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How level of globalization affects public opinion towards globalization in particular nations

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HOW LEVEL OF GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS
GLOBALIZATION IN PARTICULAR NATIONS

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
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in

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by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to understand how the level of globalization affects the public opinion towards globalization. The reviewed literature traces the history of the most significant developments of the current global capital system as well as the public opinion literature which discusses relevant issues pertaining to the subject. Since globalization is highly correlated with modernization, much of the literature will involve examination of modernization as well as its critics. To test the presented hypotheses, Pew's Global Attitudes Project Survey 2010 was used. The question used as the basis of the dependent variable asks if the respondent believes increasing business and trade between the respondent's nation and the world was very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad. The results provide evidence that the level of globalization a nation experiences changes how the nation's public views this phenomenon. Interestingly, while the level of globalization has a positive effect on public opinion, the levels of political and economic globalization have negative impacts upon the dependent variable. Additionally, a robustness model bore similar results.

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is an ever-increasing and important factor in the daily lives of individuals and in the functioning and planning of governments and societies. By participating in a system in which there is little ability to extricate one's self from, nation-states show themselves willing to accept the influx and fusion of the various cultures and ideas from those nations seeking to participate in the dominate system. Commonly, globalization is used to mean a continuous increase in the number of international financial transactions and economic interdependence (Reinicke 1997, 127). This trend has made profound impacts upon the international system, some of which, however, have been negative in nature. The dispute over globalization is not necessarily whether the consequences are acceptable or not; rather, the dispute tends to be in whether or not globalization and modernization are positive. From this point of discord, two main schools have risen up: modernization in opposition to anti-modernization. More precisely, the research that is being presented here is seeking to elucidate how global public opinion towards globalization is affected by the level of globalization and its accompanying modernization.

The current global structure seems to be the perfect conditions for testing political-economic theories since nations are at differing levels of economic development and governmental arrangements but are still operating under conditions of American global capitalism. The use of public opinion towards globalization is a means of judging the content or discontent that is predicted by these theories based upon differing variables.

Globalization is one of the most salient aspects of the international political economy. It is important to understand what comprises the international political economy to comprehend the importance of globalization to the field of study. Frieden and Martin (2002) have a simple

definition: “[The international political economy can be taken] to include all work for which international economic factors are an important cause or consequence. This ranges from the politics of... dispute settlement, to the impact of international flows of goods or capital on national political systems” (Frieden and Martin 2002, 118). Gilpin (1987) states a more precise and functional definition: [Globalization is] the “market competition and the responsiveness of economic actors to relative price changes [that] propel society in the direction of increased specialization, greater efficiency, and the eventual economic unification of the globe” (Gilpin 1987, 65). Both of the definitions imply that globalization brings with it a set of regimes, institutions, and organizations that characterize the current global capitalist system (Gilpin 1987, 65-6; Frieden and Martin 2002; Ruggie 1982, 379-82). Most importantly, globalization, as it is currently known, is an American capitalist regime (Ruggie 1982).

This research seeks to understand if the level of globalization that a nation experiences is related to that nation’s public opinion towards globalization. The answer is that there is a statistically significant relationship between the level of globalization in a nation and that nation’s public opinion towards globalization. Additionally, there are other factors that show themselves to have influences on public opinion. Furthermore, these additional factors are direct derivations of the expectations of one of the more identifiable movements that are critical towards the global capitalism. Originating with the works of Engels (1844) and Marx (1867), socialist and anti-modernization critiques provide many variables that are identifiable and can be used in testing the expectations of social response to particular phenomenon. On the other side of the debate, those supporting globalization in its current form have their own beliefs and expectations of how society will respond to globalization.

LITERATURE REVIEW

To reiterate Reinicke's (1997, 127) definition given in the introduction, globalization can be seen as the continuous increase in international and transnational financial transactions and economic interactions. The seeming permanence of the monolith known as globalization can make it seem ageless. However, its roots can only be easily traceable from the Age of Mercantilism and the Westphalian Peace established in 1624.

Before moving on to the core of this literature review, it is necessary to establish two definitions. International institutions are explicit arrangements and behaviors that are followed by the international community (Stein 1982; Mearsheimer 1994; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Krasner (1982) understands that an international regime can be implicit or explicit and helps in the guiding of how a nation-state behaves and operates in the international community (Krasner 1982; 186). Those institutions and regimes that are of the most concern to this research are those ones which allowed or accompanied the rise of the modern global capitalist system. Furthermore, there have been many innovations and developments that have influenced the current system. Of primary concern is the development of the state. Second, the innovative period which has great bearing on this research is known as the industrial revolution. Following will be a discussion on the urbanization that accompanies modernization. The literature review will continue with discussions of globalization in the 20th and 21st centuries under the guidance of American capitalism. Finally, a brief review of public opinion literature which is relevant to the variables will be given.

Historical Background of Globalization

Globalization, as we know it, did not appear from nowhere nor did any particular event precipitate the phenomenon. Rather, the global capitalist system as it now functions was a result

of many decades of events and series of events that all gradually paved the way for the next step without much reflection on how certain events may actually influence the future. The two main influences of our current economic system are: the development of the defined territorial state and the industrial revolutions. The following discussion will highlight the development of globalization and then proceeds to a discussion of relevant public opinion studies.

Development of the Nation-State

Of the many influential happenings leading to globalization, the first subject of this discussion is the development of the nation-state and its continuance. The peace treaties associated with the 17th century Peace of Westphalia unwittingly determined how international relations were to be conducted for the next four hundred years by the Western world and, increasingly, the globe. The current system of globalization, has its beginnings in the what is known as the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 (Polanyi 1944, 6-7; Rosecrance 1986, 79-84).^{1, 2} Furthermore, the Treaty of Westphalia has had such an influence on the structure of the system so that the United Nations Charter guarantees the protection of state sovereignty and independence (Rosecrance 1986; Polanyi 1944; Angell 1911; Gross 1948). However, the Westphalian system, as the system of nation-states has come to be called, promotes sovereignty and independence within territorial boundaries (Schmidt 2011, 601-2).

The real effect that the treaty had on the development of the Westphalian state-system was that it established defined territorial units for which serfs, citizens, and nobility could become attached. This attachment to defined borders and sovereignty is the reason for why wars

¹ Stephen D. Krasner (2001) disputes that the Treaty of Westphalia, which was actually the amalgam of the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, established the state system as it is known now. While this may be the case, Meerts and Beeuwkes (2008, 158) refer to the treaty as being the “embryonic facility” of what was to come.

² This treaty was originally designed to establish the partitions of Continental Europe based upon religious ideals which were eventually replaced by statism (Polanyi 1944, 270-2; Rosecrance 1986, 82-5; *Columbia* 2011). The treaty was also the culmination of several peace treaties of continental Europe.

are fought; the inevitability of war is based upon a state's need to be secure in its own territory (Rosecrance 1986, 83). Therefore, the only logical conclusion to the effects of the Treaty of Westphalia was the rise of nationalism and a population's adherence to a symbol of the state (Rosecrance 1986, 85). From the need to protect one's security as well as a need for continued revenue sources and glory for the homeland, colonial imperialism was inevitable (Rosecrance 1986, 85). And, it is colonial imperialism which embodies a more aggressive form of globalization.

All things considered in the development of the state, identification with a territorial entity is most important. However, there is another equally important consequence that is pertinent to the research being presented. The state, even under conditions of cooperation, is still the dominant factor in influencing our lives. Globalization is predicated on the fact that nations are sovereign but must sacrifice autonomy in cooperative efforts for international trade and business. This identification with a defined territory is prevalent not only in international politics but in domestic ones and in interpersonal interactions.³

Industrialization and the British Hegemony of the 19th Century

England has had a system that has favored the development of private property and property rights, as well as innovation and entrepreneurship (Macleod 2009, 37). These are the keystones of capitalism. The first industrial revolution, which occurred in Britain during the 18th century, was fostered by the ability of innovators to capitalize on the worth of their improvements (Macleod 2009, 37). By the start of the Hundred Years' Peace, the industrialization of Britain was well underway and spreading throughout the world (Macleod 2009, 37). The ability for individuals to profit from their work created an enormous shift in the

³ For evidence of this, one needs only imagine one of the first questions most people ask upon meeting a new person, "where are you from?"

behaviors of the actors in the international system as well as disrupting the distribution of wealth at both the domestic and international levels (Clark 2002). Furthermore, the shift in international wealth created a shift in the balance of power now that the costs of war were rising exponentially (Rosecrance 1986, 83-5; Meerts and Beeuwkes 2008). Power was becoming economic.

A brief synopsis of how the Statute of Monopolies (1624) could produce such profound events is in order. The Act of Parliament known as the Statute of Monopolies (1624) encouraged the formation of private property. Furthermore, by removing the barriers to possessing the rights of one's innovation and work, the Statute of Monopolies (1624) permitted the innovator or entrepreneur to maintain the rights to profit from the creation for an extended period of time.⁴ The British Industrial Revolution is generally accepted to have begun in 1760 with the invention of an improved mechanized loom (Rosecrance 1986; Meerts and Beeuwkes 2008). As a result, both Clark (2002) and Macleod (2009) believe that the British Industrial Revolution was able to come to fruition and affect the world system. As the industrial revolutions evolved, an accompanying phenomenon was occurring.

Urbanization

An unforeseen concurrent event with the industrial revolutions was a major boom of a state's industrial cities as former farmers and agrarians flocked to these centers for various reasons. The effects of this population migration from the rural society into the industrial society were commented upon by Friedrich Engels (1844) in his work *the Working Class in England*. Engels (1844) discusses how cities such as London and Birmingham experienced massive bumps to their population, and cities such as Halifax and Leeds nearly doubled in size (Engels 1844, 19-21). Madsen, Ang, and Banerjee (2010) discuss the cumulative effects of the urban-industrial

⁴ Section 6 of the act states that the rights to particular advancements, such as industrial innovations and inventions, were to be guaranteed for fourteen years. The translation used can be found at Wikisource at the following address: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Statute_of_Monopolies.

population booms with the right to maintain one's intellectual property set forth by the Statute of Monopolies (1624) as being the root of the explosion in per capita economic growth rates.

Madsen, Ang, and Banerjee's (2010) study saw that there was a correlation between the growth of urban-industrial populations and surges in per capita growth rates during their study.^{5,6}

Wagner and Ward (1980) study trends of urbanization in Brazil. With the rapid urbanization of Brazil that occurred over the course of thirty years where the urbanized population increased from 15% to over 50%, there was a seismic shift in the Brazilian governments reaction to the phenomenon with intent to counteract the consequences (Wagner and Ward 1980). This rural-urban migration in Brazil showed a relationship to the industrialization of that nation which occurred during that period (Wagner and Ward 1980). The true value of this research was in demonstrating that populations could exert pressures on their governments without voting or protest by choosing urbanity over rural-agrarianism.

While the trend of urbanization as a result of the industrial revolution cannot be justifiably denied, the reason for this effect can be debated and tends to fall into one of two schools (Kelley and Williamson 1984). The first theory comes from Engels (1844) and Marx (1867) according to Kelley and Williamson (1984). From the Engels-Marx perspective, migration to the urban-industrial centers is seductive to the agrarian due to promises made by the economic systems and availability of machinery that requires human input (Kelley and Williamson 1984, 420; Engels 1844; Marx 1867). Additionally, it is this migration of internal

⁵ This research resulted in a negative correlation until the middle of the 19th century which is contemporaneous with the writings of Engels. The positive correlation seen after the mid-19th century was attributed to the growth in innovative activity that accompanied the Second Industrial Revolution. This would seem to indicate a certain amount of interaction between population growth and innovation that results in increased per capita growth rates.

⁶ The time period covered coincides, more or less, with the signing of the Statute of Monopolies (1624), which is a major development on the way to industrialization according to the presented research. Additionally, if the economic wisdom of the American Republican and Libertarian parties is to be believed, then it is these two concepts that are the driving force behind economic growth. Furthermore, this wisdom seems to have some empirical evidence supporting (Madsen, Ang, Banerjee 2010) the standpoint of those political party.

populations that is a main disruptive factor of industrialization (Engels 1844; Marx 1867; Kelley and Williamson 1984).

Secondly and conversely, Ravenstein's (1885) publication has a different interpretation of why there are mass internal migrations that accompany the industrial revolutions (Kelley and Williamson 1984, 420). One of the main assertions of his work is that due to resource constraints, most notable was available land, of agrarian societies forces or "pushes" the population from rural-agrarian areas into the urban-industrial centers due to the availability of factory work (Kelley and Williamson 1984, 420). It is not hard to see that both the anti-modernization views, represented by Engels (1844) and Marx (1867), and the view represented by Ravenstein (1885) agree on the phenomenon in principle – urban-industrial centers grow as an effect of having more economic opportunity available when compared to rural-agrarian areas – but not as to the cause of this emigration. However, what is important to this research is that urban-industrial centers did grow at the expense of the rural-agrarian areas (Kelley and Williamson 1984; Engels 1844; Marx 1867; Madsen, Ang, and Banerjee 2010).⁷

Modern Globalization

The Rise of American Globalization

During the interwar years between the First and Second World Wars, the United States, and much of the rest of the world, returned to the provisions of protectionist policies as the world sunk into a grand depression. Yet, following World War II, America capitalized on an opportunity to reshape the image of the global structure under its guidance. America, seeing the utter destruction wrought throughout Europe and Asia, solidified its territorial sphere of influence against the Soviet Union which countered with the Warsaw Pact. For this section, a

⁷ According the *Communist Manifesto*, the difference between these societal types would be obliterated (Marx and Engels 1848).

focus on America is two-fold. Primarily, America is the dominant state, some may say hegemon, of the contemporary economic globalization. Secondly, the United States molded the current global capitalist system whilst in competition with the Soviet Union for domination of the global system.

The international economic order of the post-World War II era is significantly different from the economic order of the previous age under the *pax Britannica*. No longer was the *laissez-faire* mentality embraced to the detriment of the nation practicing (Helleiner 2006, 944; Ruggie 1982). An early embodiment of the new order was the establishment International Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which were meant to help restructure and rebuild the Western world with America as the banker (Dellas and Tavlas 2011; Williams 1945; Kindelberger 1951; Harberler 1953).⁸ Although the results of the Bretton Woods Accords may have faded, America's dominance over the modern global economic system has not. Furthermore, America's dominance over the global economic system is still perceived by just under half (49.5%) of the respondents from the 2010 Pew *Global Attitudes Project* Survey (Fig. 1). This is down 2.6% using the same question found in the 2009 *GAP* Survey (Fig. 2).

⁸ The Good Neighbors Program during the 1930s and 1940s can be seen as portent of these organizations (Helleiner 2006).




Figure 1. “Who is World’s Leading Economic Power?” (Q25) from Pew *GAP* Survey 2010




Figure 2. “Who is World’s Leading Economic Power?” (Q15) from Pew *GAP* Survey 2009

Modernization and its Detractors

Modernization has become nearly synonymous with industrialization, materialism, urbanization, and capitalism; more importantly, modernization indicates a destruction of the

traditional (Hendricks 1982; Ouyang, Liu, and Zhu 2006).⁹ All of these things are noted and described by Engels (1844) and Marx (1867). Furthermore, the rise of modernization has been an accompaniment to contemporary globalization. The difference is that Engels (1844) and Marx (1867) take a stance in opposition to these forces and will be discussed later; whereas, modernization theory views these things as being more beneficial. Modernization theory, simply put, examines how societies evolve, or devolve in the case of anti-modernists, as a consequence of industrialization with the accompanying technological improvements and the move towards a post-industrial economy. But more importantly, there is a shift to post-materialism that accompanies modernization (Inglehart 1971; Inglehart 2006; Inglehart 2000).

With any massive change, critics are sure to come forth. In a preemptive response to modernization, the socialist works of Engels (1844) and Marx (1867) detail the negative consequences that are associated with the modernization of society. Even in the nascent stages of capitalism and globalization, these authors were able to understand the profoundness of the events taking shape around them. For this reason, a preponderance of this section will be framed by these critics with support from more modern sources. The justification for this is three-fold. First, the durability and generalizability of these theorists speaks to their recognition and comprehension of the phenomenon known as modernization. Secondly, it is from the various works of Engels and Marx from which many modern critical theories are rooted. It is important to remember that Engels and Marx were writing at the height of British dominance and in response to the industrial revolutions – the beginnings of modernization – of England and continental Europe. Thirdly, a focus on Marx’s literature is the basis of Inglehart’s (1971) seminal article finding that there is a shift in “advanced industrial societies” away from “acquisitive values” towards “post-bourgeois” ones. Even Inglehart’s own words invoke Marxist

⁹ Hendricks (1982) analyzes the benefits of modernization in the health and care of gerontological populations.

thought. It is simple to reword Inglehart (1971) in the following manner: as a society becomes more post-industrial, the individuals tend to be less self-interested and more oriented towards the collective good. Yet, some of the critiques and troubles foreseen by the fathers of socialism have come to obscene fruition under the age of America.

What began with a simple English improvement in textile manufacturing catapulted the global society into a new and nearly unpredictable age of economic expansion and societal destruction which has occurred over the last few centuries in various places at various times as the world moved towards a modern age (Engels 1844; Marx and Engels 1848; Marx 1867; Polanyi 1944; Schumpeter 1950). One of the more disturbing of the realizations of modernization's impact upon individuals was Engels (1844) assertion that human beings, more specifically the proletariat, were simply another form of capital. A nation-state possesses its population in such a way that if a unit migrates from one to another, then the unit is exclusive to the new nation. For these reasons, larger populations could be seen as having effects on societal responses to modernization.

Finally, as American capitalist globalization has become gradually more completely global, it was only a matter of time before a Marxist theory would arise to explain global capitalism. This was the Modern World System (Gilpin 1987, 68). This theory rests its main assumption on the same premises of traditional Marxism but with a modern global twist: the current age of global political economy is fundamentally different than that of the preceding age (Gilpin 1987, 68). The point of differentiation is that the divisions are no longer based upon class, but the divisions are now based upon a developed and advanced core replacing capitalists with the advanced core of developed nations and replaces the proletariat or working class with the backwards or undeveloped periphery (Gilpin 1987, 69). As in classical Marxism, there is a

natural antagonism between the groups due to the oppression of the periphery by the core (Gilpin 1987, 69-72; Rogowski 1987; Hiscox 2001).

Public Opinion and Attitudes

Many studies have sought to examine the influences of public opinion. To this end, a discourse on pertinent information related to the subject of this study – public opinion towards globalization and its influences – shall be delved into. In order to facilitate ease, the literature shall proceed in a manner similar to the order previously presented.

States, Nation-States, and Populations

With the dawn of capitalism, power became economic; it was a commodity. Whereas more traditional theories view power in terms of populations amongst other things (Rosecrance 1986; Meerts and Beewkes 2008; Angell 1911), capitalism – and its global variant – believes these to be commodities (Engels 1844; Marx 1867; Polanyi 1944; Gilpin 1987; Hiscox 2001). Since owners of abundant factors – whether those factors are people, territory, or capital – tend to benefit from freer-trade, they tend to push for more globalization (Rogowski 1989; Lu and Tian 2008; Gilpin 1987; Hiscox 2001). O’Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov (2005) examine how geopolitical determinants affect the public opinion in Russia. They found correlations with rural residents, regional influences, and regional identification (O’Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov 2005). Considering populations as commodities or factors, the understanding of how the owners of these commodities behave (Rogowski 1989; Lu and Tian 2008) combined with the geopolitical correlations of O’Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov (2005) allows for the development of hypotheses related to these aspects. In addition to the preceding, Wolpert (1988) finds that there is a correlation between population size and the generosity of the cities in the arts, health care, and welfare. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine if there may be a correlation

between populations and its public opinion. However, this requires the assumption that populations are owned by themselves and that the nation is owned by the residents. This assumption does incorporate Engels (1844) assertion that populations had become commodities, and it incorporates Rogowski (1989), Lu and Tian (2008), and Hiscox (2001) which describe how abundant factor owners push for more globalization.

Additionally, Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1987) examine the effects of state culture on public opinion in the US. The authors find strong correlations between region and public opinion (Erikson, Wright, McIver 1987). Identifying with a particular region entails taking account of its geography, urbanism, and personal party identification (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1987). The results of this research provided evidence that a particular US state has a more profound effect on party and ideological identification than other many variables, such as race, gender, and education. It is the partial basis for another hypothesis that concerns urbanization which is in line with the works of Engels (1844) and Marx (1867).

Urbanization and the Public

A study conducted by Baloyra and Martz (1977) found that urbanization has a modest effect on public attitudes in general. This supports Erikson (1976) and takes away from the anti-modernization perspectives. However, urbanization has been shown to increase government spending (Henderson, Monroe, Garand, and Burts 1995; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005). Yet, Rudra (2002) found no correlation between welfare and urbanization in a multinational study. Furthermore, the study did show evidence that welfare spending is affected by how developed the nation is (Rudra 2002). This disparity is attributed to the ability of workers to unite and prevent the dismantling of the welfare state in those nations that were more developed (Rudra 2002). Finally, Rudra (2002) found evidence that the level of globalization in the form of

trade flows has a positive correlation with welfare expenditures in nations. Combining the insights of Rudra (2002) with those of Inglehart (1971), welfare can be understood to be the post-industrial, post-modern public expression. Because of the increased societal benefits, one could assume that urbanization does affect the public opinion of nations in regards to globalization.

Globalization, Modernization, and Public Opinion

Hellwig (2007) examines if globalization affects public opinion towards confidence in politicians. Conducted in France, this study showed that there is a strong negative correlation between these two variables. The study discusses how confidence is a result of an expectation of accomplishment (Hellwig 2007). Additionally, confidence is affected by exposure to the international economy; more specifically, confidence becomes more volatile as exposure increases (Hellwig 2007). Finally, this study found evidence of a negative correlation for domestic policy demands and economic globalization (Hellwig 2007). A negative correlation between the confidence of respondents in their government to handle economic issues and the level of globalization was found using data from this research using a bivariate correlation (Table 1). These findings seem plausible and worthy of further study when considered with Drezner (2001). Drezner (2001) finds that globalization is positively related to policy convergence amongst nations. This policy convergence restricts what actions a nation can take independently (Drezner 2001). With Hellwig (2007) and Drezner (2001) taken in conjunction, an exploration of how the level of political globalization and participation in international organizations and institutions effects public opinion towards globalization seems in order for this research. However, the previous authors would seem to stand in contradiction to those that find that representatives are responsive to public opinion.

Table 1. Bivariate Correlation between Confidence in Government to Handle Economy and Globalization Index

		Confidence in Government to Handle Economy	Globalization Index
Confidence in Government to Handle Economy	Pearson Correlation	1	-.133**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	23886	23886
Globalization Index	Pearson Correlation	-.133**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	23886	24790

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The literature suggests that there should be a correlation between political globalization and public opinion towards globalization. Inglehart and Rabier (1978) examine the public opinion trends of the European Community. In their study, they found evidence that increasing international ties resulted in a positive relationship with the opinion of citizens of the Community member-nation (Inglehart and Rabier 1978). They found that increased exposure to regionalism – a regional take on globalization – increased the public’s perception of the community (Inglehart and Rabier 1978). This study provides a link by which the level of globalization should affect the public opinion. Combined with of evidence legislative responsiveness (Jacobs, Lawrence, Shapiro, and Robert 1998; Lax and Phillips 2009), this would indicate that perceptions of globalization increase as the level of globalization increases which in turn and over time results in higher levels of perception of globalization.

Bloom (1995) did a global public opinion survey on environmental issues. Considering that the environment is ultimately global, there are some extrapolations that can be made. First, the respondents on the survey showed that the global periphery and core have similar beliefs towards responses to saving the environment (Bloom 1995). Most important to this research is

that the study showed that the publics of the core and periphery both believe that strong international and transnational institutions should be utilized to regulate the global environment (Bloom 1995). The finding of Bloom (1995) support Speth's (2008) claim that there needs to be more international political governance in order to protect the environment from the ravages of globalization and modernization. For all of the preceding reasons, this research will be examining those variables which affect public opinion towards globalization.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

As has been discussed, industrialization is undeniably accompanied by the phenomenon of urbanization. The more contentious part of the two phenomena is whether or not society responds in a positive or negative fashion towards globalization which is the driving force behind urban-industrialization in the contemporary age. Therefore, this research proposes three hypotheses that examine these phenomena.

First, Polanyi (1944) refers to urban-industrial centers as being Satanic mills “grinding men into masses.” Engels (1844) talks of the destruction of the traditional society as emigration from the rural to the urban occurs. Wagner and Ward (1980) discuss the responses of the Brazilian government to mitigate the effects of the rural-urban migration. For these reasons, it seems reasonable to believe that there is a negative correlation between populations residing in urbanized areas in regards to the public opinion towards global capitalism.

H1: As percent population residing in urban-industrial centers increases, the opinion of the public should be less favorable in reference to globalization.

However, it is important not to discount the evidence of other more recent works. Urbanization is an accompanying phenomenon of modernization and globalization. Urbanization has a positive bivariate correlation with the level of post-industrialization (Table 2). Increasing post-industrialization has a positive correlation with GDP/capita (Table 3). Increased resources allow for more generosity to the public. Therefore, increased urbanization could have positive influences on public opinion towards globalization since globalization provides the means to raise the capital necessary to increase welfare benefits by national governments. However, because this logic tends to suggest what could be a more spurious relationship, the hypothesis is phrased in a manner meant to convey a direct relationship as is implied by Engels (1844) and Polanyi (1944).

Table 2. Bivariate Correlation between Urbanity and Post-industrialization

		Urbanity	Post-Industrialization
Urbanity	Pearson Correlation	1	.623**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	24790	24790
Post-Industrialization	Pearson Correlation	.623**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	24790	24790

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 3. Bivariate Correlation between Post-industrialization and GDP per Capita

		Post-Industrialization	GDP per Capita
Post-industrialization	Pearson Correlation	1	.693**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	24790	24790
GDP per Capita	Pearson Correlation	.693**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	24790	24790

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The second hypothesis would actually be more in-line with the theories of Marx's (1867) socialism or the post-modernists and post-materialists. For Marx (1867), capitalism was a natural progression of human society from proto-communism and is the era prior to socialistic utopianism. For the post-materialist such as Inglehart (1971; 2006), the post-industrial society moves away from the "acquisitive" towards a more collective society. This is related to generations of citizens experiencing life without a focus on the need to survive due to increased economic development; therefore, these younger generations are more concerned with "quality of life" (Inglehart 2006).

H2: The increasing post-industrialization of a society leads to an increase in favorability towards globalization.

Additionally, for reasons similar to those presented in the previous literature on urbanization and the public, the fact that welfare generosity is positively correlated with the global core (Rudra 2002) tends to make this hypothesis seem highly plausible. This is because, to reiterate, welfare is a question of the quality of life which is an accompaniment to economic development (Inglehart 2006). Furthermore, welfare’s linkage to economic development is because of a sense of worth becomes more related to a collectiveness in society rather than individualism which is prevalent in the earlier and more opportunistic stages. Finally, bivariate correlation shows a positive relationship between the level of post-industrialization (*pindus*) and the Globalization Index (*glob*) (Table 4).

Table 4. Bivariate Correlation between Post-industrialization and Globalization Index

		Post-industrialization	Globalization Index
Post-industrialization	Pearson Correlation	1	.592**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	24790	24790
Globalization Index	Pearson Correlation	.592**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	24790	24790

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The third and final hypothesis concerns how the level of globalization affects the public opinion towards globalization.

H3: As the level of globalization increases, the societal approval of globalization should be significantly affected.

The reason for the non-directionality of the preceding hypothesis is simple: the literature is mixed on whether or not globalization affects public opinion. Additionally, the literature suggests that different types of globalization are likely to have varying effects on public opinion.

Therefore, the remedy for this conundrum is that three variables will be created for the model: an overall globalization score (*glob*), an economic globalization score (*eglob*), and a political globalization score (*polglob*).

The expectation of the overall globalization score is that there will be a positive relationship. According to Inglehart and Rabier (1976), increasing ties within the European Community lead to a higher level of post-materialist views, in which the respondents tended to prefer actions that favored the collective good over the needs of individual nations. Second, the level of economic globalization is expected to be positive. The reasoning for this assessment is rooted in the findings of Rudra (2002) and of Avelino, Brown, and Hunter (2005). Both find that increasing economic globalization is positively correlated with governmental spending such as social securities (Rudra 2002; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005) and education (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005).

Finally, political globalization would be expected to be negatively correlated with public opinion. This is understandable with the understanding that people tend to have their political identities shaped by the region in which they live (Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1987; O'Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov 2005). With political identities being affected by the region in which one resides, residing in a particular nation shapes the political identity of its citizens, and there is a sense of national sovereignty and independence which is built into the Westphalian state-system (Gross 1948; Rosecrance 1986; Schmidt 2011). Therefore, since there is policy convergence associated with globalization which constrains the autonomy of nations (Drezner 2001), people may perceive that their national identity is at risk. This perception of threat should manifest itself in the form of decreased favorability towards globalization, in general.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Method and Dependent Variable

A binomial logistic regression is used to test the hypotheses, because this is the preferred method when the dependent variable is dichotomous. This is the preferred method when the dependent variable encompasses two outcomes. This research utilizes the Pew *Global Attitudes Project* Survey from 2010. Twenty-two nations are surveyed with a valid number of observations of more than 21 000 ($N= 21\ 836$). For the dependent variable (*poglob*), survey question 24 was used: “What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between (survey country) and other countries – do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?” If the respondent had a negative view of globalization – which was a result of either “very bad” or “somewhat bad” – they were coded as 0 (*poglob*=0). If the response was positive – a response of “very good” or “somewhat good” – then the variable was coded as 1. This research uses individual level data for analysis. Finally, a trichotomous version of this variable is coded for robustness. In the robustness model, “somewhat good” was coded as 1, and “very good” was coded as 2.

Independent Variables

The first independent variable is the percent of the population that resides in urbanized areas (*upop*). Taken from the UN’s *Demographic Yearbook* and the CIA’s *World Factbook* for 2010, the urbanity of the nation in which the respondent resides was coded using the raw data.

The second variable indicates the level of post-industrialization of a nation (*pindus*). To capture the essence of this variable, the percent of the economy that was categorized as the service industry was used for each nation. This was taken from the online *CIA World Factbook* which contained these figures for the year of 2010.

There are three variables of interest attached to the third hypothesis. Third, I use the raw globalization scores to indicate the overall level of globalization (*glob*). This variable is taken from the *KOF Globalization Index*. The *Globalization Index* divides the score is a composite of three categories: economic globalization, political globalization, and social globalization. First, economic globalization (*eglob*) contains data such as trade flows, foreign direct investment, and trade restrictions which are used to form a composite scale that ranges from 0 to 100 (Dreher 2006). Political globalization (*polglob*) is the second variable of interest associated with the third hypothesis and is continuous from 0 to 100. There are four aspects to this variable: the number of embassies that a nation has, number of memberships in international organizations, and the number of personnel per capita that a nation contributes to UN Security Council missions. The final aspect is the absolute number of international treaties that a nation has signed and ratified, and these treaties must have been filed with the UN Treaties Collection to be included. It is taken from the *KOF Globalization Index* (Dreher 2006). Finally, the social globalization aspect – which is not of interest on its own to this research – contains data on telephone traffic, trade in books, internet users (per 1000 people), the number of IKEAs and McDonald's, foreign population, international tourism and letters, and households with television per 1000 people.

There are still a few variables which are not of primary interest but which could be having an effect on the model that need to be discussed. These control variables will be briefly described with information on where the data originated from.

Control Variables

The first control variable is the population of the nation (*pop*). This variable is taken from the United States Department of Agriculture's *Economic Research Services Historical Population* dataset. Raw data in millions is used.

Second and taken from the 2010 *GAP* Survey, the level of confidence in domestic leaders to handle the government is used (*confidence*). The exact question is: "How good a job is the (survey country) government doing in dealing with the economy? Would you say the government is doing a very good job, a somewhat good job, a somewhat bad job or a very bad job?" "Very bad" is coded as zero and, in ordered ascension, "very good" is coded as three.

Third, a dichotomous control of whether or not the respondent believes the US is the leading economic power is used (*useconpwr*). This is taken from the *GAP* Survey for 2010: "Today, which ONE of the following do you think is the world's leading economic power?" If the respondent answered the US, then a code of zero was received, and everything else was coded as zero.

Fourth, GDP per capita (*gdp*) is used as a control variable to judge the average wealth of the nation. This is taken from the *CIA World Factbook 2010*.

Fifth, there is a control variable for the age of the respondent which was taken from the 2010 *GAP* Survey. This is used because of Inglehart (1971) used this variable in his landmark study on the move from the "acquisitive" to the "post-bourgeois."

Finally, the gender of the respondent was coded. Males were coded as 1; whereas, females were coded as zero.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results of the binary logistic regression present some interesting results (Table 5). As expected, the urban population variable (*upop*) presented with a negatively significant relationship to the public opinion on globalization (coeff.= -.009; p= .000). This finding would support socialist and anti-modernist critiques (Engels 1844; Marx 1867). Although this was the predicted correlation, it is still a surprising result. Considering Rudra (2002) found there to be a strong positive correlation between welfare spending and the level of globalization as well as findings that urbanization results in increased welfare and societal spending by governments (Henderson, Monroe, Garand, and Burts 1995; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005), one could have reasonably expected for the public to make the associations presented in the literature.

Table 5. Regression Results for Variables affecting Public Opinion Towards Globalization

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.
Urbanity	-.009**	.002	30.046	.000
Post-industrialization	.007*	.003	5.070	.024
Economic Globalization	-.024**	.005	23.765	.000
Political Globalization	-.023**	.003	50.170	.000
Globalization Index	.030**	.007	16.754	.000
Population	.000**	.000	43.396	.000
Confidence	.506**	.026	369.863	
US is Leading Economic Power	.290**	.043	45.077	.000
GDP per Capita	-.002	.003	.512	.474
Age	-.079**	.022	13.122	.000
Gender (Male)	.014	.042	.114	.736
Constant	2.868	.349	67.615	.000

N=21 836

* p< .05

** p< .01

Cox & Snell pseudo-R² = .041

The variable relating to the level of post-industrialization in the nation of the respondent (*pindus*) was significant at the .024 level with a coefficient of .007. This was in the predicted direction. By definition, globalization promotes interconnectedness of nations and people (Reinicke 1997; Gilpin 1987). Additionally, globalization has already had evidence of a positive relationship with opinion towards globalization in the European Community (Inglehart and Rabier 1978). Furthermore, Inglehart (1971; 2006) found that there was a move to post-materialism that accompanies the economic development that post-industrial economies represent. Therefore, the findings of this research seem quite reasonable.

Another surprising finding is that increased levels of economic globalization (*eglob*) are negatively related to public opinion on globalization (coeff.= -.024; p= .000). Although this is in contradiction to the expectations of this research, it may not be so outlandish when considered with the findings related to political globalization levels (*polglob*). The political globalization result was in the desired direction with a coefficient of -.023 at a significance level of .000. It was pointed out in the literature that increased political globalization constrains the actions of nations and infringes upon its autonomy and sovereignty (Drezner 2001) which is embedded in the Westphalian state-system (Gross 1948; Rosecrance 1986; Schmidt 2011). Additionally, political identities have been shown to be shaped by the region in which one resides (Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1987; O'Loughlin, Tuathail, and Kolossov 2005). For these reasons, the hypothesis produced supporting evidence; however, increased economic globalization also constrains the actions of nations by definition (Reinicke 1997; Gilpin 1987). It could be the fact that these constraints are seen as detrimental to the traditional society of the nation. Considering

the aforementioned rationale, the negative correlation between economic globalization levels and public opinion towards globalization does not seem so surprising.

The Globalization Index variable (*glob*) produced results in the predicted direction with a coefficient of .030 at a significance of .000. This is in-line with the findings of Inglehart and Rabier (1978) that found that increased regionalism within the European Community produced higher approval for the European Community in general. It would appear that overall interaction between economic, political, and social globalizations that result from overall globalization and modernization is what produces a more favorable opinion towards the increasing business and financial ties in the international community. In other words, the level of overall globalization promotes a sense of post-materialist collectiveness that was discussed in Inglehart (1971; 2006) and Inglehart and Rabier (1978) which increases the public's favorability of globalization.

Finally, all of the control variables except for GDP per capita and gender attained statistical significance. Most noticeably, the variable capturing the public's confidence in their governments to handle economic issues was positively correlated with their opinions on globalization. This stands in contrast to the findings of Hellwig (2007) which found that confidence in politicians declined as exposure to globalized markets increased. However, the findings of this research seem quite understandable considering that if one approves of the political-economic phenomenon of globalization, then they are quite likely to have confidence in their leaders to handle economic issues within the country because of the aforementioned fact that globalization is a process of increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world's markets. On another note, the variable representing age had a negatively significant relationship with favorability towards globalization, which is in-line with the findings of Inglehart (1971).

All of the patterns discovered in the dichotomous model were supported by the findings of the robustness model with some small exceptions (Table 6). Urbanity and post-industrialization did not achieve significance when comparing “somewhat good” to the reference category “bad.” However, they did achieve significance when comparing the reference category to “very good,” and the results were in the predicted direction. The results found for the various globalization scores achieved significance in both favorable categories in the predicted direction. This supports the results of the dichotomous model. Finally, the variable representing gender had mixed results in the robustness model. When choosing between “somewhat good” and “bad,” the relationship was negative and significant; however, when choosing between “very good” and the reference category, the results showed a positive and significant relationship.

Table 6. Robustness Results with Trichotomous Dependent Variable

Favorability of Globalization ^a		B	Std. Error	Wald	Sig.
"Somewhat Good"	Intercept	2.009	.363	30.667	.000
	Urbanity	-.002	.002	1.310	.252
	Post-industrialization	-.001	.003	.185	.667
	Economic Globalization	-.023**	.005	20.907	.000
	Political Globalization	-.024**	.003	49.862	.000
	Globalization	.035**	.008	21.540	.000
	Population	.001**	.000	103.985	.000
	Confidence	.469**	.027	291.370	.000
	US is Leading Economic Power	.240**	.045	28.447	.000
	GDP per Capita	.002	.003	.388	.533
	Age	-.059**	.023	6.906	.009
	Gender (Male)	-.098*	.044	5.041	.025
	"Very Good"	Intercept	2.290	.384	35.512
Urbanity		-.016**	.002	78.395	.000
Post-industrialization		.015**	.003	22.854	.000
Economic Globalization		-.025**	.005	21.262	.000
Political Globalization		-.023**	.004	40.131	.000
Globalization		.024**	.008	9.458	.002
Population		.000	.000	1.160	.281
Confidence		.556**	.029	374.788	.000
US is Leading Economic Power		.367**	.047	60.931	.000
GDP per Capita		-.010**	.003	8.532	.003
Age		-.109**	.024	21.083	.000
Gender (Male)		.185**	.046	16.353	.000

a. The reference category is: disfavor towards globalization.

N=21 836

* p< .05

** p< .01

Cox & Snell pseudo-R²= .084

CONCLUSION

This research has produced evidence that two important socio-economic factors have a strong influence on how the public of various nations view globalization. The urbanity of a population tends to decrease the level of favorability of globalization.

But more importantly, levels of globalization do have significant effects on public opinion towards globalization. How is it that more politically and economically globalized nations are less likely to approve of globalization, but are more likely to approve when overall globalization is considered? This is a question that deserves much scrutiny. Why is there such a disconnect between increasing international political ties and economic ones? One way to resolve this issue is to more closely examine which nations tend to be more politically globalized than others. It is quite possible that the core represents higher shares of political globalization. If that is the case, then the issue is one step closer to being resolved. On the other hand, if this is not the case, then this finding is more confounding. Regardless, these are issues to be developed in future research.

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