were more likely than others to adopt cooperative foreign policies. Additionally, the conceptual complexity variable neared significance, making it appear that countries that are led by more complex individuals will be more likely to rely on cooperative policies than conflictual policies.

Table 4.2 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Psychological Characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers on Official State Policy

Psychological Characteristics	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	8.187/7.362	.143
Distrust (-)	-4.576/5.693	.218
Conceptual Complexity (+)	13.217/14.977	.196
Need for Power (-)	1.266/10.697	.454
Strategy, OCI1 (+)	5.568/4.073	.097
Tactics, OCI2 (+)	.666/8.104	.468
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	24.576/9.927	.014
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	2.591/3.291	.222
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	3.214/3.472	.185
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	26.395/13.344	.034
Control, OCP4 (+)	3.433/9.635	.364
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-28.188/17.161	.062

Note: N=16.

Table 4.2 shows that four psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers are significantly related to official state policy at the .10 level. Those governments that contained foreign ministry heads who believed in the use of more cooperative strategies were more likely than others to adopt cooperative national policies. Those whose Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers were more risk acceptant were more likely to adopt cooperative national policies. Those whose Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers believed the political future was predictable and that chance had a limited impact on world events were more likely than others to support cooperative national policies. Additionally, the need for affiliation variable approached significance, indicating that governments containing foreign ministry heads who had a higher need to maintain close, friendly relationships with others would be more likely to adopt cooperative policies.

Table 4.3 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Advisory Group's Psychological Characteristics on Official State Policy

Psychological Characteristics	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	15.133/7.076	.026
Distrust (-)	-9.832/8.382	.130
Conceptual Complexity (+)	16.846/18.085	.184
Need for Power (-)	-1.796/16.647	.458
Strategy, OCI1 (+)	5.524/4.381	.114
Tactics, OCI2 (+)	4.975/6.696	.235
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	24.869/14.897	.059
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	-.203/4.159	.481
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	-.588/3.837	.440
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	-12.829/14.883	.202
Control, OCP4 (+)	-9.563/14.085	.254
Chance, OCP5 (-)	23.979/20.871	.135

Note: N=16.

The results of the analyses reported in Table 4.3 show that two of the psychological characteristics of the advisory group directly affect official state policy if we adopt a .10 threshold of significance. Governments that contain advisory groups whose members exhibit a high need for affiliation are more likely to adopt cooperative foreign policies. Governments whose advisory groups are composed of risk takers are more likely than other states to adopt cooperative foreign policies. Additionally, it should be noted that both the first instrumental operational code index and advisors' distrust near significance and are in the hypothesized direction. Therefore it appears that governments that contain foreign policy advisors who believe in the utility of cooperative policy options, and who are less distrustful, will be more likely to adopt cooperative policies.

Taken as a whole the results seen in Tables 4.1-4.3 once again show some support for the proposition that foreign policies are at least partially the product of the psychological characteristics of those who design them. Perhaps surprisingly, more of the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and advisory groups appear to affect national policy than they do the initial personal policy preferences of those individuals and groups.

But before we can be sure of the strength of these relationships we must first examine whether or not these psychological characteristics variables maintain their effects when the influence of other variables that affect decision makers during the final stage of decision making are accounted for. I initially considered controlling for three other influences on decision making — the degree of threat to national interests at stake, the degree of force that one's opponent is using, and the number of information

processing errors committed by the decision-making group when it was considering what policy to adopt during a case. The third control variable was included given that earlier work on decision making has found that groups that commit several errors when processing information, for example ignoring key advice or biasing the assessment of data, lead states to pursue more conflictual methods of action (Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Janis 1982; Schafer and Crichlow 1996). But in a bivariate regression equation I found that the number of information processing errors committed by a decision-making group did not significantly affect whether states adopted cooperative or conflictual policies in this set of cases. Therefore, that variable is excluded from further models examining what affects official state policy, though I will return to the question of how the psychological characteristics of decision makers influence the process of decision making later in the chapter.

In Tables 4.4-4.15 I conduct a series of multivariate regression analyses. In each of these the official state policy that was adopted by the decision makers in the sixteen cases included in this analysis is the dependent variable. The key independent variables are those psychological characteristic variables that were found to have significant effects, or neared significance at the .10 level, in the preceding bivariate analyses. Each of these variables is included in two separate regression equations that control for the impact of the type of action taken by a country's opponent and the scale of the threat to national interests. Again, these control variables must be tested in separate analyses as they are highly correlated with one another. All of the psychological characteristics of the national executive leaders that I test can be included together in the same model. That is also true of the advisory groups' psychological characteristics that I test.

However, once more I must test the impact of the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of States and Foreign Ministers separately as their strategy and risk orientation scores are extremely highly correlated, as are their political future and chance scores. While this lengthy exposition of tables is perhaps not ideal, it is unfortunately necessary as testing these variables together in the same model would produce skewed results. Tables 4.4–4.5 deal with the impact of the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders. Tables 4.6–4.7 deal with the impact of the psychological characteristics of members of the advisory group. Tables 4.8–4.15 deal with the impact of the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers.

Table 4.4 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of National Executive Leaders' Psychological Characteristics and Level of Provocation on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Power (-)	-12.533/11.284	.144
Control, OCP4 (+)	9.736/13.258	.239
Level of Provocation (-)	-.805/.707	.138

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.204. F statistic=2.284 (prob.=.131).

Table 4.5 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of National Executive Leaders' Psychological Characteristics and Threat Level on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Power (-)	-9.289/11.463	.217
Control, OCP4 (+)	8.237/12.795	.266
Threat Level (-)	-1.795/1.228	.085

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.251. F statistic=2.678 (prob.=.094).

Table 4.6 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Advisory Groups' Psychological Characteristics and Level of Provocation on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	.262/9.284	.489
Strategy, OCII (+)	-6.599/5.970	.147
Risk Orientation, OCII (+)	53.500/21.740	.016
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.841/.633	.007

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.458. F statistic=4.163 (prob.=.027).

Table 4.7 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Advisory Groups' Psychological Characteristics and Threat Level on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	2.504/9.869	.402
Strategy, OCII (+)	-9.516/6.673	.091
Risk Orientation, OCII (+)	42.910/22.113	.039
Threat Level (-)	-2.887/1.204	.018

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.370. F statistic=3.202 (prob.=.057).

Table 4.8 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers' Strategy and Level of Provocation on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Strategy, OCII (+)	5.777/3.538	.063
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.320/.560	.018

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.287. F statistic=4.022 (prob.=.044).

The results of these multivariate regression analyses show that some of the psychological characteristics of key decision makers are indeed directly related to the official policies that states adopt, though controlling for the impact of variables related to

Table 4.9 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers' Risk Orientation and Level of Provocation on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Risk Orientation, OCI3 (+)	27.236/7.602	.002
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.462/.438	.003

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.568. F statistic=10.853 (prob.=.002).

Table 4.10 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers' View of the Political Future and Level of Provocation on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	17.543/14.048	.117
Level of Provocation (-)	-.965/.638	.077

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.233. F statistic=3.279 (prob.=.070).

Table 4.11 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers' View of Chance and Level of Provocation on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-18.881/16.891	.142
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.079/.618	.052

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.216. F statistic=3.071 (prob.=.081).

the nature of the international system and the conflict at hand weakens these effects.

Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders do not have a direct effect on official state policy. And only one psychological characteristic of advisory groups maintained a significant effect in the

Table 4.12 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers' Strategy and Threat Level on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Strategy, OC11 (+)	2.928/3.742	.224
Threat Level (-)	-2.328/1.011	.019

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.277. F statistic=3.876 (prob.=.048).

Table 4.13 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers' Risk Orientation and Threat Level on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Risk Orientation, OC13 (+)	18.798/9.009	.029
Threat Level (-)	-2.060/.887	.019

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.433. F statistic=6.727 (prob.=.010).

Table 4.14 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers' View of the Political Future and Threat Level on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	17.879/12.381	.086
Threat Level (-)	-2.143/.961	.044

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.348. F statistic=4.998 (prob.=.025).

anticipated direction. Governments that adopt more cooperative policies are likely to

have presidential advisory groups that are composed of risk acceptant individuals.

However, a number of the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and

Foreign Ministers maintain direct effects on official state policy even after key attributes

of international disputes are controlled for. It appears that if a government's Secretary

Table 4.15 Multivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers' View of Chance and Threat Level on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Chance, OCP5 (-)	-21.408/14.879	.087
Threat Level (-)	-2.327/.930	.013

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.347. F statistic=4.986 (prob.=.025).

of State or Foreign Minister is risk acceptant and prefers to rely on cooperative strategies then the government will be more likely to adopt cooperative policy proposals. While the results are somewhat mixed, it also appears that governments are more likely to adopt cooperative policies if their chief foreign affairs minister believes that the political future is basically predictable and that chance has a relatively minor role in shaping world events. These findings are probably the most remarkable in this chapter. There had heretofore not been this kind of rigorous, statistical confirmation, across a large, varied set of foreign ministers, that the psychological characteristics of a state's chief foreign affairs minister significantly affect official state policy. This is an important finding that should enlarge the scope of projects studying the linkage between the personal characteristics of foreign policy decision makers and official state action. Overall, the results seen in Tables 4.4-4.15 show that the psychological characteristics of key advisors may play a considerably more important role in shaping the official foreign policies that states adopt than many would have thought.

Before leaving this section focusing on the direct effects that decision makers' psychological characteristics have on the policies that states adopt, it is appropriate to test how the characteristics of leaders and their advisors work in tandem to affect official

policy. The best way to do this is with a comprehensive multivariate OLS model. Unfortunately the small size of my sample of cases makes this extremely difficult. Statistical requirements only allow me to include a small number of variables together in the same equation. Still, it is worth investigating whether or not the central characteristics of these decision makers affect policy when tested together.

The point of this investigation is not so much to test whether or not specific variables have significant effects. The earlier analyses investigated that question. Here I am interested in whether or not the model as a whole, including the variables I expect would be most fundamental in shaping these decision makers' foreign policy preferences, is significant.

In this test I focus on the core psychological characteristics of the two sets of individuals who have the greatest ability to shape international policy, the national executive leaders and the heads of their foreign ministries. As I can only include a few variables in this model, I chose to test the effects of national executive leaders' belief in their ability to control events and their need for power, as well as foreign ministers' general strategic orientation and their conceptual complexity. I expect these variables are particularly important in shaping these decision makers' foreign policy preferences for the following reasons.

First, generally speaking, most national executive leaders do not enter office with a deep knowledge of foreign affairs. The matters they are most likely to immediately have to confront in this area upon taking office deal with gaining a better understanding of their country's resources and place in the world. Hence many, upon being confronted with a challenge, are likely to first consider the question, "What can we do?" They are

likely to develop a general understanding of international relations, and to rely on their aides for more specific knowledge and ideas. Seeing national executive leaders as typically policy generalists, I would expect that the psychological characteristics that are most central to their foreign policy preferences deal with the issue of what they think their state can do, and their level of satisfaction with that power. The two psychological characteristics that may be the most central in shaping how they will respond to international events are their belief in the ability to control events and their need for power. The first of these deals with their belief about what their country can do, their perception of the power of their government and their country. The second of these variables deals with the degree to which they feel a need to control their surroundings. This deals with their intrinsic need to augment the level of power that they perceive themselves as having.

While national executive leaders are policy generalists, foreign ministers are typically the chief architects of their states' foreign policies. A central part of their job is to set a state's basic strategy in foreign affairs. They often serve as a state's chief thinker on foreign affairs issues. This being the case, I expect that the first operational code instrumental index and conceptual complexity will be especially important in shaping the policies advocated by these individuals, since these two psychological characteristics deal with these individuals' basic policy orientations and how they structure their thoughts and beliefs.

I include these four variables together in the most comprehensive theoretically-driven model I can construct. This model includes Level of Provocation as a control. The results of this test are seen in Table 4.16. Unfortunately, the F statistic

shows that the model does not significantly affect the dependent variable, official state policy. The adjusted R-square shows that the model explains eighteen percent of the variation in the dependent variable, a fair amount considering the small size of my sample. These results do not, of course, mean that the central psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and foreign ministers lack a direct effect on policy. I have already found such links between individual psychological variables and state policy. And in this particular model three of the variables approach significance in the expected direction. But the small size of my sample made it unlikely that I would find statistically significant relationships. Overall, these results suggest while individual variables may have important effects, establishing which variables play the most fundamental role in shaping decision makers' preferences, and establishing how the characteristics of decision makers fit together in affecting policy, will be a complicated endeavor. Nevertheless, these are two important issues that should be pursued in future research.

Table 4.16 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effects of the Core Psychological Characteristics of National Executive Leaders and Foreign Ministers and Level of Provocation on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Leaders' Need for Power (-)	-9.630/11.907	.219
Leaders' Control, OCP4 (+)	10.881/15.284	.247
Ministers' Strategy, OCII (+)	4.523/4.021	.144
Ministers' Conceptual Complexity (+)	-9.905/17.214	.289
Level of Provocation (-)	-1.052/.749	.095

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.177. F statistic=1.643 (prob.=.235).

The Indirect Effects of the Psychological Characteristics of Decision Units

The preceding analyses focused on only the direct effects that these variables have on state policy. There are a number of indirect ways in which the influence of these variables is also felt. For example, consider the fact, seen in Table 4.17, that the official policy a state adopts is strongly related to the personal policy preferences of its decision makers, irrespective of the decision unit that sets state policy. In the preceding chapter I showed that the policy preferences of these decision units are affected by their psychological characteristics. So the policy preferences of decision makers are an intervening variable linking their psychological characteristics to the official state policies they adopt.

Table 4.17 shows that the personal policy preferences of national executive leaders have an enormous effect on the policies their states adopt, explaining sixty-six percent of the variance. These preferences are another intervening variable between the psychological characteristics of foreign policy decision makers and official state policy. This is because these preferences are affected by more than just the

Table 4.17 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect of the Policy Preferences of Decision Units Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Leader's Preference (+)	.591/.108	.000
N=16. Adjusted R-square=.660. F statistic=30.084 (prob.=.000).		
Foreign Minister Preference (+)	.422/.160	.010
N=16. Adjusted R-square=.284. F statistic=6.942 (prob.=.020).		
Advisory Group Preference (+)	.711/.301	.018
N=16. Adjusted R-square=.260. F statistic=5.566 (prob.=.036).		

psychological characteristics of national executive leaders. Presidents and prime ministers frequently do not develop a preferred policy option in a situation until after some consultation with their senior aides. So another set of factors that affect the personal policy preferences of national executive leaders is the preferences of their top advisors. Table 4.18 shows that in my sample of decision makers the personal policy preferences of national executive leaders are powerfully affected by the policy preferences of their advisors. These advisors' preferences are, in turn, affected by their own psychological characteristics. These linkages provide a further avenue of indirect effects by which the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect official state policy.

Table 4.18 Bivariate Regression Analysis: The Effect of the Personal Policy Preferences of Foreign Ministers and Advisory Groups on the Personal Policy Preferences of National Executive Leaders

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Foreign Minister Preference (+)	.576/.226	.012
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.267. F statistic=6.475 (prob.=.023).		
Advisory Group Preference (+)	.955/.428	.023
Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.235. F statistic=4.984 (prob.=.045).		

But of course this type of indirect relationship does not run in just one direction. While advisors affect leaders through the advice and expertise they provide, leaders affect who advise them as well. Most importantly, they decide which individuals should fill these influential positions. And, generally speaking, one can expect an executive leader to choose top aides with whom they share a variety of common characteristics. These include similar goals, similar world views, and other personal traits that should

lead to the operation of a well-functioning decision-making team. Typically, one can expect a president or prime minister to appoint top advisors who they believe share their core viewpoints, and who will act in ways that the president or prime minister will support. As Anthony Bennett described the American cabinet, “A president likes to gather round him people with whom he feels comfortable, who share the same kind of basic goals in economic, foreign and social policies, who have the same kind of social and academic background, are of the same generation and are in agreement with his way of doing things” (Bennett 1996:222).

Of course in some cases other considerations come into play in the appointment process and lead a chief executive may appoint a top advisor with whom he or she has noticeable differences. This was seen, for example, in Margaret Thatcher’s appointment of Francis Pym as her Foreign Secretary at the beginning of the Falklands War following the sudden resignation of Lord Carrington. Thatcher wrote that she and Pym “disagreed on the direction of policy, in our approach to government and indeed about life in general” (Thatcher 1993:306), and after a budget dispute between the two earlier in her government she had removed him as Defence Secretary (Cosgrave 1985). But Pym nonetheless was named Foreign Secretary because he had the requisite experience, was popular within the House of Commons, and his appointment would not necessitate a major reshuffling of her cabinet. Extraordinary times and political imperatives can, on occasion, lead to unlikely alliances. But appointments such as this are a relatively rare occurrence. When appointees who strongly disagree with the beliefs and favored approaches of their leaders are named to high office, one can expect a greater than normal chance that they will be marginalized within the decision-making group. The

example of Francis Pym also matches this tendency. His approach to foreign policy was opposed by Prime Minister Thatcher throughout much of his tenure in office (Sharp 1997), and he was soon replaced as Foreign Secretary (Harris 1988; Thatcher 1993).

So did the national executive leaders in my sample appoint advisors whose psychological characteristics were like their own? To get at this question I run a series of bivariate regression equations, the results of which are displayed in Table 4.19. The independent variables are the psychological characteristics of the national executive leaders. The dependent variables are the corresponding psychological characteristics of those leader's Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers. I focus on investigating whether or not the individuals who hold those position share common personality traits and core foreign policy beliefs for two reasons. First, the Secretary of State or Foreign Minister is the national executive leader's top foreign policy aide. Therefore, one would expect that the national executive leader would be more concerned about placing an individual similar to himself or herself in this position than in most other top foreign policy offices. Second, I earlier found that the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers are particularly strongly related to their personal policy preferences, and to the policies that states adopt. Therefore, knowing whether or not national executive leaders appoint individuals similar to themselves to these posts is especially important.

Looking at the results we see that only two variables were significant at the .10 level. Presidents and prime ministers tended to appoint foreign ministry chiefs whose strategic views and need for affiliation were like their own. However, a number of other variables approached significance. Overall it looks like national executive leaders were

Table 4.19 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effects of the Psychological Characteristics of National Executive Leaders on the Psychological Characteristics of Their Foreign Ministry Heads

Psychological Characteristics	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Need for Affiliation (+)	.386/.233	.061
Distrust (+)	.344/.294	.131
Conceptual Complexity (+)	.384/.401	.177
Need for Power (+)	.201/.301	.258
Strategy, OC11 (+)	.321/.228	.091
Tactics, OC12 (+)	.193/.180	.150
Risk Orientation, OC13 (+)	.408/.312	.106
Political Universe, OCP1 (+)	.164/.324	.310
Optimism, OCP2 (+)	.285/.341	.209
Political Future, OCP3 (+)	-.086/.282	.383
Control, OCP4 (+)	-.041/.361	.456
Chance, OCP5 (+)	-.103/.291	.364

Note: N=16.

careful to name Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers whose instrumental operational code indices matched their own. This implies that they were careful to turn over the reins of foreign policy making to people with whom they saw eye-to-eye on how one should interact with other political actors in the world around them. It also appears possible that national executive leaders name top foreign policy advisors with whom they have common levels of distrust and conceptual complexity as these variables approach significance. These findings show another indirect way in which the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect state behavior. By naming individuals like themselves to direct their country's foreign policy apparatus, national executive leaders create another path by which their psychological characteristics affect their government's behavior.

Another way we can observe the impact that psychological characteristics of national executive leaders have on foreign policy decision making is to look at which advisors they favor when making decisions. Since more often than not leaders seek input from a number of aides before deciding to promote an official state policy it may be instructive to know if they tend to favor the policy positions promoted by those aides who are most like them. If they do act this way, that may provide further support for the position that these factors play a role in creating foreign policy.

To investigate this I reviewed the data in the 14 cases in which leaders faced a group of top foreign policy advisors who were strongly divided at the beginning of the final stage of decision making over what policy to pursue. This included all the cases except for the British decision to sanction South Africa and the Israeli decision to invade Lebanon. The national leader sided with the position favored by the advisor closest to them on seven of the variables -- Need for Power, Control, Distrust, Chance, Need for Affiliation, Tactics, Political Future -- in over half of these cases. There was a particularly high level of congruence on the first two of these variables. In 11 of the 14 cases (79%) the leader opted to support the position favored by the advisor who had the Need for Power score closest to his or her own. In 10 of the cases (71%) the leader supported the position of the advisor who had the Control index score closest to his or her own. On two variables -- Strategy and the Political Universe -- the leader opted to support the position favored by the advisor with the closest score in half the cases. Leaders chose to support the policy position initially favored by the advisor who had the Complexity, Optimism and Risk Orientation score closest to them in less than half of the cases.

Since it appears that leaders tend to rely more on those advisors who are most like themselves, I next investigated what factors affected this tendency. Some earlier studies found that leaders' psychological characteristics affected the types of individuals they were likely to appoint to office. For example, leaders with low complexity scores (Glad 1983) and a high need for affiliation (Winter and Stewart 1977) were found to be more likely to appoint people like themselves to office. Given these findings we might expect that these leaders might also be more likely to rely on similar advisors when making decisions. Therefore, I tested whether or not a leader's tendency to support the policy position advocated by the advisor with the psychological characteristics most like his or her own was affected by these variables. I did not find a significant relationship.

Another factor I hypothesized could affect a leader's tendency to rely on the advisor with the most similar psychological characteristics is their level of experience in foreign affairs. This factor has frequently been linked to the level of personal engagement that a leader takes in setting national policy, how much they rely on advisors and how they structure the decision-making group (George 1980; Hermann 1986; Levy 1994; Preston and Hart 1999). We can expect that leaders who lack foreign policy experience will be more likely to rely on advisors when making decisions. Therefore, it seems plausible to think that inexperienced leaders will be more likely than others to rely upon the advisors most similar to themselves.

I conducted a logit analysis to test whether or not this variable had an effect on leaders' tendency to favor particular aides. My dependent variable was whether or not the leader sided with the advisor whose psychological characteristics were most similar to their own in an intra-administration policy dispute. My independent variable, policy

expertise, was also coded dichotomously. I coded three of the leaders in my sample as having policy expertise in foreign affairs since they had dealt with international issues for several years before they came to power. Prime Minister Begin had served as the leader of his party for many years and as such was very familiar with regional and international issues before he was elected. Through service in a variety of government posts in the 1970s and 1980s President Bush was well experienced in international affairs before he was inaugurated. Finally President Johnson was also knowledgeable on these issues having served as Vice President and Senate Majority Leader before becoming President of the United States. He was also a member of the Naval Affairs Committee throughout his tenure in the U.S. House of Representatives and a member of the Armed Services Committee throughout his years in the Senate. The other five leaders in my sample had notably less experience in dealing with foreign affairs issues when they came to power. Therefore, I would expect those five leaders to be more likely to rely on aides with whom they had the most in common. This analysis was conducted over thirteen cases. The cases dealing with the invasion of Lebanon and British sanctions against South Africa were not included since the key advisors were not deeply divided. I also excluded the Cuban Missile Crisis as I was unable to determine which advisor's characteristics most closely resembled President Kennedy's. I coded three advisors in that case and Kennedy's scores were closest to each of them on four of the twelve characteristics. The results of this analysis are seen in Table 4.20. These results show that leaders who lack a long-standing interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs are indeed more likely than others to rely on the advice given them by especially similar advisors when making foreign policy decisions.

Table 4.20 Logit Analysis: The Effect of Policy Expertise on Leaders' Reliance on the Advisor Most Similar to Themselves

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Foreign Policy Expertise (-)	-2.351/1.406	.047

Note: N=13. Initial log-likelihood is 16.048286; at convergence 12.758.

Overall, these results would suggest that the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders do indeed have an effect on official state policy. They may have a small direct effect on state policy. But they nonetheless matter in that they name people with similar perceptions, needs and beliefs to top posts, and the analyses reported in the previous chapter show that the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers affect their policy preferences and political behavior. Also leaders tend to support the policy positions advocated by those with the psychological characteristics closest to their own, out of a group that already closely resembles their own personal traits to begin with. And of course I have shown that the personal policy preferences of national executive leaders strongly affect state behavior.

I do not mean to overstate these effects. The statistical analyses reported earlier show that there was at best a weak direct link between the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and their policy preferences in these 16 cases. This finding may give pause to those who believe a stronger link exists between these variables. Given the findings of a considerable body of earlier work in this area (Hermann 1980, 1984; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Walker, Schafer and Young 1998; Winter 1987) I expected stronger effects. I can not be sure why I did not

find stronger relationships. It seems possible that this may be due to the rather small sample size, or perhaps there is something peculiar about this sample of cases.

But whatever the reason, the lack of strong direct effects in the statistical analyses dealing with national executive leaders does not mean that what types of individuals lead states does not affect national policy. It is clear that they are important in that they decide who to appoint to their country's top foreign policy making positions. The data show that these individuals who make many decisions themselves, and upon whom leaders rely when settling conflicts over what policies to pursue, are significantly affected by their own personal dispositions and traits when setting state policy. And leaders appear to rely particularly strongly on those with whom they share common beliefs, traits and perceptions, thus reinforcing the effects that these variables have in the policy making process.

Psychological Characteristics and High Quality Decision Making

Earlier in this chapter I brought up the issue of information processing errors occurring during the decision making process. Previous research into the effects of decision-making processes (Haney 1997; Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Janis 1982; Schafer and Crichlow 1996; Schafer and Crichlow 1998) has found that low quality decision making can produce poor outcomes for states, and makes them more likely to adopt conflictual policy options. As mentioned earlier, and seen in Table 4.21, such a relationship was not found to be significant in this set of cases, although it does approach significance and is in the expected direction. While this relationship is not significant in this set of cases, considering the strong link that has been found between the quality of decision making and the policies that states adopt in other work in this area, and the

unique data set this project makes available, before leaving this chapter it is appropriate to investigate the linkages that exist between the psychological characteristics of decision makers and the quality of information processing that these leaders and advisors carry out.

Table 4.21 Bivariate Regression Analyses: The Effect of Information Processing Errors on Official State Policy

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Information Processing Errors (-)	-.444/.429	.159

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.005. F statistic=1.071 (prob.=.318).

Much of the literature investigating the causes of variation in the quality of information processing by elite decision-making groups has focused on how the personal characteristics of a group's leader shape its behavior. A number of the personality characteristics measured in this project have been linked to group leaders' leadership behavior. For example, given that more conceptually complex leaders tend to be more receptive to considering the views of others (Hermann 1984) and more capable of dealing with problems arising from a complex environment (Vertzberger 1990), we may expect that elite decision-making groups behave in more careful and methodical ways if their leader is high in conceptual complexity. Leaders with a low need for power are more willing to accept ambiguous situation and tolerate disagreements among their advisors (Preston 1997) that may aid the careful consideration of a wide variety of policy alternatives. By a common logic we may hypothesize that groups led by leaders who have lower levels of distrust will commit fewer information processing errors as they

may be more willing to consider the views of a variety of aides and experts when considering competing policy options. It also seems possible that leaders who have a high need for affiliation may be more receptive to considering the advice of their aides, though previous research has shown that high affiliation groups may put friendship and collegiality ahead of rigorous decision making and produce poor outcomes (Winter and Stewart 1977).

However, group leaders are of course not the only individuals whose behavior can be expected to affect the quality of group decision making. The reasoning behind the hypothesized relationships between the personality traits of group leaders and group behavior can be extended to the personality traits of other group members as well. We can expect that groups whose membership is high in need for affiliation, high in complexity, low in distrust and low in need for power will commit fewer information processing errors. They will be more likely to fully consider a wide variety of policy options and behave in open, collegial ways with their colleagues, seeking an outcome that is good for the group as a whole.

I conducted two multivariate regression analyses to test whether these variables influenced the quality of information processing in the hypothesized way in the sixteen cases in my analysis. In the first of these I included as independent variables the scores of the national executive leaders on these four measures. In the second of these I included as the independent variables the mean scores of the advisors I coded in these cases on each of these four personality trait variables. The number of information processing errors committed by the decision-making group is the dependent variable. The results of these analyses are reported in Tables 4.22 and 4.23.

Table 4.22 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effect of the Personality Characteristics of National Executive Leaders on the Quality of Information Processing

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Leader Need for Affiliation (-)	-5.493/4.630	.130
Leader Distrust (+)	-3.307/5.231	.270
Leader Conceptual Complexity (-)	-24.539/14.767	.063
Leader Need for Power (+)	-4.543/8.956	.311

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.045. F statistic=1.177 (prob.=.373).

Table 4.23 Multivariate Regression Analysis: The Effect of the Personality Characteristics of Advisors on the Quality of Information Processing

Variable	B/Std. Error	prob. (1-tailed)
Advisor Need for Affiliation (-)	-7.914/3.825	.032
Advisor Distrust (+)	9.174/4.374	.030
Advisor Conceptual Complexity (-)	-11.094/9.541	.135
Advisor Need for Power (+)	1.755/8.323	.419

Note: N=16. Adjusted R-square=.176. F statistic=.439 (prob.=.778).

These results confirm some of my hypotheses, but not all of them. In terms of the psychological characteristics of group leaders, one of these variables was significant at the .10 level, and another neared significance and was in the expected direction.

These results show that groups led by more conceptually complex leaders performed their decision-making responsibilities well. They committed comparatively few information processing errors. Likewise, those leaders who had a high need for affiliation appear to have been more likely to run groups that committed few decision making errors.

The results seen in Table 4.23 also show some support for my hypotheses. Groups whose members had a high need for affiliation were more likely to conduct high-quality decision making. And though the complexity variable did not quite meet the significance threshold it appears that groups whose members are more conceptually complex may also commit fewer information processing errors. These results fit well with the results seen in Table 4.22 and suggest that there may be an important linkage between individuals' need for affiliation and conceptual complexity and decision-making behavior.

Table 4.23 though also shows one puzzling finding. It appears that groups that were more distrustful of others committed fewer information processing errors than groups containing more trusting individuals. Additionally, it should be noted that decision makers' need for power appears not to affect the likelihood that they will commit information processing errors. But while I can not explain these results, they should not distract from the fact that generally the quality of information processing was found to be significantly affected in predictable ways by two of the personality traits of members of elite decision-making bodies.

While I should not overstate the impact of these findings since I did not find the information processing variable to significantly affect the policy choices states made in the sixteen cases I included in this project, these are nonetheless important findings as other studies have found a important link between the quality of decision making and the pattern of policies states adopt. This, therefore, can be said to be one more intervening variable through which the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect foreign policy behavior.

CHAPTER 5

THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN TWO CASES

The statistical models I investigated in the preceding chapters showed that the policy preferences and political actions taken by decision makers were at least partly a function of some of their psychological characteristics. Those findings, using rigorous, quantitative research techniques, add to our knowledge of how individuals have a personal impact on world politics. But unfortunately not all of the psychological characteristics of political leaders that may affect their foreign policy preferences can be easily quantified. Therefore I was not able to include a number of potentially important psychological characteristics of decision makers in the models I previously tested. Additionally, a reliance on statistical models can obscure some of the specific details that help to more clearly convey the manner in which individuals' psychological characteristics affect their behavior. Therefore, in this chapter I present two case studies. I do this with the goal of expanding the work that was done in the preceding chapters by considering the impact of new psychological-characteristic variables, and delving deeper into the effects of the variables that were included in the statistical analyses.

In examining these two decision events I first lay out the historical setting in which they occurred. I review the precipitating event. Then I provide short biographical sketches of the individuals that I focused upon in my earlier analyses, including an examination of their core beliefs and personality traits as they related to

international affairs, and how they came together as a decision-making team. I also make hypotheses about how these factors are likely to have affected their behavior during the decision-making process. I next review the decision-making process and the nature of their response. This includes the participants' initial policy preferences, the process by which the decision makers adopted an official national policy, and option they chose to set as official state policy. Through tracing the process of decision making (George and McKeown 1985) I test whether or not these preferences and processes were affected by the psychological characteristics of the decision makers involved in ways that matched my hypotheses.

The Mission to Rescue American Hostages in Iran

Relations between Iran and the United States deteriorated almost immediately upon the Shah's departure from his country and Khomeini's return to Iran. The United States embassy was besieged by Marxist demonstrators on February 14, 1979. A group of U.S. Air Force employees were held hostage for several days. Anti-American protests increased. Americans were urged to leave the country and the number of people attached to the United State embassy was cut from over a thousand to less than a hundred. The Carter administration became even more worried about the future of relations when they agreed to let the Shah come to New York for medical treatment.

But as poor and tense as relations had become, the events that began on November 4, 1979 when thousands of Iranians stormed the United States embassy in Tehran and took scores of Americans hostage were unanticipated. While American decision makers were initially hopeful that the Iranian government would disperse the demonstrators and free the hostages, it soon became clear that this would not occur.

Therefore, the Carter administration soon turned to weighing diplomatic options, rescue plans and possible military and economic sanctions to bring about the release of the hostages.

This seizure rocked American foreign and domestic politics like few events have since. Developing a response to this difficult situation involved many decision makers in a variety of policy roles. However, my examination of American decision making will focus on five individuals who played particularly active roles in the decision-making process, and whose psychological characteristics I measured and included in the earlier statistical analyses, Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance, Warren Christopher, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Harold Brown.

President Jimmy Carter

Jimmy Carter entered office without a great deal of knowledge or experience in dealing with international issues. While he began to think about these issues in earnest and exchange ideas with experts in foreign affairs after he joined the Trilateral Commission in the early 1970s, they still never became a primary focus of his professional life prior to assuming the presidency, and they were not a top priority during his successful campaign in 1976. That said, by all accounts Carter was an extraordinarily bright political leader. Once put in a position where he needed to confront these issues, he actively sought to become more knowledgeable on international matters. He sought not only to maximize American interests in situations he faced, but to study problems from a theoretical, big-picture standpoint. Indeed, one of the reasons he is said to have developed such a close relationship with his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew

Brzezinski, is that the two shared a common love for lengthy theoretical discussions (Hargrove 1989).

In terms of what he wished to accomplish in the realm of foreign affairs, Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977 with a desire to promote an idealistic foreign policy based on morality and a belief in freedom and democracy, something he felt that the United States had lacked since the Truman administration (Carter 1982:142). Indeed, his statements during the campaign and early in his term show that he was so committed to this approach that he was to “the left” of all of his senior advisors (Rosati 1987). One example of his desire to move the direction of foreign policy was his prioritization of human rights issues. He felt it was important not only to criticize abuses made by political opponents, but also to criticize abuses by right-wing regimes, even if they were longtime American allies. In general, he wished to bring a fresh approach to foreign policy. While he was of course committed to maintaining the security of Americans, he downplayed traditional concerns about political realism in foreign policy, and took considerable risks from the standpoint of domestic politics. As seen in his handling of such prominent challenges as arms control strategy with the Soviet Union and the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, Carter was willing to put the power of his office behind clearly unpopular policies if he believed they served the national interest.

This focus on new ideas and perspectives, combined with his lack of foreign policy experience may lead some to believe he suffered from a considerable level of naivete. But this also shows the types of things he would likely prioritize, or not prioritize, when facing a crisis. For example, while he clearly wanted to do what was in

the best interests of the country, his conception of what that meant appears to have differed from the opinions of his predecessors. Perhaps rooted in his unusually strong religious convictions (Glad 1980) Carter appears to at times have valued life and the quality of life more than maintaining the image of a superpower. This fits in with his general thrust to try and do what he perceived as just or moral in a given situation. While he certainly wished the country to be seen as strong in a traditional *realpolitik* sense, he also wished to be seen upholding the values that he believed the country was built upon values that he believed when publicized would strengthen the resistance against totalitarian states around the world (Carter 1982:142).

But while he entered office with plans to change the direction of American foreign policy, he gradually moved to a more traditional posture. While he “continued to express hope for a cooperative and just global future, he also began to see the negative side of global complexity and change” (Rosati 1987:76). As early as the summer of 1977 Carter was already torn between visions of a “gentler, freer, more bountiful world” and “the nature of the world as it really is (Serfaty 1978:19). He faced difficult challenges, not only with the ever-tense relationship with the Soviet Union, but also with new issues arising in Cuba, Southeast Asia, Yemen, Iran and Central America. Having to develop responses to these events Carter began to rely on more and more traditional techniques of influence and persuasion, for example by increasing the defense budget. He certainly maintained a desire see the world transform into a community of democratic nations that respected human rights. However, he also saw himself pushed by changes in the international system to revert from cooperative policies to taking tougher stances when dealing with other international actors.

In terms of psychological characteristics I measured earlier in this analysis, Carter's scores are shown in Table 5.1. As one would expect given his ideals, Carter preferred the use of cooperative strategies and tactics. However, perhaps due to the changing world around him he was generally averse to taking risks. He saw the world around him as somewhat conflictual, and was slightly pessimistic about attaining his political goals. He believed that the political world was unpredictable, though not as unpredictable as several of his aides saw it. He believed chance played a major role in world affairs. While he believed he had an impact on the development of history, he was less confident of that than his top advisors were. Overall, these scores generally match the case study work that has been done on Carter's foreign policy beliefs, and they resemble another measurement of Carter's operational code, which examined changes in Carter's belief system before and after the invasion of Afghanistan (Walker, Schafer and

Table 5.1 Psychological Characteristic Scores of Carter Administration Officials in the Period Preceding the Seizure of Hostages in Iran

Variable	Carter	Vance	Chris.	Brzez.	Brown	Sample Mean (SD)
Need for Affiliation	.41	.44	.67	.40	.42	.47(.11)
Distrust	.21	.12	.02	.17	.33	.17(.11)
Conceptual Complexity	.64	.61	.71	.63	.79	.68(.07)
Need for Power	.39	.08	.03	.33	.46	.26(.19)
Strategy, OCI1	.40	.69	1.00	.56	.41	.61(.25)
Tactics, OCI2	.37	.54	.60	.43	.35	.46(.11)
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.06	.14	.37	.11	.06	.15(.13)
Political Universe, OCP1	-.25	.11	.58	-.12	-.35	-.07(.37)
Optimism, OCP2	-.16	.22	.70	-.30	-.35	.02(.44)
Political Future, OCP3	.15	.08	.56	.08	.09	.19(.21)
Control, OCP4	.69	.75	.83	.75	.71	.75(.06)
Chance, OCP5	.90	.94	.54	.94	.93	.85(.18)

Young 1998). Even late in his presidency when he was wary of many international actors he still maintained a basic desire to interact with others in a cooperative fashion.

In terms of the four personality traits I measured, Carter's need for affiliation, distrust of others and conceptual complexity were generally near the mean of my sample of decision makers. However, in the period prior to the seizure of the hostages in autumn of 1979, he had an unusually high need for power. His score was over one standard deviation above the mean of my sample of decision makers. In terms of another characteristic, Carter was judged by his contemporaries to have a high dominance personality. That is, he insisted upon having a high degree of control over his subordinates and policy making (Shepard 1988), something that is clearly evident in his descriptions of his behavior toward subordinates in his presidential memoir (Carter 1982). Investigations of this personality characteristic have shown that decision makers with high dominance personalities are more likely than others to support the use of force (Etheredge 1978; Shepard 1988).

What hypotheses can we make about Carter's behavior? Given his background, beliefs and ideals, it seems likely that Carter would not be the sort of politician who would immediately respond to a threat or other negative action by increasing the tension in a situation. He seems likely to be the type of individual who would first turn to negotiations or cautious sanctions. He would not be quick to turn to the use of military force. However, his negative views of other international actors, his pessimism about achieving his goals, his high need for power, and his high dominance personality all suggest that if he were not able to find a diplomatic solution to his liking that he would be quite willing to employ force to achieve his aims.

Eventually turning to military force as an option would seem even more likely given his views of Khomeini. Both before and after the hostages were seized Carter judged his behavior to be deplorable, bizarre and untrustworthy. In mid-1979 Carter believed Khomeini's "statements and actions were irrational, and he and some of his fanatical followers kept Iran in constant turmoil" (Carter 1982:453). Following the seizure of the hostages Carter believed, "Khomeini was acting insanely" (Carter 1982:459).

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

Cyrus Vance's nomination as Secretary of State was announced on December 6, 1976, the first cabinet nomination announced by president-elect Carter. Unlike Carter, he had a wealth of experience dealing with international affairs and national security issues. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations he had served as General Counsel at the Department of Defense, Secretary of the Army, and Deputy Secretary of Defense. He had served as a negotiator or special representative of the president in a variety of difficult international situations, including the Paris peace conference on Vietnam, the Panama Canal Crisis of 1964 and the Dominican civil war in 1965. He had been active in a number of organizations dealing with international issues, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission. Though Vance had originally backed the 1976 presidential bid of Sargent Shriver, once Shriver dropped out of the contest Vance began giving Carter advice on foreign policy issues. While they had only met twice before the campaign (Vance 1983), Vance developed a close personal rapport with Carter. Carter respected Vance's views, and given his background and the

number of people suggesting his appointment, he was a natural choice to be named Secretary of State.

In terms of his long-term vision and goals, Vance was much like Carter. Both sought to create a new kind of global community featuring greater cooperation and respect for human rights. Both believed “a reliance on military instruments of foreign policy would be counterproductive” (Rosati 1987:61). Both strongly believed that “mankind and the international system could be reformed and improved” (Rosati 1987:63). As the Carter team faced more and more obstacles to its aim of creating a new foreign policy system, Vance remained optimistic about meeting this goal. Zbigniew Brzezinski, and to a lesser extent Jimmy Carter, adopted tougher stances and altered their images of other political actors as they encountered an increasing number of political setbacks. But Vance remained true to the perceptions and beliefs he held when he took office throughout his three and a half year tenure, even in the face of considerable opposition from other international actors (Rosati 1987). If pressed to take a conflictual approach to a situation, Vance always wanted to avoid the use of military force. As Harold Brown put it, “Secretary Vance was persuaded that anything that involved the risk of force was a mistake” (Brzezinski 1983:44).

We see twelve of Vance’s psychological characteristics measured in Table 5.1. As expected, these show that Vance preferred to use cooperative strategies and tactics. While risk averse, he was less so than most of his colleagues. He viewed the political universe as fundamentally somewhat cooperative. He was also rather optimistic about achieving his political goals. While he saw the world as an unpredictable place in which chance played a considerable role, he also saw himself as being able to strongly affect

historical development. Additionally, while three of his personality trait scores neared the mean of my sample of decision makers, his need for power was remarkably low. Also, his contemporaries considered Vance to have a low dominance personality (Shepard 1988), making it even less likely that he would back the use of force.

Given these characteristics and other aspects of his background, such as the effect that serving in the Pentagon during the Vietnam War had on him, it seems likely that Vance would be loathe to resort to the use of force to achieve his aims in a conflict. We can expect that Vance would prefer to rely upon diplomatic efforts. He would likely try to keep the lines of communication open with all actors at all times.

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher

Vance's Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, was a prominent attorney who had previously been Deputy Attorney General. Like Vance he was viewed by many to be part of the East Coast establishment, even though he was from Los Angeles. But while he may have made his career in law and lacked Vance's lengthy experience in foreign affairs, he closely mirrored Vance in terms of their shared commitment to a new, more cooperative and idealistic foreign policy. Like Vance he preferred to avoid what Brzezinski referred to as "the unavoidable ingredient of force in dealing with contemporary international realities" (Brzezinski 1983:42).

Table 5.1 shows that Christopher exceeded even Vance in his belief in an optimistic, cooperative world. He strongly believed in using cooperative strategies and tactics, and relatively speaking, he was quite willing to take political risks. He saw the political universe as basically cooperative and was very optimistic about achieving his foreign policy goals. He saw the world as relatively predictable, with chance having only

a limited impact on events. He saw himself as having the ability to affect historical developments. He had an unusually low need for power and an unusually low level of distrust. His score on the power index was over two standard deviations below the mean, and his distrust score was over one deviation below the mean. And he had unusually high need for affiliation and conceptual complexity scores. Both were more than one standard deviation above the mean of the decision makers in my sample. While Christopher has not been judged to have either a high dominance or low dominance personality, it would seem safe to presume that he has the latter given that he appears to have been exceedingly deferential when he was involved in top-level meetings, and given Brzezinski's comment about how much better he was at playing supporting roles in government than leading roles (Brzezinski 1983:42). Given all of these characteristics we can expect that Christopher would have been extremely unlikely to advocate the use of force to achieve his ends.

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski came into government with a background that in some senses was considerably different from that of his colleagues. Brzezinski, who came from an elite Polish family, had been an "impressionable teenager" during the Communist takeover of Poland in 1945 (Prados 1991:382). That event apparently made a lasting impact on him, and his relatively tough stands against Moscow made him appear to be a staunch cold warrior. But while certain aspects of his personal history were unique from those of his colleagues, he nonetheless had much in common with the other top decision makers in the Carter administration. In fact, while he might have generally been the "one central actor who didn't share the views of the majority", his views were still

enough like the other top decision makers that they formed a “homogeneous body” which featured a great deal of agreement on policy issues (Moens 1990:23).

He had met Carter through his work on the Trilateral Commission and in time became his top foreign policy advisor during the campaign. As one would expect of someone holding such a position, Brzezinski and Carter generally had quite similar views and goals about how American foreign policy should be pursued. Brzezinski also hoped to build a more peaceful world community and he greatly admired Carter’s commitment to upholding fundamental principles in the conduct of world affairs. Both wanted to replace Kissinger’s foreign policy of “power realism” with a new policy of “planetary humanism” (Serfaty 1978:19). He sought to prioritize topics like the North-South divide (Drew 1978), and considered the inequality of less developed countries a “moral problem for our time” (Serfaty 1978:6). Early in the administration he even had a “hopeful but skeptical” view of the Soviet Union (Rosati 1987:56). While he was perhaps always the advisor closest to having a conventional realpolitik view of foreign policy, he was still sympathetic to Carter’s goals, particularly early in the Carter presidency.

However, while he may have initially had a more cooperative and hopeful view of foreign policy than is often referred to, there is no question that as Carter’s presidency progressed Brzezinski took progressively tougher stances and cemented his reputation as the administration’s leading hawk. Facing a string of challenges to American interests Brzezinski saw “an increasingly turbulent, unstable system conducive to Soviet interventionism” (Rosati 1987:133). While he had always been more willing to use force to project an image of a strong superpower, for example his desire to send a carrier task force to the Horn of Africa during the crisis in that region in 1977 and 1978, changing

circumstances only strengthened his belief in the need to show the nation's strength in order to achieve its aims. This is not to say that he abandoned Carter's desire for a pacific global community that embraced fundamental values like human rights. He maintained those goals, but unlike Vance once he was in office he became noticeably more pessimistic about his chances for achieving them.

The psychological characteristic measurements seen in Table 5.1 appear to support this view of Brzezinski. In the months preceding the seizure of the hostages he favored the use of cooperative strategies and tactics, perhaps to a surprising degree. However, he was risk averse, viewed the political universe as at least marginally conflictual and was somewhat pessimistic about achieving his political goals. While he viewed the political world as unpredictable and heavily influenced by chance, he also saw himself as being able to affect the course of history. Brzezinski's scores show that he was near the sample mean on the four personality characteristics seen in Table 5.1. As one might expect, his need for power and level of distrust were higher than Vance's measurements, and his need for affiliation was lower. Additionally, Brzezinski was considered to have a high dominance personality (Shepard 1988).

What do these characteristics and personal history predict? Brzezinski's first two instrumental operational code indices would appear to show a predisposition to rely on diplomatic means to solve international challenges. However, his negative view of other political actors, his pessimism about achieving his goals, his view of an unpredictable world, his concern for maintaining an image of strength and prestige, as well as his high dominance personality all suggest that he would be likely to back the use of force under certain circumstances. Additionally, his relative lack of concern about endangering

vulnerable Americans in order to ensure that the prestige and strength of America were evident to all (Carter 1982; Strong 2000), also would make him more likely to back the use of force. He would clearly appear more likely to back the use of force than Vance or Christopher.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown

Harold Brown brought with him to the Department of Defense a mastery of many of the highly technical issues that confront leaders of that enormous department that probably exceeded that of any other Secretary, before or since. A noted physicist who had received his doctorate at the age of 21, he had served as Director of the Livermore Radiation Laboratory in the 1950's and as Director of Research in the Department of Defense from 1961-1965. He also had years of administrative experience, having served as Air Force Secretary during the Johnson administration and President of Cal Tech.

Like the rest of the decision-making team he had a commitment to assisting President Carter achieve his aims for a new kind of foreign policy. However, while he held to this mind set early in the administration backing Vance in several disputes with Brzezinski, as time went on and the administration faced more assertive foes, he began to side more and more with the National Security Advisor (Brzezinski 1983). To some degree this shift was perhaps natural given his need to promote the interests of his department and maintain the support of his subordinates. But it also matches the changes that the president himself experienced while in office, and perhaps also reflects his generally cautious tendencies (Garrison 1999).

In fact when we look at Table 5.1 we see that several of Brown's psychological characteristic scores were much like those of President Carter. Both had a tendency to back cooperative strategies and tactics. Both were risk averse. Both had conflictual views of the nature of the political universe, and both were pessimistic about achieving their goals. They saw the political universe as unpredictable with chance heavily affecting events, yet they also believed they could affect the course of historical development. They had similar needs for affiliation, and both had high dominance personalities (Shepard 1988). Brown had a very high need for power, even higher than Carter's. He also had a rather high level of distrust of others. Finally, Brown had an extraordinarily high level of conceptual complexity. This score is the highest in my sample of decision makers, two and a half standard deviations above the mean. This score is not surprising given Brown's widely acknowledged intellectual brilliance.

His high complexity level and the first two instrumental indices of his operational code would seem to imply that he would be reluctant to use force to settle a conflict. However, the rest of his psychological characteristics point to a proclivity to support the use of conflictual policy options to achieve his goals. Overall, like Carter who has a similar psychological profile, perhaps we should consider Brown to be a "pragmatic idealist" (Crichlow 1998). That is, someone who generally sought to rely on cooperative policy options and engagement techniques to achieve their aims, but whose commitment to that strategy was tempered by the influence of a hostile environment.

The Decision

Following the seizure of the hostages, and the Iranian government failing to free them after a few days, the Carter administration took a number of punitive actions.

These included ending oil importation from that country, ordering Iranian students in the country illegally to leave, and freezing all Iranian assets in American banks (Carter 1982; Rosati 1987). These actions were generally taken with the unanimous support of Carter's advisory team, with the main force slowing their implementation being working out their legality and how they affected relations with allies.

But while they agreed on certain actions, there were still divisions between Carter's advisors, especially between longtime rivals Brzezinski and Vance. Tensions were evident very early in the decision-making process. One early divide was over whether to insist that the Shah leave the United States when he had recovered from his medical treatments. Vance believed that he must leave as there was little chance that the hostages would be freed while he was in the United States. Brzezinski strongly opposed forcing a close ally out of the country (Turner 1991). This was just the beginning of what would become a deep split between the two over the proper policy to pursue on this issue.

Early in the crisis there was a clear desire by most participants to find a nonviolent solution to the conflict. Carter and Vance opened a key meeting during the first week of the crisis with statements opposing the use of military force, and proposals advocating such measures received scant attention (Turner 1991). However, as the situation persisted and there failed to be much movement on the diplomatic front, planning for a potential rescue mission or military strike, planning which began just days after the hostages were taken, intensified. The pace of this planning was accelerating quickly when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979. That event made military action even less appealing as it would likely undercut opposition in the Islamic

world to the Soviet action during a period when the Carter administration was trying very hard to organize opposition to the invasion (Brzezinski 1983). But by mid-March the lack of movement on the diplomatic front led Carter and his advisors to again begin to reconsider their options.

As proposals began to be put forward that included military action, two potential policy options got the most attention. One was a punitive military attack against Iran. The leading proposal in this regard, and one that Carter initially liked, was mining Iranian harbors. The other policy option was a rescue mission. At the early-April National Security Council meetings when the decision to launch the rescue mission was adopted virtually all of Carter's advisors backed military action. The only exception was Warren Christopher who was sitting in for Cyrus Vance. Christopher pushed for a continued reliance on diplomacy. While Vance was absent from these sessions Carter was aware that his Secretary of State also opposed any military attack unless there was an immediate threat to the hostages (Strong 2000; Turner 1991).

The president made the decision to launch a rescue mission in a meeting of the National Security Council on April 11, 1980. Everyone present except Deputy Secretary Christopher approved of this option. Brzezinski had begun trying to drum up support for this plan, the option he had favored, as far back as March. Toward this end he had shared some of the secret plans for the operation with Vice President Mondale, and with top Carter political aides Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell (Strong 2000). Additionally, Defense Secretary Brown and General Jones, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had earlier strongly argued against the mining proposal for fear that it would hurt relations with the Islamic world and drive Iran closer to the Soviet Union (Turner 1991).

For a group that was thoroughly frustrated and saw no sign that the hostages would be released the rescue plan was widely appealing. Perhaps because they were so eager to pursue this new active policy Brzezinski was the only individual to raise the subject of planning for a possible failure (Strong 2000).

The behavior of the decision group generally matches what one would expect given their respective psychological characteristics. When first confronted with this extremely serious problem there was virtual unanimity in this largely "homogeneous body" (Moens 1990:23) to avoid the use of military force. While they possessed varied opinions about nonmilitary policy responses they initially agreed on this key point. CIA Director Stansfield Turner notes having been disappointed in the group's unanimity in blocking out all consideration of military options during the first weeks of the crisis (Turner 1991).

This initial response matched the group's commitment to the foreign policy ideals espoused by Jimmy Carter at the beginning of the administration. It also matches the instrumental operational code scores of all five decision makers I coded. All five preferred to rely on the use of cooperative strategies and tactics. All five also saw themselves as having considerable control over historical development. As shown earlier in this project, that characteristic has been linked to a tendency to favor cooperative policy options. Additionally, all of the members of Carter's decision-making team except for Defense Secretary Brown had distrust scores lower than the average of my sample of decision makers. That also would seem to point to them being slower to turn to military policy options than other decision makers.

However, by the spring a division had developed between these decision makers. After observing what appeared to be months of untrustworthy behavior by the Iranians and coming to doubt more and more that the hostages would be released Carter, Brzezinski and Brown all came to believe that the United States should take military action to bring them home. Vance and Christopher though remained committed to pursuing further diplomatic measures. They did not want to risk military action.

This division matches what many would expect given the general perceptions of these individuals. Brzezinski was considered the administration's "hawk", at least relatively speaking, from the beginning of the administration (Drew 1978), and both Brown (Brzezinski 1983) and Carter (Rosati 1987) were widely perceived to have moved in that direction as time went on. In contrast, Vance and Christopher were considered strong "doves" throughout their tenure. Brzezinski has described Vance as "the ultimate example of a good man who has been traumatized by his Vietnam experience" (Jordan 1982:264). Whether or not it was because of his service in the Defense Department during that period, it was true that Vance opposed the use of military force most of the times it was proposed during the administration. And of course he was so strongly committed to that belief that he conveyed his resignation on April 17, a week before the rescue operation was launched, one of the few times in the twentieth century that a cabinet member resigned on a question of principle. Christopher was widely seen as just as strongly opposed to the use of the military, desiring to rely upon more peaceful policy options. One comment of Christopher's illustrates this quite well. At a meeting on April 16, 1980 he inquired if "taking out" Iranian guards perhaps

meant shooting them in the shoulder. The mission commander informed him that it meant shooting them between the eyes (Strong 2000:249).

This division was also seen in the psychological characteristics of these decision makers. The three whose philosophical operational code indices show that they saw the world as fundamentally conflictual and were pessimistic about achieving their goals opted to use military force. The two who saw a cooperative world and were optimistic about achieving their goals wanted to rely on diplomatic measures and economic sanctions. Those with marginally less faith in their ability to control events favored the use of military force. The three who favored the rescue mission had much higher needs for power than the two who opposed the mission. Brzezinski, Carter and Brown all had high-dominance personalities. By contrast Vance had a low-dominance personality (Shepard 1988), and it seems likely that Christopher did as well given the deference he tended to show other decision makers (Brzezinski 1983; Vance 1983). And to some degree these groups may have been shaped by different events. Vance was said to have been heavily influenced by his experience in Vietnam (Brzezinski 1983; Jordan 1982), while Brzezinski's world view was frequently said to have been shaped by his view of the Soviet Union (Drew 1978; Serfaty 1978).

Overall, the psychological characteristics of these decision makers played an important role in shaping their behavior during this crisis. The early actions of the decision makers match those that were predicted on the basis of their core beliefs and the manner they hoped world politics would function. The divisions that developed within the administration also followed predicted patterns, with those who were more pessimistic and saw the world as a more conflictual place turning to support a policy of

military action against an enemy they considered to be irrational and untrustworthy. The three decision makers who favored military action differed from those who wanted to rely on economic sanctions in predicted ways on the psychological characteristics I measured. Their differences also match predicted patterns according to the literature on high-dominance, low-dominance personalities (Shepard 1988). Additionally, the decision makers who seemed to have been most affected by particular periods of conflict in the past differed in a pattern that matches expectations given the analogies that were likely to be dominant in their way of thinking about international affairs. Vance, shaped by the Vietnam experience (Brzezinski 1983), was reluctant to use force. Brzezinski, shaped by World War II and Soviet aggression under Stalin's rule (Prados 1991; Serfaty 1978), was more willing to use aggressive military action. It appears that in this case the policy preferences and political behaviors of these decision makers was powerfully affected by their psychological characteristics.

The American Military Buildup Preceding Operation Desert Storm

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 stunned the Bush administration. That is not to say that there were not signs of it that should have raised suspicions. Of course Iraq had claimed the emirate as far back as when the United Kingdom granted it independence in 1961. But in the summer of 1990 Iraq was doing much more than issuing threats. Saddam Hussein had amassed an army of over 100,000 men near the border in late July. His forces were not limited to their usual training area, and they were deployed in ways that allowed them to be quickly put into action. The intelligence bureau at U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM Commander Norman Schwarzkopf and the Defense Intelligence Agency all believed a war was imminent (Schwarzkopf 1992).

Middle East expert Charles Allen, the Central Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Officer for Warning, hand delivered a memo to Richard Haass of the National Security Council noting a seventy percent chance of an invasion (Parmet 1997) and alerted colleagues in the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department to the threat, but nonetheless the intelligence community was divided on the likelihood of an invasion (Gordon and Trainor 1995). Perhaps believing the counsel of Arab allies who doubted Saddam would go through with an invasion (Gordon and Trainor 1995; Parmet 1997; Schwarzkopf 1992), or perhaps out of a desire to avoid coming to terms with a failed policy of engagement with Iraq (Gordon and Trainor 1995; Parmet 1997), the Bush administration did not take action to block the invasion before it began.

While his government had not prevented the attack, Bush quickly committed the United States to opposing Iraq in the wake of the invasion. At an emergency meeting of the National Security Council most potential policy options were dropped as unworkable. Secretary of State Baker, who was out of the country, and Secretary of the Treasury Brady both initially spoke of how the world could adjust to the new situation. President Bush recognized the difficulties involved in reversing this invasion, but he was distressed that he and National Security Advisor Scowcroft were the only leading officials in the government who believed that the invasion must be overturned (Duffy and Goodgame 1992). Even though he lacked bureaucratic support and plans for how to go about it, Bush famously announce, "this will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait" (Pfiffner 1993:4). To spur movement against the invasion and develop an international consensus in favor of tough action Bush made some fifty calls to world leaders during the first five days of the crisis (Parmet 1997). Soon the deployment of over two hundred

thousand American troops began as a means to deter Hussein from attacking Saudi Arabia (Freedman and Karsh 1993).

Over the next few months the Bush administration continued to expand the coalition against Saudi Arabia. They succeeded in getting more countries to voice support, to send troops and to send money. They were successful in every one of these areas. In fact by the end of the operation close to ninety percent of the cost was paid by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Germany, Japan and South Korea (Greene 2000). But while the administration was successfully isolating Iraq, Bush was becoming impatient with waiting on sanctions to dislodge Hussein. Many participants in the early stages of decision making, including the president himself, have noted that Bush strongly wanted to attack just weeks after Iraq's invasion (Bush and Scowcroft 1998; Powell 1995). With little movement on the diplomatic front, Bush eager to move, and more and more American soldiers arriving on the scene, in October American decision makers made the key decisions that would lead to the coalition forces to attack the Iraqis in January 1991.

The primary decision makers who set the country's path at this time were President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Powell (Pfiffner 1993). Unfortunately I was not able to obtain comments made by Scowcroft and Powell in the period preceding this decision that met the coding criteria, so I was not able to measure their psychological characteristics in this case. Therefore this analysis focuses primarily on the other three decision makers, though I include some discussion of the behavior and characteristics of Powell and Scowcroft.

President George Herbert Walker Bush

George H. W. Bush entered the White House with more foreign policy expertise than most of the other men who served as President of the United States during the twentieth century. During his service as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, Director of Central Intelligence, and Vice President, Bush gained broad knowledge and experience about the processes of international relations and key issues facing the United States. That should not imply that he had spent most of his life dealing with foreign affairs. He did not take his first international post until he was in his late forties, and he only served one or two years in each of the positions he filled in the Nixon and Ford administrations. But Bush believed that “his major expertise” was in foreign policy (Hilsman 1992:246), and that greatly affected the issues he prioritized during his administration and his decision-making style.

While he entered politics enthusiastic about dealing with foreign affairs, he was enthusiastic in a way notably different from President Carter. He did not have any grand plans about changing the fundamental issues and diplomatic behaviors common in international relations. Bush was “unsentimental about power politics” (Duffy and Goodgame 1992:139). He “had trained all his life to be the consummate Cold Warrior” (Duffy and Goodgame 1992:177), and his “tolerance for human rights abuses and autocracy” extended far beyond what were judged by many to be his government’s exceedingly understanding remarks to the Chinese government following the Tiananmen Square massacre (Duffy and Goodgame 1992:184).

But while he prioritized the traditional goals of state power and security, he frequently did so by engaging in cooperative tactics, as seen in his relations with the

Chinese. Bush was not an extreme hawk, and in fact pursued many policies built around the concept of breaking down old barriers and collaborating with other states to create a safer, more productive world. If he felt he could trust and work productively with another political actor he was quite willing to engage that person or country in cooperative policies that benefited the national interest. For example, with the warming of relations with what was seen as a less contentious Soviet Union, he began to make decidedly non-hawkish changes in U.S. strategic forces. He presided over sizable cuts in the U.S. military. Indeed at the time of the Iraqi attack Defense Secretary Cheney was finalizing plans to announce a twenty-five percent reduction in the size of the U.S. forces (Parmet 1997). Bush also enthusiastically embraced arms control in certain areas, working hard on treaties like the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement and the START treaties (Baker 1995). He led the country while it adopted “scores” (Baker 1995:605) of bilateral trade agreements, and pursued major multilateral trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement. And of course the way he prosecuted the early months of the Gulf War, building an enormous coalition of states to work together (Birch 1993), fits well with his desire for establishing close relationships with other states in order to pursue the national interest. Bush then can be said to have been a politician who was motivated to pursue traditional foreign policy goals, especially maintaining a position of strength and power for the United States, but one who preferred to go about that by using cooperative means to engage other countries.

While President Bush appears to have entered office with a clear understanding of his foreign policy beliefs and how he wanted to go about putting them into action, his international behavior appears to have been heavily influence by a few key aspects of his

personality. Foremost among these was the extraordinary influence Bush placed on personal relationships. President Bush strongly valued his friendships. These became very close bonds. Generally speaking, Bush was “exceptionally well mannered, modest, restrained, generous, and considerate of others” (Duffy and Goodgame 1992:202). He was remarkably loyal and willing to take political risks for his friends. For example, he pardoned a half dozen leading Reagan administration officials for their role in the Iran-Contra scandal, something that President Reagan, a notoriously personally cool individual who had limited feelings of loyalty, refused to do (Parmet 1997:510).

In international relations this behavior was seen in a unique kind of diplomacy. He became personal friends with several world leaders. He pursued this personal approach so assiduously that by his third year in office he had made more trips abroad than any previous president. While this behavior certainly produced valuable links with other countries that could strengthen American interests in the world, it was perhaps led to the president giving “more weight to leader-to-leader relationships than state-to-state relationships” (Hilsman 1992:246). This could lead Bush to engaging in perhaps surprisingly cooperative behavior with some leaders. But it could also lead him to be vindictive if he felt he had been betrayed by a friend (Hilsman 1992; Winter 1993).

The measurements of Bush’s psychological characteristics that I included in the earlier analyses are presented in Table 5.2. They largely match the descriptions of Bush that are found in the case study literature. Bush preferred to rely on the use of cooperative strategies and tactics, though he was somewhat reluctant to take risks. As befits a man who frequently sought to engage other countries in cooperative operations, and reduced his country’s military, he saw the political universe as basically cooperative.

He believed that he could affect world events and was marginally optimistic about achieving his goals, characteristics one would expect given the priority and personal attention he gave foreign policy matters. But he also saw the political universe as highly unpredictable with chance having a heavy impact in shaping the world. He had a somewhat low need for power, and a somewhat low level of distrust of others. He had a rather high need for affiliation and a rather high level of conceptual complexity. Additionally, fitting with his low need for power, according to Shepard (1988) Bush had a low-dominance personality.

Table 5.2 Psychological Characteristic Scores of Bush Administration Officials in the Period Preceding Operation Desert Storm

Variable	Bush	Baker	Cheney	Sample Mean(SD)
Need for Affiliation	.51	.40	.26	.39(.13)
Distrust	.11	.06	.17	.11(.06)
Conceptual Complexity	.69	.66	.59	.65(.05)
Need for Power	.21	.21	.43	.28(.13)
Strategy, OCI1	.64	.25	-.01	.29(.33)
Tactics, OCI2	.41	.24	.00	.22(.21)
Risk Orientation, OCI3	.14	.06	.03	.08(.06)
Political Universe, OCP1	.27	.23	.20	.23(.03)
Optimism, OCP2	.14	.24	.39	.26(.13)
Political Future, OCP3	.05	.12	.09	.09(.03)
Control, OCP4	.67	.72	.85	.75(.09)
Chance, OCP5	.96	.91	.93	.93(.03)

What hypotheses can we make about President Bush given these psychological characteristics? Generally speaking, Bush appears to have been unlikely to resort to the use of military force given his personal attributes in 1990. With the exception of him seeing the political universe as highly unpredictable and being heavily influenced by chance, all of his other characteristics point to a propensity to rely on cooperative policy

means and avoid the use of military power to solve international challenges. However, his unique approach to foreign policy and politics generally, relying so heavily on personal relationships, and his high need for affiliation, point to the possibility that there would be one circumstance in which he would perhaps be likely to lash out against an opponent. Believing so strongly in personal loyalty, if Bush felt that a personal friend was turning against him, he could become vindictive (Hilsman 1992; Woodward 1991). As David Winter has written, "Hell hath no fury like an affiliation motivated person scorned, or being double crossed" (Winter 1993:114).

Given that building a close relationship with Iraq was a leading part of Bush's Middle East policy, and that the Bush administration had worked to help develop Iraq into a stronger, richer ally (Freedman and Karsh 1993; Gordon and Trainor 1995; Greene 2000), Saddam Hussein's invasion appears to have provoked a sense of betrayal. Bush quickly came to think that he had completely misjudged the Iraqi leader. Rebuilding a cooperative relationship with Hussein would have been difficult enough, but was further complicated by the fact that he saw himself as having more knowledge of the Middle East than anyone else in his government. He had told his aides that "he new more about the region than any of them" (Parmet 1997:443). So it would be difficult for anyone to move his opinions once they were formed. And since he was quickly referring to Hussein as "a new Hitler" (Hilsman 1992:227), "evil" and a "madman" (Greene 2000:122), it was clear that there was a serious chance of a war developing between the United States and Iraq. This was particularly likely as Bush, whose first experiences away from his home and the elite confines of Phillips Andover were as a navy aviator in World War II, "relied on the 1938 Munich debacle to infer that

unchallenged tyrants view the absence of opposition to their attempts to aggrandize their powers as a weakness to be exploited" (Hybel 1993:66). This riveting "personal experience seems to have strengthened his conviction in the righteousness of the war" (Wayne 1993:39).

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III

James Baker's appointment as Secretary of State was made in record time. President Bush named him the day after the election (Bennett 1996). But this was not a surprise. Baker's appointment had been foreseen for some time. A fellow Texan, he had been close to President Bush for many years. He had also run both of Bush's campaigns for the presidency. While he did not enter his office with as much foreign policy experience as several of his recent predecessors (Duffy and Goodgame 1992; Moore 1994), he had become conversant with several international issues, particularly economic matters, during his tenure as President Reagan's Chief of Staff and Treasury Secretary and even earlier from his work in the Commerce Department during the Ford administration. Besides, Bush planned to be his own chief foreign policy expert. What he sought in Baker was a trusted aide with excellent negotiating and political skills who could successfully win over others to support Bush policies (Duffy and Goodgame 1992).

Compared to some others in the administration, Baker had tended to be less of a hard-liner during the Cold War on issues like arms control. He strongly believed in the long term benefits of establishing more cooperative relationships when possible. For example, in comparing his views to those of Cheney, Baker noted, "Dick was more of a cold warrior than I was" (Baker 1995:24). He was a "closet moderate" (Parmet

1997:103). Predictably, the thawing of the Cold War did not change his belief in the use of cooperative policies of engagement to achieve foreign policy goals. This is not to say that he was a trailblazer who sought to transform the world to match Wilsonian ideals. But he generally opposed relying upon the use of force in international affairs.

Given this basic orientation, his psychological characteristic scores seen in Table 5.2 are not surprising. They are also fairly close to those of President Bush. The instrumental indices of Baker's operational code show that he preferred to rely on cooperative strategies and tactics. He was averse to taking risks. He saw the political universe as basically cooperative. He believed he could affect historical development, and he was optimistic about achieving his goals. He believed the political universe was unpredictable and that chance affected world affairs. He had a somewhat low need for power. His distrust level was very low, over a standard deviation below the mean of my sample of decision makers. His conceptual complexity level and his need for affiliation were near the mean of my sample of decision makers. These scores lead me to hypothesize that he would be unlikely to back the use of force and launch a war against Iraq, and from the beginning of the conflict with Iraq Baker "had reservations about the speed and lack of deliberation with which the president was committing the United States to military objectives" (Pfiffner 1993:4).

Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney

Richard Cheney had of course not been President Bush's initial choice to head the Defense Department. But after the nomination of former Senator John Tower of Texas went down to defeat, Cheney seemed a safe choice to head the Pentagon. He had not ever really developed expertise in foreign affairs or national security issues.

However, he had developed a broad policy expertise during his days in the Ford administration and his six terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, including service on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and as Minority Whip. He was extremely conservative. He was an “unreconstructed Cold Warrior” who “had never met a weapons system he didn’t like” (Gordon and Trainor 1995:32). But he was widely respected by members of both parties in Washington (Duffy and Goodgame 1992), and he was easily confirmed.

Cheney recognized that the Cold War was thawing and was presiding over the Pentagon at a time when the U.S. military was being cut (Parment 1997). But while he saw an increasingly cooperative and peaceful world, that should not imply that he had abandoned his faith in pursuing aggressive policies that showed the strength of the United States. He remained a believer in the use of force when he thought it was called for to push traditional U.S. interests, and he was highly skeptical of using U.S. force and prestige to support new foreign policy goals like humanitarian aid operations (Baker 1995).

Cheney’s psychological characteristic scores in the period before the invasion of Kuwait are seen in Table 5.2. Cheney was divided as to his favored strategies and tactics. He appears to have preferred using conflictual and cooperative policy options about an equal number of times. He was extremely reluctant to take risks. He saw the political universe as somewhat cooperative. He was optimistic about achieving his goals, and he believed he could affect historical development. He saw the world as unpredictable with chance affecting world events.

His level of distrust was higher than that of Bush or Baker, though still somewhat low. His level of conceptual complexity was relatively low. His need for power was unusually high, and his need for affiliation was unusually low. Both of these indices were more than a standard deviation from the mean of my sample of decision makers. Overall, these two needs, along with his conceptual complexity score and his instrumental operational code indices point to Cheney being willing to support the use of military force to achieve U.S. interests in certain situations. This proclivity was seen from the beginning of the conflict. Cheney was looking at how the United States could topple Saddam from power as early as the day of the invasion. He wanted the invasion reversed, not just stopped (Gordon and Trainor 1995:33).

The Decision

President Bush had wanted to expel Iraq from Kuwait ever since the invasion. However, that seemed highly impractical in early August. He did not have the necessary forces in the area. Several of his advisors were unenthusiastic about the idea. And there was the prospect that without first marshaling international support that action by the government of the United States could undermine its position with a variety of important countries in the world. Therefore, the initial U.S. planning and diplomatic work was centered around defending Saudi Arabia, not liberating Kuwait. American forces started to flood into the area, and Americans took the lead in isolating Iraq and imposing sanctions against it. But Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, remained determined to strike back at Iraq (Woodward 1991). By late-September and early-October decision makers in Washington began to once again confront the issue of whether they would rely on sanctions to punish Iraq, or whether they would change the

military operation in the Middle East from a defensive one to an offensive one. Such an operation seemed more realistic as more troops and equipment poured into Saudi Arabia, and as the growing coalition of nations opposed to Iraq held together and promised to devote more resources to the cause (Freedman and Karsh 1993; Greene 2000).

Bush's foreign policy advisors formed the "most collegial" national security team in the postwar era (Duffy and Goodgame 1992:138). They had worked together in top government posts since the Ford administration. But while they had much in common and often agreed on policy questions, in this instance a division developed between them on whether or not to ratchet up American forces to enable an allied military attack to free Kuwait. Bush, Cheney and Scowcroft were sympathetic to using military force from the outset. Their desire to institute such a policy was only momentarily tempered by the need to make battle plans and deploy the resources necessary to carry them out. However, Baker, along with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell favored relying upon sanctions and a containment policy to force Iraq to leave Kuwait (Baker 1995; Freedman and Karsh 1993; Hybel 1993; Woodward 1991). Powell, whose early years in the military were powerfully affected by the Vietnam War (Powell 1995), was notoriously cautious and generally only backed the use of force when victory was assured with minimal losses, and the goal was likely to be widely popular with the general public. In this case he had reasons to doubt both propositions noting that the "American people do not want their young dying for \$1.50 gallon oil" (Gordon and Trainor 1995:33). He was also concerned that the decision-making process was limiting the consideration of nonmilitary means to force Iraq out of Kuwait (Woodward 1991). Secretary of State Baker was the "most important believer in containment in the Bush

administration” (Hybel 1993:72). He had worked hard to get most of the world’s countries to support a policy of containment, and believed that that policy should be given time to work before it was tossed aside in favor of military options. He also doubted the public’s commitment to support a war.

The division among the president’s advisors largely matches what one would generally expect given their psychological characteristics. Cheney’s operational code indices show that he did not believe as strongly in relying upon the use of cooperative strategies and tactics as Baker did. Additionally, he had a higher need for power, a lower need for affiliation, a higher level of distrust and a lower level of conceptual complexity. Considering those relative characteristics one would generally expect that Cheney would be more willing to support the use of military force than Baker. These characteristics also match expectations created by descriptions of those two men by their contemporaries that describe Cheney as more of a hard-liner (Baker 1995; Duffy and Goodgame 1992; Parmet 1997).

General Powell also fits into this division as you would expect given his psychological characteristics. While I was not able to include Powell’s characteristics in this case in my statistical analyses because I was not able to locate remarks he made during the period preceding the decision to adopt an offensive military option that met the coding criteria, the coding that I conducted for the other Bush administration case showed that he had characteristics that would seemingly make him unlikely to favor the use of military force. His instrumental operational code indices looked much like Baker’s. He saw the political universe as more cooperative than Bush, Baker and Cheney. He had a very low need for power and a very low level of distrust of others.

He also had a relatively high conceptual complexity level. These characteristics, when combined with the fact that his world view was heavily affected by what he perceived as the lessons of the Vietnam War, would seem to make it very unlikely that Powell would often favor the use of military force.

But looking at President Bush's psychological characteristic scores in Table 5.2 we quickly see that his behavior did not match what we would expect given my hypotheses. For example, he generally preferred to use cooperative strategies and tactics. He saw the political universe as fundamentally cooperative. His conceptual complexity and need for affiliation scores were rather high, while his need for power and distrust of others scores were rather low. Even though he saw the world as unpredictable and was perhaps less personally convinced that he could affect world events than his advisors were, given the other scores I would not have expected him to so quickly choose to adopt such a highly conflictual stance. Not only that, we saw in the Iran Hostage case that President Carter opted to support the policy option favored by the advisors whose psychological characteristics were most like his own. In this case Bush took a position that was opposed by advisors whose characteristics were more like his own, and was supported by Secretary of Defense Cheney whose characteristics were less like his own.

So why do Bush's general psychological characteristics not match his behavior in this case when they seem to do a good job explaining the positions of the other decision makers in this case, and of the decision makers in the Iran Hostage case? It seems that part of the answer very likely lies in psychological characteristics I did not include in the statistical analyses, or that may have more complicated effects than I hypothesized. As I

mentioned earlier, President Bush placed a great deal of weight in his personal relationships with his friends. This matches his high need for affiliation. And Bush thought of many international leaders as his friends (Parmet 1997). It seems quite reasonable to think that Bush took Saddam Hussein's behavior as a personal affront, and being someone who often struck back vindictively at those who deserted him (Woodward 1991), he immediately decided that Hussein must be punished for his action. As Winter (1993) has noted, many people with a high need for affiliation are quick to lash out at those whom they believe have betrayed them.

But this does not mean that he was attacking Hussein solely on the basis of a personal grudge. It appears that Bush's initial disgust and annoyance quickly developed into a much more intense dislike and distrust. When added to Bush's tendency to rely upon the Munich analogy when thinking about how he should deal with rogue dictators, this led him to favor an extremely harsh response (Hybel 1993; Wayne 1993). As John Robert Greene has written, "Bush was completely sincere in his hatred of Saddam; it was easy for him to equate the Iraqi dictator's actions to those of the 1940s' dictators he had risked his life to defeat" (Greene 2000:123). Of course he did not immediately implement plans to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. But from the outset of the conflict he was determined to stand up to him, something seen in his active personal diplomacy that quickly isolated the Iraqi regime.

His reliance upon himself as his country's chief foreign policy expert during this conflict (Hilsman 1992; Parmet 1997) virtually ensured that the United States would take tough action and eventually employ force to expel the invading Iraqi forces. Also matching Bush's high need for affiliation, he often closed off debate of policy options he

did not like (Hybel 1993; Woodward 1991). He set his administration's foreign policy, not his aides. Given this very personal leadership style on foreign policy issues Roger Hilsman's comment that, "more than any other man in modern history, the war in the Persian Gulf was a personal struggle between two men" (Hilsman 1992:225) seems quite fair.

In this case as well we see that even though President Bush's behavior did not match predictions made on the basis of the psychological characteristics I measured in the earlier analyses, these factors nonetheless had an important impact on decision making. Baker's and Cheney's behavior largely matched expectations based on their psychological characteristics, as did that of General Powell. The president's behavior was shaped by his own psychological characteristics as well. While in general Bush may have favored relying on cooperative policy options, preferences seen in his attempts to open trading markets and to improve relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China (Bush and Scowcroft 1998), this decision event required that Bush deal with an unusual situation. Here he was dealing with a former ally turned, to his eyes, rogue evil, threat to peace and security (Greene 2000). And given his unusually personal style of foreign policy, his high need for affiliation, and his reliance on the Munich analogy, he pursued a more conflictual approach than would otherwise have been expected. Overall, in this case as in the Iran Hostage case there appears to be considerable evidence that the behavior of decision makers was affected by their psychological characteristics.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The data and analyses in the preceding chapters have shown that a link exists between the psychological characteristics of decision makers, their personal policy preferences, and the official policies that states choose to pursue in international affairs. These results show that who leads matters. Decision makers bring with them to the policy-making table a set of personal beliefs and personality traits. Decision makers will perform their official duties in ways that are shaped by these psychological characteristics. This means that different sets of decision makers may lead states to act in noticeably different ways, even if they all face the same situation.

In the following sections I will review my findings. I first focus on how the psychological characteristics of decision makers affected their personal policy preferences. I then review the findings on how these factors affected state policy and decision-making patterns. I conclude by discussing the limitations of this project and its implications for future research in this area.

Explaining Personal Policy Preferences

The analyses investigating the fifty-five decision makers in my sample showed that no fewer than seven of the psychological characteristics I measured had a significant effect on their personal policy preferences. More distrustful individuals were more likely to favor conflictual policies. Decision makers with a higher need for power were more likely to favor conflictual policy options. Individuals who were more willing to take risks were more likely to favor cooperative policies. Individuals who believed the world

was basically conflictual were more likely to favor conflictual policies, while those who believed the political universe was basically cooperative were more likely to favor cooperative policy option. Decision makers who believed that the future was predictable and who saw chance having a small role in shaping world politics were more likely than others to favor cooperative policies. Finally, the greater an individual's perceived control over historical development, the more likely that person was to favor cooperative policy proposals. When variables controlling for the effects of the scale of an opponent's move and the level of the threats at stake are included in models along with these psychological characteristics, some of these personal influences no longer remain significant at the .10 level. However, the inclusion of these variables in multivariate models does not stop all of these effects. Individuals' perception of their control over their environment still has a significant effect, and the variables measuring decision makers' risk orientation and need for power near significance as well. It therefore appears that the personal policy preferences of decision makers are affected by certain psychological characteristics, even when the nature of the situational environment is controlled for. The types of policies decision makers preferred and advocated depended upon their central emotional needs and their beliefs about the nature of the world around them and how best to interact with it.

These results should be widely generalizeable. They were found over a varied set of decision makers. This included both national executive leaders as well as key advisors. These were government officials from three countries who had different ideologies and faced a varied set of international challenges over a forty year period.

The analyses focusing on how these links were evident in each of the three decision units I focused on, the national executive leaders, the Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers, and the advisory groups, also found significant relationships between psychological characteristics and policy preferences, though these effects were found to be especially strong in one of these units. There is a very strong connection between the psychological characteristics of foreign ministry chiefs and their policy preferences. I found significant relationships between seven of their psychological characteristics and their policy preferences, and two more psychological characteristic variables neared significance. These nine variables represent a wide spectrum of the psychological characteristics of these individuals' beliefs and personality traits and include their preferred strategies, belief about the nature of the political universe, their level of optimism, their beliefs about the predictability of the political future and the role of chance, their belief about their control of historical development, their level of distrust, their need for power, and their need for affiliation. This unusually strong relationship between the characteristics and preferences of foreign ministry heads is one of the most interesting findings in this project. There has been relatively little work of this type done focusing upon the individuals who hold these posts, and given their often extremely prominent position in foreign policy making, this finding is very informative.

I found fewer linkages between the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders and other advisory group members and their policy preferences. However, I still found some significant relationships. For example, those leaders who believed they had more control over their environment were more likely to back cooperative policies, as were those advisory groups whose members had a relatively high

need for affiliation. But it appears that those individuals who are mostly likely to have highly developed belief systems dealing with foreign policy issues, those who head foreign ministries, are the decision makers most likely to be affected by those beliefs.

I also investigated whether or not other differences between members of my set of decision makers affected their policy preferences. I did not find any differences between the policy preferences of members of different bureaucratic organizations. However, it appears that one's nationality may affect their policy preferences. It appears Israeli decision makers may back more conflictual policy options than their British and American counterparts, though that effect is mitigated by the fact that they tend to face more severe threats to their security. The psychological characteristics of Israelis also differ from those of the other decision makers in ways that would seem to indicate a tendency to back more conflictual policies. They have higher levels of distrust, lower levels of conceptual complexity and perceive themselves as having less control over the development of history than their British and American counterparts.

Finally, the reviews of the decision-making processes in the Iran hostage crisis and the Gulf War show evidence of other psychological characteristics also affecting the personal policy preferences of decision makers. It appears, for instance, that the dominant analogies decision makers used as their reference point for understanding world affairs affected their policy preferences. For example, those who appear to have been heavily shaped by the Vietnam War, like Cyrus Vance and Colin Powell, appear to have been more reluctant to advocate the use of force than decision makers, like Zbigniew Brzezinski and Richard Cheney, whose foreign policy views were substantially shaped by their views of the Cold War and the Soviet Union. Additionally, these case

histories show more support for the position that decision makers with low dominance personalities were less likely to support the use of violent force than those who had high dominance personalities (Shepard 1988). The behavior of Carter and Bush also appears to support the contention that leaders who are subjected to long periods of intense stress may be more likely to adopt conflictual policies (Holsti 1972). And the images that the presidents had of their opponents, as irrational and evil beings, appears to have affected the manner in which the leaders of the United States responded to these threats to their security. Finally, it appears that leaders bring very personal idiosyncrasies with them that affect their policy making. For example, the Carter administration's strong desire to move away from a tough *realpolitik* approach to foreign policy may have delayed their adoption of a military response to the Iran crisis. And President Bush's high need for affiliation and close, personal style of diplomacy appears to have affected his response to the invasion of Kuwait.

Explaining State Policies

The analyses in chapter 4 show a number of direct relationships between the psychological characteristics of decision makers and state behavior. Leaders' belief about their control over their environment and their need for power were initially found to significantly affect state behavior, and leaders' complexity level neared significance, though these relationships failed to reach the .10 level of significance once variables controlling for the nature of the challenged posed by the opponent are included in the models. The relationships between the psychological characteristics of advisors and state behavior are stronger, with most of them maintaining significant effects even after the effects of key situational influences are controlled for. Countries whose advisory groups

favor cooperative strategies, and who are relatively more willing to take risks, are more likely to adopt cooperative foreign policies. Likewise, countries that have Secretaries of State or Foreign Ministers who believe in cooperative strategies, are more willing to take risks, believe that the political future is predictable and who attribute chance with a relatively small impact on world affairs, are more likely to adopt cooperative international policies.

The results of the analyses in chapter 4 also show a number of ways through which the psychological characteristics of decision makers indirectly affect state behavior. One of these is through the personal preferences of decision makers. As seen in chapter 3, the policy preferences of all three decision units are at least partly a function of their psychological characteristics. The analyses in chapter 4 show that, in turn, these policy preferences affect state behavior.

Additionally, the members of the decision-making team are affected by each other's preferences and psychological characteristics. The preferences of national executive leaders are significantly affected by those of their advisors, while we see that national executive leaders appoint top foreign policy advisors whose instrumental operational code indices, need for affiliation and level of distrust are similar to their own. Additionally, national executive leaders, especially those with relatively high levels of distrust like Jimmy Carter in the later years of his presidency, tend to back the policy options advocated by those individuals whose psychological characteristics are most like their own. They particularly sided with those advisors whose need for power and whose perception of their control over historical development were most like their own.

I also found that the psychological characteristics of decision makers affected their tendency to carry out high-quality decision making techniques, a factor that other research (Haney 1997; Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Janis 1982; Schafer and Crichlow 1996) has found to affect state behavior. The decision-making groups in my sample that had leaders and advisors with greater needs for affiliation and higher levels of conceptual complexity were more likely to commit fewer information processing errors. Therefore, given earlier findings (Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Schafer and Crichlow 1996) we can expect that they were more likely to adopt policies that produced positive outcomes in terms of the national interest and produced lower levels of international conflict.

Limitations of the Project

While I have made a number of important findings that improve our understanding of how the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect foreign policy, I should again note some of the limitations of this research. Probably the most important of these limitations concerns my measurements of the psychological characteristics. While I followed measurement techniques that have been carefully developed on firm theoretical foundations (Hermann 1987b; Walker, Schafer and Young 1998), it is possible that these at-a-distance measurement techniques do not represent the characteristics of decision makers as accurately as I would hope. While decision makers' comments are surely affected by their psychological characteristics, it is possible that the match is not perfect and that it may vary between individuals. Additionally, my use of these tools is not perfectly precise. My reliance on coding decision makers comments by hand adds some error into the process. While my inter-coder agreement scores with other trained coders were very high, they did not show one hundred percent agreement.

It is also possible that my measurements were not entirely accurate as they were made on the basis of a relatively small number of public, spontaneous comments over a fairly brief time span. While I was careful to minimize these problems to the degree that I could, this research method has limitations.

Moving beyond how I measured these characteristics, my research results may have been skewed by whose psychological characteristics I measured. I only included those individuals who made public, spontaneous comments that met the coding criteria in my analysis. This limited my analysis to an examination of relatively recent decisions made by leaders and advisors in wealthy countries that were actively engaged in world affairs and had relatively strong militaries. It is possible that countries that are weaker militarily and economically, and thus have fewer resources to use as leverage in their interactions with other states, may act differently. While one may expect that the personal policy preferences of decision makers in poor, weak states may still be heavily influenced by their psychological characteristics, it is possible that having fewer policy options at their disposal will lead them to be less likely to rely on psychological influences when setting state policy.

Future Research

These two major limitations on my project point to two areas where future research can build on this work. First, while some researchers are likely to continue to question the validity of measures of the psychological characteristics of decision makers that are based upon their public comments, concerns about the reliability of these measures can be overcome by replacing human coders with computer coding. When computer programs that are capable of measuring these phenomena are completed it

seems appropriate to revisit this project and similar research to determine whether or not a lack of precision resulting from the use of multiple coders skewed the results.

Secondly, more research on this topic should be done on decision makers outside of the United States. While this project did not focus exclusively on decisions made by Americans, three-quarters of the cases I included focused on American decision makers. It seems possible that the unusual power of the United States, and even the relatively powerful positions held by the United Kingdom and Israel, might make the behavior of these decision makers different from those in weaker countries. While obtaining the data necessary to code the psychological characteristics of foreign policy decision makers in many other countries is extremely difficult, it is an important question to investigate.

One other topic that merits investigation given the results of my project is the degree to which my findings regarding the importance of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers hold up over time and in other governments. As the linkage between the psychological characteristics of these individuals, their preferences and state behavior is surprisingly strong in the cases I study, it would be interesting to know whether or not these linkages were present during other periods of history, and in the decision-making processes of other countries.

Overall, this project has reinforced the findings of many previous pieces of research on the impact that individual decision makers have on world politics, and it has presented new findings across a varied set of decision makers that show novel ways in which the psychological characteristics of decision makers affect foreign policy. The premier innovative contribution that this work makes to this growing literature are the findings dealing with the impact of the psychological characteristics of top-level advisors.

Particularly significant, we see that the psychological characteristics of Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers powerfully affect both the policy preferences that they advocate at the highest level of decision making, and the official policies that states adopt. This is a very important insight. Much of the work that has been done in this area has focused exclusively on the psychological characteristics of national executive leaders. Here we see these variables having a powerful effect on another set of decision makers that has great influence over foreign policy. The findings dealing with the reinforcing way by which leaders and advisors with similar psychological characteristics come to the fore and shape national policy are also especially significant. To sum, this work shows not only that the psychological characteristics of individual decision makers affect international relations, but that this relationship exists across both a broad set of psychological characteristics and across a varied group of individuals holding a variety of governmental posts.

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VITA

Robert Scott Crichlow spent most of his childhood in Louisiana. He received a bachelor of science degree from Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service in 1993. Since 1994 he has lived in Baton Rouge while attending Louisiana State University. Upon completion of this dissertation he will move to Morgantown, West Virginia, to assume a tenure-track faculty position at West Virginia University.



DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Robert Scott Crichlow





Major Field: Political Science

Title of Dissertation: The Impact of Individuals on Foreign Policy Decision Making

Approved:


Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:





(I am a class)

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