The Russian Orthodox Church as a Symbol of Right Order: a Voegelinian Analysis.

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THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
AS A SYMBOL OF RIGHT ORDER:
A VOEGELINIAN ANALYSIS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
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in

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by
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ABSTRACT

I will use Eric Voegelin's "new science" of politics to examine whether the Russian Orthodox Church is a symbol of right order. By investigating symbols of order and disorder in Russia, we will be able to uncover the structures of consciousness of the Russian Orthodox Church leadership. The examination of the experiences of man's consciousness will in turn reveal whether he and his society are ordered correctly or incorrectly. The explanation of symbols of order and disorder and the experiences behind these symbols is presented thoroughly in the first chapter of this dissertation. The chapter will conclude with an explanation of why Eric Voegelin's "new science" of politics is the proper method to examine symbols of order and disorder.

The rest of the dissertation will apply Eric Voegelin's "new science" to the Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of right order. The conclusion it will reach is that, with the exception of the reigns of Patriarchs Philaret and Nikon, the Russian Orthodox Church has been a symbol of right order. For most of its history, the Russian Orthodox Church has been able to displace symbols of disorder in Russia; however, in the post-Petrine period, the Church has failed to compete successfully with the symbols and ideologies of the state. It is, therefore, not the church but the state, with its attempt to subordinate the church to its own authority, that has been the cause of disorder in Russia.
CHAPTER ONE: SYMBOLS OF ORDER AND DISORDER

1.1 Introduction

In the past twenty years, some American political scientists have recognized the limitations of positivism that have dominated the discipline. For example, one prominent scholar has decided that virtue is indispensable to the success of public policy, while another has argued that warfare requires ethical analysis. Political scientists' incorporation of morality into their analyses of politics does not necessarily mean a refutation of the fact-value distinction; but those who do search for morality will be forced to reexamine the tradition of political philosophy and the questions it tries to answer: What is right order? How can it be known?

Mainstream political scientists tend to assume that political knowledge only can be verified by empirical means. When they reexamine the traditions of political philosophy, some political scientists may be inclined to use the same proofs of validity in their search for right order. However, there may exist political truths that cannot be demonstrated by the scientific method, and political philosophy may be an alternative way to understand these truths.

Eric Voegelin was a twentieth century political philosopher who searched for right order as did his contemporaries Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, and Michael Oakeshott. These thinkers tried to understand the nature of right order by concentrating on man's cognitive relationship to being, thereby distinguishing themselves from positivist political scientists who did not bother with such matters. Although they reached different conclusions about the nature of right order, all of these thinkers believed that important political truths could be known through philosophy.
It is the purpose of this chapter to invite the reader for reflection and debate about the merits of political philosophy's answers to the question of right order. By presenting the elemental features of Eric Voegelin's political philosophy, I hope to explain my method that analyzes the Russian Orthodox Church elites. A philosophical examination of Church elites hopefully will reveal whether the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church is one of right order.

I have chosen to study the Russian Orthodox Church and its elites in this manner because western political philosophy has neglected this aspect of political and theological reality. Furthermore, we may be able to determine whether political philosophy generally—and Eric Voegelin's "new science" of politics specifically—can answer the questions of right order. Finally, this dissertation hopes to correct the lack of attention in Voegelinian scholarship to the Russian Orthodox Church as well as to furnish a philosophical account of the Russian Orthodox Church as opposed to current descriptive works about it.

1.2 Voegelin's Theory of Consciousness

Eric Voegelin's search for right order began in his early studies of consciousness. He discovered that we have cognitive access to existence only through our experiences of participation in it. Since man is a participant in being, he cannot know the whole of reality. Reality, in another words, is "a datum of experiences in so far as it is known to man by virtue of his participation in the mystery of its being," but "it is not a datum of experience in so far as it is not given in the manner of an object of the external world but is knowable only from the perspective of participation in it." Accordingly, there always will remain "a core of the unknowable" to which man never will have access. The search for right order therefore is the search for the experiences that constitute it, i.e., man's
participation in the mystery of being; and the proper procedure to access these experiences is not the use of concepts abstracted from the originating experiences but is a matter of historical research and introspection.

In his analysis of Plato, Voegelin discovered the constitutive experiences of philosophy: the "love of the divine sophon (wisdom)" that ordered the psyche (soul) that arose in response to experiences of "transcendence" or the "ground of being."4 The Platonic experience of the divine sophon is articulated in the symbol of philosophy, which in turn elicits spiritual responses from others to form a society of right order. Symbols of right order are representations of man's psyche as formed by the divine:

The self-illumination of society through symbols is an integral part of social reality, and one may even say its essential part, for through such symbolization the members of a society experience it as more than an accident or convenience; they experience it as of their human essence. And, inversely, the symbols express the experience that man is fully man by virtue of his participation in a whole which transcends his particular experience, by virtue of his participation in the xynon, the common, as Heraclitus called it, the first Western thinker who differentiated this concept.5

But what exactly is man's psyche (consciousness) and how does it participate with the divine, the ground of being, or transcendence?

In a letter written to his friend Alfred Schütz, Voegelin conveyed his discovery that the nature of consciousness is a “center of energy” that was “engaged in a process, a process that cannot be observed from without.”6 This process is experienced as “inner illumination” that does not occur in the time of the external world but inside man’s consciousness that has the dimensions of a past, present, and future.7 However, this process can acquire knowledge of reality beyond the individual’s mind because “the experience of the transcendence of consciousness into the body, the external world, the community, history, and the ground of being are given in the biography of consciousness
and thus antecede the systematic reflection of consciousness." Since reality is a given in
man's consciousness, he can explore all reality external to his mind without becoming
completely absorbed by or completely separated from it. The consequence is that man's
experience of his own mind is the only immediate experiential source for an interpretation
of reality:

The experience of consciousness is the experience of a process – the only process
which we know "from within." Because of this property, the process of
consciousness becomes the model of the process as such, the only experiential
model to serve as the orientation point of the conceptual apparatus through which
we must also grasp the processes that transcend consciousness.9

Not only does man's consciousness experience itself, but it becomes the model to explain
all other processes in reality. Hence consciousness is the self-reflective part of all reality.

Man's capacity to speculate about history, politics, and God can be understood as
a function of his rootedness in animalic, vegetative, and inorganic existence. Although his
consciousness experiences itself on its own ontological foundation, different levels of
beings are "clearly distinguishable in their respective structures"; therefore, "there must be
something common which makes possible the continuum of all of them in human
existence."10 The conclusion Voegelin reached is that all reality is in some respect
ontologically identical:

If the levels of being in human existence are based on each other, if there is
a parallelism of processes, if human existence is incorporated in the world
spatio-temporally and causally, if finally there is in consciousness a reflection
of the world, then the ontologist infers a background of substantive identity
of the levels of being.11

Because man's consciousness is the model process for all understanding of reality,
differentiated levels of being are understood only as a series of phases in the unfolding of
identical substances that achieve full illumination within man's consciousness.
This "mediative complex of experiences" – the unfolding of differentiated levels of being within man's consciousness – is the process by which the divine first reveals itself to man's consciousness and then points out all other processes of being as conditioned by this process.12 This process theology is "the only meaningful systematic philosophy" for Voegelin: "a metaphysics that interprets the transcendence system of the world as the immanent process of a divine substance" is the correct one because it makes the "divine intelligible as an analogue of man's consciousness."13 By adopting process theology, Voegelin had to develop a philosophy of history that understood history not as the flow of external events but as the inner illumination of the divine substance in man's consciousness. Voegelin's philosophy of history concerned itself with man's soul and with efforts to translate experiences of inner illumination into an existential order of symbols. It does not attempt to discover any ultimate meaning of reality in external events.

Finally, Voegelin's theory of consciousness asserts that man does not fully experience the matter of the external world or the ground of being (i.e., God) itself:

our human finiteness is always within being. At one place, namely consciousness, this being has the character of illumination, but the illumination clings to this particular level; it illuminates neither the basic being of nature nor the ground of being.14

Man's consciousness can apprehend other levels of being and can know and symbolize these experiences, but it cannot grasp definitively the things in themselves. This epistemological maneuvering avoids the pitfall of idealism because Voegelin did not contend that thought is being or that consciousness is trapped inside itself and limited to its own constructs. Instead, Voegelin asserted:

the reality of consciousness is not unconscious, but through the symbolic expression in various degrees of illumination it relates to reality, either to its
own reality or participation, or in the poles of participation. The images themselves thus are a reality, the reality of consciousness, but they are not the reality to which they relate themselves in knowledge. Consciousness is always consciousness of something.

It is important to remember that the symbols created by consciousness are not realities in themselves. By rejecting St. Thomas's thesis that reason abstracts essences in the mode of proportional metaphysics, Voegelin declared that man's mind cannot get inside its objects. The repeated warnings of Voegelin throughout his works against "hypostatizing" the language of myth, religion, and philosophy is a direct result of this philosophy of participatory consciousness. This mistake of detaching the symbol that communicates an experience from its engendering experience and treating it as a topic of speculation is one of the great errors of modern philosophy, including positivist political science.

1.3 The "New Science" of Politics

In contrast to modern political science, Eric Voegelin's "new science" of politics traces political order to its origins where the ground of being touches man's mind by illuminating the various dimensions of time inside his consciousness. A science of politics therefore had to be a philosophy of history: "the existence of man in political society is historical existence; and a theory of politics, if it penetrates to principles, must at the same time be a theory of history." Again, history is not the external events outside of man's consciousness; it is man's experiences of transcendence and his participation in the ground of being. It contains an order that emerges from itself: a process of the unfolding of divine substance in man's soul. God could be known to man only as a movement in his psyche because the unfolding of the divine substance takes place within his consciousness, not in
the external world, and because he has access to his own experiences of the divine from a perspective within. From these experiences, man creates symbols of right order to which society conforms. Thus, history consists of the self-interpretive symbols of societies as representatives of transcendent truth.

Political science consequently should examine these self-interpretive symbols of societies and evaluate them according to a philosophy of consciousness:

Theory is not just any opining about human existence in society; it rather is an attempt at formulating the meaning of existence by explicating the content of a definite class of experiences. Its argument is not arbitrary but derives its validity from the aggregate of experiences to which it must permanently refer for empirical control.

Voegelin’s "new science" searches for those symbols that are "amenable to theorization as an intelligible succession of phases in a historical process" so that "the order of history emerges from the history of order." This "datum of human experiences" consisted of "God and man, world and society [that] form a primordial community of being." Man could know this datum of human experiences "by virtue of participation in the mystery of being," but not in the sense that he could grasp them as "an object of the external world," or view them from some location outside of time and place that would permit him to understand the mystery of the whole. Given this existential situation, man was engaged in a "process of symbolization" that was an "attempt at making the essentially unknowable order of being intelligible as far as possible through the creation of symbols which interpret the unknown by analogy with the really, or supposedly known." Referring to God, man, society, and world as the totality of things that people of every age could experience, Voegelin affirmed that "the range of human experience is always present in the
fullness of its dimensions,” though man himself may not be able to discern all the complex relationships in the new experiential field now or ever.  

Since man cannot discern all of the relationships among God, man, society, and the world, he renders his experiences intelligible by a process where “compact blocks of the knowable will be differentiated into their component parts . . . thus, the history of symbolization is a progression from compact to differentiated experiences and symbols.” The process moves from the experience of order founded in the consubstantiality of everything in the cosmos toward the experience of attunement of an “invisible divine being, transcendent of all being in the world” that would “be experienced only as movement in the soul of man.” Societies could be distinguished from one another as they advance toward or recede from “an adequate symbolization of truth concerning the order of being of which the order of society is a part.” For Voegelin, there are three types of the "adequate symbolization of truth": 1) cosmological, 2) anthropological, and 3) soteriological.

The cosmological symbols of right order are expressed in the medium of myth. Society is understood to be an analogue of the cosmos with its cyclical decline and restoration of order. In *Israel and Revelation*, Voegelin studied Mesopotamian and Egyptian Empires' New Year Festivals and cult acts that annually restored order to their civilizations and rescued them from their cyclical decline. The experience of history for these empires is "a rhythmical repetition of cosmogony in the imperially organized humanity which existed at the center of the cosmos." Even disruptions of this rhythmical repetition, revolts and rebellions, did not give rise to a new type of order; rather, it was hoped that the original type of order would be restored. The Mesopotamian and Egyptian
Empires "remained compactly bound in the experience of cosmic divine order and of the participation of the respective societies in its rhythm."\(^2\)

The second type of symbol, anthropological truth, is a break from the compactness of cosmological myth that establishes the order of man in his immediacy under God. Whereas cosmological man experiences truth in harmony with the cosmos, anthropological man experiences truth in his participation with the divine. It is the experience of God as the unseen measure of man.\(^2\) This discovery of anthropological truth does not mean that cosmological myth is a symbol of disorder; rather, cosmological myth is relegated to a type of lesser order. The *polis* is not ordered on cosmological myth but on the philosopher's experience with the divine.

Plato was the first to discover anthropological truth through philosophy: "the exploration of the human soul, and the true order of the soul turned out to be dependent on philosophy in the strict sense of the love of the divine *sophon*."\(^3\) In his quest for divine wisdom, the philosopher resists disorder:

The philosopher is compactly the man who resists the sophist; the man who attempts to develop right order in his soul through resistance to the diseased soul of the sophist; the man who can evoke a paradigm of right social order in the image of his well-ordered soul, in opposition to the disorder of society that reflects the disorder of the sophist's soul; the man who develops the conceptual instruments for the diagnosis of health and disease in the soul; the man who develops the criteria of right order, relying on the divine measure to which his soul is attuned; the man who, as a consequence, becomes the philosopher in the narrower sense of the thinker who advances propositions concerning right order in the soul and society, claiming for them the objectivity of *episteme*, of science – a claim that is bitterly disputed by the sophist whose soul is attuned to the opinion of society.\(^3\)

In his resistance to disorder, the philosopher's soul becomes the paradigm of right order.

Every society in some sense reflects the type of men of which it is composed; consequently, different social orders are merely reflections of different types of human
beings. Because different regimes are merely reflections of different types of souls, the philosopher explores his own to discover three elements within it that stand in a hierarchical relation to one another with the appetites at the lowest and reason at the highest. The stratification of these three forces is used by Plato to distinguish not only different types of souls but different types of regimes. A society of right order is one that harmonizes the different types of souls in the correct hierarchy, i.e., with reason (the philosopher) ruling.

Soteriological truth also regards God as the unseen measure of man. However, soteriological truth permits the possibility of friendship (philia) between God and man. Whereas anthropological truth recognizes the spiritual agreement between men who live with the most divine part within them (nous), it does not permit the possibility of friendship between God and man. Although the mystic philosopher orients his soul toward a transcendent being, he will not reach the divine. In contrast, the soteriological truth of Christianity makes such a friendship possible through the grace of God:

The experience of mutuality in the relation with God, of the amicitia in the Thomistic sense, of the grace which imposes a supernatural form on the nature of man, is the specific difference of Christian truth. The revelation of this grace in history, through the incarnation of the Logos in Christ, intelligibly fulfilled the adventitious movement of the spirit in the mystic philosophers. The critical authority over the older truth of society which the soul had gained through its opening and its orientation toward the unseen measure was now confirmed through the revelation of the measure itself.

Because philosophy and Christianity have endowed man with the insight that right order radiates from his participation with the divine, nature, and thereby cosmological truth, loses its effectiveness as a symbol of right order. Man now is able to play the role of a rational contemplator and pragmatic master of nature. But this new role comes at a price. Instead of attributing to nature the causes of disorder, man now must look within himself for the root of his own troubles, i.e., his spiritual fall from grace. The experience
of God's grace easily can be derailed into the experience of the autonomous self, an experience "brought by Christianity to the ultimate border of clarity which by tradition is called revelation."  

Thus, soteriological truth presents new dangers. Whereas the realization of anthropological truth is governed by the rhythm of growth and decay, soteriological truth seeks to be actualized in the supernatural destiny of man. Soteriological truth breaks with the rhythm of existence in its search for perfection beyond temporal reality: "man and mankind now have fulfilment but it lies beyond nature."  

History therefore does not have a meaning within it, because history extends forever in the future. But men who have experienced derailment from soteriological truth seek a meaning in history, i.e., a supernatural destiny for man in temporal reality. They seek to use the Christian structure of grace and history for their own man-made, gnostic ends.

1.4 The Experience of Disorder: Gnosticism

According to Voegelin, a gnostic is a person who claims absolute certain knowledge of the fundamental principles of reality; thus, he commits violence to the truth that man ultimately cannot understand the mystery of being. Modern gnostic movements are characterized by a Manichean obsession with a worldly evil that can be blamed on social disorganization rather than original sin and a conviction that salvation from the evils of existence can be achieved in one's lifetime through a historical process dictated by human actions, i.e., historical agents who possess gnosis (certain knowledge) to guide correct action.  

Voegelin's initial project was to show the unfolding of the ground of being throughout history. He began with the cosmological and anthropological truths of
western classical civilizations that culminated in the soteriological truth of Christianity.

After the Christian "maximum differentiation" of this civilizational cycle, Voegelin traced the descending slope of modern gnostic civilizations such as nationalism, communism, and other totalitarian movements.38

In the first three volumes of *Order and History*, Voegelin started to fill in the details of the ascending slope of this cycle. The analysis became problematic in volume one where Voegelin asserted that Isaiah had indulged in metastatic faith when the prophet had invoked God to stave off a military defeat of Judah.39 Metastasis is a "change in the constitution of being" in which the world "will change its nature without ceasing to be the world in which we live concretely."40 Voegelin did not believe such a transformation could ever occur, so he regarded all metastasic visions as magical or delusionary.41

The advent of Christianity resurfaced metastatic faith in a religious Gnostic form, with the Christian Church eagerly anticipating the imminent *Parousia* as foretold by the *Revelation* of John in the New Testament. St. Augustine, however, temporarily suppressed these chiliastic expectations in his *City of God* by pointing out that the *Parousia* would not take place until a "thousand years" had passed, a safe enough time period to quash any imminent expectation of it. The Church had managed to suppress the heresy of Gnosticism.42 After the Gnostics were defeated by the Church Fathers, western religious life evolved along the Augustinian lines of temporal and spiritual order.

According to Voegelin, Joachim of Flora became terrified by the insecurity of Christian faith during the High Middle Ages because it did not guarantee redemption to anyone. This experience caused Joachim to break from the Augustinian conception of temporal and spiritual order.43 He created a new faith that drew upon Gnostic sources.
History, according to Joachim, was divided into three stages – the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost – with each phase possessing a unique ontological quality. Joachim predicted a great leader soon would initiate a transition from the second, imperfect stage to the third, perfect one. He also created the symbol of the prophet who could foretell such things without fail, a symbol that was presumably represented by himself.

The lasting significance of Joachim was the transmission of Gnostic symbols to the modern, secular world: 1) the prophet of a new age, 2) the activist leader of a new age, 3) the tripartite philosophy of history, and 4) the new age of the autonomous person in a transfigured reality. These four symbols became secularized in the philosophies of Turgot, Condorcet, Comte, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, and Moeller van den Bruck. Moreover, the ideological movements of Nazism, communism, and nationalism are merely derivations from this Joachitic speculation about the future of history. 44

For Voegelin, gnosticism represented two types of spiritual disorder: 1) the expectation of the *Parousia* that would transform the world into a "Kingdom of God," and 2) the elimination of transcendence in order to make man the measure of all things. 45 The first type of gnosticism is found in the Gospel of John, the Epistles of Paul, ancient Gnostic and Manichaen writings, the heresies of the Middle Ages, and militant Puritanism; the second is found in the secularized philosophies and ideologies of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment periods. The first type recognizes transcendent order, while the second type rejects it. 46 What is common to both types of gnosticism is man's *libido dominandi*: his desire to dominate the world.

Since both types of gnosticism share the common feature of man's *libido dominandi*, Voegelin listed six characteristics of gnosticism to help us identify it: 1) the
feeling of dissatisfaction with man's place in the world, 2) the belief that this dissatisfaction is a result of the world being poorly organized, 3) the belief that salvation from the evil of the world is possible, 4) the belief that the order of being will have to be changed in a historical process, 5) the belief that a change in the order of being is possible through human action, and 6) the belief that one can possesses this type of knowledge, gnosis, and therefore should encourage other human beings in action to change the order of being. 47

This desire to dominate the world, man's libido dominandi, disrupts what Voegelin called a balance of consciousness. 48 It is important to recall that man participates in the world of man, God, society, and the cosmos, all of which are given to his consciousness. The most important relation among this complex is man’s attunement of his soul to the ground of being. From this participation between God and man, interpretations of right spiritual order radiate, i.e., symbols of right order. 49 Unlike the gnostic, neither this experience nor interpretation from this experience of the ground of being is knowledge of an object; rather, it is a tension between immanent and transcendent reality that man encounters as a participant.

The philosopher participates in this tension between the divine and the human realm in an “in-between” state that Voegelin referred to as the metaxy: the existence of the philosopher’s consciousness in a state of tension between the poles of immanent and transcendent reality. The philosophical existence in the metaxy is an ongoing struggle to know realities (i.e., the divine) which are beyond the scope of human understanding; therefore, the philosopher must be careful not to let his desire to know dominate his exploration of reality; he must be careful to avoid the libido dominandi. The philosopher's speculation must not degenerate into an “intentionalist” desire to know the mystery of the
divine as if it were some “object this side of the horizon”; nor must the philosopher assume that human realities belong to the sphere of the divine.30

Confronting the philosopher is the task of striking a balance of consciousness between intentionality and mystery in his analysis of reality. On the one hand, the philosopher must recognize that intentionality is an epistemological mode of understanding reality as “things” while, on the other hand, mystery is the symbol of those experiences that cannot be understood in a subject-object epistemological approach.31 If the philosopher loses this “balance of consciousness” between intentionality and mystery, he will fall into a deformed existence (i.e., gnosticism) where he perceives reality merely as objects or attempts to transform reality by metastatic faith. The philosopher must recognize that consciousness is not a fixed structure that is created a priori; rather, it is a fluid process in which the processes of reality become luminous (reveals itself) to the philosopher. The cause of gnosticism therefore is nothing short of a Promethean craving to know the mystery of being as a mathematical object that could be manipulated as one desires.

1.5 Voegelin's Revisions on Christianity

This balance of consciousness as well as its derailment was explored by Voegelin in a letter to Alfred Schütz. In his correspondence with Schütz, Voegelin claimed that the New Testament propounded not only mysterious allegories but sometimes also verged on metastatic illusions whenever it engaged in imagery of the apocalyptic:

The sectarian movements and certain trends within Protestantism insist that eschatological Christianity is the essential one, while what I call essential Christianity is for them the corruption of Christianity by the tradition of the Catholic Church.32
Voegelin argued that the movements of the ground of being as explained in man’s psyche conveys the essence of Christianity. He also condemned the fallacious tendency of Christianity's eschatological components as Gnostic. For Voegelin the essence of Christianity can be summed up in the epistle of Hebrew 11:1: "faith is the substance of things hoped for and the proof of things unseen." The ontological proposition of this epistle asserts that the substance of faith is nothing but faith, while the epistemological proposition declares that the proof of faith is nothing but this same faith. This was Voegelin's philosophical stance: he was not a theologian.

In the writing about the Christian revelation of the divine to man in volume four of *Order and History*, Voegelin recognized that he had been unwittingly involved in a gnostic enterprise himself. Thus, he abandoned his initial program of tracing the unfolding of the ground of being in history, with Christianity as the acme of his civilizational cycle, after he had discovered that his premise was a metastatic symbol. The difficulties of the Christian idea of salvation history began when Voegelin learned that historiogenesis, “the unilinear construction of history, from a divine-cosmic origin of order to the author’s present,” was a “symbolic form developed by the end of the third millennium BC in the empires of the ancient near East.” Further investigation had revealed that the notion of a unilinear salvation history “had remained a millennial constant in continuity from its origins in the Sumerian and Egyptian societies, through its cultivation by Israelites and Christians, right into... Enlightened Progressivism, Comtism, Hegelianism, Marxism.” Voegelin named this phenomenon “historiogenesis”; and, he suspected that its experiential sources were not the Israelite-Christian “differentiating events” (i.e., revelation). This suspicion in turn made Voegelin doubt the legitimacy of all Christian philosophies of history. 16

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Voegelin's uneasiness about his earlier assumptions deepened when he recognized that all historiogenetic speculations, especially Christian ones, relied on "techniques of selecting and omitting materials, as well as of rearranging their time sequence, so as to let one line of meaning emerge from a field that in fact contains several such lines, in brief . . . distortions and falsifications of history." This technique of selection and omission has been repeated throughout history in a variety of symbolized experiences:

By its mere repetitions, the sequence of the structurally equivalent symbolism of the Deutero-Isaianic exodus of Israel from herself into an ecumenic mankind under Yahweh with Cyrus his Messiah, the Stoic exodus from the polis into the imperial ecumene of the cosmos, the Christian exodus into the metastatic ecumene providentially prepared by the imperial ecumene, the Hegelian ecumenic reconciliation and the Marxian ecumenic revolution, destroys the finality of meaning claimed by each member of the series singly. The final answer to the meaning of history has been given not once but several times too often.

Recognizing the deficiencies in his philosophical enterprise, Voegelin began afresh. History is:

- definitely not a story of meaningful events to be arranged on a time line.
- In this new form, the analysis had to move backward and forward and sideways, in order to follow empirically the patterns of meaning as they revealed themselves in the self-interpretations of persona and societies in history. It was a movement through a web of meaning with a plurality of nodal points.

Although Voegelin's new philosophical project was open to genuine strands of Christian significance, it precluded any attempts to interpret all of history in terms of a single, Christian meaning.

The earliest example of the form of historiogenesis, according to Voegelin, can be found in the kingdom of Sumer which sought to "sublimate the contingency of imperial order in time to the timeless serenity of the cosmic order itself." This metastatic symbol disrupted reality "by projecting an imaginary second reality on a timeless line of time that
comes to its end in the everlasting meaning of the author's present” and was transmitted to Judaism, Christianity, and modern, gnostic, western civilization. Thus, the historiogenesis of Christian salvation history arose from the gnostic or metastatic component of divine revelation. Voegelin had to abandon his earlier philosophical project because its premise made his project a gnostic enterprise.

The reason for this abandonment of Christian salvation history is its incompatibility with Voegelin’s philosophy of history, which rejected any knowable finality of meaning. We do not the future. Although experiences of the divine can have compact and differentiated expressions, they were incomparable on any scale of ultimate meaning. If history is an ongoing process that could not produce any final meaning, then the most absolute truth available to man is the process itself:

The ground can be a Platonic world-soul ... an Aristotelian prote arche ... an Israelite creator-god; the pre- and transmundane God of the Christian dogma; a Neo-platonic world soul, improved by Hegel’s dialectically immanent Geist; a Bergsonian élan vital. I am enumerating answers indiscriminately, not because one is as good as another, but in order to make it clear that we get nowhere by putting one against the other. For the answers make sense only in relation to the questions they answer; the questions, furthermore, make sense only in relation to the concrete experiences of reality from which they have arisen. No answer, thus, is the ultimate truth in whose possession mankind could live happily ever after, because no answer can abolish the historical process of consciousness from which it has emerged. But precisely because every last answer is a penultimate in relation to the next last one in time, the historical field of consciousness becomes of absorbing interest; for it is his participation in the history of consciousness that confers on man’s existential encounters with the reality of which he is a part the ultimacy of meaning which the penultimate answers, torn out of the complex experience-question-answer, do not have.

Hence, the symbols of myth, philosophy, and revelation were experientially equivalent not in the theophanic sense; rather, these three modes of awareness were manifestations of the same process of the ground of being.
For example, Christian and Greek philosophy engaged in the same process, as demonstrated by the general similarity of their symbols of the *metaxy*, the in-between state where man responds to the divine presence and the divine presence evokes a response in man. But the two symbols differed in their accents: philosophy emphasized man's participation with the ground of being, while revelation concentrated on the divine *pneuma*, God's participation in human mortality. However, Voegelin also declared that Christianity was a more differentiated symbolization than philosophy. Plato and Aristotle were surpassed when Paul was carried “irresistibly beyond the structure of creation to its source in the freedom and love of divine creativity” where the meaning of reality was salvation in immortality. He “fully differentiated the experience of man as the site where the movement of reality becomes luminous in its actual occurrence.”

1.6 Scope and Method of the Study

Eric Voegelin's "new science" of politics is an exploration of the structure of man's consciousness. By trying to discover man's experiences with the divine, Voegelin was able to speculate whether these experiences are one of order or disorder. Experiences that articulated a balance of consciousness, the *metaxy* or the *charismata*, are ones of right order: man participates in the mystery of being without seeking to dominate it. Experiences that expressed gnosticism or man's *libido dominandi* are ones of disorder: man seeks either to abolish the divine or to realize it in temporal reality. These experiences in the structure of man's consciousness are articulated either in symbols of right order – cosmological, anthropological, or soteriological – or in symbols of disorder. Symbols of right order, therefore, are man's articulation of his experience with the divine as a tension between himself and God. This experience is expressed in symbols of right
order that in turn elicit spiritual responses from others to form a society of right order. Alternatively, man's experience with the divine can derail into one of disorder. These experiences consequently will be articulated in symbols of disorder. Depending upon the spiritual health of a society, people may embrace or reject these symbols of disorder.

This study will examine whether the Russian Orthodox Church has been a symbol of right order. By using Eric Voegelin's "new science," I will attempt to discover the experiences that give rise to the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church by focusing on the structure of consciousness of Church elites. By examining the thoughts and behavior of the Church's leadership, I hope to be able to explore the structure of their consciousness through history in order to determine whether these experiences reflect a balance of consciousness, the metaxy, and the charismata. As previously noted, symbols engendered by experience can be detached and take on a life of their own. This phenomenon of degradation or deformation of reality experienced as expressed through and abetted by symbolic atrophy is a major question of the dynamic of order and disorder in history. History is not one long happy story to be told from beginning to end.

There are advantages and disadvantages with this approach. The great advantage is that the study focuses on members who control the direction and life of the Church's structure and its relation to the state. It investigates people who wield power. The great disadvantage of this approach is that people who wield power may not be the most spiritual. For example, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the staret appeared as a symbol of spiritual order. A staret is a person who lives a contemplative life combined with active service and is not appointed by either a bishop or the brethren of his
community. Unlike the patriarch and other church officials, the *staret* became a spiritual symbol of right order because of the corruption of the Church and its subordination to the state.

The appearance of the *staret* and other such symbols raises the question about the nature of a church. For Voegelin, the experiences of soteriological truth are ones of right order that are expressed in the symbol of the mystical body of Christ and not in the symbol of the Church, although the two symbols at times can represent the same experiences of man's participation with the divine. The advent of Christ in temporal history not only brought a person who provided *homonoia* among his followers but also furnished a second Adam, the spiritual common ancestor for all of mankind. Every person therefore became a member of the Christian community, although all men did not participate (*ecclesia*) in the spirit (*pneuma*) of Christ.

A distinction therefore was required between actual members (*in actu*) and potential members (*in potentia*) to account for this discrepancy between those who participated in the Christian community and those who did not. Furthermore, the symbol of *charismata* was incorporated into the Christian community as God's gift to each member. This idea of *charismata* determined the status and task of each member in the body and thereby became the organizational principle of the Christian community. Christ thus was now understood as to be the head of the mystical body with all men making up his body. 70

This dissertation seeks to examine whether the experiences of the Russian Orthodox Church's elites correspond to the experiences of the mystical body of Christ and of *charismata*. Put another way, the dissertation asks whether the Russian Orthodox
Church is a symbol of right order, specifically of soteriological truth. By restricting the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church to its leadership, I recognize the limitations of this study. Religious life outside the Church's leadership is neglected and thereby the question whether monastic life, the Uniat Church, for example, possessed the experiences of charismata is ignored. One could argue that the true church – the experiences of the mystical body of Christ – exists outside the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church. This may be the case. But the task of covering the entire sweep and scope of Christian religious life in Russia is beyond the task of any one scholar. Consequently, I restrict my analysis to the experiences of Russian Orthodox Church's leadership to determine whether they are ones of right order.

To access the experiences of the Russian Orthodox Church's leadership, I examine the thoughts and behavior of Church elites with primary focus on motive. I also take into account the psychology, social and economic class, and ideology of Church leadership. Specifically, I am looking at the structures of consciousness of the Church elite: Are their experiences one of right order? Have these elites sought to conform society to this experience of right order through the symbol of the Church? By investigating the motives of the Church leadership, I hope to be able to reconstruct the consciousness of Church elites and thereby understand their experiences, ideas, and behavior.

The dissertation begins at c.988 A.D. and ends at c.1999 A.D. Because symbols are dynamic entities, a study of them must follow their existence from their inception to their latest articulation. The experiences behind a symbol may be one of initial right order only later to become derailed into one of disorder. Thus, a historical investigation of the
Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of right order will provide us an aggregate of diverse human experiences against which to evaluate the symbol.

This philosophical approach to the Russian Orthodox Church may raise two objections in the discipline of political science which I now will address. The first is the demand of scientific proof. This dissertation seeks to investigate the experiences underlying the symbols of transcendent order. Unfortunately, the thoughts and passions of men cannot be rigorously demonstrated if one insists on absolute certainty about the intentions and perceptions of others. This difficulty is not insurmountable if one does not demand absolute certainty.

Since the beginning of western philosophy, thinkers and scholars have relied upon introspection in their efforts to understand other people. This procedure requires the political scientist to infer the motives and experiences of others by examining their situation, behavior, and self-interpretations. He tries to reconstruct their consciousness by using other people's words to awaken the desires, experiences, and perceptions within his own soul. This dissertation employs the introspective method where its deductions do not depend upon empirical means but on the author's own — and the reader's — personal knowledge of human nature.

The second difficulty is the Weberian fact-value distinction among some political scientists. This dissertation does not plan to substitute subjective opinion for reasoned inquiry; rather, it will present several possible theories and argue that some are better than others. The political scientist must consider the range of human experiences implicit in his
existence as a being rooted in the physical, societal, and transcendent worlds. To disregard certain aspects of reality because they cannot be adequately analyzed by empirical methods is to miss the truth.

1.7 The Forthcoming Chapters

With these caveats in mind, I begin the dissertation with an examination of the Russian Orthodox Church's inheritance of Byzantium, particularly its symbol of symphonia. According to Byzantine theology, relations between church and state were characterized by mutual harmony as opposed to Augustinian distinction between "a city of God" and "a city of man." The symbol of symphonia, therefore, is a critical one not only to understand the nature of Kievan Christian Rus but to understand the role of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Chapters two and three follow the Russian Orthodox Church's origin, rise, and independence (autocephalous status) within the Orthodox World. In chapter two I explore the nature of the Church in Kievan Rus: the heritage of Byzantium, the conversion of Kievan Rus to Orthodoxy, and the Kievan Christian Rus state. In chapter three I examine the rise of Muscovite Russia, the nature of the Church's resilience under the Tatar Yoke, the Church's split with Rome at the Councils of Ferrara and Florence, and how it managed to gain its autocephalous status. These two chapters cover the Russian Orthodox Church's history under both the reigns of Kievan princes and Mongol masters.

The next two chapters, four and five, focus both on the symbols of order and disorder: the doctrine of the Third Rome, the ideology of tsardom, and the Church's resistance to it. The role of Joseph of Volokolmask and the doctrine of the Third Rome is the focus of chapter four. The development of the doctrine of the Third Rome coincided
with Muscovy's independence from the Mongols. However, the doctrine of the Third Rome was never fully accepted by the Church; rather, it was absorbed by the state which in turn sought to submit the Church to its will.

Chapter five examines the nature of Church's resistance to the ideology and symbol of tsardom. The Church's response to the state included a series of church councils and protests, most of which were directed against the rule of Ivan the Terrible. In chapter five I explore the nature of this resistance as well as Ivan's persecution of the Church. Ultimately, the Church would secure a patriarchy for itself so it could match not only the imperial dignity that Constantinople now bestowed upon the Muscovite state but also act as a counter-weight to the authority of that very same state.

This newly-acquired dignity was critical for the Russian Orthodox Church's, and Russian society's, existence during the Time of Troubles. Chapter six investigates the role of the Church during the Time of Troubles and how it spearheaded Russian independence against its Polish occupiers. It also examines the restoration of the monarchy and the reign of Patriarch Philaret (1619-33 A.D.) after the Time of Troubles. Finally, chapter six closes with some reflections on reforms within the Church and its restored relations to the state.

The foreign occupation of Russia during the Time of Troubles, not to mention the waves of immigration of Greeks from Constantinople, opened Russia's doors to the world about a hundred years before the reign of Peter the Great. The influx of Greeks into Russia created a theological debate in the Russian Orthodox Church that culminated into the Great Schism (Raskol). The existence of the Old Believers was not only a problem for
the Church but for the state, too, with its vision of alternative, secular order. How the church and the state responded to these developments is explored in chapter seven.

Chapters eight and nine explore the Petrine vision of westernization and its consequences for the Church. From the Church’s perspective, the policy of westernization was disastrous: the patriarchal church was replaced by state supervision, i.e., the Holy Synod, and it would be completely subservient to the state until the February Revolution of 1917. The dictates of church life and reform would now be directed by the state. Chapter nine focuses on the consequences of the Petrine reforms by looking at internal church reforms and counter-reforms during the nineteenth century. Instead of reforms succeeding, what we find is counter-reforms and the revolution.

Revolution provided the opportunity for the Church to throw off its Holy Synod yoke. Chapter ten focuses on the restoration of the patriarchate, the life of the Church under the Soviet regime, and its existence in the post-Soviet world. Although the Church restored its patriarchate, it would soon suffer persecution by the Soviet state, a persecution not seen since the time of Ivan the Terrible. The Church’s suffering is examined under the Soviet regime, and its rebirth is looked at under the Yeltsin years. Particular attention is paid to the passage of the "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" legislation. Is this a return to symphonia? Or is it a type of Gnosticism, e.g., nationalist? Finally, the study concludes with some thoughts, questions, and prospects about whether the Russian Orthodox Church has been, is currently, or will be a symbol of right order.
1.8 The Sources

The primary sources for Kievan Rus, the Tatar Yoke, and the Muscovite Russia are the Chronicles: annual entries organized chronologically. Included in the entries are historical and diplomatic documents, treaties, stories and legends. The chronicles themselves are not the product of any single author: they were copied and often re-edited by successive writers. The earliest chronicles are named after the city or place which they were written, e.g., *The Chronicle of Novgorod*. The most important and comprehensive ones are *The Primary Chronicle*, *The Laurentian Chronicle*, and *The Nikon Chronicle*.

*The Nikon Chronicle*, completed in the 1550s, is the last history of Russia commissioned. As the last independent Orthodox nation, Russia thought it necessary to furnish an account that defended its religion and ideology in the face of Latins, Muslims, and heretics. This new style of historical writing also produced such works as *Stepennaia kniga tsarskogo rodosloviia* (Book of Degrees of Imperial Genealogy), *Kazansakia istoriia* (Kazan's History), and *Litsevoi svod* (Illuminated Chronicle).

The classic work on the Time of Troubles is Platonov, S. F. *Drevnerusskie skazaniia i povesti o smutnom vremeni XVII veka*. For the actual primary sources, I refer to *Smuta, Inoe, Kazanskoe skazaniei, Skazanie*, and Ivan Timofeev's *Vremennik*. Some of these sources are drawn from the *Chronicles* themselves, while others are separate documents.

For the period after the Time of Troubles, I primarily rely upon the historical collection of secular code laws of the Russian state, *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, Church archives such as the *Tsentralnyi gosudarstvenniy istoricheskii arkhiv SSSR*, and state histories and archives like *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*,

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khraniashchikhsia v gosudarstvennoi kollegii inostrannyk del and Akty sobramye v bibiltekakh i arkhivakh Rossiskoi imperii Arkheograficheskoiu ekspeditsieiu Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk. Essentially these post-Petrine histories are modern versions of the pre-Petrine chronicle project.

For the Soviet period I rely on two secondary sources, Pospielovsky's *The Russian Church 1917-82* and Ellis' *The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History*. Both works are well-documented and are considered classics in the field of the Russian Orthodox Church. For the Yeltsin era (1991-91), I use newspaper accounts, journal articles, and autobiographical accounts by the political actors themselves.

1.9 End Notes


2. For more about Voegelinian scholarship, please refer to Sandoz, Ellis. *Eric Voegelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982); *The Voegelinian Revolution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1982). For historical, non-analytical works on the Russian Orthodox Church in English, please refer to Pospielovsky, D. *The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir Press, 1998); and Ware, T. *The Orthodox Church* (Harmondsworth, 1963).


18. Ibid., 64.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 5.

23. Ibid., 3, 60.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 6.
26. Ibid., ix.


28. Ibid., 51.

29. Ibid., 1.


34. Ibid., 79.

35. Ibid., 119-20.


39. Ibid., 452.

40. Ibid., xiii.

42. This resurfacing of Gnosticism was partly due to the economic and social revival of the High Middle Ages which brought about a new confidence about western, temporal civilization. Voegelin, Eric. *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism: Two Essays*, ed. and introduction by Ellis Sandoz (Washington D.C.: Regenery Publishing, 1997), 75-76.


45. In this study, I use the terms "Gnostic" or "Gnosticism" to refer to the first type of gnosticism and "gnostic" or "gnosticism" to refer to the second type.


55. *Ibid.*

56. For more about Voegelin's concept of historiogenesis, please refer to Barry Cooper, "Voegelin's Conception of Historiogenesis," *Historical Reflections* 4 (1977): 231-251.


67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., 4-6.

CHAPTER 2: KIEVAN RUS
(c.860-c.1240 A.D.)

2.1 The Heritage of Byzantium: Symphonia

The emergence of the Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of right order in Kievan Rus has been traditionally dated at 988 A.D. when Vladimir converted from paganism to Christianity. Of course, Vladimir’s conversion did not eradicate paganism in Russia: paganism continued to exist at the time of the Mongol invasion and persisted well into seventeenth century, and even as late as the nineteenth. The shift from cosmological to soteriological truth therefore was a prolonged process that included the absorption of cosmological symbols and practices into Christian ones. Although the soteriological truth of the Russian Orthodox Church would ultimately emerge as the predominant symbol of right order in Kievan Rus, paganism still competed as a symbol of right order for several centuries afterward.

The Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of right order also linked Kievan Rus to the insights and truths of classical and Christian civilization. However, this linkage was to Constantinople, not to Rome. Because Russia had accepted Orthodoxy, she was deprived of what the Roman Church had to offer and therefore remained relatively isolated from the rest of Europe and its Latin civilization. Vladimir’s turn to Constantinople can be seen as the most spiritually rewarding choice at the time, and Christianity came to Russia in an easily understandable Slavic rite that laid down the foundation for a new Christian culture. Thus, in order to understand the Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of soteriological truth, it is necessary to discuss the origin and development of Orthodoxy in Byzantium first.
The soteriological truth of Christianity became institutionally manifested in the relations between church and state under the Roman Empire. The diffusion of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire and Rome's failed policy of persecution of Christians disrupted Rome's cosmological symbol of the Pontifex Maximus. Because the Roman emperor sought the favor of the gods for his imperial sovereignty, he required all citizens to pledge their allegiance to the emperor's high priest, the Pontifex Maximus. The Christian refusal to worship the Pontifex Maximus was a rejection of the Roman Empire itself. The cosmological symbol of the Pontifex Maximus was therefore threatened by the soteriological symbol of Christianity, thereby making the entire Empire vulnerable to disorder. Rome could either prosecute Christians or relent.

Rome tried persecution but this policy failed; consequently, it relented to Christian demands. Christianity was first tolerated under Emperor Constantine I (reign 324-37 A.D.), and later made the official religion of the Roman Empire under Emperor Theodosious the Great (reign 379-95 A.D.). The soteriological truth that all men share a common spirituality displaced the cosmological hierarchy of Rome's Pontifex Maximus. By replacing the cosmological symbols of Rome, Christianity not only promised men a common spiritual heritage but also divinely sanctioned the Roman Empire because it had accepted the truth of Christianity. A Christian culture would be established in order to bind together the citizens of Rome for a new purpose in existence.

The emperors' initially reluctant acceptance and later strong endorsement of Christianity had made them the de facto authorities over the Christian Church. The Church would spiritually guide the temporal affairs of men and sanctify the empire's secular authority while the emperor would rule his realm as a just and Christian king. This

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new union between church and state would reach its full bloom on the shores of the Bosphorus where the site of the new Rome, Constantinople, would be founded. Church and state would work together to create a new Christian Empire of soteriological truth.

Eusebius of Caesarea (c.260-340 A.D.) was one of the first to articulate this new arrangement between church and state in the symbol of the New Christian Empire. Since the heavens are ruled by only one God and one divine law, the earth should be ruled by only one supreme ruler and one secular law, and “that ruler, the Roman emperor, is the Vicegerent of the Christian God.”2 Eusebius’ vision of a New Christian Empire was confirmed at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 A.D., where Emperor Marcian claimed direct responsibility for the preservation of the true, apostolic faith and the dogmatic unity of the empire. In turn the council submitted to Marcian’s authority as emperor and praised him as “a new Constantine, a new Paul, a new David, the torchlight of the Orthodox faith.”3 The emperor became known as the “external bishop” of the empire, while the Patriarch of Constantinople, who had been elevated to second rank behind the Bishop of Rome, became known as its soul.4 The emperor swore to preserve the apostolic tradition, to protect the church, and to maintain religious order, while the patriarch would sanctify the emperor’s temporal power. By citing the apostolic reference to power found in Romans 13:1-7 and sanctioning the practice of the patriarch's consecration of emperors at their coronations, the Orthodox Church was able to justify this idea of a mystical union between body and soul, emperor and patriarch, church and state.

The most famous articulation of this new arrangement between church and state is Emperor Justinian the Great's Sixth Novel (reign 527-64 A.D.), the cornerstone of Byzantine political theory:
The church and the empire are the greatest gifts that God, out of his supreme clemency, has given to men. The church concerns things divine; the empire presides over the world of man. Proceeding from the same principle, they both embellish human life. The emperors should take care to honor the church that prays ceaselessly to God for their salvation. If the church is pure in its habits, and the empire, fully confident in God, wisely administers the republic, then this arrangement will result in all good things for man.9

Although the two institutions are distinct from each other, both church and state work hand-in-hand for the common good. The emperor calls church councils and enforce its decrees, but the clergy solely decides the contents of those decrees.

This complementary combination of church and state, the Byzantine symbol of *symphonia*, is reiterated in the *Epanagoge*, a constitutional project that sought to define the powers of the emperor and the patriarch. The *Epanagoge* started under the reign of Basil I Macedonian and Patriarch Leo VI the Wise (reign 867-912), but it was never published in its entirety. However, parts of it are found in the *Synopsis Basilicorum*, Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’s tenth-century compendium of laws, and in the Byzantine jurist Mattheus Blastares’ *Syntagma Alphabeticum omnium quae in sacris divinisque canonibus comprehensur*6. The *Epanagoge* restates the Justinian Sixth Novel:

> the state, like man, is formed of its parts and members. The most important and necessary parts are the emperor and the patriarch. Thus, the subjects’ spiritual and material peace and happiness are in the full accord and agreement of the empire and the church.7

Like man, the empire is composed of both the body (the state) and the soul (the church) for the common good of justice and Orthodoxy. The duties assigned to the emperor are to submit to both civil and canon law and to defend the Orthodox faith:

> The emperor is the legitimate authority for the common good of all the subjects [which was] consigned in the Holy Scriptures, established by the Seven Holy
Synods, and made into laws by the Roman emperors. It is the emperor's duty to 
defend in the most explicit way the true conception of God and piety, so that all 
may praise him for his zeal and devotion towards God.¹

For his part, the patriarch is to interpret canon law and Orthodox dogma and doctrine:

To the patriarch alone belongs the right to interpret the laws established by the 
Church Fathers and the Holy Synods. It is incumbent upon the patriarch to 
interpret these laws that were established by the Church Fathers.²

The different concerns of the emperor and the patriarch assist each other: the emperor 
enforces the dogmatic unity of the universal church and the patriarch defines that dogmatic 
unity. Unlike the Latin West, the Byzantine arrangement gives a distinct place for both 
the church and the state in order to foster cooperation, not conflict, in the governance of 
the empire.

The symbol of the New Christian Empire, symphonia, sprang from the division of 
the Roman Empire into its Eastern and Western halves. When Rome was invaded by the 
barbarians, symphonia became the sole symbol of order in the East. Byzantine 
independence, both political and ecclesiastical, fully emerged when the Western Roman 
Empire had collapsed. With the lack of any competing Christian symbol, cooperation, not 
separation, between church and state would become the dominant paradigm by which the 
East and thereby the Slavs would understand church-state relations.

Even prior to the collapse of Rome, there had been a growing cultural conflict 
between the Western and Eastern Empires. This rupture between Rome and 
Constantinople came to a head at a church council convened by Emperor Justinian II. The 
council abolished Latin customs in the Byzantine church, replaced Latin with Greek as the 
official language throughout the empire, and declared that the title of universal patriarch 
applied to the Patriarch of Constantinople, even if this title was restricted only to his own
These three events would have been enough to end relations between Rome and Constantinople, but it took Patriarch Photius's excommunication of the Latin pope and the Emperor's criticism of papal policies in Bulgaria to permanently sour relations between East and West.11

More acrimonious exchanges between the two empires followed. In response to Pope Nicholas' ridicule of the Byzantine Church as "the imitation of a Jewish king," Constantinople convoked a church council that excommunicated the pope. A series of schisms between the two churches subsequently occurred, culminating in Pope Leo IX's excommunication of the Patriarch of Constantinople and Cerularius's retaliatory excommunication. By this time the existence of two "universal" churches had become a fact. Ecclesiastical independence from Rome was now a fait accompli. Symphonia was the only symbol of right order in the East.

Although Byzantine political theory argues for cooperation between church and state, lapses in this practical arrangement have taken place in Byzantium.12 Yet, in spite of these lapses, there is no evidence to suggest a Gnostic Casearo-Papism in Byzantine political theory: the emperor as head of both church and state. According to the Epanagoge, if the emperor interferes with the content of religious dogma, the patriarch must "charge severely those who are disobedient, and to speak without shame before the emperor for the truth and for the defense of the holy dogma."13 Though in practice the patriarch's protestations may go unheard, the Byzantine emperors are in theory to submit themselves to Orthodox canon law, dogma, and tradition. Even the Synod of Constantinople in 1087, a synod which granted the emperor the right to legislate in certain ecclesiastical affairs, does not radically break with past Orthodox practice.14 Echoing the
second book of Emperor Constantine VII's *De Cerimoniis*, the Constantinople Synod merely reiterates the procedures for electing and ordaining the archbishops of Byzantium: the emperor selects three candidates for the patriarchal see and later confers upon one of them imperial approval. The charge of Casearo-Papism in Byzantine political theory therefore is incorrect.

Admittedly the Byzantine arrangements between church and state strike one as theocratic: an absolute emperor enforces the decrees, dogma, and doctrine of the Orthodox Church; he is the symbol of unity of his empire, of both church and state; and he is the Orthodox *Autokrator* who is granted absolute power. The clergy do not direct the state; rather, they respect the independence of secular authority, whether by choice or by circumstance. Given the powers of the emperor and the weakness of the clergy, the disruption of the Byzantine arrangement between church and state is more likely to come from the state than from the church. Although sometimes the symbols and ideologies of both church and state are identical, it is not the church that has sought to dominate the state but the state that has sought to dominate, and at times succeeded in dominating, the church.

2.2 Paganism: Cosmological Symbols

Prior to its conversion to Christianity, Kievan Rus elites had expressed themselves in cosmological symbols of order. Because of the dearth of written records and the scarcity of archeological artifacts, little is known about the precise nature of these symbols, and what is known is greatly debated among scholars. For example, Vernadsky argues that the Sun was the pagan symbol that united the various Slavic tribes, while Fedotov contends that the core of Russian paganism is the worship of Mother Earth.
Stender-Petersen distinguishes between aristocratic gods, celestial deities, peasant gods, and cults that were centered around the mother earth. In spite of the lack of evidence, what is generally agreed upon by scholars is the cosmological nature of these pagan symbols: the Sun-King, the Cult, and Mother Earth.

In Russian pagan mythology, the Sun-King rules on his radiant throne in the sky. He governs the twelve kingdoms of the Zodiac with his sons and daughters, who assist him in his rule. Following the cycle of the four seasons, the Sun King enacts the cosmic drama of birth on the winter solstice and death during the fall harvest festivals. The rhythmic cycle of the Sun-King's birth, life, death, and re-birth makes him a cosmological symbol of order.

The second symbol, the Cult, appears in the spring when the Ardent God, Iarilo, arrives and reigns over the universe until the summer solstice. Families, clans, and cults would celebrate Iarilo's arrival in song, dance, and ritual. The cult therefore was the social and political organizing principle for pagan Kievan Rus, as Sandoz points out:

The impact of the rod or clan cult was such that it shaped all social life in Russia, extending it to the form of family life so that all moral relations among men were symbolized at the level of blood kinship. The patriarchal character of life found expression in a wide variety of ways. The entire Russian nation could be regarded as an immense clan of whom the tsar was the earthly father – an idea well developed in the nineteenth century by the Slavophiles. The collective consciousness of the mir, or Russian village community, was but one aspect of the veneration of the parents characteristics of the rod cult.

The pagan spring celebrations centered not only around the re-birth of nature but also focused on burial rites from which the third pagan symbol, Mother Earth, emerges.

The burial practices of pagan Russians focused on the symbol of Mother Earth. Special days were set aside for the prayer of one's ancestors in the belief that they would
reappear on earth from the underworld. The symbol of Mother Earth was one of regeneration that followed the cycle of nature. Like the Sun-King, the symbol of Mother Earth enacted the cosmic drama of birth, life, death, and re-birth.²⁴

The symbols of the Sun-King, the Cult, and Mother Earth covered all aspects of the pagan's life: his world-view of the cosmos, his social interaction with others, and his understanding of death. These symbols are cosmological and therefore are a less differentiated understanding of truth when they compared to the soteriological symbols of Christianity. Although these cosmological symbols would eventually become displaced by Christian symbols, the pagan symbols would retain their power and influence among Russians so that the Russians Christian would often be described as one of double-faith (*dvoeverie*): a simultaneous adherent to both Christianity and pagan practices. Christianity in the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church may initially have triumphed in Vladimir's conversion, but its total victory was far from complete.

**2.3 Pre-Christian Kievan Rus**

(c.860-c.988 A.D.)

Due to geographical location and economic circumstance, Russia became one of the first converts to Byzantine civilization and Eastern Orthodoxy. The Dniepr river system became the main artery whereby civilization come into Russia, with Kiev and Novgorod emerging as the centers of commerce, civilization, and Christianity for the Russian tribes.²⁵ Although initial relations between Russia and Constantinople were unfriendly, Russian princes and princesses eventually became baptized into the Orthodox faith, and the Russian Church became part of the ecclesiastical machinery of St. Sophia in...
Without a doubt the most famous of these baptisms were those of Princess Olga in 955 A.D. and her grandson Prince Vladimir in 988 A.D. Although the year 988 is conventionally accepted as the date upon which Russia converted to Christianity, there were Christians at the prince's court at Kiev and elsewhere throughout the realm. The tale of Apostle Andrew's visit to Russia and the conversion of Bravlin are two mythological narratives that attest to the presence of Christianity in Russia prior to 988. More importantly, these tales would influence Russians' conception of themselves as late as the sixteenth century, when Ivan IV informed the papal envoy Antonio Possevino that Russia had received Christianity from "Andrew, the brother of the Apostle Peter . . . We in Moscow received the Christian faith here in Muscovy at the same time as you received it in Italy." The story of Andrew's visit had left its mark: the first Russian church was dedicated to St. Andrew, and the first Russian princes under Vladimir Monomashich were known as Andrew. Although initially insignificant, the myth of the Apostle Andrew would be critical for Russia when she began to assert her ecclesiastical independence from Constantinople.

Patriarch Photius's encyclical also confirms the existence of Christianity in Kievan Rus before 988. After the 860 siege of Constantinople by the Varangian chieftains Askold and Dir, Patriarch Photius announced to the Patriarch of the East that the people of Rus had:

exchanged their pagan teachings for the pure faith, having made themselves our subjects and friends . . . and had accepted a bishop and a pastor, and were embracing the religious rituals of Christianity with zeal and fervor.

Later, in 874, Patriarch Ignatius, successor to Photius, sent a bishop to the "people of Rhos" to convert the entire kingdom to Christianity; and the burial places of Askold and
Dir became the sites for the churches of St. Nicholas and St. Irina. The two princes, Askold and Dir, would rule Kiev until 882, when they were killed by the soldiers of Riurikovich's kinsman Oleg.

The successor to Askold and Dir, Oleg (reign 882-912), was a resolute pagan. The chronicles describes Oleg's reign with military exploits and with references to the pagan gods. The first reference to the existence of Christians is the years 913-914 under the reign of Igor, Oleg's successor. After two raids on Byzantium in 941 and 944, a treaty was concluded between the Greeks and Igor's envoys. A description of the oath-taking ceremony in Constantinople makes references to God and the pagan God, Perun:

in the morning Igor called his envoys and went down to the hill where the statue of Perun stood. They laid down their gold and arms. Igor and his pagan Russians took the oath, while the Christian Russians took the oath in St. Elias Church . . .

Christianity had taken root in Kievan Rus. But the princes revealed no sign of converting to Christianity. In fact, the opposite occurred. When Olga, already a Christian, attempted to convert her son, Sviatoslav, the successor to Igor, she was rebuffed: "he ignored what she said and did not listen to her." Sviatoslav's retinue would laugh at him if he converted. Olga's reply, "If you are baptized, then everyone will do the same," only made Sviatoslav angry with his mother. Although Sviatoslav did not convert to Christianity, he was not actively hostile to it. There is no evidence of persecution of Christians or a revival of pagan faith. Instead, Sviatoslav seemed preoccupied with military exploits rather than religious matters.

The time and place of Olga's conversion are points that academics have not yet settled. The dates given for her conversion range from 946 to 960 and the place may have been Constantinople or Kiev. The Primary Chronicle places it at Constantinople and
says that Olga was baptized by both the emperor and the patriarch. She traveled to Constantinople in 946 to convert to Christianity and to reinforce the trade agreements of the 944 treaty, two events on which the Primary Chronicle sheds little light. The Chronicle does mention Olga’s return as a Christian but she is unable to convert her son; and the only evidence of the growth of Christianity is the consecration of a second church dedicated to St. Sofia in 952.

In 959, according to a chronicle written by Adalbert, later the first archbishop of Magdenburg, envoys from Olga arrive at “the court of King Otto of Germany in Frank-am-Main asking for a bishop and a priest to be sent to Russia.” The envoys were successful: Libertius was consecrated as a “bishop of the Russian people,” but he never went to Russia and died in 961. Aldalbert was appointed in his place but his mission to Russia ended in failure and he returned home in 962. There are no details about his mission to Russia. One can only speculate about the difficulty of converting the Russians to a Latin liturgy rather than to Church Slavonic, which was intelligible to both Bulgarians and the Russo-Varangian Christians. In its first attempt of conversion, Latin Christianity had failed.

The death of Olga in 969 marked the end of Christian conversion until the baptism of her grandson Vladimir in 988. The period between the death of Olga (969) and the baptism of Vladimir (988) is characterized by a revival of paganism under Iaropolk and Vladimir. After Vladimir’s conquest of Kiev, paganism resurfaced when a pantheon was built to the Russian pagan gods:

When Vladimir ruled Kiev alone, he set up idols on the hills outside the place: Perun, made of wood with a silver head and a golden moustache, Khors, Dazhdbog, Stribog, Simargl, and Mokosh. The people sacrificed to them, calling
them gods; and they brought their sons and daughters and sacrificed them to the devils . . .  

The pantheon was more than a place of worship; it was also a place of human sacrifice. The Primary Chronicle under the year 983 describes the martyrdom of two Varangian Christians, father and son, “from the Greeks”; but, the story later refers to a boy and girl as sacrificed by the elders and boyars. Which it is possible that this story was written by a later chronicler who sought to emphasize the horrors of Vladimir’s paganism, it is nonetheless fairly reasonable to conclude that human sacrifices did take place under Vladimir’s reign.

2.4 Vladimir’s Baptism  
(c.988 A.D.)

Vladimir’s motives for converting to Christianity are unclear. Did he act to please his grandmother and half-brother? Was he attempting to weld together the various ethnic elements of his realm? A look at Vladimir’s conversion may reveal some answers to these questions.

The Primary Chronicle’s account of Vladimir’s baptism is divided into three parts: 1) a description about the arrival of Muslim, Roman, Jewish, and Greek missionaries who outline the basic tenets of their faiths to Vladimir; 2) Vladimir’s decision to send envoys to investigate the Muslim, German (i.e., Catholic), and Greek faiths, and the envoys’s subsequent report of Constantinople which brings him around to baptism; and 3) Vladimir’s capture of Cherson, his wedding to Emperor Basil II’s sister Anna, his baptism in Cherson, and his return to Kiev, where the baptism of the Russian people began.

Although it is impossible to distinguish fact from fiction in this account, a few things are known. Vladimir did dispatch considerable military support to Emperor Basil II
between 988 and 995. In this light, Vladimir’s capture of Cherson was probably to quash
a rebellion against the Emperor, after which Vladimir was rewarded with the hand of the
Emperors’ sister, Anna. The spiritual, cultural, and military bonds between Kiev and
Constantinople were cemented with the marriage of Vladimir to Anna. Vladimir would
had to be baptized in the Orthodox faith, though there is no evidence about who baptized
him and how the baptism was conducted. Given this situation, lacking any real alternative,
Vladimir probably had no other choice than to accept Christianity from the Greeks.

It not clear whether the emperor required Vladimir’s baptism so as to incorporate a
new ally, the Kievan state, into the Byzantine Commonwealth, or to reward Vladimir for
his suppression of the rebellion at Cherson. On the one hand, the evidence would seem to
suggest the latter since the emperor demanded only that Vladimir, not the Russian people,
to be baptized. On the other hand, it was Orthodox and Russian custom that if the prince
were to convert to a new religion, the people would follow.

Regardless of Constantinople elites’s motives, Christian missionaries were sent to
Russia to convert the populace. According to Nicephorus Callistus’s Church History,
“Feofilakt is promoted from [the metropolitan see] of the Sebastians to Russia.” There
is no information about how many bishops and priests Feofilakt brought with him to Kiev.
The Primary Chronicle’s version of Vladimir’s actions when he returned from Cherson in
989 is typical of what one expects from tales of conversion: the destruction of pagan idols
and the baptism of the Russian people. The statue of Perun was thrown into the river and
floated downstream into the Black Sea, and Vladimir issued a command that anyone not
baptized would be considered his enemy. The people went to the river filled “with joy,”
for “if this were not good, the prince and boyars would not have accepted it.”
It is doubtful that all the people embraced baptism as joyfully as the *Chronicle* claims, given that paganism was later to resurface later in Russian history. Still, Christianity made progress in Russia through the conversion of the Russian people, particularly the children “of the best people,” and the construction of a dozen churches under Vladimir’s reign. Equally important, Vladimir’s program of national conversion reflected the spirit of the Orthodox Church in its symphonic form. Church and state worked together in the conversion of the Russian people to the one, true Orthodox faith. Christianity had arrived in the form of *symphonia* in Kievan Rus.

### 2.5 Kievan Christian Rus (c.988-c.1240 A.D.)

The first, biggest, and most persistent obstacle confronting the new Church was pagan practices, beliefs, and festivals. The pagan practice of worshiping the elements and making sacrifices to them continued to be a substantial threat to Christianity. Cosmological truth would not easily be displaced by the soteriological insights of Christianity. In answering the monk Iakov’s questions about Church canon law, Metropolitan Ioann II (1076/7-89) linked pagan sacrifices, marriages, and polygamy as evils to be combated:

> For those who make sacrifices to the devils, bogs, and wells, and those who marry without blessing and who reject their wives . . . all these people are foreign to our faith and are cast out by the Church.47

But it was the professional wizards and witches that proved to be a greater threat to the Church. Metropolitan Ioann II’s injunction reveals how much importance he placed on the problem of sorcery:

> Those who perform sorcery and magic must be exposed and deterred from their wicked deeds by words and instruction. If they do not refrain from their evil, then
they must be fiercely punished in order to deter them from their wickedness. But they neither should be killed nor should their flesh be slashed, for this is not accepted by the teaching and instruction of the Church.48

Sorceries and pagan practices were a major hindrance to the consolidation of Christianity in Russia, especially given its popular appeal with its magical devices, medicinal skills, and pagan festivals such as the autumnal festival of Rod and Rozhanitsy (deities of fertility). The Church's strategy to supplant these festivals ranged from cooption (e.g., the Christian festival of the Nativity of the Mother of God on 8 September) to admonishments that linked natural disasters to the celebration of pagan rituals.49 The failure to remove these festivals of dancing, singing, and acting resulted in a "double faith": Russians were considered Christians who engaged in pagan practices.

It is difficult to assess whether the persistence of paganism stems from social unrest or dissatisfaction with the Church. Obviously, with its energy spent on developing an efficient network of monasteries, churches, and parishes, the Church was not in a position to counteract these festivals. If we look at the Primary Chronicle, we find no evidence of either a pagan renaissance or a Christian replacement. Pre-Christian beliefs co-existed with the new ideas of Christianity. In short, the soteriological symbols of Christianity had to compete with the still influential cosmological symbols of paganism.

The Russian Church's relation with the Latin Church was more civilized if not less cordial than with the pagans. Inheriting Christianity from Constantinople instead of Rome, the Russian Church held a suspicious eye to its Latin brethren, especially since all the Russian metropolitans except two had been Greek.50 Metropolitan Ioann II advised monks not to celebrate with "those who serve [the Liturgy] with azymes (opresenikom) and who eat meat in Shrovetide and eat strangled meat"; and his predecessor,
Metropolitan Gregory, warned his monks: “it is not right to take Communion from the Latins, or take a prayer from them, or to drink from one cup with them, or to eat with them, or to give them food.” But for the most part, the Russian Church displayed a curious, moderate, and tolerant attitude towards its Latin brothers. There is no evidence of direct antagonism between the Russian and Catholic Churches.

This tolerance is evident in the marriage between three of Yaroslav's sisters and three of his daughters to western rulers, against Metropolitan Ioann's prohibitions of inter-Church marriages. Yaroslav's practice of inter-Church marriage continued until 1204, well after the two Churches had formally split in 1054. It was the fourth and last crusade, the sacking of Constantinople in 1204, that led to a Russian anti-Latin resentment. Though there were no Russians involved in the Fourth Crusade, it can be reasonably assumed that Russian attitudes towards the Latins were the same as that among the Greek hierarchy in Nicaea. Still, it would take several hundred years before the Russian Church, in conjunction with the state, would become outright hostile to the Latin West, i.e., when Russia emerged from its Tatar yoke and was confronted with the might of Catholic Lithuania, Poland, and the Teutonic Knights.

Unfortunately for Russia, the sacking of Constantinople did not lead to a Byzantine Renaissance in Kiev as it would in Catholic Italy. Although the Russian Church was influenced by and subordinate to the Constantinople see, it did not inherit the Byzantine culture of classical literature, Greek philosophy, and the Church Fathers' theology. As one scholar put it, “Kievan Russia was not the heir to the intellectual world of Byzantine culture but the obscurantism of Byzantine monasticism ... any idea of a high level of intellectual culture in Kievan Russia must be dismissed.” Yet it was this
obscurantist monasticism that was not only the center of learning, albeit mostly translated
literature, but was also the center that played a role in the Kievan Rus politics.

Unlike monasteries in the Latin West, Orthodox monasteries were independent
entities that sometimes fell into conflict with both the church and the state. The biography
of St. Feodosy's life (died 1074) reveals a monastery that actively engaged the world by
criticizing the conduct of political leaders, providing charitable services to the poor, and
becoming the center of cultural and political exchanges. In this period, the example of
Grigory, Abbot of the Kiev Monastery of St. Andrew, reveals the mediating role that
monasteries played in Russian national life. When Prince Vsevolod Olgovich raised seven
thousand Polovtsians to wage war upon Prince Mstislav of Kiev because the latter was
protecting Vsevolod's uncle, Sviatoslav, the Abbot Grigory convoked a congress of clergy
in Kiev (sboriereyskiy) to release Prince Mstislav of his duty to protect Sviatoslav. He
was handed over and war was averted.

The metropolitans themselves also played a mediating role between Russian
princes. Metropolitan Nikolai (1092-1104) prevented a war between Prince Vladimir
Monomashich and Prince Svyatopolk Izyaslavich. Izyaslavich gave approval for David
Igorevich to blind his cousin, who also happened to be a relative of Prince Vladimir
Monomashich, Vasilko Rostislavich. Prince Izyaslavich tried to explain this series of
actions to Prince Monomashich, a powerful prince but not yet ruler of Kiev; but Prince
Monomashich dismissed the explanation and sought retribution. War was imminent.
But acting on behest of the “people of Kiev,” Metropolitan Nikolai, with Vladimir’s
stepmother, begged Prince Monomashich:
"Do not to destroy the Russian land by the fighting the prince of Kiev [Svyatopolk Izyaslavich]. If you fight among each other," they said, "the pagans will rejoice and take your land, and you will ruin the Russian land."  

The *Primary Chronicle* is silent about the details of the metropolitan's plea, but Prince Vladimir did not attack, and war again was averted.

Metropolitan Nikolai's and Abbot Grigory's actions are typical of Russian Church intervention in pre-Mongolian Russian political life: Metropolitan Mikhail as an intermediary agent between the Monomashich and the Olgovich in the years 1134-1140; Metropolitan Feodor as a reconciler between Prince Rostislav Mstislavich of Kiev and Sviatoslav Olgovich of Chernigov in 1161; Metropolitan Kirill I as a peacemaker among the various princely branches between the years 1223-1237. In brief, the Church's involvement in Russian political life was limited to negotiations among the various princely tribes. The office of the metropolitan made an ideal choice as a mediator because he could release a person's oath to the Cross and he could administer the ceremony of kissing the Cross, as was done to mark the end of quarrels.

The Church sought to establish greater independence from the state after the election of Metropolitan Kirill I (1224-33), who also restored friendly relations with the Kievan Monastery of the Caves. Kirill I's aim of an independent church was further bolstered by an epistle sent from Patriarch Germanus II in which the Patriarch commands:

> all the pious princes are ordered on pain of excommunication to refrain from the possessions of the churches and monasteries . . . and to refrain from episcopal jurisdiction concerning divorces, ravishments, abduction; for the divine and holy canons and Christian law command only bishops to judge and correct these misdeeds.

The threat of excommunication for the appropriation of church possession, particularly land, was critical since the main source of wealth for the Church was landed property,
usually tithes from princes and fines derived from an array of legal matters (e.g., theft, marriages, corpse-robbing). These legal affairs were in the purview of the church, not the state: “it is not right for these cases to be judged by the princes or his boyars.”62 Because the Russian clergy, unlike its Greek counterpart, was relatively landless, it had to rely heavily upon fines on its parishioners when they broke the ecclesiastical law. The Russian Church's strategy therefore was to coincide their legal procedures with those of the state as much as possible, the collection of revenue being to the mutual advantage of both parties.

With the exception of political mediation, the Russian Church refrained from state politics. Given the size of the dioceses and the fact that most of the metropolitans were Greek, the lack of greater Church involvement hardly strikes one as surprising. Though the Church had an active role in the life of the state, it was restricted to negotiations. In the framework of Byzantine political theory, the Russian Church, both as an institution and as a symbol, did not reveal any Gnostic tendencies towards in its involvement of Russian political life – that was still a few centuries away. However, if relations were congenial between the Russian Church and the princely state, they were less so between Kiev and Constantinople.

2.6 Constantinople
(c.988-c.1240 A.D.)

Attaining the goal of becoming autocephalous would be the driving force of the Russian Orthodox Church until it was granted that status in 1448. The dispute between Kiev and Constantinople played itself out on the issue of the appointment of metropolitan (and later the bishop) in Kiev. According to canon twenty-eight of the Fourth Ecumenical
Council in 451, metropolitans outside the patriarchate are "consecrated by the archbishop of Constantinople, after the according election accomplished in the accustomed manner and communicated to the see of Constantinople." In other words, the patriarch had jurisdiction over the Russian Church, but he did not have the right to appoint the metropolitan independently of the consent of the Russian clergy. With respect to bishops, the Chronicle reveals three methods of selection: appointment by the metropolitan of Kiev, appointment by a local prince, or appointment by local popular election.

Iaroslav the Wise used this power of appointment in 1051 to name a priest to succeed Theopemptus as metropolitan; however, the princes no longer practiced this custom upon Iaroslav's death in 1054. Soon afterwards, Constantinople appointed a Greek, Ephraim, to the metropolitan see. The practice of appointment and consecration from the tenth century onwards became one whereby the patriarch selected the candidates to be consecrated. A special patriarchal synod then elected three candidates from whom the patriarch selected one. This procedure continued to be applied to the selection of Russian metropolitans before 1240: twenty out of twenty-two Russian metropolitans were Greek.

The two Russians, Ilarion (1051-54) and Klim (1147-55), were elected by a council of Russian bishops. Although these two Russian appointments were a break from the appointment by patriarchal synod, they cannot be interpreted signifying a break from Constantinople. One suspects poor communication between Kiev and Constantinople resulted in Ilarion's election, while political infighting between two Russian tribes, the Olgovichs and the Monomashichs, resulted in Klim's election.
Klim's predecessor, Mikhail (1130-45) had acted as a mediator between these two tribes, though he often sided with the Olgovichs. When Prince Izyaslav Mstislavich (reign 1146-54) became the Grand Prince of Kiev, he convened a council of Russian bishops to elect a new metropolitan. According to the Hypatian Chronicle, Klim was appointed metropolitan by the council over the objections of the bishops of Novgorod and Smolensk.

These two bishops wrote to the Grand Prince:

It is not according to the law for you to appoint a metropolitan without the patriarch: the patriarch appoints the metropolitan. We shall not revere you and we shall not serve with you, for you have not received the blessing either from St. Sophia or from the patriarch. If you make amends and are consecrated by the patriarch, then we shall revere you.6

But by invoking the twenty-eighth canon of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, the Russian clergy and the Grand Prince could legitimately elect Klim as metropolitan of Kievan Rus. Like Ilyarion's election, Klim's appointment therefore cannot be construed as a break from Constantinople, especially since the patriarchal see was vacant at the time. However, unlike Ilyarion's election, Klim's appointment was a calculation of pure politics: Klim's status depended solely on Izyaslav's political stock.

The first dispute between Kiev Rus and Byzantium broke out in July 1147. The Grand Prince Izyaslav Mstislavich had Bishop Clement of Smolensk elected Metropolitan of Kiev. Clement later became ordained by a Russian synod that was independent of Constantinople.69 Prince Dologruki, unhappy about the election, asked Constantinople for a new appointment. The Patriarch Constantine IV agreed with Prince Dologruki, asking for Clement's removal.70 The Patriarch declared that "nothing in the law empowered the bishops to ordain a metropolitan without the patriarch" and that Clement's election was illegal because he "did not receive St. Sophia's benediction from the patriarch."71 The
election of Bishop Clement to metropolitan was even controversial in his own flock: the Bishop of Novgorod, not recognizing him, had written to him:

If you had not received the benediction from St. Sophia, and from the great Holy Synod, and from the patriarch, then I cannot serve with you, nor can I repeat your name in the divine service, but I shall name the patriarch.72

Metropolitan Clement was ousted in 1158 and replaced by Constantine I who, according to the wishes of Grand Prince Rostislav Mstislavich in 1160, replaced by another Greek, Theodore.

The death of Metropolitan Theodore in 1163 called for another appointment, this going to Metropolitan John and sent from Constantinople.73 However, Prince Rostislav refused the new prelate from Constantinople unless the patriarch agreed to the following condition: the Russian Grand Prince's approval must be secured before a new metropolitan may assume his office.74 This condition not only changed the ecclesiastical relations between Kiev and Constantinople but those between the Russian church and state. Princely control of the church hierarchy was now established. The death of Metropolitan John in 1166 brought to the forefront the question of whether this new condition would be honored by the Patriarch in Constantinople. It was. Prince Rostislav convoked a synod of bishops to elect Metropolitan Constantine II.

Under Constantine II's reign, we discover the first recorded example of the state meddling in ecclesiastical affairs. The expulsion of Bishop Anthony, encouraged by the abbot of the Kievan Monastery of the Caves and carried out by the prince of Chernigov, revealed the ineffectiveness of the metropolitan's office when bullied by the state. With Constantine II's support, Bishop Anthony condemned the prince of Chernigov and the abbot of the Monastery of the Caves for not fasting (i.e., not refraining from eating meat)
on Wednesdays and Fridays of the Great Festivals. Annoyed by the bishop's prohibition, the prince of Chernigov threw Anthony out of his episcopate. \textsuperscript{75} Constantine II was unable to prevent the unjustifiable expulsion of one of his bishops.

Twenty years later, Metropolitan Nikifor II's appointment of Nikolai as bishop of Rostov was rejected by the Grand Prince Vsevolod III because Nikolai was a Greek and not a Russian. Grand Prince Vsevolod requested that the metropolitan "appoint Luka... abbot of St. Savior" for the job. \textsuperscript{76} The \textit{Southern Hypatian Chronicle} then goes into great detail about how Metropolitan Nikifor II becomes humiliated and ultimately, against his will, appoints Luke as bishop of Rostov "owing to the great coercion of Vsevolod and Sviatoslav." \textsuperscript{77}

\section*{2.7 Conclusion}

It should be emphasized, however, that state inference in church affairs was more the exception than the rule in Kievan Rus. The state generally refrained from ecclesiastical matters, especially with the election of metropolitans. Although Kievan princes had some say in who was elected metropolitan, they for the most part refrained from interfering in the process. Byzantine control over the Russian Church would reign unfettered, though this control was relatively hands-off since the metropolitans were loyal and subservient to the Emperor of Constantinople and the Grand Prince of Kiev, until the year 1448. \textsuperscript{78}

Metropolitans of Kievan Rus were able to conduct their duties – consecrate churches, princes, and bishops; consolidate and close sees; and occasionally remove unsatisfactory bishops – relatively free from lay interference.

By inheriting the Byzantine symbol of \textit{symphonia} from Constantinople, the Russian Orthodox Church emerged as a symbol of right order for Kievan Rus. Although
it competed with the cosmological symbols of paganism, the soteriological truth of the
Russian Orthodox Church became the sole organizing principle for Russian society.

Having the structure of their consciousness shaped by the paradigm of symphonia, the
Russian Orthodox Church's metropolitans promoted the Church as a symbol of right order
for Kievan Rus. The Grand Princes, too, accepted this symphonic paradigm. Both the
elites of the church and of the state understood the Russian Orthodox Church to be a
symbol of right order.

2.8 End Notes

1. Baynes, Norman Hepburn. Constantine the Great and the Christian Church (London:
Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1972), 4-7; Mommsen, Th. and Paul
Meyer, ed., Theodosiani Libri XVI cum Constitutionibus Sirmondianis et Leges novellae
ad Theodosianum pertinentes, vol. 1, bk. 2 (Berlin: Apud Weidmannos, 1905), 884-85.

l’Institut de philologie et d’histoire orientales, ed. Mélanges Bidez, vol. 2 (Bruxelles:
1934), 17. The Hellenistic influence of the philosopher Diotogenes is especially noticeable
in Eusebius' political philosophy. According to Diotogenes, the state requires order and
harmony because it is a mimesis of the divine cosmos. The state therefore is an analog to
the cosmos as the king is to God; consequently, the king’s duty is to imitate God Himself.

Leclecq, 1908), 733; also see Ibid., vol. 3, bk. 1, 492.

4. Ibid., 734.

5. Schöll, F. and G. Kroll, ed., Corpus Iuris Civilis, vol. 3 (Berlin Apud Weidmannos,
1904-11), 35.

6. Zachariae von Lingenthal, Carolus Eduardus. Collectio librorum juris graecoroma-
num ineditorum. Ecloga Leonis et Constantini, espanagoge Basili Leonis et
Alexandri, vol. 4 (Leipzig: 1865), 177; vol. 5, viii-ix, 130, 542; also see Beveridge,
William. Synodicon sive pandectae canonum SS. apostolorum et conciliorum ab ecclesia
graeca receptorum, vol. 2 (Oxford: 1672), 1-272; Leunclavius, J. Juris Graeco-Romani
tam canonici quam civilis, vol. 2, bk. 1 (Frankfort: 1596), 79.

7. Zachariae von Lingenthal, Carolus Eduardus. Collectio librorum juris graecoroma-
num ineditorum. Ecloga Leonis et Constantini, espanagoge Basili Leonis et
8. Ibid., 181.

9. Ibid., 181-82.


12. The failures of Emperors Zeno (reign 474-491), Anastaius I (reign 491-518), and Michael VIII Palaeologus (reign 1259-82) to control the Church demonstrates that the clergy's ecclesiastical and theological loyalty was first and foremost to the Patriarch. There is no ecclesiastical evidence that supports secular intervention in theological matters.


16. Although Byzantine political theory provides the emperor the power of excommunication, a power which seems to be strictly in the purview of the patriarch and the bishops, the emperor can only excommunicate his subjects when he has to enforce Orthodox dogma, not for secular or political purposes.

17. The Roman law, "what pleases the prince is law," eventually became codified in Justinian law. Later, Emperor Leo VI would update the Byzantine constitution so that political theory would reflect political practice: the emperor would be granted full legislative and executive functions of the state, as stated in his seventy-eighth Novel. Schöll, F. and G. Kroll, ed., Corpus Iuris Civilis, vol. 1 (Berlin Apud Weidmannos, 1904-11), 1; also see Ibid., vol. 1, bk. 2, 6; vol. 1, bk. 4, 1.

18. Byzantine political theory blurs the distinction between church and state ideologies: loyalty to the church is loyalty to the state. The treatment of heretics especially brings this point to light, as stated in the Epanagoge: "ex legibus et ex canonibus vocantur." Heretics excluded from the church are also excluded from the state. Zachariae von Lingenthal, Carolus Eduardus. Collectio librorum juris graeco-romanum ineditorum. Ecloga Leonis et Constantini, espanagoge Basili Leonis et Alexandri, vol. 4 (Leipzig: 1865), 182.


25. An examination of the Russo-Byzantine treatise of 907, 944, and 971 indicate the importance of these relations. Vladimirski-Budanov, M. *Khristomatia po istorii russkago prava*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1885), 1-20.

26. Soloviev, S. *Istoriia Rossii s Dreveishikh Vremen*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1894-95), cols. 111-13. Also refer to Hefele, C. J. *Historie des conciles*, vol. 2, bk. 2 (Paris: trad. de l'allemand par Leclecq, 1908), 815. According to Canon 28 of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, Constantinople was now a new "Rome," which had the right to consecrate "bishops for the parts of the dioceses occupied by the barbarians."

27. All dates hereafter will be A.D. unless otherwise noted.

28. The *Primary Chronicle* (*Povest vremennykh let*, hereafter *PVL*) mentions the tale about the Apostle Andrew's visit to Kiev and Novgorod. Andrew predicted that Kiev would be "a great town with many churches." (*PVL* vol. 1, 12); also see *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey* vol. 2, cols. 6-7 (hereafter *PSRL*). However, this account is contradicted by a passage from the same *Chronicle* that attests that neither Andrew nor any apostle had ever set a foot inside Russia (*PVL* vol. 1, 12). There is no historical records of a Bravlins existing in the eighth and ninth centuries. Regardless of the "historical accuracy" of these accounts, it is clear that these stories influenced Russians' own self-conception of themselves as heirs of Christ via. Andrew's visit. Likhachev, D. S. and B.A. Romanov, ed., *Povest vremennykh let*, 2 vols., (Moscow-Leningrad: 1950); and *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey*, 37 vols. (Leningrad, St. Petersburg, and Moscow: 1901-1982).

30. PVL vol.1, 137; PRSL vol. 2, col. 197. The princes' names were Andrey Dobrii (d. 1142) and Andrei Bogolyubsky (d. 1174).


32. Theasphanes Continuatus (Bonn: 1838), 342-3.; also see PVL, vol. 1, 20.


34. Ibid., vol. 1, 39.

35. Ibid., vol. 1, 46.


37. PVL, vol. 1, p.44.

38. Regino of Prüm, Chronicon cum Continuacione Treverensi, ed. F. Kurze (Hannover:, 1890), 170.


40. PVL, vol. 1, 56.

41. Ibid., vol. 1, 58-9.

42. Ibid., vol. 1, 59-83.


50. For the history of the schism between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches, please refer to S. Runciman's *The Eastern Schism: A Study fo the Papacy and the Eastern Churches during the Xith and XIIth Centuries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 53-90, and T. Ware's *The Orthodox Church* (Harmondsworth, 1963), 51-81.

51. *RIB*, vol. 6, col. 3 (No. 4).

52. *Ibid.*, vol. 6, col. 7 (No. 13).


54. Examples of criticizing political authorities can be found in "Life," in *Pamyatniki literaturny Drevney Rusi, XI-nachalo XII veka* (hereafter *PLDR*) (Moscow: 1978), 376; also please refer to *Ibid.*, 362.

55. The metropolitan would have taken this course of action; however, the see was vacant at the time. *PSRL*, vol. 1, cols. 296-7; vol. 2, cols. 290-2.


60. PSRL, vol. 1, col. 455-6; vol. 1, col. 448; vol. 2, col. 753.

61. RIB, vol. 6, cols. 82-4.


64. For an example of royal appointment, please refer to Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg and Moscow: 1841-1949), 138; for an example of popular, local election, please refer to Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg and Moscow: 1841-1949), 21.


67. PVL, vol. 1, 104.


69. Ibid., vol. 2, 78.

70. Ibid., vol. 2, 79.


74. Ibid.; also seeSoloviev, S. Istorii Rossii s Dreveishikh Vremen, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg: 1894-95), col. 725.

75. PSRL, vol. 1, cols. 354-5.

76. Ibid., vol. 2, cols. 629-30.

77. Ibid., vol. 2, cols. 629-30.
78. The reign of Rostislav Mstislavich (1159-67) is an example of how the prince of Kiev tried to influence the selection process of metropolitan. He attempted to have Klim reinstated as metropolitan but failed and accepted the candidate from Constantinople as well as the many gifts he brought with him. *PVL*, vol. 1, 137.
CHAPTER 3: MUSCOVITE RUSSIA
(c.1240-c.1448 A.D.)

3.1 The Tatar Yoke
(c.1240-c.1480 A.D.)

There were two symbols that forged a sense of national identity for Kievan Rus: the Russian Orthodox Church and the Grand Prince of Vladimir. The former was Russia's link to classical and Christian civilization; the latter was indigenous. Both symbols were required for the symphonic arrangement between church and state in Russia. The metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church oversaw the people's spiritual needs while the Grand Prince maintained order in society and enforced the dogma, doctrine, and decrees of the Church.

Unfortunately for this ideal, between c.1240-c.1380, a series of weak princes filled the office of the grand prince, the sole exception being Alexander Nevskii (1252-63) who defeated the Swedes in 1240 and the Teutonic Knights in 1242. However, Nevskii himself was subordinate to Tatar rule and suppressed dissent to Tatar policies, especially in Novgorod. Although later canonized by the Russian Church, resurrected by Catherine I and Joseph Stalin, and popularized for the many in Eisenstein's famous film, Alexander Nevskii should be remembered more for his policies against Russian independence than for his defeat of western devils. His refusal to aid his brothers against the Mongol army at Galicia in 1242, his imposition of the 1260 Mongolian census on Novgorod, and his abstainment from the spontaneous uprising of northern cities against the Tatars in 1262: all paint a picture of Alexander Nevskii different from that of defender of Holy Mother Russia.¹

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The collapse of the symbol of the Grand Prince and, more generally, of Kievan Rus can partly be traced to the outmoded system of lateral inheritance that had governed Vladimir’s descendants until the end of the thirteenth century. The system of lateral inheritance produced social disorganization and political fragmentation which made it impossible for any single prince to forge a national sense of unity. Russian princes found themselves no match for the Mongols from the south, the Teutonic Knights from the west, and the Lithuanians from the south-west.

The Mongol rule, more commonly known as the Tatar yoke, split northern and southern Russia in two, with Suzdal, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, and Ryazan in the north and separated from Kiev, Chernigov, and Pereyaslavl in the south. Establishing a number of strategic centers throughout the Kievan empire, the Mongolian baskaki could hold a tight rein on the Russian princes, especially in matters of taxation. Besides paying tribute to the Mongols, Russian princes had to travel to Karakorum in Mongolia in order to receive the patent for their office (yarlyki). This journey, particularly difficult for the Russian princes in the north, effectively paralyzed them as a political force.

Although they kept a strict watch over the Russian princes, the Mongols were tolerant and protective of the Russian Church. Having encountered a variety of religions – Christianity, Manicheism, Buddhism, and Islam – the Mongols held all holy men in equal esteem and thereby gave no preference to any one religion. The Church’s property therefore was protected from state interference and exempt from Mongol taxation. When Ivan IV began his policy of secularization, Metropolitan Makary reminded the tsar:

many of the impious tsars [khans] took nothing from the holy churches and the monasteries, nor did they dare to move things immovable . . . forbidding anyone to offend or remove these things.
The Holy Church, right up to the present day, has received favor from the unbelievers and the pagans. But strive, princes and boyars, to show charity to the holy churches so that you may not be put to shame on the day of judgment.6

Because of Mongol tolerance and protection, the Russian Church seemed to play a more active role in Russian politics, though it is difficult to assess whether this is due to the political situation at the time, the growing self-confidence of the Church, or increased documentation of the era.

3.2 Muscovite Russia
(c.1240-c.1380 A.D.)

The first metropolitan to make his presence felt on the political stage was Kirill II (c.1250-81), the first Russian metropolitan since Klim in the twelfth century. Though his title was the "metropolitan of Kiev and all Russia," Kirill spent most of his time in northern Russia. He had visited Alexander Nevskii in Novgorod in 1251 to cure him of a "grievous sickness" by "means of his prayers" and later consecrated him as grand prince in the same year. He also accompanied him on a military campaign against the Swedes in 1256 and buried him in 1263.7 His other known visits to northern Russia were in 1270, when he intervened in Novgorod on behalf of Grand Prince Yaroslav; in 274, when he consecrated Seapion as bishop of Vladimir; and in 1280-81, when he settled a conflict with the bishop of Rostov.8 Kirill died on 27 November 1281 and his remains were interred at the cathedral of St. Sofia.9

Kirill's intervention in Novgorod merits special attention because it is the first active use of the Church as a weapon in local conflicts. The Tatar yoke had effectively paralyzed any national power other than the Russian Orthodox Church to settle domestic conflicts. When the Grand Prince Yaroslav was confronted by the possibility of rebellion
in the city of Novgorod, he relied upon his ultimate weapon, the Church. Metropolitan Kirill issued a message to the Novgorodians, threatening them with excommunication if they did not submit to the Grand Prince, for "God has entrusted me with the Russian lands, so listen to God and to me." The Novgorodians blinked.

Kirill also received the so-called Photian Nomocanon from Bulgaria in 1262-70 which he used at the church council at Vladimir in 1274. The Photian Nomocanon is a Slavonic translation of commentaries of the Byzantine canonists Balsamon, Zonaras, and Aristinus. A Greek writer named Nomocanon published their commentaries in fourteen chapters under Patriarch Photius in 885. Incorporated into Russian Church canon law, the Photian Nomocanon became part of the Kormchaia Kniga, the ecclesiastical code for the Russian Church. Constantinople still made its influence felt in Russia.

Before Kirill's successor, Peter, arrived in Russia, a new and later extinguished metropolitanate was established in Galicia. In 1303 Yury I Lovovich requested that Emperor Andronicus II and Patriarch Athanasius I raise the bishopric of Galicia to a metropolitanate, a request that was granted. The life of the Galician metropolitanate, however, was short-lived; and the emperor and patriarch decided to consecrate Peter as sole metropolitan of Kiev and all Russia. With his hopes dashed, Yury sought a possible union with Pope Clement V of the Catholic Church.

From Constantinople, Peter arrived in Russia in 1309 and visited Moscow at a time of which two insignificant principalities in northeastern Russia, Moscow and Tver, began to exert their political and economic authority. These two principalities were soon engaged in a protracted war from which Moscow ultimately emerging victorious in 1331. As a reward for its victory, Ivan I, whose descendants would rule Russia until the
death of Tsar Theodore in 1598, received the yarlyki of the grand principality from the
Great Kipchak Khan Uzbeg (1312-41).14 By both securing the office of the grand prince
and gaining the support of the Church, Ivan inherited the mantle of the Kievan Rus. The
twin symbols of Russian national identity – the Grand Prince and the Metropolitan of the
Russian Orthodox Church – were now located in Moscow. Moscow had now eclipsed
Kiev as the symbol of Russia.

The fact that Metropolitan Peter fell into the Moscow camp is not surprising since
Mikhail of Tver’s candidate for metropolitan was passed over in Constantinople.15 Peter
supported Moscow in a wide range of affairs from the Brysank incident of 1309 to the
Tverite expedition, from Novgorod in 1311 to the appointment of his own followers in the
offices of bishop.16 But it was in the year 1326, when Peter had become a resident of
Moscow and begun the building of his own burial vault, that a turning point occurred in
the history of Church. On 20 December 1326 Metropolitan Peter died and was buried by
one of the bishops of Little Russia in the presence of Grand Prince Ivan I.17 Due to his
residency and burial place, Metropolitan Peter had conferred upon Moscow the future
haven of Russian Orthodoxy, though the official transfer from Vladimir to Moscow would
not take place until the reign of Metropolitan Alexis.18 Recognizing Peter’s contribution to
the House of Moscow, Ivan initiated Peter’s canonization at the Council of Vladimir in
1327 by submitting a list of miracles.19 After Peter’s canonization, his biography or Life
was composed by Metropolitan Kirprian. As one would expect, it was filled with anti-
Tver sentiments.20

Metropolitan Feognost (1328-53), Peter’s successor, also befriended Moscow. His
reign is best noted for the retention of a single see which in turn bolstered Moscow’s cause
against Lithuania. There were three attempts to establish a rival metropolitanate, all of which were crushed by Feognost: 1) the metropolitan of Galich, 2) the metropolitan of Little Russia, and 3) the metropolitan of Kiev. The Russian Orthodox Church would remain a symbol of national unity. Feognost's determination to retain a single see brought forth the temporary political alliance between Little Russia and Moscow, an alliance that was especially useful when both principalities were confronted with the new threat of King Casimir III of Poland who "came and took the land of Volynia by cunning and did much evil to the Christians and converted the Christians churches to the Latin faith abhorrent to God." Metropolitan Feognost also assisted Moscow in its campaign against Tver. At the siege of Pskov, which was holding Prince Alexander of Tver, Feognost threaten to excommunicate all of Pskov. Alexander left Pskov, and all of Pskov surrendered to Ivan. Another example of Feognost's pro-Moscow leanings is his closing of all the churches when Semen of Moscow was to wed Maria, sister of Vsevolod of Tver. Eventually a compromise was reached with the marriage approved after "certain spiritual counseling." Feognost also contributed to Moscow's tightening grip over Novgorod. Thus, Metropolitan Feognost not only retained and consolidated his metropolitanate, but significantly contributed to the principality of Moscow and its continual dominance over northeast Russia.

Metropolitan Alexis continued Feognost's political contributions to Moscow, though he was unable to retain a single see. His greatest political success was at Novgorod when, for only the second time in Russian history, the metropolitan closed all
the churches as Dmitrii of Moscow advanced towards the city.27 Novgorod surrendered without bloodshed.

But if Alexis's actions at Novgorod can be construed as noble, his actions at Moscow were despicable. Alexis promised the leader of Tver safe conduct into Moscow, a promise which was broken. The prince of Tver eventually was set free due to Mongol interference.28 All credibility evaporated for Alexis. His excommunication of Mikhail of Tver no longer held weight, even when Patriarch Philotheus backed Alexis's action.29 Alexis died on 12 February 1378.30

The political idea of Byzantine symphonia came to maturity in Russia, specifically in Moscow, under the primacies of Feognost and Alexis: it entailed close cooperation and mutual support between the metropolitan and the grand prince of northeast Russia. According to Veselovsky, the metropolitan estate was virtually "a semi-independent vassal principality."31 Metropolitans had complete juridical and fiscal rights in their own territories, with the sole exception during a time of war. In this event, the metropolitan became a subject who was obliged to serve under the supreme command of the grand prince: "as for war, should I myself, the grand prince, mount my horse, then so too will the metropolitan's boyars and servants, but under the metropolitan's general and under my grand-princely banner."32 The symphonic ideal seemed to have been achieved between the Metropolitan of the Russian Church and the Grand Prince of Vladimir.

The church was not the only ecclesiastical player in Russian politics. The monastery occasionally contributed to the Muscovite princes, besides its duties of charity. St. Sergius of Radonezh, Abbot of the Trinity Monastery, was a key player in the 1365 closure of the churches in Novgorod.33 He also completed a successful mission to Prince
Oleg of Ryazan in 1385, convincing the prince not to wage war against Moscow and to agree to a permanent peace treaty. Sergius blessed Grand Prince Dmitrii on the eve of the battle of Kulikov in 1380. Having been blessed by Sergius, who had prophetically assured him victory, Dmitrii was inspired to fight. On 8 September 1380 at Kulikov Fields near the river Don, Dmitrii did just that. Although the Mongols would regroup themselves and sack Moscow the following year, their aura of invincibility was shattered.

Dmitrii had forever altered the attitudes of Russians towards their Mongols masters.

In addition to his victory over the Mongols, Dmitrii (reign 1359-89), son of Ivan II, managed to secure the title the Grand Prince of Vladimir for the House of Moscow. He bequeathed the principality of Moscow to his eldest son, Basil, in his will. It now belonged to the House of Moscow as recognized by northeast Russia and the Golden Horde; and it was the first time that the office of the Grand Prince was sanctioned by law.

The lands of Moscow and the title of the Grand Prince of Vladimir became the sole possessions of Dmitrii's descendants, excluded from any other branches of the Riurikovichs. The symbolic significance of the permanent retention of the office of the grand prince cannot be overstated: Moscow had secured one of the symbols of Russian national identity. All that was left for Russia to emerge as a universal symbol of right order was for the Russian Orthodox Church to become both autocephalous and patriarchal.

3.3 Consolidation of Order
(c.1380-c.1430 A.D.)

The physical relocation of the Russian Orthodox Church from Kiev to Moscow had not been a difficult move, especially with Russia under the Tatar yoke. But the death
of Alexis ushered in twelve years of political and ecclesiastical chaos among the principalities of Russia, Lithuania, and Byzantium. Metropolitans with various titles—"of great Russia," "of all Russia," "of Kiev and Great Russia," "of Kiev and Lithuania"—were appointed, dismissed, and reappointed by emperors, grand-princes, and patriarchs.

By 1381 Russia had two metropolitans: Pimen, who was metropolitan of "Kiev and Great Russia" or "Kiev and all Russia," and Kiprian, who was metropolitan of "Little Russia and the Lithuanians" or "Kiev, Great Russia, Lithuania, and Little Russia."38 Later, two more candidates for the metropolitanate, an anti-Dmitrii bishop, Dionisy and Dmitrii Donsky, came into the picture.39 The confusion over the metropolitanate was resolved when a committee from Constantinople was sent in to look into the problem. Kirprian, it was decided, was the one to become consecrated at Constantinople. He arrived to Moscow on 6 March 1390, where he was "received with great honor" by the new Grand Prince Basil I.: "the confusion (myatezh) in the metropolitanate ceased, and there was one metropolitanate Kiev and Galich and all Russia."40

Metropolitan Kiprian's reign (1390-1406) was characterized by attempts to strengthen relations among Russia, Poland, and Lithuania. He even talked about a union between the Orthodox and Latin Churches. However, this idea soon became quashed by Constantinople because Greek participants were prevented from attending the proposed council by the Turks' siege.41

The only other account we have of Kiprian interfering in ecclesiastical affairs is his excommunication of Novgorod in 1391 to prevent its independence. Kirprian had left Novgorod "without blessing their Bishop Ioann and all the Novgorodians for their trampling on that which were entrusted to God."42 The metropolitan returned to
Novgorod two years later with an ecclesiastical delegation from Constantinople. This time the Archbishop of Novgorod caved in, and Kiprian “blessed him” together with “all great Novgorod.”43 After a colorful first twelve years, Kiprian spent the last sixteen in promoting the church's, not the state's, interests in a period of relatively peace. He died on 16 September 1406.44

Besides the ecclesiastical confusion, the Church was for the first time subjected to a state tax in order to pay tribute to the khan.45 Having granted Basil I (reign 1389-1425) an additional patent for Novgorod and other city-states, the Mongols's tribute substantially increased.46 Later, Basil drew up an agreement between himself and Metropolitan Kiprian that guaranteed Church payment to the Horde until Russia was liberated: “Should we give tribute to the Tatars, then church people shall pay; should we not give tribute, then church people shall not pay duty.”47 The Church is “with true heart [to] pray to God for us and for our race and bless us.”

The Church was beginning to change its attitudes towards the Tatars. An example of this change in sentiment can be found in the Narration of the Death of Metropolitan Peter. According to the author, Peter's last liturgy was for the “pious Prince Ivan and for the defunct tsars and all pious princes.”48 The Mongols no longer were seen as benevolent, tolerant benefactors by the Church. The portrayal of the likes of Tamerlane and others as threats to the Church indicated that the Church sought greater cooperation with the state's anti-Mongolian policy.49

The most significant contribution of the Church to Moscow's anti-Mongolian policy was its ability to influence public opinion about them because only the clergy controlled the written word.50 Initially the Mongols were portrayed as heathens sent by
God to punish Russian Christians: they were neither benevolent nor malevolent. Tossed in with Russian princes and natural disasters, the Mongols were God's punishment to Russia for man's sins. Occasionally the Mongols were viewed in the light of "rewarded by God and the tsar"; but generally speaking, they were seen as impartial, impersonal forces sent by God (pushcheniem Bozhiem) because of the sins of the Russians (mnozhestva radi grekh nashikh). These attitudes would radically change in the mid-fifteenth century, when Moscow begun to emerge from underneath the Tatar yoke. The Mongols would be described as pagans and devils.

The emergence of a self-confident Moscow principality irked not only the Golden Horde but also Constantinople. Patriarch Anthony IV of Constantinople sent a missive to Basil in 1393 that chided him for refusing to recognize the Byzantine Emperor as head of all Christendom. In the letter the patriarch reiterates the principles codified in the Byzantine Epanagoge and instructs Basil to follow them. Exactly what Basil did to cause offense is not clear. In any event, the patriarch opens the letter by acknowledging Basil's and the metropolitan's sovereignty over all of Russia: "Most noble Grand Prince of Moscow and all Russia... Metropolitan of Kiev and all of Russia." Anthony continues by informing Basil that the prince is "son of the church and obliged to obey and to be corrected" and that:

Christians reject only those emperors who have been heretics, who raged against the church, and who introduced corrupted dogma foreign to the teaching of the apostles and fathers.

Essentially Anthony reiterates the principles of the Epanagoge, laid down five centuries before, as a guide for church-state relations: the patriarch interprets the content of dogma and the sovereign, free of heresy, defends the church.
Anthony, however, does not accuse Basil of violating the principles of the *Epanagoge*; rather, he upbraids the Grand Prince for his estrangement from Constantinople’s sphere of political influence:

It is said that you do not wish the metropolitan to say the divine name of the Emperor in the diptychs. This is not good. The Holy Emperor occupies a high place in the Church: he is not as others like local princes and sovereigns. From the very beginning, the Emperor had established and strengthen Christian piety throughout the Empire. The Emperors convoked the ecumenical councils, they sanctioned the laws, they fight against heresies, and they, together with the councils, set the boundaries of the metropolitan districts and episcopal eparchies. Everywhere where Christians are only named, the name of the Emperor is mentioned by all patriarchs, metropolitans, and bishops.57

Fear God and obey the Emperor, said St. Peter... By the grace of God, the Autocrat is not only most exalted and holy but also the most Orthodox – the eternal defender and avenger of the Church.58

It is not possible for Christians to have a church and not to have an Emperor. For the empire and the church are in a close union and relation between them, and it is impossible to separate the one from the other.59

Finally, Anthony closes the letter by appealing to the innate authority of the patriarch, who occupies Christ’s place here on earth:

by whom the prince is placed upon the throne... Therefore, I am persuading you and advising your majesty to obey the patriarch as you would obey Christ Himself.60

The outcome of this dispute is not known. But what is important for our interests is the reiteration of the principles of the *Epanagoge* in Patriarch Anthony’s letter to Grand Prince Basil I. The emperor’s special relationship to the Orthodox Church, his sacred character, the supreme authority of the patriarch in matters of dogma and doctrine, and the universalist concepts of Byzantium: all are there in Anthony’s letter. Simply put, the patriarch’s letter is evidence of a direct transmission of Byzantine political theory from Constantinople to Moscow.
The successor to Metropolitan Kiprian was Metropolitan Foty who, like his predecessors, supported Moscow and protected the possessions of the Church that fell under Polish and Lithuanian rule. Consecrated on 1 September 1408, Metropolitan Foty traveled to Kiev in order to establish friendly relations with Prince Vitvot of Kiev and to move all of the church possessions to Moscow:

From the beginning the metropolitans of all Russia have had Kiev as their see. But now Kiev has been reduced to nothing and everything has been removed from it to Moscow. Metropolitan Foty has transferred all the adornments of the church [St. Sofia] to Moscow, and he has ruined all Kiev by heavy taxes and intolerable tributes.61

Needless to say, Prince Vitvot was upset at Foty's actions and began a campaign to elect his own metropolitan that succeed on 15 November 1415 when Grigory Tsamblak, a Bulgarian, was appointed metropolitan of Kiev.62 A comedy of errors subsequently occurred with a reconciliation between Foty and Vitovt, the former dying on 2 July 1431 and the latter on 24 October 1430.63

Foty's relationships with Basil I and II was better but equally as complicated. The death of Basil I in 1425 left only nine year old son, Basil II, as heir to the throne, that his fifty year old uncle, Yury Dmitrievich, coveted.64 Foty requested that Yury come to Moscow but the latter refused. A council of state was convened with Foty, Basil's three uncles, Sofia Vitovtovna, and "all the princes and boyars." They decided both that Yury was a threat to the throne and "to send their father the metropolitan, Foty, to Prince Yury."65 Foty arrived at Galich and concluded a temporary truce; however, talks later broke down so Foty resorted to excommunication: "In a fury the metropolitan refused to bless and his city and departed," a departure which coincided with the Black Death in

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Galich. Yury finally relented and submitted to Basil II. Civil war once again was averted.

3.4 The Rejection of Rome
(c.1438-c.1448 A.D.)

Not off long, after Foty's death, civil war between Basil II and his enemies quickly followed. Each side secured two victories and sought a union with Rome to obtain western military aid. The metropolitan throne would remain vacant for the next six years until Isidor, a Greek who out-maneuvered a Russian, became metropolitan of Kiev and all Russia. Although the patriarch overlooked Iona, the candidate of Basil II, the Grand Prince grudgingly accepted Isidor:

As a result of the entreaties of the Emperor's envoys and the blessing of the Most Holy Patriarch, we agree – but only just agree – to receive him. When his deep grief and self-abasement had won us over, we accepted him with great honor and zeal... just like our former metropolitans, thinking that he was one of them and not knowing what deed would eventually be done by him. The "deed," of course, refers to Isidor's support of the union of the Orthodox Church with Rome at the Councils of Ferrara and Florence. At the time, however, nobody suspected him of this, though the Chronicle does say that Basil II tried to prevent Isidor from attending the Eighth Latin Council so he "would not be led astray by their heresy." Basil II required Isidor to promise that he would "strengthen the faith and unite the Church in Orthodoxy." Whether Basil II actually required Isidor to pledge himself to the Orthodox faith before he departed to Florence is questionable. More than likely, the Chronicle is engaging in post hoc reasoning to place Basil II in a better light. The Council of Ferrara opened on 9 April 1438 with the question of Purgatory. The Greeks didn't understand the theological concept and consequently did not agree to it;
however, it was not an obstacle to further discussion. Next was the question of the *filioque*: was it an addition or a clarification? Between 8 October 1438 to 10 January 1439, the session became deadlocked between Cardinal Cesarini for the Latin Church and Metropolitanss Mark of Ephesus and Bessarion of Nicaea for the Orthodox one. Before any resolution on this topic could be arrived at, a plague had struck Ferrara in early 1439 so Pope Eugene IV proposed moving the Council to Florence.

From 2 March to 2 June 1439, the subject of *filioque* was reexamined in terms of the dogma of the procession of the Holy Spirit with Bessarion, Isidor, and the lay philosopher George Scholarius conceding to the unionist position, while Metropolitan Dositheus of Monembasia and Anthony of Heraclea devotedly remained anti-unionist. Emperor John VIII agreed to the Decree of the Union on 5 July 1439, agreed to by all except for Mark of Ephesus. The only Russian prelate at the Council, Bishop Avraamy of Suzdal, signed, but only under duress: “he did not wish [to sign], but Metropolitan Isidor arrested and imprisoned him for a whole week. Then he signed under constraint.” Those who supported the union became cardinals and received pensions; among them was Isidor, the Pope’s favorite: “not one metropolitan did the pope love as much as Isidor.”

When the Greeks returned to Constantinople, they found a population opposed to the union and nobody resolute enough to enforce it. And to add insult to injury, no western military aid was sent. The crusade preached by Pope Eugene IV had ended in defeat for the Christians at Varna by Sultan Murad in 1444. The populace shared the sentiments of Luke Notaras, the Grand Admiral of the Fleet: “Better the Sultan’s turban than the Pope’s mitre.” Constantinople fell to the Turks in January 1454, and a non-unionist patriarch was invested.
Metropolitan Isidor would fare no better in Moscow. On his return home, Isidor in Buda issued an encyclical in March 1440 “to the Polish, Lithuanians, and German lands and to all Orthodox Christian Russia.” It declared that the two churches were now a union but that both churches could continue their respective practices, such as leavened and unleavened bread. It did not mention the Creed or the supremacy of the pope.

Before reaching Moscow, Isidor paid a visit at Smolensk, where the local Lithuanian prince, Yurgy Semenovich-Lugvenevich, arrested him. Having been tipped off by the Russian envoy and monk Simeon, Prince Yurgy "put two iron shackles" on Isidor, who "spent the whole winter bare-legged and wearing a small jacket, suffering cold, hunger, and thirst."

Shackled, hungry, and cold, Isidor finally arrived in Moscow on 19 March 1441.

According to the Simeon, Isidor entered Moscow:

With great pride, falsehood, and Latin arrogance, he carried before him a Latin crucifix and a silver crozier. Should anyone not bow down before the crucifix he ordered them to be beaten with the crozier, as is done in the presence of the pope.

When the metropolitan entered the holy cathedral church of Mother of God and served the Liturgy, he commemorated Pope Eugene without mention of the Orthodox patriarchs and then announced the Eighth Council in a letter from the pope that proclaimed that the "Eastern Church is now one with us."

Basil II, "realizing the delusion of the metropolitan," ordered Isidor to "be cast out from his spiritual rank for such soul-destroying heresy, to be expelled from the town of Moscow and from all his land."

Isidor was subsequently arrested and imprisoned in the Chudov Monastery.
The chroniclers do one better than Simeon in their account of Isidor’s arrival and arrest. According to their version, Basil was the only one who recognized: “the wolfish predatory of Isidor’s heresy, while the princes, the boyars and many others – especially the Russian bishops – remained silent, slumbered and fell asleep.”7 Thanks to his steadfast devotion to the one, true Orthodox faith, Basil:

shamed Isidor, calling him neither his pastor nor teacher, but a wicked and baneful wolf. All the bishops of Russia who were then in Moscow woke up, and all the princes and boyars came to their senses . . . began to call Isidor a heretic.”8

After listening to Isidor’s heresy, Basil II:

refused to receive his blessing, called him a heretical Latin deceiver, and quickly ordered that he be expelled from his throne . . . and that he stay in the Monastery until he be investigated according to the divine sacred canons of the holy Apostles and the seven councils of the Church Fathers.”9

On 15 September 1441 Isidor managed to escape from imprisonment and fled to Rome.90 A synod of six bishops was convened and concluded that Isidor’s business “is alien and different from the divine and holy canons.”91 A new Russian metropolitan was required as called for by the “God-loving bishops of our fatherland.”92

Not only was Isidor’s imprisonment a violation of the Byzantine arrangement between church and state – no layman had the authority to arrest a metropolitan for ecclesiastical reasons – but the Russian Church was legally obligated to accept the Orthodox Church’s union with Rome. The Russian Church, as under the control of the see of Constantinople, should have inserted the filioque in their Creed, acknowledged the supremacy of the pope, and accepted the Latin teaching on Purgatory, unleavened bread, and the celibacy of the white clergy.93 It had no authority, and certainly no lay authority,
to reject Pope Eugene's letter. It was a clear violation of the Byzantine idea of symphonia.

Yet the rejection of Council and the expulsion of Isidor provided the Russian Orthodox Church the occasion to end its dependence upon Constantinople. By ending all nominal allegiance of the Russian clergy to the Orthodox Church in Constantinople, Basil saw an opportunity that could not be missed. The Russian Orthodox Church's rejection of the Orthodox Church in Constantinople would also be a rejection of the emperor in Constantinople. Both church and state elites in Russia would be a step closer to its goal of leadership in the Orthodox world.

3.5 The Autocephalous Church (1448 A.D.)

The departure of Isidor left a seven year gap before the next appointment to the Russian metropolitan and patriarchal see. Civil wars, Mongol invasions, and the pro-union patriarchs in Constantinople are to blame for the delay. In 1441-42 a civil war erupted between Dmitrii Shemyaka, nephew of Basil II, and the Grand Prince; in 1442-43 plague, drought, and famine scourged the land; in 1444 the Mongols attacked Novgorod and Murom; in 1445 the Russian army was defeated, and Basil was taken prisoner and returned to Moscow; in 1446 Basil, setting off for a pilgrimage to Trinity Monastery, was captured, blinded, and sent into exile to Uglich; later in 1446 Basil recognized Shemyaka as the Grand Prince and ruler of Moscow; in 1447 Basil secured absolution from his oath, convinced Boris of Tver to become his ally, and re-entered Moscow. Shemyaka fled Moscow and found refuge in Novgorod, dying there in 1453.

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Given this series of events, it was no wonder why Metropolitan-elect Iona had to wait seven years before consecration. He had the full support of Basil until 1446, when the latter had been captured by Shemyaka. However, Basil managed to send his two sons, Ivan (the future Ivan III) and Iurii, to Murom, a place friendly to Basil. Promising to release Basil if the two children would leave Murom and agree to be raised under his care, Shemyaka asked for Iona to be an escort for the children thereby guaranteeing their safety. Once the children were in his custody, however, Shemyaka reneged on his promise: he imprisoned Basil in Moscow. Causing widespread resentment in Moscow, Iona admonished Shemyaka:

You have broken your word; you have led me into sin and shame, you should have released the prince, and yet you imprisoned his children with him. You gave me your word and they listened to me. And now I am immersed in lies. Free him and remove this burden from my soul and from your soul.

Shemyaka did what Iona demanded. Basil II was released in September 1446 and returned victorious to Moscow in February 1447.

Iona is considered by the chroniclers to be at first disloyal to the grand prince when he escorted his children from Murom to Moscow. Only when Shemyaka's supporters begin to desert him does Iona act independent of Shemyaka by rebuking him. Iona joins the rest of the senior bishops of Russia, except for the ones from Novgorod and Tver, in the condemnation of Shemyaka for being "in contact with adherents of different faiths (sinovertsi), with pagans, with many other lands and planning to destroy them and his little children and to ruin all Orthodox Christianity." Shemyaka was urged by his friends to submit to the grand prince and repent for his sins; otherwise, he will excommunicated. The condemnation may not have been initiated by Iona; but he did write to the "Lithuanian..."
princes, boyars, governors and people" about Shemyaka: "You know, my sons, what happened because Dmitrii Yurevich, how much evil and destruction of our land was caused and how much Christian blood was spilled."\(^{100}\)

Was Iona a blackguard? Ultimately, it remains unknown whether Iona was loyal or disloyal to Basil in the final phases of the civil war. Zimin certainly thinks so, while Lure refers to Iona as a duplicitous figure who played both princes off each other.\(^{101}\) It is probably the case in the year 1446 that with Basil blinded and in exile and Shemyaka reigning supreme in Moscow Iona had little choice in his actions. Like the communist period, this period of civil war offered the Church leadership a chance for survival, not clerical supremacy.

On 15 December 1448, Iona was at last appointed metropolitan in Moscow with four bishops electing him: Efrem of Rostov, Avraamy of Suzdal, Varlaam of Kolomna, and Pitirim of Perm.\(^{102}\) The archbishops of Novgorod and Tver sent documents that consented to the appointment. More importantly, neither the Grand Prince nor the Patriarch of Constantinople is not mentioned. The Russian Orthodox Church – the Church of Moscow, Kiev, and all Russia – finally had become autocephalous.

3.6 Conclusion

The Russian Orthodox leadership initially perceived the Mongols as impersonal forces sent by God to punish Christian Kievan Rus for its sins. It was only later, when the Muscovite state began to assert its independence under the Tatar yoke, that the Church began to portray the Mongols as oppressors of the Russian people. However, the Church leadership's change in attitudes is not necessarily a sign of disorder for the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church. Because the soteriological truth of Christianity had been given
to Russia in the symbol of symphonia, the Russian Orthodox elites naturally looked for its complementary partner, the state, to help it organize society. Until the Russian state could resurrect itself by overthrowing the Tatar yoke, the Church remained active in Russian politics.

The collapse of Kievan Rus under the Tatar yoke relocated the two symbols of symphonia to Moscow: the Russian Orthodox Church and the Grand Prince. The emergence of Muscovite Russia as a power to challenge the Tatar yoke naturally attracted these symphonic symbols to its capital. Moscow, not Kiev, would now be the center of Russia's secular and spiritual power.

Finally, the Muscovite state's growing power began to cause friction between the Russian Orthodox Church and Constantinople, specifically over the decisions at the Councils of Ferrara and Florence. This disagreement over the Councils of Ferrara and Florence not only led the Russian Orthodox Church to reject the Catholic West, but it also led to the Church's drive towards autocephalous status. Since Constantinople, both politically and theologically, had fallen into disgrace, the Russian Orthodox Church metropolitans and the Grand Princes of Muscovite Russia began to see themselves as the true heirs of soteriological truth; consequently, they required independent status in order to retain their prestige as symbols of right order.

3.7 End Notes


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Six yarlyki have survived from the Mongolian era and have been translated into Russian. They are printed in Pamyatniki prava perioda obrazovaniya russkogo

5. Tikhomirov, N. ed. *Letopisi russkoy literatury i drevnosti* (Moscow: 1859-63), 129-36 (hereafter *LRD*).


7. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey*, vol. 1 (Leningrad: 1920-28), cols 472-3 (hereafter *PSRL*).


15. *Ibid*.

16. *Ibid*.; also see Priselkov, M. D. ed. *Troitskaya letopis* (Moscow-Leningrad: 1950), 354 (hereafter *TL*). One of Peter’s most memorial acts of support for Moscow is his refusal to bless the army of Mikhail of Tver that was led by Dmitrii. Without the metropolitan’s blessing, the army disband and returned home. War was averted.


18. *Ibid*.
19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. The bishop of Galich was the first who attempted to establish a separate metropolitanate in 1331; however, his effort was for naught when he was merely referred to as a bishop at the consecration of Archbishop Basil of Novgorod (NPL, 343). The second attempt took place in the middle of the 1340s due to civil war in Constantinople; but it was soon crushed by Feognost in 1347. Finally, the last attempt at a separate metropolitanate occurred in 1352 by the illegal consecration of Feodorist as metropolitan of Kiev by a Bulgarian patriarch. Eventually, Feodorist was deposed and disappeared from sight. Meyendorff, John. Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteen Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 280-82, 166.

22. After annexing south-west Russia in 1366, Casimir requested his candidate, Bishop Anthony, to be consecrated metropolitan of Little Russia "so that the law of the Russians may not be reduced to chaos, so that it may not disappear." If Anthony was not consecrated, Casimir threatened then "we will be forced to baptize the Russians into the faith of the Latins." The Patriarch of Constantinople, Philotheus, consecrated Anthony, but quarrels persisted about the nature and limits of his metropolitanate (V. N. Beneshevich, ed., "Kanonicheskie otvety mitropolita Ioanna II." in Russkaya istoricheskaya Biblioteka, vol. 6 [Petrograd: 1920], cols. 129-33 [hereafter RIB]; Meyendorff, John. Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteen Century [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 191-2; F. Miklosich and I. Müller, ed. Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani. vol. 1 [Vienna, 1860-62], 578-80 [hereafter APC]). After the consecration of Anthony, Philotheus wrote to Alexis to explain his decision, justifying it by Casimir's threat of Latin baptism, and accused him:

forsaking all Christians there and leaving them without teaching and spiritual care. . . because you have abandoned Little Russia for so many years . . . the King of Poland, Casimir, who rules Little Russia, as well as other princes have sent a bishop from there [Anthony] and letters with him saying that "all the land is without law because the law is in chaos since there is no high priest, therefore we have chosen this good man, Bishop Anthony" (APC, vol. 1, 582-3; RIB, vol. 6, cols. 141-3).

Anthony was eventually removed, but it was neither by Alexis nor Philotheus; rather, Pope Gregory XI ordered the archbishop of Cracow to appoint a Latin bishop to Anthony's metropolitanate and remove the "schismatic bishop." In 1375 the order was carried out and Anthony was forced to flee. Alexis died and was replaced by the Bulgarian Kipiran who would establish peaceful relations among Moscow, Lithuania, and Poland. He was consecrated metropolitan of "Kiev and the Lithuanians" on 2 December 1375 and arrived in Kiev on 9 June 1376 (APC, vol. 2, 120. RIB, vol. 6, col. 206; Meyendorff, John.


24. PSRL, vol. 15, col. 57; also see vol. 10, 218.

25. The one time that an episcopal interdict proved to be ineffectual in the period 1240-1448 occurred when Feognost's and Archbishop Basil refused to bless a military campaign to increase Novgorod's northern empire (APL, 353). The Archbishop eventually submitted to Feognost's ecclesiastical authority (Ibid.).

26. After Feognost's death on 11 March 1353, Alexis became metropolitan in 1354; however, a new emperor and patriarch in Constantinople came to power in that same year, and Roman became consecrated as "metropolitan of the Lithuanians." Both Alexis and Roman returned to Constantinople to establish their respective jurisdictions with Roman gaining Little Russia under his control (Meyendorff, John. Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteen Century [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 168-9, also see PSRL, vol. 15, col. 62, 64-5). Roman, now "fearlessly styling himself metropolitan of Kiev and all Russia, took up his residence in Kiev, causing much confusion and trouble for the eparchy" (APC, vol. 1, 428.; RIB, vol. 6, col. 77). We know that Roman visited Tver.

he came to Tver without having been in friendly contact with the Metropolitan Alexis; and nothing happened according to his will . . . and Fedor, the bishop of Tver, did not see him, nor did he render him honor. And after a short time he went back to Lithuania (PRSL, vol. 10, 231).

But after that visit, nothing else is known about Roman or his activities as metropolitan.

27. PRSL, vol. 11, 2-5.


32. Ibid.
33. *PSRL*, vol. 25, 183; vol. 11, 5. When Dmitrii's army arrived at Novgorod, Sergy closed all the churches doors on behalf of the wishes of the metropolitan and grand prince.

34. *PSRL*, vol. 15, cols. 150-51. Sergius was sent on a peace mission in 1385 after Prince Oleg of Ryazan had sacked the Kolomna, a southern possession of Moscow. He convinced Oleg to "exchange ferocity for gentleness . . . having been put to shame by so holy a man." Sergius concluded a permanent peace treaty with Moscow.


38. Hearing of Alexis's death, Kiprian left Kiev and arrived to Moscow where he was greeted with suspicion by Grand Prince Dmitrii because of Kiprian's Lithuanian sympathies. Subjected to "blasphemies, insults, derisions, thefts, hunger," Kiprian was expelled from Moscow. Dmitrii then appointed his father-confessor, Mikhail, as metropolitan, and Mikhail was consecrated by Patriarch Macarius. Kiprian, for his part, embarked to Constantinople and arrived there in the spring of 1379. The emperor and patriarch in Constantinople were overthrown. With a new emperor and patriarch, Mikhail decided to journey to Constantinople to plead his case as metropolitan. Unfortunately, in September 1379, he died before he reached Constantinople. Instead of returning to Moscow for new instructions, Mikhail's envoy decided to elect one of their own group as a candidate for Alexis's see. The election and later consecration of Pimen as metropolitan of Kiev and Great Russia was possible because Dmitrii had given Mikhail's envoy blank sheets of parchment with the grand prince seal on them (*PSRL*, vol. 15, cols. 126-9; also see Meyendorff, John. *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantine-Russian Relations in the Fourteen Century* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 292-9, 303-6). Once Grand Prince Dmitrii heard this news, he became enraged and sent for Kiprian from Kiev who arrived in Moscow on 23 May 1381, where he was "received by the Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich with great honor and love." In spite of having no canonical authority, Dmitrii nominated Kiprian as metropolitan of "Kiev, Great Russia, Lithuania, and Little Russia" and arrested Pimen (*PSRL*, vol. 15, cols. 131-2, 142-3). The roles between Kiprian and Pimen quickly became reversed as the Mongols sacked and burned Moscow. Left with no choice, Dmitrii pledged his loyalty to the Golden Horde. Kiprian fled to Kiev, and Pimen received the support of the grand prince "from his banishment to Moscow and received him in the metropolitanate in honor and love" (*PSRL*, vol. 15, col. 147). The Russian metropolitanate was split between "Kiev and all Russia" (or Great Russia) under Pimen and "Little Russia and the Lithuanians" under Kiprian.

39. Just to add to the confusion, an anti-Dmitrii bishop, Dionysy, journeyed to Constantinople to inform the patriarch that things were amuck in Moscow. A delegation of two Greek metropolitans was sent to Moscow "to make an inquiry concerning Pimen and to depose him if they find out that indeed he had been consecrated on the basis of
deceit and forged documents” and had the authority to install Dionisy as metropolitan if they so chose (Meyendorff, John. Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteen Century [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 308). While the Greek delegation was examining the Pimen affair, Dionisy was arrested by Prince Vladimir of Kiev (PSRL, vol. 15, col. 149). The delegation concluded that the accusations against Pimen were correct and instructed Pimen to return to Constantinople (PSRL, vol. 15, col. 150). Pimen, the Greek delegation, and Kiprian all returned to Constantinople, where nothing was resolved for the next three years (1386-9). Pimen eventually died in Chalcedon in September 1389, as did his new rival for the metropolitan throne, Dmitrii Donskoy (Meyendorff, John. Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteen Century [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 191-2, 235-8).

40. PSRL, vol. 15, cols. 157-8, 537.


42. PSRL, vol. 10, 126-7.


44. Ibid.


46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 98.


52. *TL*, 363; also see *PRSL*, vol. 10, 206; vol. 15, col. 47, 56.

53. *PRSL*, vol. 15, cols. 76, 85, 97, 139, 164, 454.


55. Ibid.


57. *RIB*, vol. 6, col. 272.

58. Ibid., vol. 6, col. 276; the biblical citation is 1 Peter 2:17

59. Ibid., vol. 6, col. 274.

60. Ibid., vol. 6, col. 270.

61. Ibid., vol. 6, cols. 329-330; also see *PSRL*, vol. 35, 55.

62. In response to Foty's actions, Vitovt summoned all the Orthodox bishops from Lithuania and Galicia so that he could appoint his own candidate for a metropolitan of Lithuania and Galicia and forced them to write a letter that listed all of Foty's abuses. Hearing of this news, Foty journeyed to Kiev in the hope to reach some sort of reconciliation with Vitovt. Instead, Foty was arrested, robbed, and expelled from Kiev. Vitovt's candidate for the Kievan metropolitanate, Grigory Tsamblak, was rejected by Constantinople, probably because Vitovt had been rebaptized as a Catholic. Vitovt reacted by summoning all the Orthodox bishops for a third time to “elect as metropolitan of Kiev Grigory Tsamblak the Bulgarian.” Although the bishops objected on the grounds that “it is not right for two metropolitanas to be in one province,” they submitted because of Vitovt's threat: “If you do not appoint my metropolitan in my land of Kiev, you will a dire death (to zlo umrete).” On 15 November 1415, Grigory Tsamblak the Bulgarian was appointed metropolitan of Kiev “against their will.” The bishops again had to write a joint epistle to justify their actions and cited Foty’s neglect of the Church and the lands of Kiev “laid waste and spurned” and that “we have exiled and expelled Foty from the throne of the metropolitanate of Kiev”; “It is right for us bishops to appoint a metropolitan by a synod, as it is written in the sacred canons: two or three bishops (may) ordain by imposition of hands, that is to say appoint, a metropolitan” with the practices of the Bulgarians and Serbians and the Metropolitan Klim in the eleventh century as precedent for their actions (*PSRL*, vol. 11, 223-30).
63. Foty struck back with an angry letter that was addressed to clergy and laymen alike. He blamed Grigory Tsamblak and the bishops who appointed him. The bishops have broken their oath "not to receive another metropolitan except for the one sent from Constantinople from the catholic and apostolic Church." He ends the letter with a prayer for "the unity of God's Church," the undivided metropolitanate of Kiev and Russia. The Constantinople Patriarch supports Foty in a letter that ex-communicates Grigory and appeals to the bishops to remove him from the metropolitan throne. Neither Foty nor the patriarch blame Vitovt, however (RIB, vol. 6, cols. 315-60). Grigory remains as metropolitan and was sent to the Council of Constance at Rome by Vitovt:

"For what reason, Prince, are you in the Polish faith and not in the Greek?"
Vitovt answered: "If you wish to see not only me but also all the people of my land of Lithuania in the Greek faith, then go to Rome and argue with the Pope and all his wise men; and if you win the argument, then we will all be in the Greek faith and in the Greek custom; but if you do not win the argument, then we shall convert all the people of our land who are of the Greek faith to our western faith." And he sent him together with his papers to Rome and to the Pope (PSRL, vol. 11, 233).

Nothing came out of the Council, and Vitovt seemed to have forgotten that he had threatened the patriarch that he would convert his entire realm to Catholicism. Grigory died in the winter of 1419 and the metropolitanate of Lithuania and Galicia reverted to Foty. Foty and Vitovt eventually became reconciled with one another (PSRL, vol. 12, 9-10).

64. PSRL, vol. 25, 246-7; vol. 26, 183-4
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. RIB, vol. 6, cols. 561, 579.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., cols. 530-1.
70. PSRL, vol. 6, 152, vol. 12, 23-4; vol. 25, 253.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.

75. *Ibid.* Included in his envoy were the monk Simeon who would write the polemical *Tales of the Council of Florence* and the anonymous author of *Journey to the Council of Florence*, the earliest known description of western Europe.


77. For more information, please refer to Gill, J. *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 351-56.


80. *PSRL*, vol. 12, 39; vol. 25, 258.


83. *Ibid.*; also see *PSRL*, vol. 12, 40; vol. 25, 258.

84. *Ibid.*; also see *PSRL*, vol. 15, col. 491


86. *PSRL*, vol. 12, 41.


91. *RIK*, vol. 6, cols. 525-36.


95. Ibid.

96. PSRL, vol. 20, 260.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., vol. 26, 204.


100. RIB vol. 6, No. 64, cols. 452-2; also see his letter to Archbishop Evfirmy of Novgorod in Akty istoricheskie (St. Petersburg: 1841), No. 53, 102.


102. Also refer to PSRL, vol. 26, 208 for the transformation of Efrem's bishopric office into an archbishopric one.
CHAPTER 4: SYMBOLS OF DISORDER  
(c.1448-c.1563 A.D.)

4.1 Symbol of the Tsar

Once the state had become liberated from its Mongol masters, it came into direct conflict with the Russian Church. The controversy centered around church land, specifically monastic property. Russian monasteries traditionally had the unlimited right to acquire land. Its defense of this acquisition was a mixture of divine sanction and human charity, as evident in Kirill Belozersky's letter to Basil II's uncle, upon whose patrimony his monastery depended: "We, your poor ones, having nothing with which to protect ourselves against those who offend us, except for God and the most pure Mother of God and your charter." Other legal documents of the Church incorporate tales of ominous fates befalling robbers of church lands. Prior to Ivan III there was no national threat to church property. It was only when Ivan III became Grand Prince of Russia that the state systemically sought to appropriate church property. In response to Ivan III's policy, the Church devised the theory of the inviolability and inalienability of church property.

The controversy between the church and state over church property had caused internal discord within the leadership of the Church about an appropriate response to state appropriations. Within the Church elites there were those who defended the Church's right to own land, the so-called "Possessors," and those who contended that monastic possessions could only lead to the "downfall of the monks," the "Non-Possessors." The conflict over whether to welcome or to fight the state's appropriation of church land split the Church into two bitter factions. It also left the Church vulnerable to the manipulations of Ivan III.
By 1470 Ivan had consolidated his power to the point where he began to refer to himself with the title tsar of Russia. However, he refrained from repeated usage of this title until 1480 when he achieved full sovereignty. He claimed imperial genealogy not through his Byzantine wife, Sophie, but through Vladimir I’s marriage to Princess Anne:

The tsar’s acts come from the will of God and are known throughout the land. Our tsar is born the great tsar, since the beginning of his ancestors... by the grace of God, Ivan is the great tsar of all Russia, Vladimir, Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, Tver...

Like the Byzantine Emperors of old, Ivan had a divine right to rule all the Russian lands that had been passed down from the family of Rurikovich. In the symbol of the tsar, Ivan III had become heir to the Byzantine title of the Orthodox Autokrator, the head and defender of all of Christendom.

The new title tsar served Ivan III’s political aims of “gathering of the lands.” In 1492 the Russian Church consented to Ivan III’s new title and political program. Metropolitan Zossima (1491-92) announced that the ambition of the Russian Church was inextricably tied to the ambition of the Muscovite state, for as “The Emperor Constantine erected a new Rome, (so has) Ivan, the new Constantine, laid the beginning of a new city of Constantine, Moscow.” The Church would pray for the new "Great Sovereign Tsar of Russia," "for the health and salvation of the noble and Christ-loving Grand Prince of Russia... and for the peace and salvation of all Orthodox Christendom."

The symbol of the tsar is significant because it was universal in its ambition as heir of the Byzantine emperors of classical and Christian civilization. Ivan sought to realize this ambitions in the temporal, not spiritual, realm. The symbol of the tsar therefore was the first of a series of symbols of disorder that ultimately would culminate in the Time of Troubles.
4.2 The Possessors
(c.1503-1505 A.D.)

At the end of the fifteenth century, the Russian clergy was divided into two factions over Church property and the Church's relations to the state.\(^9\) The first faction, the Possessors (also known as the Josephians), sought to preserve the Church's extensive hereditary properties in order to assure that monastic orders had a stable, sufficient income. The monasteries in turn would serve as social and cultural centers that would provide the clergy with worthy and capable officers. The abolishment of church property would result in a decline of monasteries and therefore adequate candidates for the clergy. The idea that monastic property is un-Christian is repudiated by Scripture and civil and canon law. Led by Joseph of Volsk, the Possessors sought to protect church property by taking control of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Success, however, would hinge upon support from the tsar.\(^10\)

The second faction within the Church, the Non-Possessors (also known as Zavoghets or those beyond the Volga), shunned extensive land holdings, as advised by the likes of Metropolitan Cyprian and others.\(^11\) The resurgence of Russian monasticism in the previous two centuries had revived the principles and practices of traditionally ascetic Greek monasticism. The Non-Possessors incorporated these principles into their monastic practices and favored a life of contemplation over social activism. The spokesman of this faction was the Greek-educated Nilus of Sora (1433-1508), who was learned in Byzantine monasticism and literature. According to Nilus, the true Christian does not seek position or status; rather he completely consecrates his life to the spiritual work of contemplation and salvation. As far as the Church is concerned, it should focus

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solely on spiritual contemplation and therefore should be a completely separate entity from the state.\textsuperscript{12}

To resolve this dispute, Ivan III convoked a church council for ecclesiastical discipline and reform in 1503. The question of church property immediately came to the floor. Nilus of Sora, Paisius of Iaroslav, and Prince Vassian Patrikeiev supported state secularization; Joseph of Volsk and his followers argue for clerical preservation. Ultimately, the Possessors won control of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and the Church Council ruled in their favor. According to the Council, clerical properties "are immovable, unshakable, and indestructible estates for ever and ever," i.e., from the time of Grand Prince Vladimir.\textsuperscript{13} The theological basis for this ruling could be found in the \textit{Donatio Constantini}.\textsuperscript{14} The state could not annul the right of church property, for:

\begin{quote}
The Emperor Constantine had said: "the churches have been granted my title, acquisitions, lands, villages, vineyards, and revenues throughout the whole universe. The bishops have authority over these matters . . . all our ancestors, emperors, and princes following us are given this divine and imperial command with the blessing of the Church that no one shall able to annul or interfere with this decree."\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

The Possessors' victory had not only secured clerical property, but also established a new alliance with the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan III.

At first glance, this new alliance would seem to be a marriage of opposites: the Possessors protecting church property from Ivan's continual appropriation of it. The Non-Possessors, who had renounced clerical holdings, would seem to be Ivan's natural allies. However, the Non-Possessors' criticism of authoritarianism and their belief that the state should restrict itself to the material sphere of life had made them an unacceptable partner to the grand prince.\textsuperscript{16} Instead, the Non-Possessors found themselves allied with the boyar class which had fought to retain their traditional

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privileges and prerogatives from the tsar. The alliance between the Possessors and Ivan III was therefore one of quid pro quo: in exchange for clerical support, Ivan would refrain from touching church property and help the Church persecute heretics and other church reformers.

After their victory at the Church Council, the Possessors sought to stamp out heresies of all sorts, the most prominent one known as Judaziers. Appearing first in Novgorod in the 1470s and 1480s, the Judaziers had reached Moscow by the time of Ivan III. They rejected the veneration of icons, believed in astrology, and waited for the prophecies of the Old Testament to be fulfilled. The first known incident of prosecution of a Judazier took place in February 1488 when Ivan referred, over the objections of Non-Possessors, all heretics in question to the civil courts. Undeterred, the Judaziers continued to grow in number and support and even managed to elect one of their own as metropolitan of Moscow. Alarmed, Ivan III called another church council to resolve the matter of heresy in 1504-1505.

For Joseph and his followers, civil punishment of heretics was permissible under Scripture, canon law, imperial precedent, and the necessity of religious purity. Citing St. Peter, Joseph demanded severe treatment of heretics:

The Holy Apostles had said about emperors, princes, and judges: "they have received their power from God to punish evildoers." For St. Peter had said: "obey every command of man, obey the tsar as supreme sovereign, as well as the governors and those sent by him for the punishment of evildoers . . ."

Joseph also cites Constantine the Great, Theodosius, Marcian, Heraclius, and Justin, all emperors who took civil actions against heretics. In order for Christianity to remain uncorrupt, he argued it is necessary to create an Orthodox Autokrator:
If we do not have an Orthodox Autokrator, we will not be able to remove heretics and falsifiers. Let us cast the heretics and falsifiers into prison until their death so that the Church of God may be appeased . . . .

In short, it was the grand prince's moral and political responsibility to punish heretics.

Although Ivan supported the Nilus of Sora, who opposed the civil punishment of heretics, he was dying, and Nilius was absent from the council. On his deathbed, Ivan asked Joseph of Volsk for absolution for his leniency towards heretics. Joseph replied, "Sovereign, only advance now against the present heretics, and God shall forgive you for past things." Ivan submitted to Joseph's request, and the Possessors' triumph was complete. Thus, the two problems that had plagued Ivan III's reign, church property and heresy, had been resolved in favor of the Possessors.

4.3 Joseph of Volsk
(c.1439-c.1507 A.D.)

The political theory of the Possessors is best articulated by its leader, Joseph of Volsk, in the Prosvetitel, a tractate that summarizes most of Joseph's theological and political ideas in its use against the Judaizers. According to Prosvetitel, the tsar is the true representative of God on earth:

The sun has its task to shine on the people of this earth, so the king has his task to take care of those under him. You have received the sceptre of kingship from God in order to satisfy Him. For the king in body is like all men, but in power he is like God Almighty.

As God's representative on God, the tsar's primary concern is the material and spiritual welfare of his people:

Understand that God has given you the power to be a servant of Him. He placed you on earth as a shepherd and guardian of his people: to keep His flock intact from the wolves. God has chosen you as His representative by placing you on His throne with His sword that holds the power of life and mercy. Fear God's power. Do not prefer lies over truth; do not give free reign to evildoers; and do not punish just men like hellish dogs.
Since the tsar's command in both ecclesiastical and secular affairs is final, his subjects are expected to be completely submissive:

When you obey and serve the tsar, you are doing it for God, for the ruler looks after and cares for us. It is written: "do not speak evil of tsars"; and the Apostles had said: "fear God and revere the Tsar." For power is received by the man who is chosen by God.27

Also included among his subjects owing complete obedience are members and officers of the Church:

The divine law commands you to revere, not to question, the tsar. At the ecumenical and local church councils, neither ancient bishops nor the four patriarchs nor the pope dared to argue with the tsar. When the tsar was angry with someone, they implored him in all humility and tears.21

The tsar therefore was understood as God's representative on earth and required complete obedience from his subjects.

Although absolute in his power, the tsar still was subject to the teachings of the Church:

The prophet had said: "Lord, give your judgment and truth to tsars in order they may keep the truth forever, give justice to the wronged, be fathers for orphans, and judges for widows!"29

The tsar's submission to Christian dogma required him to defend Orthodoxy against any assault. The tsar was to punish not only secular criminals but also heretics. If the tsar refused to defend his people against heretics, he would no longer be considered a tsar but a tyrant, a servant not of God but of the devil:

As the servant of God, the tsar is to punish and to pardon men. But if the tsar is ruled by evil passions and sin — such as rapacity, violence, falsehood, deceit, pride, ambition, and worst of all, unbelief and blasphemy — the tsar is not a servant of God but of Satan. He is not a tsar but an oppressor.30
Subjects would no longer be bound to the him:

Do not obey such a tsar or prince who leads you to dishonorable and deceitful acts, even if he tortures you and threatens you with death. The prophets, apostles, and all the martyrs were killed by infidel kings, but they did not submit to them. This is the way that you should serve your tsar and prince. 31

As in the medieval West, the tsar is subject to a higher, divine law, i.e., Orthodox Christianity. 32 If the tsar violates Christian dogma and canon law, then his subjects have the right to disobey their king.

This principle of disobedience, however, has never been fully developed in Russia. Neither it nor its logical consequences have ever been defined in Russian political thought. 33 Joseph never openly discusses who decides whether the tsar is a tyrant. He seems to suggest that God is the final arbiter of the tsar's actions; but even on this point, he remains ambiguous. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that for Joseph the right of disobedience is passive in nature. There is no active, political program of resistance or revolution. In the end, Joseph's primary, and perhaps only, concern for the tsar and his subjects is their spiritual welfare. 34

Joseph not only preached political absolutism but practiced it. In 1507 he selected Grand Prince Basil III for trustee of his monastery. 35 Instead of appointing an ecclesiastical or a local, secular superior, as tradition has warranted, Joseph leaped-frogged these individuals and elected the grand prince. Since the grand prince was superior to any secular or ecclesiastical ruler, and therefore had a greater responsibility to God than any such, the grand prince should receive the trusteeship of Joseph's monastery because his judgment is superior to and more binding than any other ruler's in the kingdom:
And I asked you, Basil III, who is lord not only over Prince Theodore and Archbishop Serapion but lord over all princes of Russia. For you have been chosen by God as His representative on earth and therefore have been given the power of justice and charity over the monasteries and the whole of Orthodox Christianity.  

In other words, the tsar should receive trusteeship of the monastery because it always had belonged to him in the first place.

The ideological foundations of Muscovite absolutism had been laid. Instead of forging a Byzantine symphonia between church and state, secular and ecclesiastical leaders had opted for the ideology of tsardom or Caesaro-papism. Tsars received support from the Church for their program of political absolutism; the Church received from the tsar the right to retain clerical holdings. The Church's agreement with the tsar does not necessarily strike one as Gnostic in nature, although this relationship is close to it. The first blossoming of Gnostic ideology would be under Ivan IV's reign. To paraphrase Prince Kurbskii, it was Joseph of Volsk who was the first true "teacher" of autocracy in Russian history.

4.4 The Third Rome  
(c.1499-c.1524 A.D.)

In spite of its eventual triumph, the ideology of tsardom was not the only symbol articulated during this time. A restoration of the Byzantine symphonia was advocated by Filofei in his epistle of Moscow as the "Third Rome." While most scholars have concentrated on the "messianic" message of the epistle, they have often overlooked the underlying point of the letter: the attempt to elevate the spiritual life of the ecclesiastical community. Filofei's criticism of the practices of the church and state should be understood in the light of this attempt.
If we look at the opening of Filofei's epistle, we see that he does not begin with the Second Coming but with the observation that there are some people who "not only do not wish to live righteously themselves" but will not even leave untouched "those who live according to God." As we read further on, we come across Filofei's main point: the state's confiscation of ecclesiastical property. Citing Article Fifty-eight of the Fifth Ecumenical Council, Filofei recommends that perpetrators of such deeds should be "burnt with fire," that "their homes should be given to the church," and finally that they should be "excommunicated." And to make sure he drives the point home, Filofei refers to the grand prince himself: "If those even who wear the crown should act in this way [i.e., confiscate ecclesiastical property]," they should be, according to canon law, "excommunicated." 

In the next section, Filofei criticizes the practice of simony. He refers to the 1274 church council under the direction of Metropolitan Kirill as proof that the practice of simony is immoral. Those guilty of this sin therefore should be excommunicated. If one does not submit to and follow God's commandments to lead a righteous life, then God will punish those transgressors "as in the imperial city" (i.e., Constantinople). 

It is here that Filofei introduces his doctrine of the Third Rome with a reference from Apocalypse: "The Woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars." The Woman, Filofei explains, is the Church who, because of the use of unleavened bread and arrived at Constantinople, fled Rome. However, the Church of Constantinople fell because of the Greeks' union with the Latins at the Eighth Church Council; consequently, the Woman fled again and this time arrived at the Third Rome, in Moscow. Although last among the nations, Russia was blessed

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with the true knowledge and grace of God and therefore was fertile ground for a new Christian kingdom. The Russian Orthodox Tsar should protect and defend the Church from the serpent-devil which sought to drown her, i.e., empires that had collapsed because of a lack of faith. The present situation, marked by an increase in injustice and a decrease in good works, requires the Russian Empire to renew its commitment to Orthodoxy in order to avoid the fate of the previous two Romes. Filofei concludes the epistle with the criticism that the sign of the cross is being made without sufficient reverence and that the general moral life of Russia is lax. He exhorts the Russian people to be "pure and sinless" in the expectation of "the day of the Lord" which will come unexpectedly.43

It is clear from reading Filofei's epistle that it is not a Gnostic attempt to "leap out of being"; rather, it is a criticism of the moral neglect of Russian society as seen from the standpoint of the Church. Filofei does not usher in a third and final period of salvation on earth. The expectation that "the day of the Lord" will come unexpectedly does not necessarily mean that the arrival of the Second Coming is in the near future. Like Augustine, Filofei does not predict a particular time when the Second Coming will occur: he leaves it to an undisclosed time unknown to man in the future. Instead of worrying about the imminent Parousia, Filofei's immediate concerns are the privileges and practices of the Church: the inviolability of ecclesiastical property, the rights of priesthood, the condemnation of simony, and the making the proper sign of the cross. The problem he confronted was how to convince the state, which already had seized ecclesiastical property, to act in the Church's self-interest.
Filofei solved this problem by equating fidelity to Orthodoxy with political success. His predecessor, Metropolitan Zosima, had argued that God anointed the tsar as his representative on earth and Russia as His new Constantinople. The ideology of Moscow as heir to the Byzantine Empire therefore was not new. Filofei's contribution was to make Moscow not the heir of Constantinople but something entirely different and new from the two previous Romes:

Instead of Rome and Constantinople, there now shines throughout the universe, like the sun in the heavens, a third new Rome in your sovereign empire, the Holy Synodal Apostolic Church . . . Do not disobey the commandments that your ancestors have set down before you – the Great Constantine, the Blessed Vladimir, and the great God-Elected Iaroslav, and the other blessed saints, whose line extends up to you . . . Observe and attend to it that all the Christian empires unite with your own; for two Romes have fallen, but the third stands, and a fourth there will not; for your Christian Tsardom shall not be left for any other, according to the mighty word of God.

The tsar not only had inherited the Roman imperial titles of Autocrat, Christian Tsar, and Head of Church, but was the ruler of a distinct and independent Christian Empire that must be universal and everlasting in scope in order to reflect the heavenly empire of God. Since God's rule and power is omnipotent, the tsar's powers must also be absolute, though with a certain qualification:

Do not offend, O Tsar, the holy churches of God and the honorable monasteries that God has given as an inheritance of eternal goods, for the memory of the last generation.

Filofei in essence reiterates the conditions of a tsar's rule that Joseph of Volsk had outlined earlier.

By confronting the grand prince and reminding him of his duty to God, Filofei attempts to steer the tsar in the defense of the Church. He simultaneously points out the importance of Moscow's and the tsar's fidelity to the Orthodox faith. Moscow can only
fulfill its destiny as Orthodox Empire if the tsar submits to the Church. Although Filofei's epistle cannot be seen as a Gnostic attempt to usher in a third and final realm, the letter can be misconstrued, and later would be used by the state. The initial motivation of Filofei's epistle therefore is not Gnostic, but the seed of Gnosticism exists within the letter: Moscow, as the Third Rome, would usher in an era of everlasting peace and prosperity here on earth.

Filofei opens his second epistle, probably to Basil III, with a complaint about the severe taxation policy applied to Pskov that had caused several citizens to flee the city. As in his previous epistle, Filofei is concerned with the morality of and abuses against the Church. He writes: "The Tsar should still fulfill two commandments," one of which is the correct sign of the cross and the other is the Fifth Ecumenical Council forbidding state seizure of church property. Filofei then protests against sodomy and again articulates his conception of the Moscow as the Third Rome. The cause of the collapse of Constantinople was "a lack of faith"; therefore, the tsar of the Third New Rome "should keep in the fear of God."

In his third and final epistle, Filofei reiterates the same argument but, as in the second epistle, he makes no reference to the Latin Church. The condemnation of Greek participation in the Ferrara-Florentine Council is absent. Instead, he argues that Constantinople fell because of "a lack of faith." A Third Rome has arisen as prophesied, and there will be no Fourth.

Filofei's theory of the Third Rome therefore was primarily a defense of ecclesiastical property against state encroachment. It also was attempt to restore the harmony between church and state with the tsar submitting himself to the Church for
moral guidance. Although his doctrine of the Third Rome would be given messianic (Gnostic) significance under the reign of Ivan IV, it initially had tried to curb the political autocracy of the state and its new ideology of tsardom.

4.5 The Ideology of Tsardom (c.1505-c.1563 A.D.)

Following their success in the two church councils, Joseph and his supporters continue in their efforts to dominate the ecclesiastical hierarchy. In the monasteries the Possessors successfully introduced a system that increased the number of monks per cell, thereby increasing the greater chance to indoctrinate other clergy members in Josephian thought. Obtaining control of the monasteries was critical for the Possessors because it ensured them a powerful economic and social base within the church hierarchy. With respect to the metropolitan see, however, the Possessors were less successful. A supporter of Nilus of Sora, Varlaam, occupied the metropolitan throne from 1511 to 1522. The Possessors waited for the opportunity to crush their ecclesiastical brothers.

Such an opportunity arrived with the controversy over Basil III's divorce and remarriage (reign 1505-1533). The Non-Possessors declared the divorce invalid since the wife had not committed any offense, while the Possessors approved the action on the grounds that the benefit of a heir was greater than the fate of one woman. Although the Non-Possessors had on their side canon law and church tradition, Basil proceeded to divorce and remarry. As a reward for the support of the Possessors, the grand prince appointed Daniel, a Josephian-trained monk, as Metropolitan in 1521. A ruthless campaign against the Non-Possessors, launched after Daniel's election, lasted until 1554 when the last of Nilus Sora's followers had been imprisoned. The metropolitan defended these actions by arguing that salvation was best assured by absolute obedience to the
sovereign: "the temporal masters ordained by God for the good of the people, and not the devil."52

The arrests and confinements of the monks Vassian Patrikeiev Kosoi and Maximus the Greek were typical of the views that the Possessors persecuted. Originally brought to Moscow by Ivan III as a counter-balance to the Possessors, Vassian promulgated the ideas of ascetic monasticism, much to the annoyance of the Possessors.53 He was later arrested, declared a heretic, and sent to confinement for these views.54 Like his predecessor, Maximus (1475-1556), brought to Moscow by Basil III as a learned translator of Greek and Slavonic languages and held strong anti-property views that put him at odds with the Possessors.55 In 1525 Metropolitan Daniel, with the support of Basil III, arrested Maximus, declared him a heretic, and imprisoned him.56 He would eventually be moved to the Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery and die there with honors in 1556.

The Possessors continued to make inroads into the Church hierarchy. In 1542 Makarii (1543-63) became metropolitan. A Possessor and an able administrator, Makarii was able to remove his rivals — Sergius, Gennnadi, and Serapion — and secure his and the Possessors' position in the metropolitan machinery. He also help educate Ivan IV during the corrupt Shuiski regency and managed to convince the Grand Prince to be crowned the first Russian tsar.57

Claiming Byzantine inheritance through Vladimir, Ivan IV (reign 1533-84) convokе Metropolitan Makarii and the boyar council on 17 December 1456.58 He wanted to be declared and crowned tsar in the tradition of the grand princes such as Vladimir. The coronation took place on 16 January 1547: Ivan received the "life-giving cross," the

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crown, and the *barma* (a collar and waist that takes the place of imperial diadem), the same items that Grand Prince Vladimir Monomashich had received when he was crowned Tsar of Russia. Metropolitan Makarii declared that just as "David, his servant, was chosen by the Prophet Samuel and anointed as king over his people Israel" so was Ivan selected: "Lord, hear the prayer... of your Orthodox servant, the Grand Prince Ivan, whom You have chosen to raise as Tsar over Your people." After the imposition of the regalia, the metropolitan instructed him:

> Lord may you sit him upon the throne of truth and reveal to him the fearful guardian of your Synodal Church that is under his command. May he rule your people with righteous judgment and spare the children of the indigent; thus, he will be the inheritor of your heavenly kingdom.

The tsar was God's representative on earth: "all power is given to you from the most High God, for He has chosen you to be in His place on earth." Ivan's duty was to follow the teachings of the Church and to defend it from heresy.

Although the tsar was to submit himself to the Church, Ivan IV actually dictated ecclesiastical matters. Metropolitan Makarii would ask Ivan for approval on all church matters. The Church had accepted a submissive position to the state. Makarii best articulates this relationship in a letter to Ivan's predecessor, Basil III:

> God has chosen to place you on earth, has elevated you to sit on His throne, and has entrusted you the life and mercy of all Great Orthodoxy. Make yourself resemble the pious Emperor Constantine... suppress every disorder by your royal will and be faithful to the Seven Ecumenical Councils. It is your duty, Tsar and *Autokrator*, to keep the Church save from agitations.

Religious fidelity became equated with political fidelity, a principle that Makarii reiterates again in a letter to Ivan IV at Kazan:

> If the tsar's heart is in the hand of God, then all subjects should obey and fear according to God's will the tsar's commands. St. Peter had said: "Fear God and honor the Tsar."
The ideology of tsardom espoused by the church and state was Caesaro-papism. The tsar occupied a position that transcended all human institutions, including the church. He had become the symbol of the inseparability of church and state. As the defender of the Orthodox faith, the tsar had become transformed into an agent of divine will. The state had made the church in its own image. It had become Gnostic.  

4.6 The Universal Church  
(c.1547-c.1551 A.D.)  

In 1547, 1549, and 1551 a series of church councils were convoked to regulate the external organizations of the church and canonize a number of pious men as saints. The underlying objective of these councils was two-fold: 1) to centralize and to standardize ecclesiastical tradition, doctrine, and organization, and 2) to declare the local traditions and customs of Russia to be the true embodiment of the Christian Church, i.e., to declare the Russian Orthodox Church the sole heir of the Christian Church of the Roman Empire. By all accounts, the council had succeeded except in one respect: it lacked the final sanction of patriarch, a title that would be bestowed upon the Russian Church in 1589.  

Of these church councils, the most famous is the one of 1551, called Stoglav because the church's adopted one hundred articles. Lay members of the Church attended the council, but could not participate in the disputes. The Council adopted canons at variance with the Greek Church, thereby making its independence known to them. It also claimed for the Russian Church religious primacy in the Orthodox world, a claim which the Greeks refused to recognize. The Greeks recognized Moscow's succession to political primacy and the imperial rank of the Muscovite Gossudar in the eastern
oikoumene, as confirmed in a 1561 synodal letter from Patriarch of Constantinople, but they never recognized Moscow's claim to religious primacy.69

The Council also reiterated the principles set out in the Justinian Sixth Novel.70 But unlike the Justinian Code, the document failed to maintain the distinction between civil and canon law.71 Church and state had effectively become one. The penetration of ecclesiastical law into civil affairs was complete.72

Finally Metropolitan Marakii included in Stoglav the Donatio Constantini:

This sacred charter which proceeds from our hands and other imperial decrees have conferred upon the Church many privileges: ecclesiastical tribunals, church lands, villages, vineyards, lakes, customs duties. This divine law and imperial command has been established in the East and the West, in the North and South, in Judea, Asia, Thrace, Hellas, Italy, and in various islands .

Secular authority can neither judge the people of the Church, nor meddle in their lands, nor interfere with their immunities: we take God as a witness of our words and we confirm them by our divine will. We command these privileges remain unmovable and unshakable until the end of the world.73

The Church had cemented Filofei's ideology of the Third Rome into its own. It now had perceived itself as the one, true, and sole heir of the Christian Church and of the Roman Empire. The ideology of tsardom had triumph.

4.7 Conclusion

After the liberation of the Muscovite state, secular elites soon fell into conflict with the leadership of the Church. Becoming conscious of the growing power of the state, Ivan III and Ivan IV articulated this experience in the symbol of the tsar and sought to subordinate every institution, including the Russian Orthodox Church, to their will. This desire to dominate, man's libido dominandi, became fully expressed in the ideology of tsardom. By asserting their will over every institution and symbol in Russian society, the tsars aimed to destroy the symphonic arrangement between church and state.
The Russian Orthodox Church elites themselves were fragmented, as revealed in the symbols of the Possessors and the Non-Possessors. Each symbol recognized fundamental experiences of soteriological truth: the Possessors realized that man is naturally a social and political animal and therefore requires property to sustain his existence, while the Non-Possessors pointed out that man's spirituality is not fundamentally conditioned by events in temporal reality. Each symbol is only half-correct for Voegelin: man's participation with the divine is not determined by his existence in temporal reality; however, man is rooted in vegetative and animalic existence and his needs cannot be ignored for the sake of mystical contemplation. Unfortunately for the Russian Orthodox Church, each side refused to recognize the validity's of the other's insight into truth about human nature. The result was a shift in the experiences underlying the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church. With the Possessors' triumph, the Russian Orthodox Church had become a symbol of partial right order: the mystical experiences of man's experiences with the divine became overshadowed with temporal concerns.

In addition to this schism within the Church elites, the symbols of Moscow as the Third Rome and the Universal Church entered into the picture. The initial experiences behind the symbol of Moscow as the Third Rome were initially ones of right order, but this symbol had become derailed into one of disorder by the state. Tsars incorporated the symbol of Moscow as the Third Rome into their ideology of tsardom, i.e., state domination over the church. The same happened to the symbol of the Universal Church. In their ideology of tsardom, the tsars now perceived themselves as the true and sole heirs of the soteriological truth of Christendom.
4.8 End Notes

1. *Akty istoricheskie* (St. Petersburg: 1841), No. 32 (hereafter *AI*). There also were political and economic motives for princes to bequeath and to protect church land: increased yields from untilled land donated to monasteries, political support from the Church during princely fraticide, etc.

2. Malinin, V. *Starets Eleazarova monastyrya Filofey i ego poslaniya, istoriko-literaturnoe issledovaine* (Kiev, 1901), No. 20.

3. After conquering Novgorod in 1478, Ivan III confiscated church property. He completed his appropriation of Novgordan church property in 1499 with the blessing of Metropolitan Simeon. He probably would have continued to seize church property in other conquered principalities except for the church councils in 1503 and 1504-05. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey*, vol. 25 (St. Petersburg: 1844-1949), 319 (hereafter *PSRL*); also see *Ibid.*, vol. 4 (St. Petersburg), 269.

4. Metropolitan Kiprian in 1395, Siemeon in 1419, and Feodosy in 1463 all defended church property from state seizures (*AI*, vol. 1, 18); also see *Russkaya istoricheskaya Biblioteka*, vol. 6 (Petrograd: 1920), cols. 402 (hereafter *RIB*); *AI*, vol. 1 No. 77.

5. *Akty (sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi Imperii Arkheograficheskoiu Ekspeditsieiu Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk)*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: 1836), No. 80, 280, 281 (hereafter *AE*); also see *RIB*, vol. 4, No. 100, 102.


8. *AI*, vol. 1, No. 112.

9. For a dissenting view about the dichotomy between the Possessors and the Non-Possessors, please refer to Donald Ostrowski, "Church Polemics and Monastic Land Acquisition in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy," *Slavonic and East European Review*, 64 (July 1986): 355-79.


12. Ikonnikov, V. *O Kulturnom Znachenii Vizantii v Russkoi Istorii* (Kiev: 1869), 76-82.


14. The *Donatio* is a false testament written in the West. It was attributed to Constantine I who was supposed to have bequeathed imperial rank and domains to Pope Sylvester. By the eleventh century, the *Donatio* had become incorporated into the papal *Decretum*; by the twelfth century, it had become part of Orthodox canon law in Theodore Balsamon's edition of *Photian Nomocanon with Commentaries*. The Greek monk Mattheus Blastares, a byzantine jurist of the fourteenth century, included the *Donatio* in his *Syntagma alphabeticum*. The *Syntagma* was translated into Serbian and then reached Russia by the fifteenth century. The first known reference to the *Donatio* is Ivan III's letter to the German ambassador in 1489. "Snosheniia Velikikh Kniazei Ioanna Vasilievicha i Ioanna Vasilievicha i Vasilia Ioannovicha s Imperatorami Germanskimi, 1488-1517," in *Pamiatniki Diplomaticheskikh Snoshenii drevnei Rusi s Derzhavami inostrannymi*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: 1851).


18. The Church's acceptance of Ivan III's political program of absolutism is the first time the Church had submitted itself to a subordinate role in Russian society. For more information, please refer to M. Karpovich, "Church and State in Russian History," *Russian Review*, 3 (Spring 1944): 10-12.


20. *AE*, vol. 1, No. 380. The archbishop of Novgorod, Gennadius, requested Ivan's assistance to take civil measures against heretics. Ivan consented in February 1488 and referred all heretics in question to the civil and ecclesiastical courts of the grand prince: "you will interrogate and bring up for civil jurisdiction those priests, deacons, and scribes, as well as ordinary persons who are in this affair; and my officers will punish them; and after having made inventories of their possessions you will forward copies of them to me." Also see *AI*, vol. 1, No. 285.


22. *Ibid.*, 540


25. Joseph of Volsk. *Provestitel* (Kazan: 1896), 547. Joseph never identifies the tsar with the Grand Prince of Moscow. However, it would be difficult to imagine otherwise.


34. A dissenting view can be found in Valdenberg, V. *Drevnerusskie ucenija o predelakh carskoj vlasti* (Petrograd, 1916), 219. Valdenberg contends that the principal of disobedience is the central point of Joseph's political theory. Certainly fear of the divine is an effective psychological deterrent. However, Valdenberg neglects the point that for Joseph the tsar is the sole evaluator of his own conduct and that resistance to a tyrant is passive, not active, in nature.


39. For example, please refer to Likhachov, D. S. *Natsionalnoye Samosoznaniye Drevney Russi* (Moscow-Leningrad: 1945), 100. Likhachov denies the messianic interpretation of Filofei’s doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome.

40. The epistle that is quoted here can be found in V. N. Malinin, "Appendix X," in *Starets Eleazarova Monasteryrya Filofey i yego poslaniya. Istoriko-literaturnoye issledovaniye* (Kiev: 1901), 57-66.


42. *Ibid.*


44. If we look at his chronology of cause and effect, we see that Constantinople fell because of its participation in the Ferrara-Florentine council of 1438: "It is ninety years since the Greek empire had been ruined and fails to stand." A date which would put it at

45. In the words of Zossima, now God has raised up "his kinsman, also abiding in the Orthodox faith, the pious and Christ-loving Grand Prince Ivan Vasilyevich, Sovereign and Autocrat of all Russians, the new Tsar of Constantinople and of the new city of Constantinople, the Sovereign of Moscow and of all the Russian lands and of many other lands." RIB, vol. 6, col. 795-96.


47. Ibid.

48. Ibid. After Filofei's complaint about the treatment of the citizens of Pskov, "the Grand Prince in the year 7019 (1511) removed those namestniki . . . and these namestniki began to be clement and the citizens began to reassemble in Pskov from whithersoever they had fled." PSRL, vol. 5, 288

49. Evgenii, M. Slovar Istoricheskii, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: 1827), 311; Stroev, P. Rukopisi Slavianskiia i Rossiskiia (Moscow: 1848), No. 185, 153-55.


51. Ibid. Metropolitan Varlaam had been forced into retirement not only because of his opposition to Basil III's divorce and remarriage but also for his criticism of Basil III's foreign policy. Basil would invite princes to Moscow, guaranteeing their safety, and afterwards kill them.

52. Dyakonov, M.A. Vlast Maskovskikh Gosudarey. Ocherki iz istorii politicheskikh idey Drevney Rusi do konsta XVI veka (St. Petersburg, 1889), 103. For more about Daniel's career, please consult Zhmakin, V. Mitropolit Daniil i ego Sochineniia (Moscow: 1881).


54. Ibid., 724-26.

55. Ibid., 675-77. Maxmius wrote: "The prelacy crowns and confirms the emperors, and not the emperors the prelates . . . for the sacerdoce is greater than the earthly kingdom." Ibid., 696-97. It also was through Maxmius that Russia received its first notions of Plato, Aristotle, and the clerical literature of humanism. He was imprisoned for all these views. Ibid., 666.
56. Ibid., 691-712.

57. Ibid., 763.

58. PSRL, vol. 13, 451. Also refer to Dopolneniia k Aktam Istoricheskim, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: 1897), No. 145 (hereafter DAI) and Sobranie Gossudarstvennykh Gramot i Dogovorov, vol. 2 (Moscow: 1813-28), No. 51 (hereafter SGGD). The confirmation of the tsarist rank by the patriarchal see in Constantinople was given in 1561 (RIB, vol. 22, col. 68).

59. PSRL, vol. 13, 451-52. For more about the coronation ceremony, please refer to SGGD, vol. 2, No. 23 and DAI, vol. 1, No. 39. For the relationship between the Muscovite coronation ceremony and the Byzantine one, please refer to PSRL, vol. 13, 451-52 and SGGD, vol. 2, No. 33. For a view that argues the Muscovite and the Byzantine court ceremonies are completely divergent, i.e., the Muscovite ceremony is autocratic and the Byzantine one is symphonic, please refer to Paul A. Bushkovitch, "The Epiphany Ceremony of the Russian Court in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," Russian Review 49: 1-17.

60. PSRL, vol. 13, 451-52.

61. Ibid.; also see Psalm 72: 1-2, 4.

62. DAI, vol. 1, No. 30, 49.


64. DAI, vol. 1, No. 25.

65. PSRL, vol. 13, 491.

66. In response to the tsar’s request, Makarii established a network of permanent schools to standardize church teaching throughout the country. The metropolitan also sought to create a literature worthy of a "Third Rome" by initiating several works: Tsartvennaia Kniga, Stepennaia Kniga, etc. Of the most important of these works is the Domostroi. This so-called instructive literature was dispersed throughout Russia. The Domostroi stressed the importance of obedience to the church and to the state. For example, in chapter five of the Domostroi, "Concerning the Honor Due to Bishops, the Priests, and the Monks," the individual is told of the respect which he ought to show toward his spiritual instructors. "The priests and monks have a right to your entire confidence, to your affection, to your obedience, to every manner of submission of your part"; and chapter seven, "How to meet to honor the Tsar and the Prince and to obey him in all things; to humble oneself before, and to serve him with all honesty, and to devote oneself to the great and the small to the afflicted and the weak; how one must behave and watch over himself." A quote from this chapter is as follows:
Fear the Tsar and serve him faithfully: pray to God always for him and never speak lies in his presence, but answer him humbly the truth, as you would to God himself, and obey him in all things. If you serve the earthy Tsar with uprightness and you fear him, you shall learn thus to fear also the heavenly Tsar . . . So, submit yourself to your chiefs and render them the honor due to them, for they are sent by the Tsar for the punishment of the evil, and for the praise of the good. Adhere to your Prince to your masters with your heart; nourish not any evil thoughts toward them. For St. Paul had said: "all power are instituted by God: if one opposes the powers, he opposes the command of God." In the prince's service, or any other lord, keep yourself from lying, from perfidy, from malice, for the Lord shall cause to perish all those who lie, and those who defame, they are cursed by the people.


68. Kapterev, N. Kharakter Otoshenni Rossii k Pravoslovnomu Vostoku v XVI i XVII st (Moscow: 1885), 434-35.

69. The confirmation of Ivan IV as heir to the Byzantine Empire came in a synodal letter from the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1561. The letter affirmed the imperial link long established between Russia and Byzantium, beginning with the Byzantine Princess Anne, wife of Grand Prince Vladimir I. According to Moscow, this line remained unbroken up to Ivan IV, thus validating the title "Tsar" over all Christendom. RIB, vol. 22, cols 67-69.


71. Ibid., chapters 23-24; Golubinski, E. Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. 2 (Moscow: 1901-1911), 774-75.

72. Ibid., chapters 29-49.

73. Ibid. chapter 60, 171-72.
CHAPTER 5: SECULAR MESSIANISM  
(c.1564-c.1598 A.D.)

5.1 Egophantic Revolt  
(c.1564-c.1584 A.D.)

The triumph of the ideology of tsardom created a new theocratic state with Ivan IV, "The Terrible," as its new ruler. Like previous Russian princes, Ivan was compared to Christ the Martyr, who was one person with two natures. Because the tsar was one person with two natures, body and soul, he was a mediator between heaven and earth. This philosophical perspective is what Voegelin called a balance of consciousness. However, this balance was broken when Ivan IV sought to fulfill the biblical prophecy of the Apocalypse on earth. By seeking to establish the eschatological unity of creation and divinity in temporality, Ivan had, as Cherniavsky puts it, "destroyed the tension between the twin but inequal natures of the Agapetan ruler."\(^1\) Ivan had engaged in an *egophantic*, or Gnostic, revolt against God Himself.

Metropolitan Makarii's new iconography and literary texts, the so-called "Wisdom Literature," provided the theological context of Ivan's *egophantic* revolt.\(^2\) According to the Wisdom Literature, the tsar was identified with God the Father and Christ His Son.\(^3\) Just as Christ's resurrection realized the power of God's *logos* in the temporal world, so must the tsar realize God's *logos* in his kingdom. But before realizing God's *logos*, the tsar had to purify his kingdom because his people had strayed from him and the church. As protector and defender of the church, the tsar must punish heretics and other perceived enemies of the clergy and state. Ivan created a state police force, the *Oprichnina*, to accomplish this task.
The most famous expression of Ivan's egophantic revolt can be found in his Epistle to the Prince Kurbskii (c. 1564). In this letter Ivan writes about his betrayal by his own people: their unwillingness to suffer for the sake of the kingdom, their refusal to submit to the tsar, and their pride and self-indulgence. Specifically, it was the boyars and the clergy who had taken advantage of Ivan's piety for their own personal gain. Ivan therefore needed to purge the church and the state in order to restore order to his kingdom.

In his letter to Prince Kurbskii, Ivan accused the prince of pride because he had refused to submit himself to the tsar:

... why have you feared an innocent death ... that is the will of God – doing good to suffer. If you are so righteous and pious, why have you not wished from me, your contentious sovereign, suffering ...

By refusing to submit himself to the tsar, Kurbskii had shown himself "in opposition to God." His refusal to accept penance for his sins against Ivan revealed Kurbskii to be a heretic who had repudiated Christ:

Now I fear that you, by accusing me of being unhealable, have implicated yourself as well. Is it possible that you do accept neither the repentant David, in whom repentance preserved a prophetic gift, nor the great Peter, who suffered as a man during the savior's passion? But Jesus accepts them ...

Kurbskii's refusal to submit himself to the tsar's power was tantamount to a refusal to submit himself to God Himself. Kurbskii's denial of the tsar's absolute power over him branded him an "iconoclast heretic" because he has rejected the idea of the tsar as the temporal image of God. Kurbskii, according to Ivan, had cut himself off from the community of believers and therefore had denied that Ivan was God's rightly anointed representative on earth.
This denial of his divinity, in addition to other perceived insults and humiliations, tormented Ivan IV. But like Christ, who was made powerful through his suffering, Ivan would have his strength "made perfect in weakness." Like Christ, he would be persecuted to the point of tears:

... neither with wounds, nor drops of blood, but with much seating and toiling have I been burdened by you above my strength! Your meanness and persecution have caused me to shed many tears, utter sobs, and anguished my soul... 

Because he would rather share the suffering of his people than stand above them, Ivan was considered weak by the boyars:

... although I bear the purple, I know that I am burden with weakness as other men are - not as you claim in your heresy that I stand above the laws of nature...

Ivan's empathy with his people made him look weak to the boyars. Like Christ's persecutors, the boyars would judge their humiliated sovereign as a weak tsar, thereby exposing themselves as self-righteous, boastful, and ultimately heretical.

In contrast to the boyars, who were proud, Ivan was humble and one with the people in sin. He was the embodiment of the Christian virtue of humility. But not content to leave matters to the afterlife, Ivan would invert the story of the Passion and Resurrection by seeking to punish those who transgress God's law in the here and now:

I confess and know that those who... trespass God's law will not only be tormented in the beyond, but here they will experience the anger of a righteous God...

Ivan would be the rod that God uses to smite his sinners on earth. The Christian image of the saintly fool had been stood on its head. Ivan sought in temporal reality to save mankind by killing his subjects in the name of Christian virtue. He had deified himself as the Christ figure who would bring the Resurrection into his own kingdom and in his own

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lifetime. Ivan's helpers in this task would be the _Oprichnina_, the archangels of tsar's Second Coming.12

Ivan's identification with Christ as the holy fool, as one humiliated by the boyars, provided him the justification to purge his realm in order to prepare Russia for final salvation. His purges was a campaign to push the history of divine salvation to its ultimate conclusion in temporal reality. By communicating with Mary and the Archangel Michael, Ivan knew that final salvation could be realized in temporal reality:

> For we Christians acknowledge as standing before us the triune God-head, knowledge of which we have gained through Jesus Christ our God, and also through the intercessor for the Christians, who was worthy to be the mother of God, the most pure virgin, and then standing before us are all the heavenly powers, archangels and angels, for the Archangel Michael stood before Moses and Joshua the son of Nun and all Israel; he also stood invisibly before the first Christian tsar, Constantine, in the piety of his newly gained grace. The Archangel Michael moved before his army and defeated all his enemies and from that time even until the present day he aids all pious tsars.13

Anyone else who tried to speak for the Archangel Michael, Mary, or God was dismissed by the tsar as a fraud:

> But though I be rude in speech, yet not in knowledge; but we have been thoroughly made manifest among you in all things. Have I committed an offense in abasing myself that you might be exalted... Are they Hebrews? So am I. Are they Israelites? So am I. Are they the seed of Abraham? So am I. Are they ministers of Christ? I am more; in labors more abundant, in wounds above measure...14

Only Ivan could commune with God, His angels, and His saints.

> For almost a decade the _Oprichnina_ would push the spiritual salvation of Russia forward with the blood of the Russian people. But after the slaughter of countless victims, it had failed in its task. Because it had not succeeded, the _Oprichnina_ was dismantled. It
was clear that the *Oprichnina* had lost God's favor. Salvation would have to rest on the shoulders of another imperial agency.

The *Oprichnina*, however, had served a useful purpose. If there were any lingering doubts whether Ivan was revolting against God, the reign of the *Oprichnina* had put them at rest. The ideology of tsardom had transformed itself fully into the Gnostic ideology of earthly salvation.

5.2 The Church’s Response to Disorder  (c.1503-c.1568 A.D.)

The ideology of tsardom that had begun under Ivan III and culminated under Ivan IV was resisted by the leadership of the Church. Although the Church had very few weapons at its disposal, she did have the power of admonishment and the possession of her property to act as a counterweight to the tsar's political absolutism. Ultimately, however, it would take the death of Ivan IV rather than any particular action of its own to provide the Church some breathing space.

The first line of defense for the Church against the ideology of tsardom was its possession of property. Clerical property was defended on the grounds of canon law, which included the *Donatio Constantii*, divine law, and the rules of the Apostles and of the Church Fathers. According to Church law, the Orthodox tsar must respect clerical property, i.e., he must refrain from appropriating it. Furthermore, the tsar must refrain from taxing clerical property. Finally, the tsar must not ask for the judicial extradition of criminals who had committed on clerical estates. Those who lived on clerical property came under the jurisdiction of the local *sviatitel* (bishop or abbot). This arrangement had become public law in the Muscovite legal codes, the *Sudebniki*, in 1497 under the reign of
Ivan III. The Church therefore had jurisdiction over the "priests and deacons, monks and nuns, and old widows, who resided at the church of God."17

This agreement between church and state is best articulated in Metropolitan Cyprian's letter of instruction to the Church of Novgorod:

. . . do ordain, according to the tradition of the Holy Apostles and the rules of the Church Fathers, who set the boundaries for the Churches of God, the Metropoles and Bishoprics, that those monastery people, hegumens with monks, priests, deacons, and every church person, who have become attached to whatever Metropole or Eparchy, are all under the authority and jurisdiction of the bishop. No lay person can refer to the civil authorities about these matters. If any hegumen, priest, or monk seeks to have recourse by removing himself from the bishop's authority, then the Church shall exclude and excommunicate him.18

Those who violated this agreement will be excommunicated by the Church. Although both the church and the state at times failed to practice what they preached, the state nonetheless would officially maintain this position of non-interference with ecclesiastical matters until the seventeenth century.19

Ivan IV, of course, had violated this and other agreements with the Church. The tsar loathed the idea of symphonia; and he refused to recognize the Church's authority in moral matters. For example, Ivan had convoked an ecclesiastical assembly in 1572 in order to have his fourth marriage recognized by the Church as canonical.20 He had forced Metropolitan Afanasii into retirement, expelled Metropolitan German, and killed Metropolitan Philip. Except for Bishop Kornili of Rostov, the Church hierarchy had been purged.21

Because the Church had failed in its mission, Ivan IV had created the Oprichnina to sniff out treason and to convert the pagans of the outer lands to Christianity.

Opponents to the ideology of tsardom quickly arose. The Non-Possessors, while still in
existence, had opposed Ivan III's, Basil III's, and Ivan IV's march towards political absolutism. Unfortunately, the literary output of the Non-Possessors' spokesman, Nilus of Sora (1433-1508), was small and mostly limited to spiritual contemplation. The only evidence we have about Nilus's position about monastic property is an anonymous pamphlet of the mid-sixteenth century, Pismo o nelyubkakh (Epistle Concerning the Hostilities). According to the epistle, the question of monastic property came to the floor at the Church Council of 1503:

When the Council concerning widowed priests and deacons was finished, the Elder (starets) Nilus began to speak, saying that monasteries should not have lands, but that the monks should live in hermitages and should nourish themselves from handwork.

Nilus was answered by Joseph of Volsk who argued that landless monasteries would fail to attract qualified candidates for the Church. "This," says the epistle, "was the first cause of enmity [between the Possessors and Non-Possessors]!"

Nilus's most famous disciple, Vassian, attacked Joseph of Volsk's defense of clerical property. The Possessors had cited the Slavonic Kormchie for proof that monastic land ownership was sanctioned by the Ecumenical Councils. In response, Vassian wrote the Kormchaya kniga (Book of Pilot), a work that was to be the equivalent of the Greek Nomocanon, (the work of the canons of the Orthodox Church and the imperial laws). Vassian handed over his magnus opus to Basil III. Reward for his labor was arrest, interrogation, and confinement to Volokolamsk Monastery.

Vassian's two polemical works are Slovo otvento protivu kleveschushchikh istinu euangelskuyu (Reply to Those Who Falsely Interpret the Truth of the Gospels) and Prenie s Iosifom Voltskim (Dispute with Joseph of Volsk). The works reiterate the differences...
between the Possessors and the Non-Possessors on the question of monastic property and
the punishment of heretics. The true path towards salvation, according to Vassian, is to
sell all your possessions, give to the poor, and follow Christ's teachings. He refutes the
Possessors' defense of clerical property by contending that possession of property
inherently invites corruption, abuse, and other injustices. Princes may donate property for
the salvation of their souls and for the memory of their forefathers, but the clerical abuse
of this property undermines all noble intentions of the original donation. Those who
support clerical property are liars, cheats, and heretics, like Joseph:

What will happen to you, Joseph, and to your disciples before Christ on the day of
the judgment? You have asked neither a pardon from us, nor have you pardon us.
To each according to his own deserts!27

Like Ivan the Terrible, Vassian believed that he alone had genuine knowledge of the
workings of God's ways on earth.

The triumph of the Possessors on the matters of clerical property, church and state
relations, the punishment of heretics, and monastic discipline and ritual would be complete
in the year 1531 with the double trial of Vassian and the other great Non-Possessor,
Maximus (1475-1556).24 Non-Possessor ideas, along with other rationalist free-thinking,
existed north of the Volga; and the followers of these ideas were allowed to live. It was
only with the 1553 trial of Matvey Bashkin, a Muscovite of service gentry extraction, that
the Church began to persecute those beyond the Volga. At his trial Bashkin admitted to
heresy, to the denial of certain dogmas, to his refusal to recognize the authority of patristic
literature, and to the charge that his beliefs had been approved by the "Trans-Volga
Elders."29 This admission allowed the Possessors to persecute Non-Possessors, free-
thinkers, and other heretics.
But even the tsar's support of the Possessors had limits. When the state began to
infringe upon the Church's claims, as it had under Ivan IV, the Church struck back, but
often at a loss: Metropolitan Afanassi was forced to retire; Metropolitan German was
expelled; and Metropolitan Philip was arrested and executed. Of all these confrontations,
Ivan IV's encounter with Metropolitan Philip is the most famous. Not only does
Metropolitan Philip best represent the Church's resistance to the tsar's political absolutism,
but the confrontations between these two men capture the ultimate futility of the Church's
defense against the state.

Even before Philip became elevated to the metropolitan throne on 25 July 1566, he
had demanded the abolishment of the *Oprichnina*. After his election to the throne, Philip
continued to criticize the tsar. Ivan IV thwarted Philip's attempts to interfere in political
affairs, but he did concede to Philip the right to give advice (sovetoval by) to the tsar as
metropolitans had done under his father and grandfather. However, this concession was
not enough for Philip:

Tsar, follow God's law that was given to you in order to rule your kingdom justly.
The possessions of the world are like river waters, for they gradually will be
depleted. Only the heavenly treasure of truth is preserved. Although you are high
in God's image, you are still God's subject. He who is truly called tsar rules over
himself: he controls, not controlled by, passions.

According to Philip, the tsar is only like God: he is not God. The only restraint to his
power is an appeal to his piety and moral example. Philip instructs the tsar to care for all
of Orthodox Christianity by observing Church canon law, tradition, and teaching, not to
flatters:

Tsar, accept good counsel, not flattery. Do not divide your realm [*Oprichnina*],
for you have been placed by God to judge God's people in truth, not take the
image of a torturer upon yourself. All that is in the world passes away – both
honor and glory. Only life in God is immortal. When all that is earthly is removed, then we will have to give an account of our lives to God. Remove all slanders from you as though rotten limbs and make your people one, for God is only present where there is the spirit of oneness and spirit of sincere love.

Why do you deprive me of the hermitage and of the Church Fathers? If you dare act contrary to the canons, then do anything you wish. But I must not weaken when the time of encounter comes.32

Such an encounter took place on 22 March 1568 at the Dormition Cathedral in the Kremlin, when Metropolitan Philip accused the tsar of the murder of innocent Christians:

Fear God's judgment and be ashamed of your own imperial robes. If you impose laws on others, why do you commit acts that are worthy of condemnation? . . . Desist from such undertakings — such things are not characteristics of your pious realm. How much do Orthodox Christians suffer! We, O Tsar, have a pure and bloodless sacrifice to God that is for the salvation of man, but outside the altar Christian blood is being shed and people are dying needlessly. Or have you forgotten that you also are of this earth and also need the forgiveness of your sins? Forgive and you will be forgiven, for it is only through forgiveness of our fellow man that we shall escape the Lord's wrath.33

Another rendition of the encounter quoted Philip's words as follows:

All merciful Tsar and Grand Prince, how long do you wish to shed the innocent blood of your loyal Christian people? How long will falsehood reign in the Russian realm? Tatars and pagans — and the whole world — would claim that all nations have law and truth but not Russia. All over the world there are criminals who seek mercy from rulers and find it, but there is no mercy in Russia for the innocent and the righteous. Realize that even though God has elevated you in this world, you are still a mortal man and God will inflict punishment on you for the innocent blood which is shed. The stones under your feet, if not living souls, will cry out and will accuse and judge you. By God's command I must tell you this even though death will befall me as a result.34

In response, Ivan struck the floor with his crozier, threatened Philip with his life, and left the church.

Unlike the two previous metropolitan predecessors, Philip refused to remove himself from the metropolitan throne and retire to a monastery. Ivan therefore invented a legal pretext to remove him. According to the Life, a number of clergymen assisted Ivan
in this task: some out of ambition, others out of fear. A church council was convoked in November 1568, and Philip was charged with the ecclesiastical crime of leading "an unseemly and indecorous life," specifically in his admonishment against the tsar at Dormition Cathedral. On 8 November 1568, on the feast day of St. Michael, Metropolitan Philip's rank was removed, and he was to be incarnated in the Bogiavlenskii and later in the Nikoskii Monastery presumably for the remainder of his days. Instead, he was murdered by Ivan's chief oprichnik, Malitua Shuratov, on 23 December 1569.

5.3 The Patriarchal Church (c.1584 - c.1598 A.D.)

Ivan IV died in 1584 and was succeeded by his son, Theodore I, who was crowned on 30 June 1584 in the Cathedral of the Assumption. The coronation ceremony was an almost exact duplicate of the 1547 coronation. After the preliminaries of the ceremony, the tsar entered the cathedral to pray, received the life-giving cross and crown from metropolitan, and then proclaimed his reign to the kingdom:

And you, our father, by the will of God would bless and anoint and ordain me upon the Tsardom and Grand Princedom . . . and crown me even with this imperial crown, according to our ancient imperial ceremony.

Once his proclamation was finished, Theodore received instruction from the metropolitan:

Judge your people and yourself humbly with truth, and save the children of the indigent. You shall be the inheritor of the kingdom of heaven . . . you are crowned Tsar of Russia according to the blessing of your holy father, the Tsar and Grand Prince Ivan Vasilievich, Autocrat of Russia, and according to the gift to us of the divine grace from the Holy Spirit, through the ordination of our humility.

Power is given to you from God, and strength from the Most-High, and you have been chosen of God to be in His throne on earth . . . You shall be the heir of the Kingdom of heaven with all the Orthodox tsars.
Unctio and confession followed the coronation. Theodore had received the crown before the consecration and anointment by the metropolitan. The principal rite of spiritual authority followed the dynastic and political rite of succession.

The Church no longer legalizes secular authority but only sanctifies it; the Church not longer creates a ruler but only confirms the principle of succession to the will of God. The tsar's sovereignty is no longer based on spiritual sanctification but on political and dynastic succession. By breaking with the tradition of Byzantium, the Muscovite state had secured its new ideology of tsardom.40

The Muscovite state was the Third and Final Rome which would defend the Orthodox faith from heretics and other enemies of the Church. Earlier, in 1498, Grand Prince Dmitrii had received from Metropolitan Simon the title of "temporal head of Orthodox Christendom and defender of the universal faith." Now that the tsar was defender of the Orthodox faith, he would require a Church that would match his political aspirations of absolutism. In short, all that was required for complete political success was the title of patriarch for the tsar's Church.

The collapse of Constantinople provided such an opportunity for the tsar. Moscow, under the direction of Boris Godunov, had begun negotiations with Constantinople in the summer of 1587. A Greek envoy was sent to Moscow from Constantinople to report that the Patriarch of Jerusalem would be entrusted with the office of ordaining the Russian Patriarch. But instead of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, the Patriarch of Constantinople arrived to Smolensk in 1588 to ask for assistance against the Turks. Although his status was questionable because the Sultan had intended to appoint a new patriarch, Patriarch Jeremiah of Constantinople was welcomed into the Kremlin and
placed under house arrest until he recognized the autocephaly of the Russian Church and participated in the enthronement of her first patriarch. Jeremiah did just that. He ordained and blessed Metropolitan Job of Moscow as Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The Church Councils in Constantinople approved of Moscow's patriarchal elevation.41

During the ceremony of patriarchal elevation, the tsar addressed Patriarch Jeremiah:

We have received the sceptre of the Great Tsardom of Russia to support and to watch over our pious and present Russian kingdom and, with God's grace, to guard it in peace and free from disorders.

Most enlightened Jeremiah, Patriarch by the grace of the Holy Spirit, coming from that very great Apostolic throne, heir and pastor of the Church of Constantinople, Father of Fathers, and in accord with the wish of our Tsar, you have accomplished this deed, yourself, along with us and with the arch-hierarchic Job, Metropolitan of the reigning city of Moscow and of all Russia.42

Patriarch Jeremiah replied:

O Orthodox, and Christ-loving, God-crowned Tsar, who is honor of God, shines forth to the ends of the entire Orthodox world . . . may you desire to honor and embellish the holy and Great Synodal Church.43

Since ancient Rome fell to Appollinarian heresy, and the second Rome, which is Constantinople, is possessed by the pagan Turks, so your Great Russian Tsardom, more pious than all previous kingdoms, is the third Rome . . . and you alone under heaven are called the Christian Tsar for the whole world; therefore, the very great act to establish the Patriarchate will be accomplished according to God's will and according to your counsel.44

Although Constantinople would retain ecclesiastical primacy throughout the Orthodox world, Moscow had become the Third and Final Rome. But it was a Rome not of the Church but of the state.
5.4 Conclusion

The second half of Ivan IV's reign (c. 1564-84 A.D.) was a classic display of man's libido dominandi. Ivan IV believed that he possessed a special type of knowledge, gnosis, about the nature of being and sought to change the order of being through human action. Of all the symbols of disorder, the Oprichnina became the most predominant one that reflected Ivan IV's Gnosticism.

The Russian Orthodox Church, both as a symbol and as an institution, resisted Ivan's Gnostic revolt. The leadership of the Church at the time – Metropolitans Afanasii, German, and Philip – appealed to Ivan's better nature. They were unsuccessful. It is important to note that the leadership of the Church did not appeal to revolt or revolution during Ivan IV's reign. By not appealing to a temporal solution to an essentially spiritual problem, the Church elites managed to avoid using a Gnostic "solution" to a Gnostic problem.

Finally, the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church itself was transformed into the Patriarchal Church because of the collapse of Constantinople to the Turks. The symbol of the Patriarch could act as a counterweight to the symbol of the tsar. It also signaled final independence from Constantinople. The Russian Orthodox Church now was the sole symbol of soteriological truth in the East.

5.5 End Notes

1. Cherniavsky. Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 52. For more about the tsar as a Christ-like martyr or a saintly fool, please refer to Ibid., 5-49.

2. The new iconography was based on untraditional sources and was located in the Kremlin cathedrals of Dormition, the Annunciation and the Archangel Michael, and St.


6. Ibid., 13-14.
7. Ibid., 19, 41, 99.

8. Ibid., 13.

9. Ibid., 42. Also see 2 Corinthians 12:9.

10. Ibid., 38-9.

11. Ibid., 39.


15. Prince Oleg of Ryazan's decree forbade his officers to judge the inhabitants of the Olgovo Monastery. Akty istoricheskie, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: 1841), No. 2, 24 (hereafter AI). Likewise, the Prince of Tver had appointed a special monastic judge for the Monastery of the Seven-Sleepers. Akty (sobranie v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi Imperii Arkeograficheskoiu Ekspeditsieiu Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk), vol. 1, (St. Petersburg: 1836), No. 5 (hereafter AE). Grand Prince Basil and Metropolitan Cyprian issued similar charters for all monasteries in the metropolitan domain (AE, vol. 1, No. 9).


17. Ibid., vol. 1, No. 153.

18. Ibid., vol. 1, No. 7.


24. Ibid.


28. Please refer to "The Ideology of Tsardom" section in chapter four of this dissertation for more details.


30. Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khraniashchikhsia v Gosudarstvennoi kolegii innostrannykh del (Moscow: 1813-94), 577-58.

31. Philip's Life in is Fedotov, George P. St. Filipp Metropolitan of Moscow — Encounter with Ivan the Terrible (Belmont, MA: Norland Publishing Company, 1978), 117-18. Although the Life does not present an exact transcript of Philip's words, it does gives us a clue to the religious consciousness of sixteenth century Moscow.

32. Ibid., 119.

33. Ibid., 120. Also see Sobranie Gossudarstvennykh Gramot i Dogovorov, vol. 1 (Moscow: 1813-28), No. 193 (hereafter SGGD).

34. Ibid. Four years after the event, two foreigners, Taube and Kruse, produced their own account of the incident at the Dormition Cathedral.

35. Ibid., 126-135.

36. Ibid.
37. *SGGD*, vol. 2, No. 51, 72-76.


40. For more about Muscovite and the Byzantine court ceremonies, please refer to Paul A. Bushkovitch, "The Epiphany Ceremony of the Russian Court in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" *Russian Review* 49: 1-17.

41. *SGGD*, 95.


CHAPTER 6: RESTORATION OF ORDER
(c.1598-c.1652 A.D.)

6.1 Boris Godunov
(1598-1605 A.D.)

The death of Theodore I extinguished the Riurikovich dynasty and ushered in the
Smutnoe Vremia, the Time of Troubles. It is a period, to use Platonov's schema, when
dynastic, social, and national issues were at stake. Within a decade and a half (1598-
1613), Russia was ruled by four different rulers – Boris Godunov (1598-1605), the First
False Dmitrii (1605), Basil Shuisky (1606-10), and an interregnum headed by Prince
Theodore Mstislavsky (1610-13) –, experienced famine and droughts (1601-03),
confronted a series of internal rebellions (1606-10: Princes Shakhovskoy and Bolotnikov,
False Peter, the Second and Third False Dmitrii), and suffered from Polish occupation
(1610-12). During this period of chaos, the Russian Church was the only institution and
symbol that could give Russians any sense of continuity and stability. In the absence of a
legitimate tsar, the patriarch would eventually become the de facto head of state; and
after the Time of Troubles, he would rule as a coequal with the new tsar, Mikhail
Romanov. But once Patriarch Philaret had died (1633), church and state relations would
revert to their pre-Smutnoe Vremia arrangements.

With the extinction of the Riurikovich dynasty, a new tsar was required for
Russia. Patriarch Job, who was appointed to the patriarchate by Boris Goudnov, had
assumed the supreme authority of the state in confirming a new regime. Convoking a
Zemskii Sobor to elect a new tsar, Patriarch Job asserted the clergy's right to partake in
the nomination and confirmation of Russia's new tsar:

By the grace of the Holy Spirit, and according to the canons which were laid
down in council, we have the power to ordain the pastor, preceptor, and tsar
worthy of our land, whom God has chosen . . . Without God nothing good was
done; and the Lord said, "without me nothing can be done."^2

The assembly met in Moscow on 17 February 1598 under the presidency of the patriarch.
It consisted of 474 delegates: 100 members were from the clergy, 272 from the boyars,
33 from provincial townships, and the rest from elite guards, Cossacks, and other
miscellaneous groups. The patriarch announced his support for Boris Godunov, who
was subsequently elected by the votes of the clergy and the boyars. On 3 September
1598 Boris Goudnov was crowned tsar of Russia.

Accounts of Boris Godunov's reign show initial admiration for the ruler as a just
and able administrator, a defender of the poor against the rich, a protector and defender
of the church. Godunov's primary purpose was to preserve the existing order of the state
in order to make salvation possible through the church. Hence, the role of the state was
to be autocratic, demanding complete obedience from its subjects so the church could
save souls. This idea of the tsar as preserver of the temporal realm for the sake of eternal
salvation is expressed in the analogy of biblical creation in the Vremennik:

Our ancestors, the first couple Adam and Eve, were created in ancient times by
the hand of God — he from the dirt and she from his rib. God, out of all that
existed, appointed him to be the autocrat tsar of all creation; the birds, the beasts
and reptiles all obeyed him with submission as their creator, master of all, and
lord. And until the first-created was tempted by the Destroyer and Enemy of all
to break the first commandment, all the speechless trembled at the command of
that creature, even those which now terrify us. When the serpent whispered
temptations into the ears of Eve, and Eve, instructed by it, tempted her own
husband, immediately after that, the newly-created tsar of all the world himself
became terrified of those animals . . .

And as all the wild animals were in everything obedient to Adam until his
transgression, so in the same way in recent time our own autocrats in their states
ruled over us, their age-old servants, while they themselves kept the
commandments given by God up to the end, as long as they did not sin before
Him. In the passing of many centuries up to now we did not oppose them, as
according to the scriptures a servant should obey his master. In all service we
were obedient to them not only to blood, but even to death itself; as a beast cannot oppose the man who leads him to slaughter, we were answerless before them like voiceless fish; with great care we bore the yoke of servitude, obeying them with such fear that out of fear we showed them honor nearly equal to God.\(^8\)

Out of fear, subjects obeyed their sovereign and honored him as if he were God.

The influence of Byzantine political thought is evident: the state is copied after and justified by God's relationship to creation. Like Adam's relationship to the animals, the tsar's relationship to his subjects depends on his obedience to God's commands known to him through the Church. The purpose of the tsar is to preserve the laws, customs, and traditions of the kingdom.\(^9\) When these laws are altered, subjects lose their natural obedience to their sovereign:

When the years came to an end, the more our rulers changed the old lawful regulations (blagoustavleniia zakonnaia) that were passed by our fathers and changed the good customs into new opposing customs, the more in their obeying the natural fear of obedience to a master began to diminish.\(^10\)

This state of disorder is referred to as lawlessness (bezzakonnyi), unseemliness (nedostoinnyi), and impropriety (nelepyi).\(^11\) It is the tsar's primary responsibility to prevent a state of disorder like the Time of Troubles.\(^12\)

The breakdown of theological, political, and social order was dependent upon the moral character of the tsar. Whereas Theodore, although an idiot, was deeply pious and therefore considered a great tsar, Boris Godunov, although supremely skilled as an administrator and politician, was deeply impious and therefore considered an unworthy tsar who ushered in the Time of Troubles.\(^13\) The tsar's will was dependent upon God's will. The principle of order is the anthropological one: the tsar's relationship to God determined the order of society.

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Tsars could fall not only by having defective characters but also by following bad advice, even if their moral characters were incorruptible. Boris Godunov, and later Basil Shuisky, was given bad advice: "after the years came to an end, our rulers wanted gladly to incline their ears to false whispered words just as in the Old Eve, the ancestress of all, attentively inclined her ear to the tempter snake . . ."14 The result was disorder throughout the kingdom: Godunov’s murder of Dmitrii, the persecution of the Shuiskys and the Romanovs, the First False Dmitrii’s ascent to power, and the plan to kill "the boyars, the gentry, the merchants and all Orthodox Christians."15

When a tsar has become unrighteous or an imposter has come to the throne, the subjects of the realm have a duty to protest against the sovereign.16 Patriarch Hermogen is an example of one who carries out this duty: he is "a hard diamond and unwavering column . . . and he alone stands against them all like a giant without arms . . ."17 Patriarch Philaret and the defenders of Smolensk and Chernigov are two other examples of individuals who protest against an unjust tsar.18

In the tale "Novaia Porvest," the writer calls upon the people to follow the example of Patriarch Hermogen and the defenders of Smolensk to aid Russia in her cause of liberation.19 The writer laments how fear prevents brotherly love among the Russian people, thereby allowing Russia to be ruled by her enemies.20 If subjects do not speak out in protest of unrighteous acts, then destruction, humiliation, and submission will be the order of the day:

And as it were for the sake of [the persecution of] these Nikitich-Iurves [the Romanovs] and because of foolish silence of the whole community where no one dared to speak truth to the tsar [Boris Godunov] about the destruction of the guiltless ones, the Lord darkened the sky with clouds, and such a rain poured forth that all men were terrified.21
The fate of the realm therefore was dependent on both the tsar's moral character and the people's spirituality.

When the realm fell into disorder, it was the responsibility of individuals to point out the tsar's injustices. These individuals, like the Old Testament prophets, have a theological and political obligation to protest against his injustices. Patriarch Hermogen, for example, is portrayed as "a prophet" who tries to warn Shuisky of his bad advisers. But as much as an individual may protest against political and moral disorder, his obligation is restricted to protest. There is no program of political or social action. Even the constitutional bodies, the boyar duma and the Assembly of the Land, refrain from political action. The "prophet" was the only constitutional check to the tsar's political rule.

6.2 Symbol of the False Prince
(1598 A.D.-1613 A.D.)

The Time of Troubles ushered in a new symbol: the False Prince who shall return to restore order in the realm. This symbol of disorder is manifested in the False Dmitriis and the False Peter. The symbol of the False Prince did not succeed because it had to compete with the Russian Orthodox Church for the organizing principle of Russian society.

The Time of Troubles actually began in 1582 with the birth of Dmitrii, the youngest son of Ivan IV by his seventh wife, Maria Nagaia. When Ivan IV died in 1584, Dmitrii inherited the principality of Uglichen; and Theodore, Dmitrii's half-brother, became tsar of Russia. Unlike Theodore, Dmitrii was considered by some a legitimate heir to the throne because his father's marriage to Maria Nagia was not recognized by the
Church. But to be safe rather than sorry, Theodore, probably at the urging of Boris Godunov, had Dmitrii, his mother Maria, and their entire court banished to Uglich.

On 15 May 1591 Dmitrii was found dead in the courtyard palace at Uglich, a death that today still remains a mystery. Leading a commission to investigate the cause of death, Shuisky went to Uglich, conducted an investigation, and on 30 May 1591 sent his report to the tsar, who in turn referred the report to the patriarch and the council of bishops. The council and the patriarch concluded that the commission's report was correct: Dmitrii had died accidentally during an epileptic fit. Dmitrii was buried in the Uglich Cathedral rather than the Cathedral of the Archangel Michael, where the other members of the Rurikovich dynasty lay interred. The rest of the Nagoi clan was deported, murdered, or sent to the monasteries.

Shortly after Boris Godunov was elected tsar, a young man, claiming to be Dmitrii, appeared in Poland. When Godunov died on 13 April 1605, the army supported the First False Dmitrii. By 20 June 1605 the First False Dmitrii had entered the capital. Patriarch Job refused to recognize him and subsequently was deposed and sent to a monastery. Replacing Job was the Ignatius, the Greek bishop of Ryazan, who happened to be the first ecclesiastical figure to recognize the First False Dmitrii as the true tsar. Dmitrii also promoted the monk Philaret to Ignatius's place. On 18 July 1605 Maria Nagia, Dmitrii's supposed mother, recognized him as her son; on 21 July 1605 the First False Dmitrii was crowned tsar.

The First False Dmitrii's reign was quickly ended by a coup d'état led by Shuisky, despite his earlier allegiance to the First False Dmitrii. Elected tsar, Shuisky replaced Ignatius with Hermogen, the metropolitan of Kazan, and in the summer of 1606 sent out
circulars to all the Russian towns to announce the deaths of the pretender, Dmitrii, and the death of the true Dmitrii. It also named Boris Godunov the murder of the tsarevich and declared that Dmitrii's remains would be transferred to Moscow. Of all of the messages, the most interesting ones were perhaps about the transfer of the tsarevich's remains. When Dmitrii's remains were first recovered, the men found them to be uncorrupted. On the procession to Moscow, Dmitrii's relics are alleged to have cured several people of their ailments. Finally, Dmitrii was laid to rest in the Cathedral of Archangel Michael with his other family members. He was canonized in June 1606 as a martyr of the Church.

In spite of the full weight of the Russian Orthodox Church behind the announcement of Dmitrii's death, a second person claiming to be Dmitrii appeared. The appearance of the Second False Dmitrii, in addition to that of a False Peter and the outbreak of rebellions in the south led by Princes Shakhovskoy and Bolotnikov, put Russia into turmoil. With assistance from Sweden, Shuisky was able to temporarily suppress these rebellions as well as drive back the Second False Dmitrii, "the Felon of Tushino," from Moscow. However, within a few months, the Polish advance toward Moscow, the sudden death of the popular Prince Skopin-Shuisky, and the reassertion of strength by the Felon of Tushino created a legitimacy crisis for Shuisky. He was deposed by an assembly consisting of the clergy, boyars, gentry, and the common people in July 1610. For the next three years, Muscovite Russia would be ruled by a seven-member boyar council led by Theodore Mstislavsky. But it was not in the state that the people rested their hopes; rather, they looked toward the Church for national liberation and dynastic restoration.
The government tried its best to hold the realm together. As Sigismund III's Polish army advanced toward Moscow, a *zemskii sobor* was hastily convoked to elect a new tsar. There were three candidates: Prince Basil Golitsyn, Michael Romanov, and the Polish Prince Wladyslaw. With support of the boyars, Wladyslaw won the election, and negotiations commenced between Moscow and the Polish army commander Zolkiewski. However, Patriarch Hermogen refused to sign the documents bearing the Russian terms unless the Polish prince who would reign as tsar agreed to be baptized in the Orthodox faith: for the head of the Russian state, the tsar, does not take any decision "without the counsel and respect of the patriarchs." The boyars conceded to the Patriarch, and on the condition that Wladyslaw converted to Orthodoxy, the Russians invited Wladyslaw into Moscow to rule them. A delegation that included Metropolitan Philaret was sent to Sigismund III, whose headquarters were at Smolensk, to confirm these new arrangements. Surprisingly, Sigismund rejected the offer on religious grounds, i.e., Wladyslaw's conversion to Orthodoxy; and desiring to become ruler of Russia himself, he arrested the Russian delegation and banished them to Poland for nine years.

Sigismund III soon began his campaign to win the tsarist throne through war, propaganda, and diplomacy. Sigismund's main competition for the tsarist throne was Sweden's candidate, Prince Philip. Sensing Russia's vulnerability, the Swedes had invaded Russia and now pushed forward their own candidate, Prince Philip, for the tsarist throne. Finally, the Second False Dmitrii, the Felon of Tushino, had revived his strength and became another contender for the throne.

With no tsar and an impotent boyar council, the patriarch again became the *de facto* ruler of Russia. Although the Church had generally refrained from political
matters, it was the only organization that could continue the notion of statehood. Essential to this idea of the Russia state was Orthodoxy. Ever since the time of Godunov, the Church had established the precedent that the tsar must be baptized in the Orthodox faith: "We do not want a sovereign who is not ours, who is not of the Greek faith." The breakdown of negotiations between the Poles and Moscow in 1610-11 is attributed to Sigismund's intention of converting all the Russian people to Catholicism. Patriarch Hermogen (1606-1612) then assumed the leadership of the Muscovite state. He declared Russia free of its allegiance to Wladyslaw and sent manifestoes throughout the country that urged the people to organize an army in order to liberate the capital from the Poles and Swedes for the defense of their faith. A national army created in response to Hermogen's appeals acted as the government. Unfortunately, internal bickering, particularly from the Cossacks, dissolved the army when it was on the verge of victory. The Polish army collected its strength and smashed Smolensk, while the Swedes captured Novgorod and the Felon of Tushino reasserted himself once again. Finally, another pretender, the Third False Dmitrii, appeared in Pskov.

Undeterred, Hermogen issued another patriotic appeal, so did other ecclesiastical figures like the Abbot Dionysus of the Holy Trinity St. Sergius Monastery. A second national army was created and, its predecessor, it acted as the government of Russia. This second army became known for beginning a religious as well as a national revival across Russia, and, unlike the first national army, this one was successful, liberating Moscow from its Polish occupiers in 1612. As the national army approached Moscow, Patriarch Hermogen, who had twice called upon Russians to liberate themselves from

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their Polish masters, and now who was imprisoned and dying of starvation in the Kremlin
dungeon, waited for his emancipation. He would not live to see Moscow liberated.

6.3 Tsardom Restored
(1613-45 A.D.)

The first aim of the victorious national army was to establish a legitimate government, i.e., to elect a new tsar. A specially called *zemskii sobor* convened for this purpose consisted of members from the clergy, gentry, townspeople, and peasants. After considering a half dozen or more Russians, the assembly in February 1613 decided upon Mikhail Romanov as the new tsar of Russia. The Romanovs were popular with the people and had good relations with the Cossacks; furthermore, the candidate was only sixteen years old, young enough not to be compromised by the Poles and the pretenders. Mikhail also was Patriarch Hermogen's choice, although the patriarch did not live to see his election. Emissaries were dispatched throughout Russia to sound out local opinion, and when reports came of strong endorsement for the candidate, Mikhail was elected to rule Russia as tsar, the title to be passed down to all his descendants.

This act of "confirmation" of the election of Mikhail as tsar of Russia creates the fictional genealogy of those Russian princes who trace their blood line back to imperial Rome. Mikhail is considered the true successor to the last of the Riurikovich line, Tsar Theodore, for the "establishment of our true Orthodox faith." Not only does the official invitation that Mikhail accept the title of tsar emphasize this fictional genealogy, but it reveals the divine character of this appointment. Archbishop Theodorit of Ryazan, the head of the commission, wrote to Mikhail:

Many are called, but few are chosen. For the Lord had said: "not everyone shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of the Father shall"... it is
also written that nothing good can be fulfilled or done without God . . . So Great
Tsar do not disobey the commandment of God.37

The invocation of the title tsar beckoned back the imperial symbol of Constantinople as
the "Second Rome" that was ruled by the Byzantine Emperor and the "First Rome" ruled
by Augustus. Now with Moscow as the "Third Rome," the tsar would be the true and last
retainer of the Roman-Byzantine heritage.

The official act of Mikhail Romanov's election as tsar reestablished the theocratic
arrangement between church and state. The forms of popular government — the
interregnum, the national armies, the zemskii sobor — did not alter the ideological content
of tsardom. Although the tsar was obliged to consult the zemskii sobor, elected in 1613,
he could select from it his favorite and trusted nobles from it for positions in his
government. Furthermore, the sobor did not possess any legislative initiative and could
not reject a decree from the tsar. In practice, nothing had changed.

The coronation ceremony was held on 11 July 1613. In the absence of a
patriarch, Metropolitan Ephraim of Kazan performed in the ceremony in the Uspenski
Cathedral. The metropolitan reiterated the line of Riurikovich who had ruled Russia and
then referred to Mikhail's legitimate succession by election to the title of tsar. Ephraim
confirmed the sobor's election, declared Mikhail fit to be crowned by God tsar, instructed
Mikhail with references to the Old Testament King David, and presented him the royal
regalia. Finally, the metropolitan declared:

O God-crowned Tsar and Grand Prince Mikhail, Autocrat of all Russia! The
sceptre is given to you to govern Russia! Guard it and keep it! Rule the kingdom
according to the will of God . . .38

The metropolitan also reminded the tsar to obey canon law, fear God, love truth, and
defend the Orthodox realm against infidels, for:
God has chosen you to be his representative on the earth and has raised you to sit upon his throne, as it befits you, who has received from the most-high commandments.\textsuperscript{39}

Compared with previous coronations, it is almost an exact duplicate of those of 1584 and 1598. The Possessors' theocratic formula reemerges with the one qualification that the titles of the dominion, the Russian land, were changed: they were given by God rather than by inheritance. This theoretical innovation made Russian political theory more like its original Byzantine source with its concept of \textit{imperium}: the emperor's received his dominion from God Himself.\textsuperscript{40}

\textit{6.4 Velikii Gossudar} \\
(1619-33 A.D.)

The \textit{zemskii sobor} had elected Mikhail Romanov as Russia's new tsar; however, Mikhail informed the assembly that he would not accept the throne unless he was blessed by his father.\textsuperscript{41} The patriarchal throne therefore was reserved for Mikhail's father, Philaret, who was a prisoner of the Poles and would not be released until December 1618, following the treaty of Deulino. On 14 June 1619 Philaret returned home to Moscow and was consecrated as patriarch later that month. A new era in Russian history had begun.

Under Godunov's reign, the Romanov family was popular, and in order to dissuade the Romanovs from political ambition, Boris assured Philaret that he would consider him "as a brother and an aid" in the affairs of the state.\textsuperscript{42} Apparently flattery did not work. The Romanovs were later accused of a plot to poison the tsar and consequently were banished from the capital. Henceforth Philaret's ambitions could only be ecclesiastical rather than political. He obtained the metropolitan of Rostov and was a nominee for patriarch under Shiusky's reign. But after a mission to Uglich, Philaret
returned to Moscow only to discover Hermogen, metropolitan of Kazan, had replaced him as the nominee. Because of Shuisky's suspicions of his political ambitions, Philaret would remain metropolitan of Rostov and become an enemy of Shuisky. He was nominated patriarch under the Second False Dmitrii and later joined the interregnum government. He was a member of the delegation that journeyed to Smolensk to negotiate with the Polish king Sigismund III for a new tsar. For his pains, he was arrested, imprisoned, and finally released to return home on 14 June 1619 to find his son the new tsar and himself the undisputed patriarchal nominee.43

The reign of Patriarch Philaret (1619-33) was one that elevated the position of the patriarch and the church in its relation to the tsar and the state. With his son, a weak and inexperienced boy, as tsar, Philaret took over the reigns of government. On official acts of state, the patriarch's name appeared underneath that of the tsar, and the rehabilitation of the treasury and army was conducted under Philaret's watch.44 He replaced the boyar duma with himself as the tsar's chief counselor.45 And although unschooled in theology, Philaret purged the heretical elements of the Russian Church, persecuted Roman Catholics and Protestants, restored ecclesiastical administrative order, and retained clerical lands and privileges.46 In short, Philaret possessed the ability to govern both church and state.

Philaret's official sovereign position and title, Velikii Gossudar, was conferred on him during his patriarchal consecration on 24 June 1619. The consecration has been preserved in the state document, "Information on the Commencement of the Patriarchate of Russia and on the Elevation of the Patriarchal Throne of Philaret, Metropolitan of Rostov, and the Order of his Ordination."47 As head of the Russian Church, the patriarch...
claimed ecclesiastical primacy in the Orthodox world because of Russia's political
primacy. Only Moscow in the Orthodox world possessed a ruler of the imperial rank of
tsar, thereby making the Muscovite patriarch "unique among all the patriarchates" in the
Orthodox world.40 Constantinople sanctioned Moscow's imperial ambitions with its
blessing:

the ecumenical patriarch granted the Russian Church the power to select another
patriarch for the throne of the holy apostolic church of Great Russia. He shall be
elected and elevated by his metropolitans and bishops . . .49

In short, with the blessings of Constantinople, the head of the church assumed both in
title and in practice the powers formerly reserved for the state.50

During Philaret's rule, there seemed to be no significant disagreement between
father and son, patriarch and tsar.51 Unfortunately for the Russian Orthodox Church,
Philaret did not rule Russia for its benefit, although he did preserve clerical land and
privileges; rather, the patriarch ruled Russia to reestablish the ideology of tsardom.52 He
persuaded his son to declare in 1629 that no Orthodox believer may serve under a non-
Orthodox master, and he sought to secularize and bureaucratize the church while
overlooking clerical abuses, a neglect that planted the seeds for future ecclesiastical
discontent.53

Philaret reestablished the patriarch's authority over the Church by eliminating his
rivals. His first victim was Jonah, bishop of Krutisky, who had been *locum tenens
(mestoblyuditel) of the patriarchal throne between 1613-1619. By 1620, Jonah had been
dismissed from his post and sent to a monastery on the Volga.54 Philaret had brought a
series of charges against Jonah to discredit him. First, Jonah had admitted two Catholic
converts into Orthodoxy without undergoing a second baptism. Because "the Latins are

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the most impure and most ferocious of all heretics . . . like dogs, known to be enemies of
God," Philaret convoked an ecclesiastical council that declared all converts should be re-
baptized.35 Jonah was then asked by Philaret whether he had Polish and Catholic
sympathies, to which he recanted and pleaded mercy.56 But more damaging was the
accusation that Jonah had unjustly condemned Nektariy, bishop of Vologda, in 1616.57 It
was this charge that brought him into disgrace and eventual exile on the Volga.

The requirement of re-baptism was imposed not only on those of non-Orthodox
faiths but also demanded of immigrants, even if they were Orthodox, because their faith
was suspect.58 Previously, people had been accepted as loyal subjects of the tsar if they
were Orthodox. Now, under Philaret, the state for the first time linked religious identity
with the notion of "Russianness." But as the example of Kurtsevich reveals, this link was
still a weak one. Kurtsevich, a western orthodox bishop who was never re-baptized, had
ingratiated himself to Philaret. For his blandishments, he was given the bishopric of
Suzdal, where he lived a life of corruption. It was only after the death of Philaret that
Kurtsevich was investigated, dismissed, and sent to Solovki in the Arctic to repent for his
sins.59

By May 1625, Philaret's control over the Russian Church was complete. He had
secured a charter from the tsar that, with the exception of a few cases, gave him complete
jurisdiction over the Church.60 His reign was marked by cronyism, with Kurtsevich and
Cyprian, the bishop of Tobolsk, as the two most prominent examples.61 Promotions and
demotions were dependent upon not loyalty to the Church but to Philaret. The patriarch's
refusal to reform clerical abuses, while exiling those who tried to make reforms, such as
the layman Ivan Neronov, the monk L. Z. Tustanevsky, and the writer K. T. Stavrovetsky, only revealed the extent of his corruption.62

Theological scholarship in Moscow also was lacking, particularly given the patriarch's policy on printing. In response to the sudden popularity of printing presses, Philaret issued decrees that prohibited the purchase of any "Lithuanian," i.e., non-Muscovite, ecclesiastical literature.63 Printing raised the problem of authenticity of texts and the desirability of corrections, argued Philaret. Theological reform and innovation were discouraged. For example, it would require six years, after Philaret had obtained the sanction of the other eastern patriarchs, before any authorization was granted for changes in prayer.64

In spite of these restrictions on the printing of texts, scholarship did flourish in the city of Kiev. Under the leadership of Peter Moghila, Metropolitan of Kiev (1596-1647), the city had become the intellectual center of Russia. Moghila prized education and tried to establish clerical schools to teach both clergymen and laymen such subjects as theology and Slavonic and Greek grammar.65 Although his educational efforts failed to bear fruit, scholarship was still of high caliber in the West and, more important, the Western Russian Church continued to pledge to view itself as part of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow.66

Instead of supporting ecclesiastical and theological innovation, Philaret stood firmly behind conservatism, cronyism, and tsarist absolutism. Although he was able to resurrect the administrative apparatus of the church, protect clerical lands and privileges, and rule the state, Philaret offered nothing of spiritual substance. His support of the church was only in the interest of the state, is demonstrated by the symbol of his title,
The Church needed a spiritual leader; instead, it found an administrator.

6.5 *Symphonia Restored*  
(c.1634-c.1652 A.D.)

If Philaret’s reign was the acme of church supremacy, then his successors returned the church to its traditional role in church-state relations. The patriarchs after Philaret neither claimed equal dignity with the tsar nor initiated secular action. Furthermore, their elections had been determined by the throne. For example, the election of Joseph was chosen by Philaret on his death. The tsar had selected six candidates for the patriarchate, and the synod selected one with the tsar’s approval. On 31 January 1634 Joseph ascended the patriarchal throne and resumed the traditional title of *Velikii Gospodin* instead of *Velikii Gossudar.*

The Church began to reform itself, with the encouragement of the new tsar, Alexis (1645-76), and his confessor, Stephen Vonifatiev, and the "white" clergy. Despite the patriarch’s disapproval, the white clergy sought to eliminate clerical corruption and correct abuses by advocating the ecclesiastical discipline of the early Church Fathers. The reformers within the Church sought to raise the moral standards of the clergy and lay people, to revive respect for the Church and its services, and to restore clerical obedience. The first target of this reform was drunkenness among the clergy. In February 1646 Alexis issued a decree commanding that:

all Orthodox Christians are to observe fastings, to live in purity with the upmost temperance, and to refrain from drunkenness, wrong, and every other type sin possible.
Later in March 1647, Alexis forbade the Solovetski Monastery to possess alcohol and informed the monks that drunkenness is disgraceful to the clergy. He urged them to mend their ways by emptying their shelves and cellars of all wine and liquor.\(^7\)

Other reforms quickly followed. Convoking a church council, Alexis ordered all people to observe Sunday as a religious holiday, attend church services, and pray as good Christians.\(^71\) He issued this order again to the Gortisky Monastery and the Beloozerski Monastery of St. Cyril, the latter having been warned to obey the tsar or face "severe punishment without mercy."\(^72\) In 1648 Alexis ordered a state decree to all provinces that pagan games and superstitions must be eradicated from all of Russia. The governors, not the Church, had discretionary power to punish violators of this decree.\(^73\) The Church, for its part, also insisted upon complete submission from its believers; otherwise, it would refer them to the tsar "for their disobedience."\(^74\)

Alexis's zeal for reform, which had been fueled by his confessor Stephen Vonifatiev, had encroached on Patriarch Joseph's authority. Stephen had criticized the Russian Church and called the patriarch a "wolf" instead of a "pastor."\(^75\) He accused the patriarch of hoarding church riches and reducing the salaries of administrative personnel in the patriarchal service.\(^76\) Because of these insults, Patriarch Joseph demanded that Alexis punish Stephen for his slanderous remarks about the patriarch and the church.\(^77\) Joseph asked that capital punishment be imposed on the offender as stipulated by the penal code for the crime of blasphemy.\(^78\) After receiving the patriarch's complaint, the tsar did nothing. State supremacy over the church had become reestablished.

This arrangement of state supremacy was formalized in the secular code *Ulozhenie*, compiled in 1648-49.\(^79\) Drawing from previous *boyar* councils, holy synods,
tsars' decrees, and ecclesiastical legislation, it rationalized and standardized all legal and administrative procedures into a written code. Patriarch Joseph's demand that blasphemers be subjected to capital punishment is found in the first chapter of the Ulozhenie, "Concerning Blasphemers and Church Seditionaries," which stipulates that anyone censoring God, or the other divine beings, or saints, shall be apprehended and investigated, and if his blasphemy is determined, he shall be burned. The Ulozhenie permitted the state to determine ecclesiastical matters on the grounds that the tsar was the defender of Orthodoxy and the symbol of the unity of the nation and faith.

Orthodoxy and the ideology of tsardom became fused into one idea. This fusion even applied to subjects of the realm in that it stipulated that no Orthodox person could become a servant of an unbaptized person or a person of another faith. The Church therefore had a role to play in the politics of the state as did the state in the ecclesiastical affairs of the Church. In Patriarch Joseph's case, the law asked the tsar to determine whether the patriarch or the confessor would speak for the church because the role of the state was to preserve the dogmatic unity and respect for the church. Alexis determined the substance of that dogmatic unity by throwing his weight with his confessors and thereby with the reformers.

The conflict between the reformers and the conservatives within the church came out in the open in 1651 at a church council convened over the subject of vocal performances in church services. The debate was over monovocal and polyvocal performances of chants and liturgy during church services. The reformers supported the "single-voice" performance because they sought to restore the beauty and intelligibility of the divine service. According to the reformers, the current practice of polyvocality
created audio and therefore spiritual dissonance. Previous reforms of vocal performances, such as the ones at the church council of 1551 and under the reign of Patriarch Hermogene, had been rejected.

The crisis came to a head in February 1649 when a special-one day church council had reconfirmed "polyvocality" and had requested Alexis to punish reformers who oppose and insult the bishops, e.g., Stephen, who had insulted Patriarch Joseph, by calling him a wolf. Alexis, on the side of the reformers, convoked another church council in 1651 to resolve this matter. The reformers prevailed: polyvocality was banned. Alexis issued a letter of decretal to all churches in his tsardom to institute the "single-voice" performance. This victory for the reformers was only temporary. The growing antagonism between the "white" clergy, the reformers within the Church hierarchy, and the "black" clergy, the monks at the monasteries, would continue.

When Patriarch Joseph passed away, Alexis offered the patriarchate to his confessor, Stephen Vonifatiev; however, Stephen refused on the grounds of old age and instead proposed Nikon, the Archbishop of Novgorod, an active reformer. Nikon twice declined when offered the tsar's nomination, but he accepted the third offer, contingent upon receiving the title Velikii Gossudar. It is important to recall that Alexis' nomination (in practice selection) of the patriarch is not the state exercising control over the church; rather, the state works together with the church in symphonia. Critical to the idea of symphonia is a pious tsar, which Alexis definitely was.

6.6 Conclusion

The extinction of the Riurikovich dynasty threw Russia into turmoil. The symbols of disorder, like the False Prince, competed with the symbols of right order,
such as the Russian Orthodox Church, for the spiritual and institutional organization of Russian society. It was only under the leadership of Patriarch Hermogen that the Russian Orthodox Church emerged triumphant as the symbol of right order.

The election of Mikhail Romanov as tsar and his father, Philaret, as patriarch ushered in a new symbol, the Velikii Gossudar, that supplanted the Russian Orthodox Church. This symbol, the Velikii Gossudar, was one of disorder because it sought church domination over the state. But when Patriarch Philaret passed away, the Russian Orthodox Church was restored as a symbol of right.

6.7 End Notes


2. *Akty (sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi Imperii Arkheograficheskoiu Ekspeditsieiu Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk)*, vol. 2, (St. Petersburg: 1836), No. 6 (hereafter *AE*).


4. *Sobranie Gossudarstvennykh Gramot i Dogovorov*, vol. 1 (Moscow: 1813-28), No. 82 (hereafter *SGGD*).

5. *Dopolneniia k Aktam Istoricheskim*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: 1897), No. 145 (hereafter *DAI*). The coronation ceremony followed the pattern of the previous ones: the Church reaffirmed the principle of divine institution and the right to succession; the Patriarch instructed the new tsar to be just, subordinate to canon law, and a defender of the Orthodox; and the tsar accepts the mantle of Orthodox prince.


7. *Russkaya istoricheskaya Biblioteka*, vol. 13 (Petrograd: 1920), cols. 224 (hereafter *RIB*); also see *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey*, vol. 14 (St. Petersburg: 1844-1949), 6-7 (hereafter *PSRL*).

8. *Vremeniik Ivan Timofeeva*, ed. O. A. Derzhavina and E. Kolosova (Moscow-Leningrad: Izo-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1951), 109. The *Vremeniik* is a compilation of
primary documents during the Time of Troubles.

9. At this time law is a vague concept and probably refers to the king's will, unwritten custom, and positive written law. For references to zakon, please refer to Ibid., 89 and RIB, vol. 13, cols. 536, 540, 552.


11. This state of disorder is presented as follows:

Everyone began to want to climb higher than his own rank to which he was called; servants wanted to be masters, the unfree leapt for freedom, and military servitors began to behave like boyars (voins'tvenyi zhe chin boliarstvoate nachinakhu).


14. Vremeniuk Ivana Timofeeva, ed. O. A. Derzhavina and E. Kolosova (Moscow-Leningrad: Izo-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1951), 110. Tsar Basil Shuisky "greeted those lies which were whispered into his ears against the people with a happy face, and wanted to listen to them sweetly." Patriarch Hermogen warned Shuisky that he had fallen into sin and tried to curb the influence of those counselors, but the attempt was to no avail. Ibid., 252.


next passage (cols 1312-15), however, Hermogen is said to have quarreled with the tsar's
advisers, not the tsar himself. Hermogen warned the tsar "that the advice of those near
him was not good." Nonetheless, Shuisky continued to persist in his errors. For his part,
Hermogen, "the godly wise pastor, constantly comforted him in everything lovingly and
meekly." The Patriarch instructed the evil advisers in Holy Scripture, prayer, and
prohibition. With the exception of this one passage, Patriarch Hermogen is generally
admired as the leader of the national Russian revival.

18. *RIB*, vol. 13, 1310-15. Righteousness is not restricted to any particular social class
or rank in the Russian mind as evident in the example of Kozma Minin, a meat merchant
by trade. *RIB*, vol. 13, col. 1317.

19. Like the author of the *smuta*, the identity of the writer is unknown. Droblenkova, ed.
*Novaia provest’ o prestavnom Rossiiskom tsarstve* (Moscow-Leningrad: Izd-vo
Akademii nauk SSSR, 1960).

20. *Vremeniik Ivana Timofeeva*, ed. O. A. Derzhavina and E. Kolosova (Moscow-

21. *Skazanie Avraamiia Palititsyna*, ed. O. A. Derzhavina and E. Kolosova (Moscow-
Leningrad: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1955, 252-53; also see *Vremeniik Ivana
Timofeeva*, ed. O. A. Derzhavina and E. Kolosova (Moscow-Leningrad: Izd-vo Akademii
nauk SSSR, 1951), 94ff.; *RIB*, vol. 13, cols 152-153.


23. The Assembly of Land's only political function is the election of tsars as guided by
God's will. *RIB* vol. 13, col. 618, 1319; also see *Vremeniik Ivana Timofeeva*, ed. O. A.
Derzhavina and E. Kolosova (Moscow-Leningrad: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1951),
165.

24. For more about the Time of Troubles, please refer to Platonov, S. F. *The Time of
Troubles: A Historical Study of the Internal Crisis and Social Struggles in Sixteenth and
Seventeenth-Century Muscovy*, trans. J. Alexander (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas

25. N. S. Artsybashev, "O konchine tsarevichan Dimitriia," *Vestnik vestnik* 3 (1829): 90-
126; N. S. Artsybashev, "O konchine tsarevichan Dimitriia," *Vestnik Evropy* 12 (1830):
241-66; E. A. Belov, "O Smerti tsarevicha Dimitriia," *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnago
prosveshcheniia* 7 (1871): 1-44; E. A. Belov, "O Smerti tsarevicha Dimitriia," *Zhurnal
Ministerstva narodnago prosveshcheniia* 8: 277-320; O. A. Iakovleva, "K voprosu o
dobrosovestnosti ofitsial’nogo Uglichevskogo sledstvia 1591 g.,” in *Uchenye zapiski
Nauchno-issledovatelskogo instituta izayka, literatury, istorii i ekonomiki pri Sovete
Ministrov Chuvashskoi ASSR* 21 (1962): 350-55; Klein, V. I. *Uglichevskoe sledstvennoe
delo o smerti tsarevicha Dimitriia* (Moscow: Pechatnia A. I. Snegirovoi, 1913); N. I.
Kosotomarov, "O sledstvennom dele po povodu ubiennia tsarevicha Dimitriia," in
*Sobranie sochienii*, vol. 5 (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Ob-va dlia posobiia

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26. For more about the life of the First False Dmitrii, please see Barbour, Philip L. *Dmitry called the Pretender: Tsar and Great Prince of All Russia, 1605-1606* (London: Macmillan, 1967).

27. *SGGD*, vol. 2, No. 142, 146-147. The first circular identified the First False Dmitrii as Grishka Otrepev and stated that the real Dmitrii had died in 1591 at Uglich as collaborated by the testimony of Maria Nagaia and her brother, Mikhail. The second circular named Boris Godunov as the murder of Dmitrii. The third circular, sent on 2 June 1606, announced the transfer of Dmitrii's remains to Moscow and the grant of a pardon to Maria Nagaia (Marfa) for her incorrect identification of the pretender as her son. She would spend the remainder of her days in peace and solitude. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, No. 150.

28. *SGGD*, vol. 2, No. 149. Also see *Ibid.*, No. 151 for Marfa's letter and Shuisky's letter that discusses the miracles that had happened when Dmitrii's remains were journeying to Moscow. Foreign witnesses, on the other hand, remained skeptical. For example, one claimed that Shuisky had a new coffin made and filled it with a priest's recently deceased nine year old boy. Bussow, Conard. *The Disturbed State of the Russian Realm*, trans and ed. G. Edward Orchard (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 85-86.


30. The first clergyman who advanced the idea that the head of the church had the authority of the tsar was Metropolitan Alexis (1354-78). A student of Metropolitan Theognostus (1328-53), Alexis wrote that bishops ranked higher than princes because all persons should be submissive to the prelates "without any contradictions." The temporal ruler is not the supreme authority because the temporal realm was a "earthly heaven" that required those devoted to God to govern, i.e., the bishops. The instructions Alexis gave
to Ivan II would be to "respect, obey, and submit yourselves to your spiritual fathers." The metropolitan would manage state affairs during the reigns of Ivan II (1353-59) and Ivanovich Donskoii (1359-81). Another person who argued for the supremacy of the church in secular matters was Maximus the Greek. Golubinski, E. *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi*, vol. 2 (Moscow: 1901-1911), 189.

31. *SGGD*, vol. 2, No. 144; also see *AE*, vol. 2, No. 175-188.

32. For Sigismund's intention of converting Russia to Roman Catholicism, please refer to his letter to Pope Paul V on 30 October 1610. Pierling, S. J. *La Russie et le Saint-Siege*, vol. 3 (Paris, 1896-1901), 364-66, 371. Sigismund's imagination was captured by the Jesuit Peter Skarga's "Sermon on the Deits" in the late 1590s. Capitalizing on the apocalyptical strand of Christian thought, Skarga inspired Sigismund to come to power in the retinue of the First False Dmitrii. Sigismund's ambition was nothing short of a "universal Christian republic." The Vatican-supported Polish invasion of Russia stimulated a national revival in the defense of Russia and the Orthodox faith. Rightly or wrongly, the Roman Church had become identified with Sigismund's army. Billington, James H. *The Icon and the Axe* (New York: Knopf, 1966), 105-108. For Muscovite reactions to Catholic conversion, please refer to *SGGD*, vol. 2, No. 142, 146; vol. 3, No. 1.


34. Of all the successful defenses against the Poles, two of the most famous are the Pskov Monastery of the Caves and the Trinity of the St. Sergius Monastery, the latter which held out for sixteen months against the Polish siege. The spiritual leaders of the St. Sergius Monastery were Archimandrite Dionisius and the monk Avraamy Palitsyn. Interestingly, Palitsyn was not at the Trinity Monastery of St. Sergius himself. He had spent time in one of the monastery hostels in Moscow. Instead of an eye-witness account of events, Palitsyn gathered the daily records of the siege and interviewed witnesses. According to Palitsyn, the cause of the Time of Troubles was Russia's sinfulness. The first sin committed by Russians was *bezumnoe molchanie* (foolish silence): those who should have protested against the crimes and persecutions of Godunov but failed to do so. For their silence, the Russian people were punished with the famine of 1601-03. Unfortunately, this lesson was ignored by the rich and powerful, who took advantage of the situation to enrich themselves and let the poor starve. For their greed, the upper class became victims of internal rebellion and foreign invasion. Palitsyna, Avraamiya. *Skazanie*, ed. V. Cherepnin (Moscow-Leningrad, 1955), 250-79.

35. *SGGD*, vol. 1, No. 203.


37. *Ibid.; also see Matthew 20:16, 7: 21 and John 15:5.*
40. There were some elements that recognize the Sobor as the authority that made the principal of hereditary succession valid. However, such a idea was not developed any further. *SGGD*, vol. 3, No. 1, 16.

41. *DAI*, vol. 2, No. 76.

44. *AE*, vol. 3, No. 92, 102; also see *SGGD*, vol. 3, No. 52.

45. Neither the boyar duma nor the zemskii sobor played a significant role under Philaret's reign. In fact, not a single council was summoned between 1621 and 1632. J. L. H. Keep, "The Decline of the Zemsky Sobor" *The Slavonic and East European Review* 36 (1957): 109.

46. *SGGD*, vol., No. 71; also see *AE*, vol. 3, No. 164; *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (St. Petersburg: 1830), vol. 1, No. 201 (hereafter *PSZ*). For more information about the spread of non-Orthodox religion in Russia, please refer to *SGGD*, vol. 3, No. 90 and *AAE*, vol. 3, No. 147.

47. *DAI*, vol. 2, No. 76. Philaret's full title was "Our Father, the Great Sovereign, the very Holy Patriarch Philaret Nikitich of Moscow and all of Russia." It gave the patriarch the authority of the tsar in both secular and ecclesiastical affairs. Also see *PSZ*, vol. 1, No. 201.

50. Since the Russian Church did not have a patriarch for some time, it required outside approval for a new patriarch. Consequently, Mikhail informed Patriarch Theophanes of Constantinople of his choice, to which Theophanes gave his approval. Mikhail then informed Philaret of his nomination, which he accepted, requesting that he be confirmed by the synod and the Patriarch of Jerusalem. After his declaration to the Christian faith and the Seven Ecumenical Councils, the patriarch was ready for consecration. Once the ceremony of consecration was complete, the patriarch sat with the sovereign at the tsar's table instead of the clergy's, symbolizing the close association between church and state. *DAI*, vol. 2, No. 76.


53. *SGGD*, vol. 3, No. 77; also see N. I. Tiktin, *Vizantiiskoe Pravo kak Istochnik Ulozhenii 1648 g.* (Odessa: 1898), 173.


55. Ibid., 23-30; also see A. Smirnov, "Svyateyshiy Patriarkh Philaret Nikitich moskovskiy i vseya Rusi," in *Chteniya v obshchestve lyubiteley dukhovnogo prosvecheniya*, vol. 2-5, 10 (Moscow: 1873-74), 256, 260-62.

56. Ibid.

57. A. Smirnov, "Svyateyshiy Patriarkh Philaret Nikitich moskovskiy i vseya Rusi," in *Chteniya v obshchestve lyubiteley dukhovnogo prosvecheniya*, vol. 2-5, 10 (Moscow: 1873-74), 635-55.

58. Ibid., 30-33. This requirement was a regulation passed at the second church council in December 1620.


61. Cyprian also led a life of corruption but managed to redeem himself and win Philaret's favor again. *SGGD*, vol. 3, No. 60.

62. Ivan Neronov, a future leader of the zealots, protested against clerical abuses. He was exiled in 1632 by Patriarch Philaret for "teaching without authority" and "causing disorder among the people." *AAE*, vol. 3, No. 198. The monk L. Z. Tustanevsky compiled a catechism that sought to explain the movement of the heavenly bodies in scientific terms. His work was printed but not authorized for publication. K. T. Stavrovetsky had his work publicly burnt in Moscow. *SGGD*, vol. 3, No. 77.

63. *SGGD*, vol. 3, No. 77.

64. *AAE*, vol. 3, No. 166.

66. *Ibid.* The western Russian Church would suffer a century of political discrimination from its Polish rulers, i.e., the Uniate Church, the Brest-Litovsk Synod in 1596, etc. Unfortunately, this topic is outside the scope of this study.


68. Kapterev, N. *Patriarkh Nikon i ego Protivniki,* (Moscow: 1913), 106.


70. *AE,* vol. 4, No. 322.

71. *AE,* vol. 4, No. 6

72. *AE,* vol. 4, No. 324, 328.

73. *AE,* vol. 4, No. 35.


75. Kapterev, N. *Patriarkh Nikon i ego Protivniki* (Moscow: 1913), 172.

76. *AE,* vol. 4, No. 57.

77. Patriarch Joseph’s petition to the tsar is entitled as follows: "Petition of the Patriarch Joseph, on the eleventh day of February, 1649, to Sovereign Alexis Mikhailovich, against the Tsar's Confessor, the Archpriest Stephen Vonifatiev of the Annuciation, with the accusation that Stephen slandered his Patriarch and the whole holy synod with injurious words." Kapterev, N. *Patriarkh Nikon i ego Protivniki* (Moscow: 1913), 172, 164.

78. *Ibid.*, 174; also see *PSZ,* vol. 1., 1-3.


82. *AE,* vol. 4, No. 327.
83. Alexis was by all accounts a pious tsar. For his religious upbringing, please refer to Kluchevsky, V. O. *A History of Russia*, vol. 3 (London: 1911-13), 333-334; and for the influence of his confessor, please refer to Kapterev, N. *Patriarkh Nikon i ego Protivniki* (Moscow: 1913), 106-107.
CHAPTER 7: DERAILMENT OF ORDER
(c.1635-c.1683 A.D.)

7.1 Views From Another Shore
(c. 1635-c.1660 A.D.)

Two differing accounts are available to us about the nature of the Russian Orthodox Church: one by Adams Olearius, a German scholar, who was sent on a diplomatic mission to Muscovy (1633-34, 1635-39) by the Duke of Holstein; the other by Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo, who accompanied his father, Patriarch Macarius of Antioch, on an alms-seeking mission to Moscow in 1652-60. Paul of Aleppo also attended the church council of 1666. These accounts are interesting not only because they describe the religious practice of the Russian people "from below," but also because reveal the religious and cultural prejudices of each author.

According to Olearius, the Russian religion is "primarily superstition" with the common man understanding little of the Church's doctrine, dogma, or practice. As a consequence of this condition, Russians are extremely devoted to ritual and ceremonial observances. Olearius is skeptical about whether the Russian people's worship of icons is "Christian." It is also inconceivable to Olearius that "intelligent and noble westerners" would want to convert to Russian Orthodoxy other than for some practical reason, e.g., enhanced social status within Russian society. The only admirable aspect of the Russian Orthodox Church for Olearius is its religious toleration of believers other than Roman Catholics and Jews:

The Muscovites tolerate and have dealings with people of other nations and religions, such as Lutherans, Calvinists, Armenians, Tatars, Persians, and Turks. But they are very intolerant of Catholics and Jews, and one cannot insult a Russian more than by calling him a Jew (zhid).
In short, Olearius finds the Russian Church primitive, superstitious, and selectively tolerant of other religious minorities.

In contrast, Paul of Aleppo viewed the Muscovites as the most pious Christians in the world because of their strict observance to the ceremonies and regulations of the Orthodox faith. Russia was a blessed land without Jews, Armenians, and Catholics, where rich merchants dressed simply and the Muscovites displayed their humility by beating their foreheads to the ground in front of the tsar. The village priests were pious and well-respected. Government officials stood in church for daily prayer with the rest of the congregation, collected relics and icons for their own private chapels, and kept their own priests. Everyone followed the example of the Tsar, Alexis, whose piety and devotion to the Orthodox faith established the tone for the rest of the country. With such an emperor and pious government officials, only justice could prevail in Russia:

Pity the man who commits any offense, whether he be rich or poor! They drag him off to judgment, executed, God knows, with the strictest of justice, as we often witnessed ...

In addition to his positive impression of the government, Paul was equally taken by the intellectual rigor of Russia's clergymen:

The Muscovites are celebrated for their knowledge and philosophy ... for the profound questions with which they puzzle the learned and put them to blush.

The persons whom the Russian clergy would puzzle and embarrass were bogus metropolitans and patriarchs who would arrive to Moscow to solicit funds. Russia at the time was experiencing a flood of Greek clergymen into its country as a result of the Turkish conquest of Constantinople. Both genuine and false alms-seeking patriarchs would arrive and be tested by the Russian clergy to determine the patriarchs' credentials.
Paul praised the Russian clergy for distinguishing genuine alms-seeking patriarchs from false ones, an ability derived from their great learning, literacy, reasoning, and libraries that were filled with thousands of thick books.9

But all was not well in Russia. Paul does criticize the Muscovites for their "silent disposition": their refusal to answer the questions of foreigners. He also notes that the peasants were like slaves and treated like chattel and that Siberian prisons were filled with priests and monks who, having been caught drunk, exiled by Patriarch Nikon.10

Clergymen discovered not wearing their cassocks in the street were similarly dispatched to Siberia.11 Furthermore, Germans, English, and Swedes were expelled from Moscow city proper, and the Armenian church in Astrakhan had been razed to the ground.12 In spite of these faults, Paul found Moscow to be overall a land of religious piety and good government. It truly deserved the title of the New Rome.13

What is revealing about these two accounts of seventeenth century Moscow is their anticipation of the two great crises that would confront Russian Church: the Great Schism and Peter the Great's program of westernization. Olearius' disdain for the primitive backwardness of the Russian people and its institutions would appear in the court of Peter the Great, while Paul of Aleppo's account of the influx of Greek clergymen and Nikon's iron-fist rule provides us a context for Nikon's meteoric rise and even faster fall. Both Paul and Olearius observe how important the practice of ritual is to the Russian religious mind, an importance that helps explain why a mere switch in a finger would be the foundation for the Great Schism.
Before examining the ecclesiastical career of Nikon, we must first look at the state and its continual attempt at secularization. The symbol and institution of this secularization was the Monastyrskii Prikaz, the monastery bureau, which was established by the boyars during the interregnum period. Under its jurisdiction was the gramochiki class of property: church and monastic possessions that had been granted special charters (nesudimy and tarkhanny) by the tsar. These charters permitted the tsar to govern these properties directly instead of relying upon local provincial lords, boyars, or the church to rule them. The tsar, in another words, was trying to bring ecclesiastical property under his domain through the Monastyrskii Prikaz and its appointed official, the nastroiateli, who often interfered with the work of the church, e.g., the prevention of the peasant paying their church taxes. The Church and its monasteries were beginning to lose their autonomy to the state.

When Mikhail Romanov became tsar and his father, Philaret, became patriarch, the Monastyrskii Prikaz's authority was curtailed: previous charters granted by the tsar were invalidated, thereby permitting the patriarch and the monasteries to recover full jurisdiction over inhabitants, except for cases involving serious criminal offenses. Subsequent tsarist charters confirmed the Church's privilege to govern its inhabitants. This victory by the Church, however, was short-lived, for a series of riots and rebellions in Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, Kursk, and other towns over the tax-exempt status of clerical property forced Alexis to order that a new code, the Ulozhenie, be established.
On 9 November 1648 Alexis ordered an inventory of ecclesiastical estates and forbade the Church any further purchase and acquisition of property. This prohibition was confirmed in the *Ulozhenie* (chapter XVII, article 42), and a new *Monastyrskii Prikaz* was created to judge and to sentence all church people in both criminal and civil cases. In chapter XIII, article one, the *Ulozhenie* summarizes the new position of the church in relation to the state:

In all affairs against metropolitans, archbishops, bishops, and their functionaries, and the people of the manors, and against noblemen, and against their peasants, and against monasteries, archimandrites, hegumens, superiors, sacristans, treasurers, and ordinary brethren, and monastery servants, peasants, priests, and parish clergy – the judgment is to be executed in the *Prikaz* of the Great Palace. And now the Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Prince Alexis of all Russia, upon the petition of the nobles of Moscow and of the towns, and of the noblemen and merchants, and of other townspeople, decrees all cases of complaints against the church ranks, or their subordinates and peasantry, are to be handled by the *Monastyrskii Prikaz*.

The process of state secularization and centralization touched upon the towns as well as the churches:

Charters of judicial exemption in the towns are to be given to no one . . . and such charters as remain are to be taken from those people possessing them and sent to the Sovereign of Moscow.

The Church had lost its judicial independence. It was now subordinate to the authority of the state both in civil and criminal matters.

The sole exception was the patriarch, who retained his jurisdiction over his inhabitants without interference from the *Monastyrskii Prikaz*:

In all affairs against the patriarchate, and the noblemen, peasants, and against every rank of person whatever, who inhabit the estates of the patriarch, the judgment shall be given unconditionally to the patriarchate . . .
The patriarch therefore had civil jurisdiction over his own subjects. This precedent was extended to some metropolitans such as to Nikon, metropolitan of Novgorod. In February 1651, Nikon requested and later was granted a special charter from the tsar that would empower him with full jurisdiction over his clergymen with the exception of serious criminal offenses. Although the Church had lost practically all of its jurisdiction over its subjects as well as the right to acquire more land, the patriarchs (and occasionally a few metropolitans) were able to retain their traditional rights.

In addition to his request of a special charter of jurisdiction, Nikon had also requested that the remains of Metropolitan Philip – the metropolitan murdered by Ivan IV – be transferred to Uspenski Cathedral and that Alexis ask for a pardon on behalf of his predecessor, Ivan IV. The tsar consented. The supplication was read at St. Philip's tomb:

I pray to you and desire that you come to my presence, to resolve the sin of our great-grandfather, Tsar Ivan, that he foolishly committed against you in jealousy and anger that knew no limits. Although I am not guilty, the tomb of my great-grandfather constantly persuades me and inspires regret in me. Thus, I bow before you for my great-grandfather, who sinned against you ...

The tsar, in accordance with the Byzantine idea of symphonia, asked for forgiveness from the church for not obeying its commands. By requesting the tsar to ask for forgiveness, the Russian Church tried to maintain its status as an equal entity in relation to the state.

7.3 The Raskol
(c.1652-c.1654 A.D.)

The influx of Greeks, the conflicts with the Monastyrskii Prikaz, the reincorporation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into the Moscow fold, and the attempt at ecclesiastical centralization within the Muscovite Church itself brought to the surface chaos and confusion over the proper procedure of rites and ceremonies within the Russian

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The tsar's confessor, Stephen Vonifatiev, and the "white clergy" (John Neronov, Avvakum, Longuin, Lazarus, and others) sought to standardize religious practice according to original Russian practices so as to establish Moscow once and for all as the preeminent church of the Orthodox world. By returning to the original intentions and practices of the Church Fathers in liturgical services and other rituals, the white clergy sought to regenerate the moral and spiritual life of the Russian Church. This attempt to eliminate error in Christian rite and ceremony was brought to the attention of the white clergy and the tsar by Patriarch Paisius of Jerusalem who informed the Russian Church of its errors. The tsar, Stephen Vonifatiev, and some members of the white clergy became convinced of their mistakes and looked to Constantinople for rectification.

But before this matter could be resolved, Patriarch Joseph died on 15 April 1652. Alexis asked Stephen Vonifatiev to become tsar, but he refused. In May 1652 Alexis sent a letter to Nikon requesting him to be patriarch of the Russian Church. On the condition that he would be given the title Velikii Gossudar, Nikon accepted the tsar's appointment, became elected, and was later consecrated as the new patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia on 23 July 1652. Wasting no time, Nikon immediately tried to make the Russian Church's rites, rituals, and ceremonies conform with those of the other eastern patriarchates to make the Moscow patriarchate the first among equals in the Orthodox world. In a pastoral letter issued in 1653, before the beginning of Lent, Nikon required all Russians to use the three-finger cross as practiced by the other churches.

Avvakum and other members of the white clergy refused to accept this change and clung to the practice of making the sign of the cross with two-fingers, a practice that was declared canonically legitimate by the church council of 1551. Ever since 1448, the
Russian Church had vied with its Orthodox brethren for ecclesiastical supremacy in the Eastern Christendom. The influx of Greeks into Russia, most of them pretenders, to solicit donations from the Russian Church only exacerbated the tension between Moscow and Constantinople. The white clergy, the reformers within the Russian Church who had advocated polyvocality and who believed in the supremacy of Russian religious rites and practices, refused to concede anything to the Greeks. These "Old Believers" would be persecuted, punished, and sent off to exile in Siberia under Nikon.

For his part, Nikon recognized that in order for Moscow to be the leader of the Orthodox world, it had to conform to the customs of the other churches; and Alexis, desiring to have a patriarchate that was worthy of the Christian Emperor, sided with Nikon. Still, the Old Believers refused to consent to the new practice of the three-finger sign of the cross. To bolster his legitimacy, Nikon requested that Greeks act as arbiters of this liturgical dispute. Most of the Greeks and Patriarch Makarii of Antioch supported Nikon, though a few dissented, one of whom was Patriarch Paisy of Constantinople, who wrote to Nikon in 1655 that both types of customs were legitimate. A series of church councils in 1654, 1655, and 1656 recognized Nikon's innovations as church practice and condemned the Old Believers. Nikon won the battle of the Great Schism, but at the cost of Russian ecclesiastical supremacy in the Orthodox world.

7. 4 Derailment into Disorder (c.1652-c.1658 A.D.)

Within the realm of Russia, Nikon sought to establish the supremacy of the Russian Church over the state. His title and powers of Velikii Gossudar and his rule of Russia in the tsar's absence during the Polish War (1654-57) had made him the de facto...
co-ruler of the Russian state. As co-ruler, Nikon protected the church’s sovereignty by consolidating and expanding the patriarchal eparchy, since it was exempt from state control. He also built several new monasteries – Izverskii, Krestnyi, Voskreesenskii – and continued to ask the tsar for more land endowments. The justification for these and other actions of Nikon are articulated in the revised publication of the *Kormchaia Kniga*.

In response to the publication of the *Ulozhenie* and its restrictions on clerical property, the Church published the *Kormchaia Kniga*, a compilation of canon law over the years: the church statutes of the early princes, the *Sudebniki* of 1497 and 1550, the *Stoglav* of 1551, the church charters of Tsars Boris and Mikhail. It originally was a translated version of the Byzantine Nomocanon (church and canon law) that was printed under Patriarch Joseph; however, it was revised under Nikon and published again in 1653. In the revised version, Nikon outlines his program of political power for the Church.

In the preliminary supplement of the *Kormchaia Kniga*, Nikon excludes the Roman Pope from the Orthodox world. The Greek Church, not the Roman, would be the spiritual foundation for the Russian Orthodox religion. The prophecy of Apostle Andrew that Russia Orthodoxy would be the one truth faith of Christendom was fulfilled in the baptism of St. Vladimir. Although the Russian patriarch is the fifth ecumenical patriarch in the Orthodox world, the patriarch's imperial rank after the collapse of Constantinople is what distinguishes her from the rest of her brethren:

> Since old Rome has fallen to Apollinarian heresy, and the New Rome, Constantinople, is subject to the infidel Turks, your kingdom is the third Rome, and has surpassed in piety all others. All Orthodoxy shall unite with your single empire and you alone under heaven are called Christian Emperor throughout the whole universe with all Christians.
As heir to the Roman Empire and the Orthodox faith, Nikon tried to elevate the power of
the church over the state instead of maintaining the Byzantine arrangement of *symphonia*.

Nikon incorporated the Sixth Novel of Emperor Justinian I and the *Epanagoge* of
Emperor Basil I and Leo IV into chapters 42, 48, 49, and 67 of the *Kormchaia Kniga*.

According to Nikon, the prince is supreme in both secular and ecclesiastical matters;
however, he has a responsibility first and foremost to God:

> God has commanded us to obey Him. According St. Peter, the tsar is to shepherd
> the faithful flock, and to believe nothing to be superior to justice and truth . . . By
> being preoccupied by things that are useful and pleasing to God, our mind
> incessantly supervise the execution of justice on the earth. This justice is
> mediation from heaven and is a force more cutting than any sword against the
> disobedient and real adversaries.41

Because the tsar's first and foremost responsibility is to God, both the patriarch and the
tsar had to govern Russia:

> The greatest of the divine gifts that God has bestowed upon man is the priesthood
> and the tsardom: the first serves God; the other is concerned with human
> government. These two proceed from the same source and embellish human life.
> Because of this, nothing is more important to the tsardom than the honor of the
> priesthood . . .49

Although the priesthood (*sviashchensivo*) and the empire (*tsarstvo*) are the two
authorities that administer Christian rule, it is clear that the patriarch should be given first
rank in dignity and in judgment:

> Of all God's gifts to man, the greatest are the priesthood and the tsardom: the one
> serving the divine; the other ruling and caring for the human. Both proceed from
> the one and same source to enhance human life; therefore, nothing brings greater
> benefit to a realm.50

The theoretical justification of this position was the incorporation of the *Donatio
Constantini* into the *Kormchaia Kniga*. According to the *Donatio Constantini*, as
previously noted, the Roman Emperor had granted Pope Sylvester, the bishops throughout
the Orthodox world, and all their successors exemption from secular jurisdiction. If
anyone meddled with church affairs, he would be condemned to hell. Knowing that
canon law has the same weight as civil law in the Orthodox world, Nikon used the revised
Kormchaia Kniga to preserve clerical interests in the Russian realm. The theoretical
justification for the patriarchal control of the state had been announced.

The boyars, who had been triumphant over the Church in 1648-49, saw the fruits
of their victory being eaten away by Nikon's policies. The mere appointment of Nikon as
patriarch had given rise to feelings of resentment and betrayal among the boyars. The
cause of these feelings was not against Christianity itself but against the Church's
exemption from taxation in national causes such as the military campaigns of 1654-55
against Lithuania and Poland. Although in this case Nikon and Alexis made an exception
by requiring clerical property to provide labor and supplies to the boyar class, the Church
for the rest of the period continued to be exempt from state service, and previously
nullified charters were restored. On 25 February 1657 the tsar ordered that the charters
issued by Tsars Godunov and Mikhail Romanov to the respective Patriarchs Job and
Filaret be restored to their full legal status, i.e., that those properties be exempted from the
Monastyriskii Prikaz.

And as if to add insult to injury to the boyar class, before Alexis left to lead his
army against Poland and Lithuania (1654-56), he delegated to Nikon the responsibility for
the protection of the tsar's family and the power of general supervision of state affairs. Nikon's rule over the church and the state became so autocratic that rumors of the
patriarch's rule soon reached Alexis's ear. Nikon's star quickly fell as the tsar let his
displeasure be known by his failure to attend the religious services in honor of the "mother of God Kazan" and the "Lord's Chasuble." Nikon would ultimately be stripped of his title of Velikii Gossudar by Alexis. In response, Nikon announced on 10 July 1658 that he would step down as patriarch because of the tsar's anger with him.58

7.5 Greek Supremacy (c.1658-c.1675 A.D.)

Retired to the Voskresenskii monastery, Nikon continued to support the Church's exemption from state taxation and service as written in church statute.59 He objected to the tsar's legislation that the clergy should come before the Monastyrskii Prikaz to settle all disputes, and the tsar's decrees that sought to establish ecclesiastical discipline and reform.60 Nikon sought not only to protect clerical property, immunity, and autonomy from the state but to establish the church as a superior force to the state in secular affairs.

In an August 1662 letter entitled "A Refutation or Demolishment by the Most Humble Nikon, Patriarch by the Grace of God, of the Question Which the Boyar Simeon Streshnev Addressed to Paisius Ligarid, Metropolitan of Gaza, and Pasius's Answers," Nikon wrote:

The clergy is a more honored and higher authority than the state itself... the throne of the clergy has been erected in heaven. Who says this? The Heavenly King Himself: "Whatsoever you shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven..." Thus it is the tsars who are anointed by the priests and not the priests by the tsars.61

The tsar is subordinate to the prelate as the body is to the spirit. For the difference between the two persons is like that between the sun and the moon: the authority of the prelate is over the day, that is over the souls, while the authority of the tsar is over the things of this world. The authority of the tsar is that his sword must be ready against the enemies of the Orthodox faith. If the prelates and all the clergy demand that he defend them from all unrighteousness and violence, then the civil must obey the spiritual.62
The priesthood does not come from men but from God Himself. The tsar's authority is derived from the priesthood, as the rites of the tsar's coronation testify. ... Priestly authority is superior to civil power as heaven is superior to earth. For our abode is in heaven, and our life is hid there in spirit with God.  

Confronted with Nikon's stance, Alexis asked for and obtained the advice of Metropolitan Paisius to review, judge, and sentence Nikon. The church council of 1666-67 reconfirmed the supremacy of the tsar in secular affairs. The patriarch is to play a secondary role, though the church has a right to rebuke the tsar if he falls into heresy:

It is understood that the tsar is not to put his will in ecclesiastical affairs and change the ancient laws and custom of the church, nor should he introduce liturgies, in addition to what has been laid down and established by St. John Chrysostom, Basil the Great, etc.

With respect to the question of whether Nikon should be deposed to eliminate a dual authority within the Russian Church, the council ruled on 12 December 1666:

We have now learned that Nikon lived tyrannically and was given to iniquity, rapacity, and tyranny; therefore, we debar him, in accordance with the divine and sacred canons and the ecumenical and local Orthodox councils, from every sacerdotal function ... he will be assigned a place to dwell to the very end of his days, and may it be some old and suitable monastery, where he can lament his sins in great silence.

The council in short condemned Nikon's political aspirations by accusing him of harboring papal-like intentions for the patriarchate of Moscow. He was banished by the council.

However, the church council did approve several of Nikon's reforms, such as clerical immunity from secular courts (article thirty-seven of the council), and the tsar accepted a compromise of this statute on 22 January 1669: a clerical officer is to be present when a clergyman accused of a major offense appears before civil court. The
council also argued that all clerical cases should be supervised by ecclesiastical courts (article thirty-eight of the council).69

In exchange for recognition of tsarist supremacy, the Church had its traditional jurisdictional privileges restored. The council confirmed Nikon's conception of two separate authorities: the tsar agreed to respect the church's jurisdiction and its right to appropriate new land in spite of chapter XVII, article forty-two of the Ulozhenie. In fact, Alexis repeatedly granted new land holdings to the clergy until his death.70 Nikon's Gnostic aspirations had been crushed. The Byzantine idea of symphonia had been restored.

The council continued to confirm Nikon's innovations in Christian rites, rituals, and ceremonies, especially the three-finger sign of the cross:

Some have called the newly corrected and translated books of Nikon heretical and corrupt because they conform with the Greek texts. Those who oppose these books have called the clergy abusive names, disparage their episcopal rank, disturbed people with violent acts, claim the Church is not the Church, prelates are not prelates, priests are not priests, and other such lies. The result is many people's opinion of the Church have been corrupted by these heretics of the anti-Christ . . . In light of these insults, we – the prelates, metropolitan, archbishops, bishops, archimandrites, abbots, and other notables of the Church – have convened in the Patriarch's Hall of the Cross to examine in great detail the newly corrected and translated books of Nikon. We have found nothing perverse, corrupt, or contrary to our Orthodox faith in these newly corrected and translated books; rather, everything is to be in accordance with the old Slavonic Russian books.

If anyone disobeys our commands and does not submit to the Holy Eastern Church and this Holy Council, we shall, by the power given to us from the Holy Spirit, deal with such recalcitrants. If he is a member of the clergy, we shall excommunicate him, deprive him of the priesthood, and place a curse upon him; if he is a member of the laity, we shall excommunicate him, remove him from the Holy Trinity, curse him as a heretic, and cut him off from the Orthodox community and the Church God, until he repents and gains understanding of the truth . . .71

Avvakum is especially noted by council as one in error with the Church's teachings.72
A second church council met on 15 May 1675 to correct church books and rituals as approved by the eastern churches. The council ruled that only the clergy, not lay officials, can govern ecclesiastical officers and collect clerical rent and taxes. When Alexis died on 30 January 1676, the Church appointed his son, Theodore, to succeed him. Theodore III (1676-82) continued his father's policy of respecting clerical land donations and ecclesiastical immunities from the state.

Nikon's autocratic rule in both the religious and secular sphere created many enemies, all only too willing to pounce upon him when given the chance. With the fall of Nikon, the idea of spiritual and Gnostic supremacy were lost. The councils of 1666-1667 and 1675 had overturned the decisions of the church council of 1551 that had declared the supremacy of the Russian Church. Both councils were a triumph for the Greeks over the Russians and the state over the church. But, more important, the vision of Russian Orthodox supremacy had become dashed, a vision that had supported and sustained the Russian Church. This religiously-inspired vision, first spiritual and then later transformed into the political, would be replaced by another one under the reign of Peter the Great.

### 7.6 Seeds of Secularism
(c.1630-c.1683 A.D.)

A rudimentary secular theory of the state that rejected the Byzantine idea of symphonia slowly came to be articulated by a series of thinkers: Grigorii Karpovich Kotoshikhin (1630-67), the draftsman of the Ulozhenie, Simeon Polotskii (1629-80), Iurii Krizhanich (1618-83), and Archpriest Aavakum Petrov (1620-61). Each of these thinkers focused on the problems of protest and civil disobedience against the state in secular terms. These thinkers are the intellectual forerunners of the architects of Peter
the Great's program of westernization, a program that would replace for Russian national identity.

Kotoshikhin served as a clerk for the tsar's foreign office before defecting to the Swedes in 1664. In 1666, he completed for the Swedes a comprehensive account of the Muscovite state called *On Russia in the Reign of Alexis Mikhailovich*, a work that would eventually be published in Russia in the nineteenth century. Although a traitor, Kotoshikhin accepted the legitimacy of the Russian state and admired its institutions, particularly the *Ulozenia*. It cannot be proven with certainty, but it is likely that Kotoshikhin's theoretical views of the state are probably those of a servitor of the tsar.

According to Kostoshikin, a ruler is bound by moral law and forfeits his right to govern when he transgressed that law. In this sense, Kostoshikhin is a product of the Time of Troubles. However, Kostoshikhin contends that Ivan IV had the right to rule not because he was the heir to the title of Augustus or the Byzantine Emperors, but because he conquered the states after throwing off the Mongol yoke. Divine right has no place in Kostoshikhin's thinking about the legitimacy of tsars. Ivan and other tsars after him derive their authority from their election and from specific promises to observe certain rights of their subjects. However, Kostoshikhin does not offer any solution for the problem of the tsar's acting unjustly. The published law is only an implicit limitation on the monarch's power. In short, Kostoshikhin comes close to the creation of a constitutional theory with its limitations on the power of the state, but at the last moment he stops.

In contrast to Kostoshikhin's lay profession, Simeon was a clergyman who participated in the church council of 1666-67. In 1678, he published a collection of didactic poems called the *Vertograd mnogotsvetnyi (The Many-Flowered Garden)*.
Arranged alphabetically by title, the poems cover a variety of subjects that range from philosophy to politics. In some poems Simeon expresses the idea that God gives political power to the tsar to do good and to prevent evil and that even evil tsars must be obeyed because God has some hidden purpose behind it:

All power is from God. He gives rulers to create good and permits evil rulers because of our sins; therefore, one must respect the authorities and not disobey them when they promulgate good decrees. An opponent of legitimate authority opposes God, for which God is the avenger, who gives life to the blessed.13

Simeon recognizes that human beings, both ruler and subject, are not naturally disposed to righteous conduct, as evident in his poems Milost gospodskaiia and Glas naroda.44

Because people cannot be trusted, the foundation for good government is law that binds a community together for good rule. In Nachalnik, (The Ruler) Simeon compares a sovereign to a shepherd who respects and reveres, and in turn is respected and revered by, his flock:

So it is also the duty of the rulers to go before their flock of subjects, To lead them to the pasture of health, safety, and divine law, not contrary to laws of human society

The third beneficence of rulers is to take counsel in all matters And not depend on his mind alone, but always request advice from wise people; Thus can all matters be well resolved, and not in error. Two eyes see better than one. Salvation lies in much advice, in one mind a slippery path. The fourth virtue is to preserve the truth, To guard subjects from falling into error, to honor the worthy and to have no regard for gold. Judge equally both humble and great. Law must not be like the weak web spun by a spider That catches the small things
while the larger one tears the web.
Do not judge thus, but have one justice for all, for the
realm of mankind is one.  

However, this law is not God's law but secular law, as Simeon writes in his poem

*Grazhanstvo:*

Bias, most wise, gave his opinion
that society is best
where it fears the law like the tsar
and the tsar like the law

Furthermore – in which citizens obey their leaders
and these leaders respect the law.
These are the things which strengthen the state,
which give honor and glory to a reign.

Finally, in his poem *Istina,* Simeon writes that one aspect of truth is to conform one's
action to the law (*zakon*). The significance and the status of the law are independent of
the ruler and of God: everyone is equal under the rule of law. Simeon's poems were
published and well circulated at the time, and it is likely that both Alexis and Theodore
were familiar with some of them.

By contrast, Krizhanich's work, though not published in his lifetime, was read in
manuscript by several prominent men such Golitsyn, Morozov, Rtishchev, Ivanov, and
Ordin-Nashchokin. It also has been argued that Tsar Alexis was familiar with his
works. Arriving in Moscow in 1659 to promote his pan-Slavic vision, Krizhanich was
exiled to Tobolsk for seventeen years on the charge of subversion. In exile he composed
*Politika* between 1633-67; in it he discusses Russia's economic policy to the West. He
advocated an autocratic state with just laws, drawing a distinction between the tyrant and
the monarch. A ruler may not introduce "laws contrary to God's commandments and to
natural honor and justice." Good laws are required to protect the tsar's subjects from his officials:

When people are granted reasonable privileges, a bridle is needed for royal servitors so they cannot indulge in their vicious desires and drive the people to despair. The bridle is the only means subjects have to protect themselves against the royal servitors' evildoing. This is the only way to safeguard the realm. If there were no privileges, then the king cannot punish or prohibit his servants from evildoing; nor can he prevent advisers from giving him godless, inhuman counsel.

Krizhanich then proceeds to the topic of the contract between the tsar and the nation at the time of Mikhail Romanov's election. The current tsar is the heir of that election, and therefore part of his contract is to respect the property of his subjects. Like the previous two thinkers, Krizhanich does not sanction a theory of revolution if the tsar acts unjustly; however, he does suggest that those who had been treated badly should be compensated by the state when a new tsar has come to the throne.

These ideas of a secular state rooted in the conception of law instead of divine right are best articulated in the *Ulozhenie*. The drafting commission consisted of N. I. Odoevskii, S. V. Prozorovskii, F. F. Volkonskii, Garila Leontev, and Feodor Griboedov: men whose careers are representative of the upper service class and the upper professional service. The primary sources of the *Ulozhenie* are Byzantine rather than western, and yet it is first and foremost a secular document, albeit a very conservative one, e.g., in its treatment of the codification of serfdom and slavery. The *Ulozhenie* protected the right of property and created procedural equality in a society of unequal substantive rights. It also narrowed the distinction between the ruler and the state: the more comprehensive the scope of the law, the less room for discretion on the part of the state.
Finally, the *Ulozhenie* outlined crimes against God and the Church, but stipulated that these cases were to be tried in secular, not ecclesiastical, court. The purpose of the law was not to prepare man for salvation but to regulate things of this world. Almost no attention was paid to the subjects' spiritual needs. Although the ideas of the *Ulozhenie* and the above mentioned works do not fully outline a secular theory of the state, the seeds had been planted to replace the symbol of *symphonia*. Peter the Great was just around the corner.

**7.7 The Old Believers**  
(c.1666-c.1681 A.D.)

The Old Believer Avvakum's ideas about the tsar and his relation to the state were traditionally Muscovite, i.e., Byzantine; however, he approached the problem of authority differently when it had become morally impure. Exiled in Siberia and having seen the Stenka Razain and Solovetskii uprisings, Avvakum was in a position to reflect upon his religious ideas as they relate to the tsar and to the state in his autobiography, *The Life of the Archpriest Avvakum*. Exiled to Tobolsk, Avvakum was sent to Dauria (Transbaikalia), where he was tormented by the local military governor Afanasii Paskhov. However, by his good works, patience, and perseverance, Avvakum won over Paskhov. According to Avvakum, the military governor asked him for forgiveness: "For ten years he had tormented me or I him, I know not which." This type of passive resistance is characteristic of Avvakum's practice of civil disobedience.

When Nikon had been condemned by the church council, Tsar Alexis recalled Avvakum from exile on the condition that he would hold his tongue. Unfortunately for himself, Avvakum could not and was banished once more, but this time to a monastery.
where the bishops had him shorn as a monk on 13 May 1666.\textsuperscript{102} Avvakum's followers were later punished and tortured. Finally, in January 1667, Avvakum was tried by the church council. He refused to recant his beliefs and therefore was excommunicated and sent into exile to Pustozersk in the Arctic where he lived for fourteen years until he was burned at the stake for treason along with some of his followers in 1681.\textsuperscript{103}

Avvakum's religious beliefs provided him the intellectual space to reject ecclesiastical and secular authority. According to Avvakum, one must look into "the mind of Christ . . . within" for truth and authority. However, the devil could also enter into one's mind. If he did, then Avvakum would call upon his friends to beat the devil out of him.\textsuperscript{104} This Manichean struggle between good and evil within the individual was everlasting.

But in terms of authority and wisdom, Avvakum advocated introspection to discover the truth rather than authority from either the church or the state. He defied both secular and ecclesiastical authority when these two spheres interfered with his beliefs and mode of worship, as he stated in his defense at the church council of 1666-67:

I answered them: "O you teachers of Christendom! Rome, along with the Poles, who were enemies of Christians, had fallen long ago and now lies prostrate. Now your own Orthodoxy had been corrupted by the Turk Mohammed, so no wonder you have become impotent. You should have come to us to learn, for by the grace of God we are the autocratic realm. Before Nikon the apostate, our Russia was filled with pious princes and tsars, our Orthodox faith was pure, and the Church freed from turmoil. Nikon, that wolf, together with the Devil, ordained that men should cross themselves with three fingers, but our first shepherds made the sign of the cross and blessed men with five fingers, according to the tradition of our Church Fathers . . . \textsuperscript{105}

Avvakum repeated a similar admonishment to the Tsar Alexis:

Like in Stefan's time, take a deep breath and say in Russian: "Lord, forgive me, a sinner!" Be done with \textit{Kyrie eleison} – this is what the Hellenes say – spit on them!
For you are a Russian, not a Greek. Speak in your native tongue: do not degrade it in a church, home, or in sayings. Christ through the Holy Cyril and his brother taught us to read and write in our tongue. What more do we want? . . . Stop tormenting us! Seize and burn those heretics, who destroyed your souls: the filthy dogs, Latins, and Jews.106

But unlike Kotoshikhin, Krizhanich, and Simeon, Avvakum cared not a whit for law if it was inconsistent with truth as he perceived it. One must disobey law if it was used as an instrument of evil.

In spite of these religious beliefs, Avvakum never criticized the tsar and always praised the principle of autocracy. He accepted the principle of church subordination to the state, and he attributed suffering not to the tsar but to Nikon or the devil. Again, Avvakum would only disobey the tsar if he thought he would not be able to practice his mode of worship. He did not support a general rejection of civil authority; rather, he called for civil disobedience only when civil authority was inconsistent with true faith, as determined by the individual. He did not translate even his sympathy with the Solovtskii uprising into a call for overthrowing tsardom. Neither Rowland's Muscovite ideologue nor Robinson's Marxist revolutionary, Avvakum planted civil disobedience in an appeal to individual conscience. This tradition would be inherited by the Slavophiles and the other dissenters of the nineteenth century: they did not call for rebellion but for a return to the pre-Petrine traditions of Russia. There is no political philosophy of revolution here.

7.8 Conclusion

The tsars continued in their attempt to subordinate and to secularize the Russian Orthodox Church, with the Monastyrskii Prikaz emerging as the symbol of disorder. The Russian Orthodox Church's resistance to the state's attempt at secularization and subordination was successful under Patriarch Nikon. However, Nikon's resistance to the
state became one of disorder in his symbol of the *Velikii Gossudar*. Like Philaret, Nikon sought to have the church dominate the state, thereby breaking the symphonic arrangement between the two symbols.

The Russian Orthodox Church also suffered from internal division, i.e., the *Raskol*. The symbol of the Old Believers emerged as one of disorder in its challenge to the authority of the Church. This division between Church elites and the Old Believers was settled in favor of the Church but at the price of the Russian Church's claim to ecclesiastical supremacy in the Orthodox world.

Thus, once again the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church fell into disorder and, accordingly, the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church suffered. But the experiences of right order were restored to the Church leadership and later were reflected in the symbol of the Church itself.

7.9 End Notes


6. Descriptions of the tsar are as follows: Alexis is referred to as a monk, pilgrim, or saint (*Ibid.*, vol. 1, 390-92), Alexis waiting on monks (*Ibid.*, vol. 2, 240-42), and Alexis dragging Patriarch Macarius into a room of sick monks so that the patriarch can minster them (*Ibid.*, vol. 2, 252-53).
7. Ibid., vol. 2, 72-73.

8. Ibid., vol. 1, 283.

9. Ibid., vol. 1, 304.

10. Ibid., vol. 1: 400, 410.

11. Ibid., vol. 1, 268.

12. Paul of Aleppo describes Nikon as follows: one who is both loved and feared (Ibid., vol. 1, 310, 317-18), who opposes western-style icons (Ibid., vol. 2, 76-78), who expels the bishop of Kolomna to Siberia for opposing the introduction of Greek rite (Ibid., vol. 2, 49-50), and who fills the prisons with his opponents (Ibid. vol. 2, 76-78).

13. Ibid., vol. 2, 123; also see vol. 1, 359.


17. Ibid., vol. 4, No. 3; SGGD, vol. 3, No. 71; Dopolneniia k Actam Istoricheskim, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg: 1897), No. 37 (hereafter DAI).


20. Ibid., vol. 4, No. 33.


22. Ibid. vol. 1, 66.

23. Ibid., vol. 1, 38.

24. Ibid., vol. 1, 66.

25. The Ulozhenie is ambiguous on the subject of criminal cases. A later decree from the tsar would exclude the patriarch's jurisdiction over criminal cases. PSZ, vol. 1, 405.

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26. *AI*, vol. 4, No. 50, also refer to *AE*, vol. 4, No. 3 when the metropolitan of Novgorod on 27 October 1645 requested a similar charter from Tsar Mikhail.

27. *SGGD*, vol. 3, No. 147.

28. For Patriarch Nikon's argument that Metropolitan Philip died for his resistance against Ivan IV's encroachment upon the Church's rights and privileges, please refer to *SGGD*, vol. 1, No. 153.

29. The Turkish conquest of Constantinople created a migration of Greeks to Russia. For example, on Easter Day in 1653 Alexis had received a Greek delegation of merchants about the topic of liberation. However, the influx of Greeks was not limited to merely political and commercial concerns. Theodore Rtischev (1625-73), a member of the white clergy, established the Andreievski Monastery, the sole task which was to translate the Bible from Greek. The tsar requested two Kiev-educated monks who were in Greek to do the literary work. Alexis also sent out the monk Arsenius Sukhanov on two missions to the eastern Orthodox sees to report on their rites and began to correspond with other Orthodox leaders to clarify ecclesiastical policy. With respect to the Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian forces began a joint campaign against Poland after the Pereiaslav council of January 1653. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church had different practices than the Russian Church; consequently, Nikon wanted to bring them back into the Russian Church but under Russian practices. Kapterev, N. *Patriarkh Nikon i ego Protivniki* (Moscow: 1913), 19-22, 99-104.


31. *Ibid*.


33. *AE*, vol. 4, No. 57.

34. *Ibid*.

35. *Ibid*.

36. The Russian Church had preserved the traditions of the tenth and eleventh centuries of liturgical worship. The innovations and evolution of liturgical worship in the rest of the Orthodox world, especially in Byzantium, was unknown to the Russians. The church council of 1551 had declared the superiority of the Russian liturgical custom over the Greek one.

37. Some of the more famous cases of pretenders are as follows: the monk Arseny, who was discovered to be an adventurer who had joined Patriarch Paisy of Jerusalem on his journey to Moscow; the archimandrite Jeremiah who turned out to be a Uniat monk.
excommunicated by the Orthodox Church; and Metropolitan Neophitos who was an excommunicated bishop who brought with him a Greek merchant as his chaplain.


39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Although the tsar is the nominal head of the church, the patriarch is "the image of the high God . . . and since he is the image of the Lord . . . he is considered to be in Christ's place." Because the patriarch is the guardian of Christian truth, he should be given equal dignity to the tsar as called for by canon law with the title of *Velikii Gossudar*. *Kormchia Kniga*, part one, (St. Petersburg, 1833), fol. 25; *Ibid.*, part two, fol. 299. The first use of this title by the patriarch is in a letter of 19 November 1652 (*AE*, vol. 4, No. 330); also see SGGD, vol. 3, No. 153 where the title *Velikii Gossudar* is attributed to Nikon at a general assembly convoked by the tsar on 1 October 1653 to determine whether Russia should declare on Poland.

42. *PSZ*, vol. 1, 66; also see *AE*, vol. 4, No. 33


44. Nikon also received the Byzantine canon and civil laws in Greek and Latin from his translator, Epiphanius Slavinetski of Kiev. Included in this collection is the *Epanagoge* that provides the Byzantine definition of temporal and spiritual powers for the state and the church. Epiphanius also translated Theodore Balsamon's *Nomocanon with Commentaries* and Mattheus Blastare's *Syntagma Alphabeticum*. Nikon therefore had the Greek Orthodox Church ecclesiastical code in his hands to make innovations for the Russian Church. Metropolitan Evgenii. *Slovar' Istoricheskii, o byvshikh v Rossii pisatekh dukhovnago china Greko-Rossikoi Tserkvi*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: 1827), 172-175.

45. *Kormchia Kniga*, part one, (St. Petersburg, 1833), fol. 1 ff.

46. Ibid., part one, fol. 7-9.

47. Ibid., part one, fol. 22; also see *Ibid.*, part one, fol. 12, 20.

48. Ibid., part two, fol. 171. Also see I Peter 5:29. Nikon probably believed this statement to be an introduction to the *Epanagoge*, since it preceded chapters 1-11 in the collection of Byzantine code published by Leunclavius. *Juris Graeco-Romani tam canonici quam civilis*, vol. 2 (Frankfort: 1596), 79. The bishop was the guardian of Christian faith to whom the prince submitted.

49. Ibid., part two, fol. 7. This is drawn from Justine's Sixth Novel.
50. Ibid., part one, fol. 1.

51. Ibid., fol. 8-10.

52. Justinian I declared in Novel 131 that "the canons of the first four ecumenical councils are to be observed as laws of the empire." Church and civil law therefore had the same public authority because divine law was considered by the Church Fathers as superior to secular law. In Russia church statute had the force of civil law from the day of national baptism. Krueger, P. and Th. Mommsen, ed. Corpus Iuris Civilis, vol. 3 (Berlin Apud Weidmannos, 1904-11), 655.


54. Ibid., vol. 3, No. 82, 84, 86.

55. PSZ, vol. 1, 402-05.

56. AE, vol. 4, No. 71, 86; also see PSZ, vol. 1, 163, 355; and AI, vol. 4, No. 103.


58. AI, vol. 4, No. 126.

59. AE, vol. 4, No. 86.

60. Ibid., vol. 4, No. 115.


62. Ibid., 128-29.

63. Ibid., 183.

64. SGGD, vol. 4, No. 28.

65. Ibid., vol. 4, No. 27.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. PSZ, vol. 1, No. 412; Ibid., vol. 1, No. 399. For a first minor offense, the clergyman is to appear before ecclesiastical courts; for a second, he becomes subject to civil authority. Ibid., No. 412.

69. PSZ, No. 399.
70. Ibid., No. 524, 521, 549, 552, 554.

71. DAI, vol. 5, 483-84, 486-88

72. Ibid., vol. 5, 488.

73. AE, vol. 4, No. 104; AI, vol. 4, No. 1

74. Apparently problems of state interference with church property and jurisdiction were beginning to rise. On 20 August 1670, there was a problem in Novgorod that required that a representative of the tsar be sent to order the governor not to interfere with the affairs of the clerical domain. AE, vol. 4, No. 176.

75. PSZ, vol. 2, No. 169.

76. Ibid., vol. 2, No. 809-10.

77. L. N. Pushkarev compiled a comprehensive historiography of Russian language materials of the seventeenth century of which I'll select the major ones. Pushkarev, L. N. Otechestvenno-politicheskoi mysli Rossii, vtoraya polovina XVII veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 25-76.

78. The secondary literature on these thinkers' theory of civil disobedience vary. For example, Kliuchevskii portrays Kotoshikhin and Krizhanich as critics of Russian backwardness (Kluchevsky, V.O. A History of Russia, trans. by C. J. Hogarth, 5 vols. [New York: Russell and Russell, 1960]: 252-63). Valdenberg studies the theoretical limitations of the tsar's powers by arguing that Avvakum believed the church is subordinate to the tsar, but if the tsar acts contrary to Orthodox faith, then Orthodox believers should remain true to divine law (Valdenberg, V. Drevnerusskii uchenii o predelakh tsarskoi vlasti [Petrograd: Tip. A. Beneke, 1916], 397-431). Bennet's study of seventeenth century theory of kingship is one that the tsar's job of preparing his subjects for salvation had been transformed into terrestrial well-being at the end of the century (Bennet, Douglas J., Jr. The Idea of Kingship in 17th Century Russia [Dissertation, Harvard University, 1967]). The Soviet Marxist scholar, A. N. Robinson, contends that Simeon is representative of the court ideology of absolutism, while Avvakum is representative of the democratic movement. He makes Avvakum an active priest in the Riazan rebellion (Robinson, A. N. Borba idei v russkoi literature XVII veka [Moscow: Nauka, 1974] 194-245). Rowland argues that seventeenth century political conceptions are God-dependent, i.e., the tsar need to be pious and required a good adviser. The principal duty of the tsar was to make sure his subjects were righteousness. Rowland traced how both apologists for absolutism like Joseph of Volsk and dissenters like Avvakum shared several images of the tsar: a strong ruler, a pious defender of the faith, preserver of hierarchal order of tsardom and the tsar's tormentor, the anti-tsar. These images work in a dynamic system (Daniel Rowland, "The Problem of Advice in Muscovite Tales about the Time of Troubles," Russian History 6 [1979]: 259-83; Daniel Rowland, "Towards an Understanding of the Political Ideas of Ivan Timofeyev's Vremennik," The
Finally, Kollmann traces the evolution of conservative ideas of "law" and "compact" throughout the pre-Petrine period. According to her, the "law" was God's law and the existing order was a compact of all in God's society. The Assemblies of Land were not so much an exercise in obtaining popular approval for laws and wars as they were ritualistic attempts to seek a spiritual unanimity between sovereign and subject (Nancy S. Kollman, "Muscovite Theories of Autocracy," paper presented at the conference, "Absolutism and Despotism in Comparative Perspectives, Sixteenth century Convention," University of Minnesota, 1984).


83. Ibid., 338.

84. Maikov, L. N. Ocherki iz istorii russkoj literatury (St. Petersburg: Izdanie A. S. Suvorina, 1889), 109, 119.


86. Ibid., 244-45.


89. Ibid. Despite being a Croat and a Roman Catholic, Krizhanich is thought to be a part of Russian thought and intellectual history. Bennett, Douglas J. The Idea of Kingship in 17th Century Russia (Dissertation, Harvard University Press, 1967), 4.


91. For more about this, please refer to Ibid., i-lxxxiii.
92. Ibid., 189.

93. Ibid., 206.

94. Ibid., 225.

95. Ibid., 243-56.


98. These uprisings were interesting because they were a result of the tension between the monasteries and the Russian Church. For more about the causes of these uprisings, please refer to Georg Michels "The Solovki Uprising: Religion and Revolt in Northern Russia" Russian Review 51 (January 1992): 1-15.


100. Ibid., 91; also see Ibid., 62-84.


103. Ibid., 117-33.

104. Ibid., 134, 144.


CHAPTER 8: THE PETRINE VISION  
(c.1676-c.1881 A.D.)

8.1 Westernization  
(c.1676-c.1718 A.D.)

Prior to Peter the Great, church-state relations remained relatively unchanged. Tsar Theodore (1676-82) confirmed his father's policy toward the church: land grants to the church and to the monasteries were renewed, and the immunities of the patriarchate continued without state interference. When Theodore died, a power struggle began between the boyars, who wanted the church subordinate to the state, and the clergy, who sought ecclesiastical independence. Neither side won. Patriarch Ioakim (1674-90) managed to keep the struggle on the question of church-state relations at a standstill. Patriarch Ioakim's successor, Adrian (1690-1700), was selected patriarch by Peter the Great's mother and defended the interests of the Church by invoking the Kormchaia Kniga of 1653 that included the Donatio Constantini. However, church-state relations essentially remained static with neither side prevailing until Adrian's death on 16 October 1700. With the death of Adrian, Peter the Great (1682-1725) began his campaign to subordinate completely the church to the state and replace the traditional vision of Russian society as symphonia with a new one: westernization.

Although the range of Peter's policy of westernization is vast— from the reorganization of the military to the centralization of governmental administration, from the development of a national economy to the revision of education and cultural practices— the purpose and evaluation of Peter's policy remains mixed. Was he an enlightened liberal who tried to break Russia free from its backward chains of the past? Or was he merely a militant at heart who sought to learn from the West in order to bolster the
Russian military? Unfortunately, this debate about Peter's policy of westernization, a
debate that would polarize nineteenth century Russian society into the Westernizers and
the Slavophiles, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.\(^3\) By focusing on the relations
between church and state, I will reveal how Peter's policy of westernization resulted in a
complete submission of the church to the state, thereby destroying the vision of
*symphonia* for Russian society.

Peter the Great's wars with Turkey (1695-1700; 1711), Sweden (1700-21), and
Persia (1722-23) compelled him to levy increasingly heavier taxes to finance his military
campaigns. Unlike Henry VIII, who secularized ecclesiastical property, Peter managed to
control the economic life of the Church without destroying the institution. Like the other
institutions in Russian society, the Church became subject to a series of taxes of troop
levies, supply requisitions, etc.\(^4\) These taxes culminated in 1718 into the infamous "soul"
tax that would bring Gogol fame.\(^5\)

Peter also enforced the *Ulozhenie* 's prohibition on any further clerical acquisition
of property; and he refused to issue or renew charters that granted privileges to
monasteries and other clerical institutions.\(^6\) In January 1701 Peter prohibited the
patriarchate from acquiring more estates and revived the *Monastyriskii Prikaz* that placed
all monastic and patriarchal dependants and revenues under its civil authority.\(^7\) Although
the division of jurisdiction over ecclesiastical and secular affairs continued to exist in
theory between the *Monastyriskii Prikaz* and the Church, this arrangement in practice
proved to be unmanageable under Peter. In a series of decrees in 1706, 1711, and in
1716, the *Monastyriskii Prikaz* would govern clerical persons and clerical crimes such as
"schism, heresy, and opposition to God's church."\(^8\) This jurisdictional confusion would
continue until 1720 when the institution of the Most Holy Synod would finally be established.

Furthermore, Peter did not request that a new patriarch be ordained, refraining from doing so on the advice of one of his officials, A. A. Kurbatov, who had written to Peter, "concerning the election of a patriarch, Sovereign, it seems to me best to wait for a time, that in all these matters your autocratic will may be done." Peter not only heeded the advice but also abolished the patriarchal Razryadnyi Prikaz and put all clerical cases under the jurisdiction of the Monastyrskii Prikaz except for cases of schism, heresy, etc., which would fall under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan of Ryazan and Murom, Stefan Yavorskii.

A former monk of the Monastery of the Caves, Yavorskii was familiar with both the theologies of Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, a reason that made him an attractive candidate to Peter. As "Exarch of the very Holy Patriarchal Throne, the Supervisor and Administrator," Yavorskii directed ecclesiastical affairs under the tsar's command. Without control over the patriarchal treasury and with his jurisdiction restricted to cases of heresy, Yavorskii's role was relegated to being Russia's chief religious spokesman and ecclesiastical advisor to the tsar on clerical education and appointments. The days of Filaret and Hermogen were over.

Yavorskii was a member of the "Ukrainian party" that came to prominence under Peter the Great. Its members included Dmitriy of Rostov, Feofilakt Loptainsky, Arseny Matsuievich, and Stefan Yavorskii. In contrast to the conservative Muscovite bloc (Patriarch Adrian, St. Mitofan of Voronezh, Ilarion of Suzdal, Iov of Novgorod, Isaiya of Nizhny Novgorod, Tikhon of Kazan, and Gregory of Rostov) and the group of reformers...
who had Protestant inclinations (Feofan Prokopovich, Feodosy Yanovsky, Gavrill Buzhinsky, and Pitirim Novogorodsky), the "Ukrainian party" was pro-reform but also sought ecclesiastical independence from the state. In the beginning of his reign, Peter recruited the Ukrainian party into his government because of their western education and their readiness to accept western culture.13

Peter managed to use the Ukrainian party to subordinate the church to the state, but he was unable to destroy the party itself. Yavorskii's initial support of Peter, the numerous panegyrical sermons he gave in support of the tsar and his policies, would dissipate to the point at which the metropolitan himself was banned from delivering sermons in 1712.14 The relationship between Peter and Yavorskii quickly soured in 1708 when Peter ordered Yavorskii to excommunicate the Ukrainian hetman Mazepa. A close friend of Yavorskii, Mazepa had supported Charles XII of Sweden, thereby incurring Peter's wrath.15

Two other incidents made relations between Peter and Yavorskii difficult. The first was Yavorskii's sermon that opposed secular control of the church; the second was his book, Kamen Very (The Rock of Faith), which Peter banned from publication.16 In response to a popular religious teacher, Grishka Talitskii, who preached the imminent end of the world and denounced Peter as the Anti-Christ, Yavorskii wrote his book as a defense of the Orthodox faith against Protestants at home and abroad.17 Peter nevertheless banned the book.

The conflict between church and state came to a head over the Tveritinov trial. Tveritinov had written the article, "Muscovite Free-Thinkers of the 18th Century," which was denounced as heretical by Yavorskii. After being tried and tortured by the
Ecclesiastical Prikaz, Tveritinov and another of his followers fled to St. Petersburg and placed themselves under the protection of several senators and the Archimandrite Theodosius Yanovskii. Yavorskii ultimately convinced Peter to hold a trial for Tveritinov, which opened on 21 March 1715 in the Senate chancellery. The trial dragged on without a resolution in sight; consequently, Peter ordered a conclusion to the trial and the defendants were given the choice to repent or be executed. Even Peter apparently had a limit for religious toleration.  

This victory for Yavorskii, however, was short-lived. In 1716 Peter issued a Military Statute that declared:

- His Majesty is an autocratic monarch who need not account for his actions to anyone on earth. As a Christian Sovereign, he has the power and authority to govern his realm according to his own will and discretion.  

This new theory of the sovereign's power, a theory attributed to Theophanes Prokopovich, justified Peter's decision to deprive his son, Alexis, of the throne and to name whomever he desired to succeed him. Prokopovich was a pro-Lutheran clergyman who had studied the natural law doctrine of Pufendorf that recognized the supreme jurisdiction of the state in ecclesiastical matters (jus circa sacra). Such views were antithetical to Yavorskii’s position of ecclesiastical independence; consequently Yavorskii opposed Prokopovich’s nomination to the bishopric see of Pskov because the latter was a “Latinizer.” Yavorskii lost the battle, and Peter elevated Prokopovich to bishop of Pskov and Narva on 1 June 1718. Yavorskii was invited to St. Petersburg from Moscow in May 1718 and detained there while the first part of the Ecclesiastical Regulations was being drafted by Prokopovich. Eventually he was released so he could retire in Moscow without influence, prestige, or
power. The changing of the church guard and the center of church power occurred without a protest. Westernization had won.

8.2 The Most Holy All-Ruling Synod  
(c.1718-c.1725 A.D.)

The Ecclesiastical Regulations created an ecclesiastical college to replace the patriarchate of the Russian Church. According to the Regulations, the replacement was necessary because:

the common people do not perceive how the ecclesiastical power differs from the Autocrat's; rather, they become dazzled by the great honor and glory of the Patriarch – they think him a kind of second Sovereign, equal to or even greater than the Autocrat himself, and imagine that the ecclesiastical order is another and better state.24

Furthermore, people are "more inclined to accept and obey the decision of a council than the decree of a single person"; and the council "is not some faction secretly joined to promote its own interests, but rather composed of people gathered together for the common good."25 Finally, an ecclesiastical college will be less likely than the patriarchate to partake in "notable transgressions" against the state.26

The Ecclesiastical Regulations were finished and ratified by the Senate and the Church in 1720. The following year the state established the ecclesiastical college.27 By decree of the tsar, the college opened on 25 January 1721 with the manifesto that the supreme sovereign had the divine authority within him to establish and correct the faith; therefore, the tsar had the authority to put the Russian Church under the present statute.28 Peter established the ecclesiastical college to govern church affairs: it was composed of one president (Yavorskii of Ryazan), two vice-presidents (Yanovskii of Novgorod and Prokopovich of Pskov), four councillors (archimandrites), and four assessors (one

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archpriest, one priest, and two monks). On January 27 the members of this college took an oath of office. On 11 May 1722 Peter decreed:

From all the officers, a good man, who is courageous and able to acquaint himself with the Synodal administration, is to be chosen for the position of Chief Procurator.

On 15 June the Senate informed the Synod that Colonel I. V. Boltin had been appointed by the tsar as chief procurator of the Synod. For its part, the Synod requested a copy of the Instruktsiya so it could know about the chief procurator's duties. According to the Instruktsiya, the chief procurator's primary duties are the following:

to sit in the Synod and observe that it strictly fulfills its duties, and that all matters submitted for the Synod's consideration and resolution are dispatched truthfully, zealously, promptly, and in an orderly way . . .

to observe that the Synod conducts its business justly and impartially. Should he discover anything contrary to this, he must inform the Synod that very hour, demanding a full explanation why they did not act as they should have. Should the Synod not comply that very hour, he must protest, suspend business, and promptly report to the tsar's court.

In short, the chief procurator is the tsar's "eye and personal representative (stryapchi) for the affairs of the state."

The ecclesiastical college itself was renamed the Most Holy All-Ruling Synod on 14 February 1721. Since the death of Patriarch Adrian in 1700, there had not been a new patriarch appointed. Peter instead created the Most Holy All-Ruling Synod because the title of patriarch was "not to be attributed to any one member in particular, but only to the body as a whole." This new body, the Most Holy All-Ruling Synod, was to take over the functions and responsibilities of the patriarchate itself.

The Holy Synod's legal foundation was rooted in the Ecclesiastical Regulations. The first case involving patriarchal jurisdiction was held in February 1721. Metropolitan
Ignatius of Krutisy, who had been administrating the ecclesiastical affairs of the patriarchate, asked the Holy Synod whether he should continue, to which the Synod replied no. On 8 March 1721, the Holy Synod instructed Metropolitan Ignatius:

In accordance with His Majesty's edict, the Holy Synod is to be obeyed in all things. Since this synod is a council, it possesses patriarchal honor, power, and authority.34

Although Peter never bestowed upon the Synod the "honor, power, and authority" of the patriarchate, the Holy Synod acted as if he had. Ignatius protested this usurpation of authority and consequently was vacated from his metropolitan see by January 1722.35 The Synod would continue to usurp the authority of the patriarchate until opposition to its existence had been eliminated.36

The Holy Synod also sought to muscle in on the monastic affairs at the expense of the Monastyrskii Prikaz. On 14 February 1721, the Synod submitted a question to Peter about the possession of jurisdiction over all ecclesiastical persons and property in Russia. Peter favored the Synod.37 The Monastyrskii Prikaz was liquidated in December 1718 and its functions taken over by the Ecclesiastical College by the summer 1720.38 On 24 February 1721, the Holy Synod declared that the Monastyrskii Prikaz and all of its functions, i.e., collections of church estates' taxes, were now under its control.39

Finally, the Holy Synod claimed exclusive jurisdiction over ecclesiastical disputes, e.g., quarrels between bishops. The Ecclesiastical Regulations not only made the Holy Synod the final court of ecclesiastical disputes but also prevented bishops from imposing sentences upon sinners "without prior consent of the Synod."40 For the first four years of its existence, the Synod did not adjudicate any cases between bishops, though it did try individual cases of schism and marriage.41 In April 1722 the Synod's jurisdiction was
abridged in favor of the secular courts. Peter ordered that the following type of persons be tried in secular courts: 1) persons guilty of blasphemy; 2) "notorious sinners"; 3) non-confessors; and 4) transgressors of the "respect and obedience" due to the Synod. Although its authority over ecclesiastical cases was complete, the Synod's range of jurisdiction had been curtailed.

The Synod would continue to face further encroachments by the state, particularly by the Senate bureaucracy. Conflict between these two bodies, the Senate and the Synod, erupted in May 1721. On 3 May the Synod charged the Senate with not supplying it with an administrative staff, a bureaucracy it was entitled to as stated in the tsar's decree: "this All-Ruling Synod has the honor and power in the ecclesiastical government that the All-Ruling Senate enjoys in the secular." The Senate justified its actions and reminded the Synod that in civil affairs the Senate reigned supreme; consequently, civil servants could work for the Synod only with the Senate's permission. The Synod replied that it had exclusive jurisdiction over the bureaucracy. Unlike the patriarchs of old, the Holy Synod was created "by the decrees of His Majesty," who had "established Himself as Supreme Ruler and Judge of this Holy Synod." The Synod did not answer to the Senate.

It would at first seem that the Synod had emerged victorious from this dispute, given Peter's support in a letter to the Synod in July 1722:

... if in future some matter arises which cannot be postponed, you will write to me about it, but only for our information; for you can decide the matter together with the Senate in anticipation of our approval.

The Synod was considered an equal body with the Senate, and it had no difficulties in securing its request to the Senate for an additional twenty-eight staff members. Eventually the Synod's bureaucracy would achieve a parity with that of the Senate.
However, the Synod would lose control of its bureaucracy and send several complaints to the Senate that the bureaucrats continually interfered in Synodal affairs. For example, the twenty-eight additional staff members that the Synod requested were sent by the Senate only on the condition that they be transferred back if they had "nothing to do." This was typical of the bureaucrats sent to the Synod: the Senate reserved the right to recall them to the secular government.

The continuous rotation of civil servants in the Synod created a situation whereby the Synod lost control over its bureaucracy. The Synod may have been pleased with itself for maintaining the theoretical division of the administrative state into the secular and ecclesiastical spheres, mirroring the Byzantine idea of symphonia, but the practical reality of the relationship between the Senate and the Synod had placed the latter at the mercy of the former. Having lost its patriarchate, its monasteries, and its jurisdiction over its own properties and inhabitants, the Synod had to submit to the orders of the Senate and the tsar. The Holy Synod persisted in giving lip-service to the idea of symphonia, but it lacked the resources, will, and leadership to resurrect it in practice.

8.3 The Secularization of the Church (c.1725- c.1801 A.D.)

After Peter the Great's death in 1725, the Supreme Privy Council (1726-30) ruled in the name of Peter's infant grandson, Peter II, until his death in 1730. The Council invited Anna, niece of Peter the Great, to become empress, but under certain conditions that reduced her power. Anna accepted, but Prokovich convinced Anna to tear up the paper that restricted her power when she arrived at the Kremlin. She actually did this with
the protection of the imperial guards. In a single rip, the possibility of a Russian
constitution fell to shreds.  

Anna's government (reign 1730-40) became suspicious of all political opposition to
her. That opposition, in their view, took two forms: the failure to take loyalty oaths in
1730-31, and the omission of church services on state holidays. The majority of those
who did not take a loyalty oath were the "unsworn clergy," whom an investigation had
shown to number 5,000 members. The clergy did not refuse to take the oath out of
political disloyalty to Anna; rather, most of them had never heard of it, had understood it,
or had merely forgotten to take it. Unfortunately for the clergy, Anna's government
suspected the worst: it forbade the ordination of anyone who had not taken an oath and
later forced the "unsworn" clergy into the army as recruits. Anna's overreaction to the
clergy's failure to attend state holidays was based on equally misconstrued grounds. The
clergy missed state holidays not out of political protest but for more common reasons such
as drunkenness or forgetfulness.  

By 1740 political opposition to the state had virtually disappeared. The clergy had
adjusted to the shock of the Petrine reforms. State conscription was still required, but
clergymen could protect their sons by enrolling them into seminaries. The post-Petrine
period had freed the clergy from state taxation but still required them to perform state
services.  

The orders to prosecute the clergy came from the Holy Synod, which had been
reduced to four bishops and five members of the lower clergy. It was reduced again in
1739 to one bishop and two priests. However, under Empress Elizabeth (1741-62), the
Holy Synod was restored to its original status of six bishops and one archimandrite. Its
President was the Archbishop Dmitri of Novgorod, and its chief procurator was Prince A. Shakhovskoi (1741-53). Both were honest, hard-working, and able administrators who fought against clerical corruption, improved clerical education, and centralized the Church's bureaucracy. The status of the Synod would remain unchanged, even when its new chief procurator, Ivan I Melissino, created a commission that proposed the following program to the Synod:

1) complete religious freedom to all foreigners in Russia.
2) complete freedom to Old Believers.
3) shorter and less severe fasting periods.
4) correction of errors and contradictions in Church canons.
5) the formation of a commission consisting "of people from prejudices" in order to liberate the Church from superstition and false miracles, especially in connection with icons and relics.
6) the abolition of taking icons in processions to homes.
7) a reduction in the number of feast days and the abbreviation of services.
8) step-by-step abolition of monasticism because it did not exist in the early Church.
9) permission for priests to wear "more appropriate clothes."
10) the abolition of prayer for the dead as acts of extortion.
11) the simplification of divorce proceedings.
12) the withholding of communion from children under ten years old.

To its credit, the Holy Synod ignored these proposals, and the commission was dissolved by Catherine the Great in 1768.

Melissino was replaced by Brigadier P. P. Chebyshev, who openly denied the existence of God. The Synod investigated its new chief procurator and found him guilty of embezzling the Synod's budget. In 1774, Chebyshev was replaced by S. V. Akchurin, a chief procurator in the mode of Prince A. Shakhovskoi. Akchurin's replacement in 1786, A. I. Namov, was likewise another able and talented administrator of the Synod.

Catherine the Great (1762-96), who had her husband killed and had managed to leapfrog over her son Paul, became empress in 1762. Like Elizabeth, she considered the
Russian Church as a potential source of hostility; unlike Elizabeth, she did not persecute it and appeared to be a faithful daughter of the Orthodox faith. She did not support the reforms for the Holy Synod suggested by her husband for the Holy Synod: the period of fasting should be shortened; "superfluous" festival days should be abolished; church services should be shortened; celibacy should not be required for bishops, etc. In fact, Catherine neither supported nor rejected any reform from outside or inside the Church; consequently, the Holy Synod acted as if these proposals never existed.61

After Catherine's death, little changed for the Synod or the Church under Paul I's reign (1796-1801), though the emperor did double the size of the annual compensation to the Church for the nationalization of its estates and increased state subsidies for ecclesiastical education. Paul's first chief procurator, Prince V. A. Khovanskii, was deposed by the Synod and replaced by Count Dmitrii Khvostov, who in turn ceded control of the Synod to Metropolitan Ambrose. However, little really changed in the relations between church and state: the Synod was subordinate to the emperor in both civil and ecclesiastical matters.62 But, as we will see in the next chapter, the secularization of the Russian Orthodox Church had only just begun.

8.3. Other Religious Developments (c.1740-c.1841 A.D.)

A notable clergyman who protested against the state and managed initially to escape prosecution was Metropolitan Arsenii who in 1740 had refused to take a loyalty oath to Anna because she was Lutheran. However, he did agree to take a loyalty oath to her son, Ivan. As a result of his actions, Arsenii was exiled to Siberia, only to be called back and reappointed the metropolitan of Rostov and Yaroslav by Metropolitan Ambrose.
of Novgorod after Elizabeth had finished her coup d'etat in the Kremlin. In a re-enactment of 1740, Arsenii refused to read a section of the loyalty oath that named the monarch the bishop's ultimate arbiter; but, unlike the last time, Elizabeth permitted him to skip reading this section. Pushing his luck, Arsenii refused to pledge to the entire loyalty oath as long as the section of the monarch's supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs remained. The Empress permitted Arsenii to keep his appointment without taking the oath. She even refused to charge Arsenii once his protector, Metropolitan Ambrose of Novgorod, had died, in spite of the Synod's attempts.63

Under Peter III's one year reign (1762), the state re-nationalized the Monastyrskii Prikaz that had been under the control of the Church during Elizabeth's reign (1741-62). Arsenii vehemently protested this act and was saved only by Catherine the Great's (1762-96) coup d'etat. In need of the clergy's support, Catherine ordered the creation of a commission filled with both lay and ecclesiastical people to investigate the matter of monastic estates. Citing the text stating that the Church's kingdom is not of this world, the commission on 26 February 1764 ordered that the Monastyrskii Prikaz and its one million peasants be placed under state control. Arsenii again protested the commission's finding and proposed a restoration of the patriarchate.64

This time Arsenii's luck took a change for the worse. On imperial orders, the Synod charged, tried, and sentenced him to a monastery near the White Sea. He would again be tried by the Synod in 1767 and sentenced to the Talinn tower for life, his cell having only a hole in the wall into which food could be thrown to him. He was renamed Andrei the Liar and died in 1772. If there were any doubt about who was in charge on ecclesiastical matters, it was now clear: the Holy Synod as directed by its emperor.
With the white clergy completely subordinate to the state, genuine spiritual practice could only be found in the monasteries and among the Old Believers. However, the latter had split into various sects and religious movements because they could not solve the two problems that confronted them: 1) the absence of bishops, which made the consecration of priests impossible, according to the rules of apostolic succession; and 2) the lack of state support, which made the intellectual and spiritual basis of their congregations flimsy. Although the Old Believers refused to submit to Peter's policy of westernization, their faith alone did not prove enough to keep them together as an alternative organization to the Holy Synod. The end result was fragmentation.

It would be the monasteries and the revival of the Non-Possessor strain of the Russian Church that would provide fresh spiritual practice untainted by secular hands. St. Tikhon of Zadonsk (1724-83), previously the Bishop of Voronezh, and St. Seraphim of Sarov (1750-1833) would recover this buried tradition of the Russian Church in the idea of Starchestvo. The origins of the Starchestvo, a phenomenon that would become popularized in the nineteenth century, are derived from St. Seraphim's theology of a contemplative life combined with active service to one's fellow Christians. The person who participates in this type of life and guides others in it is called a staret: a person without appointment by either his bishop or by the brethren of his community. The staret was a chosen vessel of the Holy Spirit — the Russian version of the Christian symbol of charismata — and was responsible only to its calling.

The center of this movement was at Optina Pustin, a monastery near Tula in central Russia, and the practice of Starchestvo began there under Father Leonid, who had been the disciple of the famous monk Paisy Velichkovskii. Following the precepts of St.

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Seraphim of Sarov, Velichkovskii introduced the practice of Starchestvo to the Russian Church. It soon spread throughout Russia and would influence the Slavophile philosophy as best portrayed by Dostoevski's character, Father Zossima, in the *Brothers Karamazov.*

8.5 Secular Symbols of Order  
(c.1829-c.1881 A.D.)

Peter the Great’s policy of westernization and Catherine the Great’s importation of the European Enlightenment created a secular culture that produced symbols of order that would ultimately replace the Russian Orthodox Church: the Decembrists, Official Nationality, the Westernizers, and the Slavophiles. By turning toward the West, Peter the Great attempted to modernize Russia, transforming it from a land-owning gentry with a serf-based peasantry into a military-administrative aristocracy with placid workers for Peter’s public projects. However, the reaction of the peasants to the gentry’s increasing acceptance of westernization was one of suspicion and outright antipathy. What ultimately arose in Russian society was a westernized gentry governing a people who still clung to their non-Europeanized customs and traditions. As Dostoevski describes it, the “entire upper class of Russia ended up by being transformed into Germans, and, uprooted, got to love everything German and to hate and despise everything of their own.” The legacy of Peter the Great is a gentry culturally dislocated from its own native traditions with the bulk of Russia’s population remained un-westernized.

Catherine the Great’s importation of the European Enlightenment continued Peter the Great’s project of westernization. But whereas Peter’s westernization was determined by utilitarian motives, Catherine’s was one of vanity: Catherine sought the accolades of the *philosophes* as an “enlightened monarch.” However, after the atrocities of the French
Revolution, Catherine as well as the Russian gentry became less receptive to French revolutionary ideas. The facade of the Russian Enlightenment was exposed.

Yet it was during Catherine's reign that an independent Russian intellectual culture with a distinctive philosophical content modeled after western Europe began to form. Works of the French Enlightenment, by authors such as Diderot, d'Alembert, Voltaire, and Rousseau, were widely discussed. Although the actual sophistication and philosophical rigor of the Russian intellectual culture were superficial, the conceptual framework, as borrowed from the Enlightenment, had been established for the discussion of such topics as religion and politics.

The reign of Alexander I (1801-1825) was one in which liberalism was initially accepted but subsequently rejected. Although the Napoleonic War of 1812 ended Alexander's flirtation with liberalism, the Russian gentry still aspired to a liberal state, an aspiration which intensified after the Russian army had marched through France, where they were exposed first-hand to the liberalism of the West. But at home Alexander continued to reject liberal reforms, a rejection that drove a frustrated gentry underground to form secret societies like the Decembrists. Although the Decembrists' insurrection failed, their attempt signified the ever-widening chasm between the westernized gentry and the Russian peasantry. Thus, the Decembrists' call for revolution against Alexander revealed not only the gulf between the gentry and the monarchy but the growing gap between the gentry and the peasantry.

The Decemberists' successors, the Russian Romantics of the 1830s and 1840s, eschewed political questions in favor of philosophical ones imported primarily from the German West: Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Of all these German thinkers, Schelling had
the greatest impact on the Russian intelligentsia. Schelling argued for people to rely upon
their intuition to find the Absolute within themselves; consequently, social and political
questions were ignored. 71

The reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855) and his program of “Official Nationality”
(Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality) drove Russian western intellectuals further
underground; consequently, as observed by Dostoevski, they would only become more
frustrated because of the gap between thought and action: “Finally, having discussed,
talked about and solved a number of problems of general importance and having reached a
unanimous decision, the entire ‘circle’ lapses into a state of irritation, into a kind of
unpleasant state of limpness.” 72 If the corridors to power were closed off to the western
Russian gentry, the compensation would be found in Schelling’s philosophy of an
experience of inner truth as discovered by one’s intuition.

By the end of the 1830s, Belinsky and other Russian intellectuals such as
Turgenev, Bakunin, Granovsky, Stankevich, and Herzen had been influenced not by
Schelling’s philosophy but by Hegel’s. 73 Belinsky, influenced by Bakunin, “reconciled”
himself to Nicholas’ regime by ignoring the role of negation in Hegel’s philosophy and
instead concentrating on the inner contemplation of truth. 74 However, Belinsky began to
reassess Hegel in the early 1840s when he began to examine Russia’s proper relationship
with the West, a question that had preoccupied Russians since the fall of Constantinople in
1453 and Filofei’s subsequent claim that Moscow was the “Third Rome” of Christendom.

The first secular expression asking about Russia’s place in the world appeared in
Karamzin’s The History of the Russian State, written in the early 1800s, which contended
that Russian history is a progressive evolution to the Russian state. But it was a result of
Hegel's philosophy via Bakunin and Belinsky that the question about Russia's proper relationship to the West began to be debated among Russian intellectuals. According to Hegel, the Absolute Spirit, having “actualized” itself in Europe, will move to North America and finally to Russia. The United States was dismissed as a possible center for the renewal of western civilization because of its religious propensities; therefore, it was the Russian people who were more likely to renew civilization, given their closer proximity to Europe and their greater spiritual depth.

The assumption that Russia had a special role in the salvation of western civilization provided the context of the debate between the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. This debate about Russia's role in the world formed the intellectual backdrop of the ideological polarization between the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. For the Slavophiles, the Russian people had rejected western reforms since Peter the Great and continued in their traditional ways with admirable tenacity; for the Westernizers the peasants' rejection of the Enlightenment was a symptom of Russia's ancestral backwardness, which made it all the more pressing to continue along Russia's path of westernization.

For the Slavophiles, the unique spirit of the people, a concept borrowed from Schelling and Hegel, was first realized in Orthodox Christianity; so they sought to combat the materialism of the modern world by returning Russia (and subsequently the world) to a state of primitive perfection that had existed in pre-Petrine Russia. Slavophism expressed a vision of integration, peace, and harmony that could be found in such pre-Petrine institutions as the zemskii sobor and the sobornost, religious and political associations that were based on love, freedom and the truth of Orthodoxy. According to the
Slavophiles, the future of Russia lay in a return to native principles that still resided in the peasants communes. After being cured, Russia would take its message of harmony and salvation to the decadent and dying West, which was best manifested by the Roman Catholic Church and the reforms of Peter the Great. It is this transformation of the Russian Orthodox Church from one of spiritual salvation to one of earthly paradise that makes the Slavophiles a symbol of gnosticism.76

Not that the Westernizers fared much better. Although they did not possess a single, integrated ideology, they adopted the gnostic ideologies of the West for their own. The split between the "fathers" and the "sons" therefore is a superficial one: the "fathers" supported a gradual pace of western reform, while the "sons" sought immediate revolution with the doctrines of positivism, materialism, socialism, and eventually communism. Both approaches were gnostic.77

8.6 Conclusion

The Petrine vision of westernization was the latest articulation of the state elites' experiences of disorder. The secular policy to subordinate and to secularize the Russian Orthodox Church destroyed the Church as a symbol of right order. Replacing the Church was the symbol of the Holy Synod that represented Church leadership under state control. The symbol of symphonia and the experiences underneath this symbol had become lost. Secular gnosticism reigned.

8.7 End Notes


2. For a summary of the politics of Patriarch Adrian's and Peter the Great's rise to power, please refer to Cracraft, James. The Church Reforms of Peter the Great (Stanford:
3. For more about Peter's policy of westernization and an evaluation, please refer to
Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),
213-241.

4. Examples of Peter the Great's taxes can be found in *PSZ*, vol. 3, No. 661; also see vol.
3, No. 1711, 1757, 1803, 2372, 1395, 2036, 2078, 2082, 2108, 2130, 2421, 2888; vol. 5,
No. 2362, 2650, 3026, 3240, 3419 3305, 3501.

5. *PSZ*, vol. 5, No. 3245, 3287; also see vol. 6, 3481.


7. *Ibid.*, vol. 4, No. 1839. Peter would issue a decree on 11 March 1701 that reiterated
these same conditions for the Church.


9. The original letter is from Verkhovskoi, P. V. *Uchrezhdenie Dukhovnoi Kollegii i
Dukhovnyi Reglament*, vol. 1 (Rostov-on-Don, 1916), 111-12.


11. For more about Yavorskii's biography, please refer to Cracraft, James. *The Church

12. Yavorskii was not allowed to use any of the patriarchal revenues, as they were
transferred to the Admiralty Prikaz in 1701. *PSZ*, vol. 4, No. 2346.

13. J. Šerech, "Stefan Yavorsky and the Conflict of Ideologies in the Age of Peter the


17. J. Šerech, "Stefan Yavorsky and the Conflict of Ideologies in the Age of Peter the
Great," *Slavonic and East European Review* 30 (December 1951): 53-54, 57. I agree
with Cracraft's argument and his use of the Musin-Pushkin's letter as evidence that
contends Yavorskii's *Kamen Very* was not directed against Peter the Great, as Šerech
claims, but against Protestantism. Please refer to Cracraft, James. *The Church Reforms

19. *PSZ*, vol. 5, No. 3006

20. Alexis, a sympathizer of the conservative faction in Peter the Great's court, was condemned for treason and sentenced to death; however, he died before the state could carry out his sentence. Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 238-39.


27. *PSZ*, vol. 6, No. 3718.


30. *PSZ*, vol. 6, No. 4001.


33. *Polnoe sobranie postanovlenii i rasporyazhenii po vedomstvu pravoslavnogo ispovedaniya rossiiskoi imperii* (St. Petersburg: 1876-1916), vol. 1, No. 294 (hereafter *PSP*).

34. *PSP*, vol. 1, No. 27.

35. For more about the incident, please refer to *PSP*, vol. 1, No. 121, 338.
36. For more examples, please refer to PSP, vol. 1, No. 30, 60, 130, 195, 203, 218, 233-34, 345; vol. 2, No. 348, 447, 464, 508, 650, 793, 901; vol. 3, No. 1017, 1044, 1054; also see PSZ, vol. 6, No. 3097; vol. 7, No. 4190.

37. PSP, vol. 1, No. 3, 25, 64, 127; also see PSZ, vol. 6, No. 3734, 3749, 3796.


42. PSZ, vol. 6, No. 3963; also see PSP; vol. 2, No. 532.

43. PSP, vol. 1, No. 82.

44. Ibid., vol. 1, No. 112.

45. Ibid.

46. PSZ, vol. 6, No. 4051; also see PSP, vol. 2, No. 716.

47. PSP, vol. 1, No. 171.

48. Ibid., vol. 1, No. 280; vol. 2, No. 869.

49. Ibid., vol. 1, No. 12, 119, 123, 215, 312-313, 338; vol. 2, No. 346, 389, 394, 671, 751, 791, 921, 946; vol. 3, No. 988; also see PSZ vol. 6, No. 3854.

50. Ibid., vol. 2, No. 171.


54. PSP, vol. 7, No. 2298, 2518; vol. 9, No. 2853; vol. 10, 3417; also see PSZ, vol. 9, No. 7133.

55. ODDS, vol. 18, 324.


70. Reddaway, W.F., ed.. *Documents of Catherine the Great: the Correspondence with Voltaire and the "Instructions" of 1767 in the English Text of 1768* (Cambridge:1931),
13, 67, 119.


75. Herzen, A. *From the Other Shore* (New York: 1963), 78.


CHAPTER 9: SECULARIZATION AND SUBORDINATION  
(c.1801-c.1917 A.D.)

9.1 The State Part of the Church  
(c.1801-c.1855 A.D.)

In the eighteenth century, the Holy Synod had considerable authority and autonomy from the state in the administration and supervision of ecclesiastical affairs. Of course monastic properties and peasants eventually came under the state's control, but the routine matters of ecclesiastical life and canon law were left to the Church.¹ This arrangement between church and state would dramatically change in the nineteenth century with the chief procurator administrating the daily tasks of the church under a secular bureaucracy.

The motive for exercising state control of the church bureaucracy was dissatisfaction with the church's ecclesiastical administration. For example, Nicholas I (reign 1825-55) often complained about the corruption and irregularities of the priests and bishops of the Russian Church. When the Emperor learned that an archpriest in Kursk had suspicious relations with peasant women but managed to escape punishment, he had the priest defrocked and rebuked the bishop for moral laxness.² The following year, Nicholas reprimanded a drunk priest who had dropped the Holy Elements:

Once more I repeat that this serves as new proof of how little local ecclesiastical authorities perform their duty, and I reiterate that priests of dubious conduct are absolutely not to be tolerated.”³

Though he berated individual priests, Nicholas left the responsibility of the Church's administration to the Holy Synod. The anonymous memorandum, "Some Comments and Proposals for Improving Church Matters," which suggested the creation of an additional council to assist the Synod in the administration of church affairs, had become buried by
the political maneuvering of Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow. 4 It would not be the
emperor himself but the reorganization of the state bureaucracy that would cause the
demise of the Synod's authority.

Under Alexander I's reign (1801-25) the Petrine collegiate system was reorganized
into ministries with each minister possessing his own bureaucracy as an autonomous
organization. Each minister, in turn, would meet in the State Council (Committee of
Ministers) to protect the interests of his institution. The chief procurator, the minister of
the Church at the State Council, had his own state bureaucracy that responded only to
him. Alexander I's first chief procurator, A. A. Iakovlev, sought to have all of the Synod's
mail go through his office, all diocesan secretaries made subordinate to him, and state
procurators appointed to supervise the dioceses. Iakovlev's reforms caused such a protest
from the Synod that the emperor decided to have him removed from his post. 3

Iakovlev's successor, A. N. Golitsyn, an agnostic but an able administrator, made
the bureaucracy more efficient and ended financial abuse. He adopted new procedures for
state offices and the Synod and tightened supervision over the dioceses. 6 Later he would
reform seminary education (1808-14) and, as Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs and
Education, reform ecclesiastical and secular schools. 7 In essence, Golitsyn's strategy was
to create a parallel structure to mirror the Synod's in the administration of church affairs.
The strategy itself was not particular to the Church: other ministers adopted the same
strategy in the supervision of their own institutions. Under Golitsyn's procuratorship, the
Synod's authority and power had faded.

The Synod's decline was temporarily reversed in the first decade of Nicholas I's
reign (1825-55). Golitsyn's successor, P. S. Mescherskii, deferred to the bishops in
ecclesiastical affairs. However, under the new chief procurator, S. D. Nechaev, that deference had diminished. A former military officer, Nechaev brought the church hierarchy under his control by instigating anonymous denunciations of bishops who had opposed the "resolutions and decisions of the Holy Synod, either through sheer persistence or legerdemain." The bishops, however, managed to convince Nicholas to replace Nechaev with N A. Protasov (1836-55), a military officer who nonetheless promised to respect the Church's traditional rights, privileges, and prerogatives. When hearing of the appointment, Metropolitan Filaret wrote to the emperor, "your appointment is received with complete sympathy, satisfaction, and high hopes." Protasov, however, proved to be worse than his predecessor Nechaev. With the emperor's complete trust, Protasov was able to bring the Church under his complete control, his initial pretext being administrative efficiency. He also implemented reforms in ecclesiastical education using a utilitarian program that removed scholastic education in favor of medicine and other practical sciences. Protasov criticized scholastic education because, in his opinion, biblical criticism and hermeneutics would erode people's religious faith and therefore lead to political revolution. According to Protasov, western hermeneutics only encouraged "rationalist principles" that "offend the sensibilities of our pious forefathers on the authenticity, veracity, and divine spirituality of the books of the Holy Scripture." The problem with scholastic education is that it sought to find "faith on reasoned conviction or, what is the same thing, putting reason in the place of [faith]."

Protasov's control of the Synod's bureaucracy was complete by 1840. The Synod could pass resolutions, but the implementation of those resolutions depended upon the chief procurator. Furthermore, Protasov created a parallel bureaucracy, a "special
chancellery," to the Synod's with the emperor's approval. The "special chancellery" gave the chief procurator a power base that for the first time was not dependent upon the Church. At Protasov's suggestion, Nicholas also created separate committees to supervise the church's finances and education under the chief procurator's control. Finally, the Synod's composition was changed when Protasov removed Metropolitan Filaret (Drozdov) of Moscow and Metropolitan Filaret (Amfiteatrov) of Kiev from the Synod over the "Pavskii affair."

At issue was Pavskii's translation of the Old Testament into modern Russian, an idea that both metropolitans supported; however, they both rejected this particular translation. But the very principle of supporting the publication of the Bible in modern Russian was enough to justify the dismissal of both metropolitans from the Holy Synod. With the withdrawal of the powerful and influential Filarets from the Synod, Protasov could exert complete command over that body and thereby the Church.

The Synod became reduced to an advisory body that rubber-stamped approval of the chief procurator's demands. The Church hierarchy resisted Protasov's rule, creating a conflict within the state between the church and its chief procurator. The authority invested in the chief procurator was not based on law but on the emperor's trust. The Ecclesiastical Regulations remained unchanged. However, Protasov could rule with an iron fist over the Synod because he had Nicholas complete trust. But, as we shall see, with a new emperor, a new relationship would develop between the Holy Synod and its chief procurator.

For the clergymen, the church's point man was formally the metropolitan of St. Petersburg, who presided over the Synod. Metropolitan Serafim Glagolevskii,
metropolitan of St. Petersburg (1821-43), tried to defend the church's interests; however, his poor health and age precluded him from being an effective leader. Serafim's successors, Antonii Rafalskii (1843-48) and Nikanor Klementevskii (1848-56) were unable to match wits with Protasov. On the other hand, the metropolitan of Kiev, Evgenii Bolkhovitinov (1822-37) and Filaret Amfitaetrov (1837-57), were able to protect some of the church's interests. But as mentioned previously, the "Pavskii" affair in 1842 gave Protasov reason to dismiss Filaret from the Synod, thereby effectively removing him from ecclesiastical politics.18

The metropolitan of Moscow, Filaret (Drozdov), (1821-67) also was dismissed from the Synod in 1842. Unlike Metropolitan Serafim, Filaret sought religious reform—the translation of the Bible into modern Russian— but, like Serafim, he defended the institution of the Church. According to Filaret, the principal problem of the church was not institutional innovation but moral corruption:

it is tedious how people see only disorder and abuse in everything, and— because of the misdeeds of one person in one place— want to reorder the whole world."19

This approach to clerical reform was reactionary: the uprooting of moral laxness instead of creating something new. In spite of fostering followers in this movement of moral regeneration, Filaret would lose the support of his admirers because of his reactionary reforms for the Church.20

The events of the last years of Nicholas' reign had transformed the Church into a complete component of the state's attempt to cement its program of "Official Nationality." As Gregory Freeze put it: Peter made the Church part of the state; Protasov made the state part of the Church.21 But within the State Council, the Synod was only one of many
ministries that sought to defend its own institutional interests. The Synod, with Protasov's support, managed to stop the government from seizing control of all Church revenues, and the Synod did its best to preserve its institutional authority within the state. But ultimately its authority would become eclipsed by the state. The result was discontent among those Church's bishops who did not take public action but sought consolation in private prayers and diaries, the most famous one being I. S. Belliustin's *Description of the Clergy in Rural Russia*:

The present monks are divided into two classes: the learned and the unlearned; the former are superiors in the monastery and dioceses, the latter are unskilled labor. The former live according to these rules: 1) the diocese or monastery is an estate, from which one can extract whatever is good and valuable; 2) given the impossibility of having one wife, one can have two or three "nieces" as circumstances allow; 3) to avoid needless worries in administering the diocese, delegate all authority to the clerk, and in the monastery, a nephew; 4) permit subordinate monks to do anything, and if one commits something truly horrendous (for example, knives and strangles his lover), then as far as possible conceal this and with all your might defend him before justice; 5) persecute and destroy anyone who dares to have the insolence not to live according to these rules; 6) spare no money to rise from archimandrite to bishop, and then to become a member of the Synod; 7) to reach this goal, it is possible to become a mason, a communist—whatever, just so as to reach this goal as soon as possible.22

Belliustin's concerns and condemnations would be the seeds of clerical reform and liberalism during the next emperor's regime and the era of the great reforms that he inaugurated.

9.2 A. P. Tolstoi  
(c.1855-c.1860s A.D.)

The death of Emperor Nicholas I in February 1855 and Russia's defeat and humiliation in the Crimean War (1853-56) ushered a tide of rising expectations that Alexander II (reign 1855-81) recognized, informing an audience of noblemen that it was better for reform to begin "from above, rather than from below."23 The reforms covered
every aspect of society: justice (1864), local government (1864), education (1863, 1865), censorship (1865), city government (1870), and, most important of all, serf emancipation (1861).  

The cause of the first reforms of the Church – whether they were driven by the "tsar liberator," an "enlightened bureaucracy," or the peasant "class" below – is not a concern for us here. What is important for our purpose is to note that the reforms were modeled after western laws and directly involved society in the reform process. The government employed a policy of publicity (glasnost) to expose those bureaucrats who resisted the Great Reforms as corrupt and petty. Specialists, not bureaucrats, were recruited to organize and implement the reforms; and segments of society, not bureaucrats, were asked to consent to these reforms. However, this policy of glasnost, if we recall from our own recent experiences, is a dangerous game to play. By unfettering the social forces of the lower classes, the government had to be careful to prevent these groups from becoming radicalized to the point at which they would seek to undermine and overthrow the state itself. Thus, the reforms of the 1860s would continue until the end of Alexander II's reign but in a different spirit and tone.

Church reform came to the surface after Protasov's and Nicholas I's deaths in 1855. Protasov's successor, A. P. Tolstoi, believing that bishops should govern the Church, defended the Church's interests at the State Council. Specifically, he opposed the state's plan to include the Church in its budget because it threatened the Church's autonomy, not to mention that the Church already was suffering from insufficient funding:

Given the insufficiency of Church resources, there is no possibility for the state to utilize any of this, and all this would have harmful moral impact upon the clergy and people, without the slightest gain for the treasury.
Tolstoi also removed the power of delegating diocesan secretaries from the chief procurator and returned it to the bishops, since "bishops should make such appointments according to their own judgment." In short, Tolstoi was trying to return to the clerical arrangements of the pre-Protasov order.

A former Synod clerk, A. N. Muravev, wrote a secret memorandum, "On the Influence of Lay Authority in Church Affairs," that charged Protasov had redirected the Synod's funds to the state bureaucracy. The Synod had lost its authority and its members had become "accustomed to secular leadership that, even in the over-procurator's absence abroad, they did not fill vacancies in the most important dioceses, for they were not willing to choose bishops." Muravev therefore asked the emperor to limit the chief procurator's authority by reducing his chancellery and give the Synod direct control over its agenda. Finally, he asked the emperor to create a bishop's council "for discussions just once every year or two at the residence of the senior metropolitan, this would produce much good for the Church and enable the adoption of useful measures against schism." Though the memorandum did not receive the emperor's support, it was embraced wholeheartedly by Tolstoi.

With the support of Tolstoi and Muravev and led by the ever-active Metropolitan Grigorii (Postnikov) of St. Petersburg, the Synod opposed some state policies, such as the creation of new rights for Old Believers and Roman Catholics, the removal of monks' and monasteries' rights, and the subjection of the Church's budget to secular control. At Alexander II's coronation, the bishops convened a church council that overturned the resolution of the 1842 council on the Pavskii case and planned to publish a Russian
The Synod also protested the publication of material that criticized the Church but managed to slip through the eyes of the state censors. A series of conflicts between the state censors and the Church continued until Alexander II announced in June 1858: "Hereafter publication of all articles on the Orthodox Church, the Orthodox Church in the East, or the Greek clergy, is not to be authorized without prior permission from ecclesiastical authorities." In practice, however, Alexander's decree did little to block the publication of anti-clerical material.

It is important to remember that the Church was not reactionary in its politics; rather, like all the other institutions in Russian society at the time, it sought reform in diocesan administration (particularly in the western provinces), the selection of candidates for the clergy, clerical publication, and ecclesiastical education. Tolstoi's seeming acquiescence of his authority to the Synod permitted the Church to take the initiative in its own reforms. However, these reforms were narrow in focus. Institutional reform and state service were not touched by the Synod or its chief procurator. A quick look at the struggle over the reform of defrocking bishops reveals the nature and limit of the Church's reforms and the relationship between the Synod and its chief procurator.

The Synodal resolution removed the disabilities on clergy who voluntarily defrocked in order to improve the plight of widowed clergy. It was supported by a majority in the Synod but was opposed by its chief procurator. Tolstoi accused the Synod of Protestantism because the resolution made holy orders seem something less than "indelible." He accused the clergy "of indifference to Church matters and of excessive concern with their own material well-being." According to Tolstoi, "our clergy are forced by marital ties to be concerned with family needs and for the most part to convert the..."
transfer of clerical positions into a device for supporting their children." The struggle between Tolstoi and the Synod would last for a year before Tolstoi emerged victorious.

Interestingly, Tolstoi's victory was not necessarily the emperor's victory. Alexander sent an anonymous memorandum, "On the Widowhood of Priests" to learn the Synod's opinion. The memorandum was written by Belliustin, who had criticized the clergy and advocated that the state reform the Church. In the memorandum, Belliustin urged the Church to facilitate voluntary defrocking and remove legal barriers that made voluntary defrocking rare. Such a reform would free the Church of clergy who remain in their profession against their will and provide the state a fresh supply of "useful teachers and honest civil servants." It would also ease the financial burden of the Church: widowhood affected four out of ten priests. Given all these reasons, the disabilities on the clergy who have voluntarily defrocked should be removed.

Tolstoi refused to send the memorandum to the Synod as Alexander had ordered. Instead, he sent an anonymous critique of the memorandum to the emperor:

Upon reading this memorandum, I found it significant that it makes absolutely no mention of canon law. Instead, it proposes to permit widowed priests to defrock at will and bases all its arguments on human frailties. Hence by severing the sacred bonds that the Church lays on holy orders, it at once undermines not only the sacrament of ordination but also that of marriage. For if infirmity of flesh justifies the violation of the celibate vows of ordination, so much the more does it justify a fourth marriage for laymen or divorce on grounds of illness by one of the spouses.

Tolstoi ultimately prevailed in this struggle over the clergy and the tsar. By gaining the support of Metropolitans Grigorii and Filaret, he was able to force the Synod to retract its original resolution.

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Tolstoi's victory revealed the limits of the Synod's new authority, even with the support of the emperor. Tolstoi was able to prevail because the Synod itself was split over the issue and because he was able to threaten the Synod with the charge of Protestantism. Unlike other institutions, the Church could not explicitly invoke western models as the blueprint for its reforms. Input into this debate was left to elites in both the church and the state. Thus, a conservative chief procurator instead of a conservative Synod opposed reform over voluntarily defrocking. Other church reforms, however, would be approved by both the Synod and the chief procurator, often mixing conservative and liberal principles in areas like ecclesiastical education and the administration of the western provinces.41

9.3 The Great Reforms
(c.1860s-c.1880s A.D.)

The Petrine reforms and Catherine's absolutism created a secular culture that was influenced by western ideas, some adherents of which opposed the Russian Church itself. In response to this secular culture, the Synod sought to improve the material and moral condition of the Church. Even though under state control, the Russian Church was a topic of ridicule and scorn by the educated elite, especially by the "sons" of the 1860s. In 1861 Metropolitan Isidor proclaimed that "the contemporary agitation of minds and unbounded striving for reform promises nothing good"; in 1862 Metropolitan Arsenii of Kiev announced that "we are living in a time of cruel persecution of the sacred faith and the Church"; and Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow justified his distribution of a circular to parish churches about "the need for repentance and earnest prayer" with the argument that "ideas and teaching antithetical to the Church and government have for some time been

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spreading with particular force in literature [censored and uncensored], in the younger generation, and is penetrating the lowest strata of society." There were even rumors about the elimination of bishops and priests that Filaret took seriously: "They are writing from Petersburg of fears that 'the first blow' will fall on the higher clergy, monasticism, and the Church. And this is not written by some mere superficial gossip-monger."43

While some clergyman remained silent, others published articles that advocated greater authority and autonomy for the Church. A. N. Muravev, for example, wrote several memorandums that portrayed the reign of Nicholas I, a reign which Muravev had previously criticized, as one that did much for the Church such as absorbing the Uniates in 1839. Alexander, however, bestowed rights on Old Believers and permitted the press to criticize the Church. Muravev appealed to Alexander to follow his father's lead in favoring Russian Orthodox, but Alexander ignored him.44 Another example of a conservative defender of the Church was Agafangel who argued for the elimination of the chief procurator's power, the restoration of the Synod's original authority, the decentralization of many of the Church's administrative functions, and the appointment of some bishops to the State Council so as to give the Church a direct voice in state affairs.45

The state's response to the nihilists and other revolutionaries of the 1860s was to partly blame the Church. State officials were dissatisfied with the Church's role in the emancipation of the serfs: clergymen failed to influence peasants in helpful ways. The Minister of Interior complained in May 1861:

disorders and disturbances occurred among peasants in some places solely because of an incorrect explanation of the [emancipation] manifesto by local priests.46
Ecclesiastical schools also brought blame to the Church as they became the hotbeds of political revolutionaries. The government began to draw a list of seminarians and former seminarians who joined the nihilist movement. Finally, the reforms in the western provinces failed, revealing that the implementation of reform could not be left in the hands of the Church alone.

In response to the Church's inability to reform itself, P. A. Valuev, a state bureaucrat, submitted a report to the tsar: "On the Present Condition of the Orthodox Church and Clergy." In his report, Valuev recognized a crisis building within the clerical ranks between the "whites" (married clergymen who could be priests only) and the "blacks" (celibate clergymen who are assigned to monasteries). The cause of this rupture is the bishops's maladministration:

Diocesan hierarchs for the most part pursue the life of involuntary recluses, avoiding the secular world around them, neither understanding nor knowing its needs, not satisfying conditions for a useful interaction with [this world], and they are mainly preoccupied not with the flock entrusted to them, but with the lower clergy subordinated them. Over the latter [the priests] they reign with the most cruel despotism, and that despotism is all the more oppressive because it is exerted mainly through the avarice of diocesan chancelleries and consistories.

Because of the black's autocratic rule, Valuev claims, "the white clergy hate the black, and with the assistance of this hatred, there is beginning to spread not only democratic and even socialist aspirations but also some predisposition toward Protestantism." The financial ruin, low level of education, and its status as a caste instead of an estate created a clergy that is inferior in status, education, and economic to its Protestant and Roman Catholic counterparts.

Valuev proposed two major reforms: 1) to bolster the white clergy's economic and social status by a variety of improvements, one of which that would permit the sons of the
white clergy to leave their clerical estate status; and 2) to incorporate Synod members into
the State Council in order to cure them of their backward outlook on life. Overseeing this
transformation would be a special chancellery. Alexander approved this report and
authorized Valuev to open discussions on this report with Church leaders.52

Metropolitan Filaret approved the plan for broad reform in the parish clergy,
though he objected to the agricultural land grants and to Synod members attending the
State Council, in fear that the state would try to take control of the Church's budget. He
also insisted that seminary reform take place under the purview of the Holy Synod.53

Other church leaders consented to Valuev’s report.54 However, chief procurator Tolstoi
refused to consent to it:

- Our bishops are not familiar with matters discussed in the State Council and
  therefore their mute presence, without participation, but with the obligation to sign
  the minutes, can only lower them in public estimation and in the present
  circumstances encourage blasphemy. Bishops will share responsibility for matters
  that will subject them to criticism, a responsibility from which they have hitherto
  been free.55

The controversy over Synodal members participating in the State Council proved to be the
death blow to Valuev's recommendation.56

Despite this defeat, Valuev managed to establish a reform commission for the
Church. Alexander agreed to form that commission on 24 November 1861 with the
Emperor's brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, as its chairman.57 After a series
of political maneuvers, the commission published a public manifesto on itself and its
purpose in reforming the Church.58 It was the first time that the Church had invited the
parish priest to participate in Church's reform. The course into unknown waters had
begun.

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The 1862 publication of the Special Commission's existence and purpose – to improve the material condition of the parish clergy – raised, perhaps to unrealistic levels, the hopes, aspirations, and expectations of the ecclesiastical rank-and-file. The commission opened its first session in late January 1863, with Metropolitan Isidor of St. Petersburg presiding. The metropolitan concluded that data were required to determine the material needs of the clergy. The clergy in each parish was therefore to compile "opinions" (mnenia) on the clergy's needs according to a standard that was prepared by the commission.19 The questionnaire the commission wrote asked parish staffs about their material condition and the condition of parish schools with each bishop being able to comment on the clergy's legal status.60

The results of the commission's questionnaire revealed the huge diversity of parishes in population, wealth, and social composition. The report also showed that most parishes were dependent upon agriculture and emoluments for their income, an implicit recognition that reforms of the past had little practical effect. Clerical attitudes toward their material condition were ones of intense discontent, especially after the 1861 emancipation of the serfs.61 The bishops, like the parish clergy, also desired larger salaries and showed little enthusiasm for the creation of local parish councils. The bishops also desired that their legal status be improved and the administration of the church be streamlined.62

While waiting for answers to its questionnaire, the commission adopted the principle that society was responsible for improving the clergy's material condition. Because it could not rely upon the state to finance its reforms, the Church had to look at

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its own members to initiate and to implement reform. These ideas were articulated in the commission's March 1863 report:

In searching for means to improve the clergy's condition, attention has been directed almost exclusively toward state resources. However, in view of the aid already provided by the government [and others to be indicated below], the support of clerical staffs and the maintenance of parish churches are primarily the responsibility of parishioners themselves. Further state aid, in general, should have an auxiliary function and be applied to those places where parish means are insufficient and, especially, where the lack of local means is greatest.63

For both realistic and theoretical reasons, the commission called upon its own members instead of the state to reform its institutions.

The commission created the parish council (prikhodskoi sovet later popechitelstvo) to solicit parish clergy support in its reforms. The local councils would awaken dormant social groups within the church that, in turn, would be able to raise funds from lay organizations in order to bolster the Church's infrastructure.64 The implementation of this idea proved to be far more difficult, with the commission submitting a general framework for the councils.64 The commission's submission was revised by the emperor's second section, M. A. Korf, who left the chairmanship of the council open to both the ecclesiastical and lay person and restricted the local council's ability to tax. Alexander II accepted the final version, as revised by the State Council, and signed it into law on 2 August 1864.66

Although signed into law, church reforms produced little practical results, nor could they meet the unrealistic expectations of the parish clergy for higher salaries, improved social and legal status, and ecclesiastical independence. As a St. Petersburg newspaper observed in May 1865: "It seems that not a single question moves so slowly here as the question of improving the clergy's material condition, although action was
begun on this over a year and a half ago."67 By 1865 the result was clear: the policy of incorporating those from below while not completely trusting them had failed. Church reform from below was dead.

D. A. Tolstoi's reign as chief procurator (1866-80) was a surprising one, given his reactionary, although non-Slavophilic, outlook.68 The death of Metropolitan Filaret, who had opposed reform on any ground, certainly helped Tolstoi to embark on his program of reform; or, as attributed to him on the day of Filaret's burial: "[His death is] an enormous loss, but I'll tell you frankly that it has untied our hands."69 Furthermore, the government's financial crisis had passed and the assassination attempt on the Emperor's life had convinced Alexander to support the Russian Church in order to bolster his regime. The timing could not have been better for Tolstoi to begin his program of reform.

Tolstoi began with an appeal from below, a formula that had just failed, but with a twist: he appealed to the zemstvo, the new organ of self-government established in 1864 to handle local needs. He had hoped the zemstvo would support clerical participation in primary education. However, this strategy was doomed to failure because of the zemstvo's hostile attitudes toward the clergy, not to mention its own financial difficulties. The reforms failed. Tolstoi had to abandon his reliance of the zemstvo for his reforms. Reform from now on would be begun from above.70

Tolstoi and the Synod reformed ecclesiastical education (1867, 1869), abolished family claims to clerical positions (1867), separated children from the clerical estate (1869), and reorganized the Church and diocesan administration in response to Rostislavo's The White and Black Clergy (1869).71 In essence, these reforms professionalized the clergy at the expense of the clerical estate: the Church was open to outsiders at the cost of

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traditional and familial privileges and prerogatives. Although the reforms were passed into law, they had yet to be realized in practice.

Tolstoi's reforms would encounter great resistance from the conservative clergy in education and parish and service reform.\(^7\) Furthermore, clerical liberalism – the movement toward improving the clergy's material condition, even if such improvements violated canon law – soon began to gain in popularity but was later transformed into political resentment after the failure of the reforms.\(^7\) Public political protests were rare, but disillusionment and dissent grew within the clerical ranks. For example, according to one police report, a priest in the Samara diocese, "having drunk a little, complained that the Sovereign continually promises to improve the life of the clergy, but in fact he does nothing." He then called the emperor a "son-of-a-bitch" and privately cursed him during church service.\(^7\) The chief procurator, K. P. Pobedonostev, wrote "there are terrible priests – priests who are nihilists and propagandists of revolutionary teachings."\(^7\) Reform may have met the clergy's expectation, but its lack of implementation dashed any future illusions.

9.4 Reversal and Revolution
(c.1880s-1917 A.D.)

The dismantling of the Great Reforms was part of an overall reactionary movement against autocracy by the state. In response to the growing popularity of liberalism and socialism among the masses and elite, not to mention the several failed assassination attempts on the emperor's life, the state began to curb the reforms of the 1860s. The Church experienced counter-reform, as did all the other institutions in Russia. The new
chief procurator, K. P. Pobedonostev, with the assistance of the suffragan bishop Amvrosii (Kliucharev) of Moscow, sought to reverse the Great Reforms of the 1860s. A memorandum entitled "On the Establishment of Parishes and Parish Staffs" blamed the church reforms of the 1860s and the current press for corrupting the clergy. Amvrosii writes that "the press pointed out to the clergy such necessities, which the poorer part had previously never dreamed of, and thus the reform 'only made the clergy's existence spiritually more difficult.'" Consequently, a series of "counter-reforms" were enacted by the state: the removal of the right of diocesan clergy to elect their own superintendents, the tightening of the Church's control over the press, and the reestablishment of family claims to clerical positions. The state provided full support of these "counter-reforms," especially after the assassination of Alexander II in March 1881. The movement of counter-reform would continue until the 1905 Revolution.

The drift to the 1905 revolution was caused by a variety of factors: an intellectually radicalized student body protesting against an autocratic state, a disgruntled nobility fighting against Witte's policy of industrialization, a property-starved peasantry asking for more land, and poverty-stricken workers demanding better wages and more rights. The reactionary reigns of Alexander III (1881-94) and Nicholas II (1894-1917), along with the empire's defeat in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, only exacerbated tensions between the state and society. Once Bloody Sunday began the 1905 Revolution, the Church, like the rest of the segments of society, sought to reclaim the privileges once granted under the Great Reforms.

The leader of the Church reform was Metropolitan Antonii (Vadkovskii) of St. Petersburg who wrote a manifesto that asked:
whether now is the time to abolish the constant tutelage and vigilant control of the secular authorities over the life of the Church, for this deprives the Church of its independence and initiative.

whether now is not the proper time to abolish [or at least moderate] the constant tutelage and all the vigilant control exercised by secular authorities over the life of the Church and its administrative activities, for this deprives the Church of its independence and initiative.*0

The Synod requested Nicholas II to consider the restoration of the patriarchate, which the Emperor approved in principle but chose to defer implementation until more favorable times. A survey among diocesan bishops revealed support for the restoration of the patriarchate along with administrative reform.*1

Once a constitutional monarchy had been established, the state put aside any plans for a restored patriarchate and instead subjected the Church to the whims of Rasputin, who ordained monks supportive of him.*2 The bishops had become so alienated by the state that the Synod refused the chief procurator's request on 27 February 1917 for a declaration of defense of the monarchy.*3 In addition to Rasputin's influence, Nicholas II's approval of the Preconciliar Commission report on 25 April 1907 further antagonized the Church: heretics, sectarians, and schismatics were legally tolerated under the constitutional monarchy. Because the Church was dependent upon the state for recourse and hence could not compete with these other religious groups, it faced a situation in which its religious competitors, independent of the state, began actively to recruit members into their organizations.*4 Finally, the heavy causalities of the First World War put salt on an already open wound. Given all these factors, it should come as no surprise that the Synod refused to support Nicholas II when he needed them the most. The reign of the chief procurator had failed to support the state.

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The movement of clerical liberalism also rejected the old order. The priest Georgii Gapon led workers on the march of Bloody Sunday; and some clergymen even joined the liberal Kadet Party. The most radical members of the clerical liberalism movement printed a manifesto in March 1905 by a "Group of Thirty-Two St. Petersburg Priests" that demanded a shift of authority from the "blacks" to the "whites" and the laity. Although clerical liberalism was suppressed by both the church and the state after the 1905 Revolution, the movement would reemerge in the February Revolution. On 7 March 1917, the "Group of Thirty-Two" would transform itself into the All-Russian Union of Democratic Clergy and Laymen with a program for democratizing the Church, redistribution of land to the peasants, and condemning capitalism. Some clergymen supported the overthrow of the monarchy and overthrew their own bishops. In June 1917 an All Russian Congress of Clerics and Laymen was convened by supporters of clerical liberalism and voted for further democratization of the Church. However, clerical liberalism would lose most of its steam with the Church Council of 1917-18 and the Bolsheviks' seizure of power. The movement would make one final re-emergence, this time under the Soviet regime, as the Renovationist Church.

9.5 Conclusion

The Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of order still remained buried under the machinery of the state. Secular symbols of disorder continued to exist with the chief procurator as the prime example of church subordination to the state. Both church and state elites operated within the paradigm of secular supremacy, whether it was debate about the Great Reforms or the 1917 Revolution. The soteriological experiences of right order remained submerged under the secular symbols of disorder.
9.6 End Notes


3. PSPR, No. 216; also see No. 330.


17. *Ibid.*, f. 797, op. 12, d. 29882, ll. 7-14, 17-18 ob., 22-23. G. P. Pavskii was a professor at the St. Petersburg Ecclesiastical Academy who translated the Bible from the original Hebrew into modern Russian. The purpose of his translations was purely pedagogical; however, his students made lithographs of this translation in 1838, 1840, and 1841. A junior faculty member reported the incident to the over-procurator in an anonymous note. Needless to say, the translation was banned by the censors. Freeze, Gregory. *The Russian Levites: Parish Clergy in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 44-46.


19. Filaret (Drozdov). *Perepiska Filareta, mitropolita moskovskogo, s S. D. Nechaevym* (St. Petersburg, 1895), 70.


24. For more details about these reforms, please see Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 369-78.


GBL, f. 302, k. 4, d. 20, l. 3.

27. Ibid., f. 302, k. 4, d. 20, ll. 5-6.


29. Ibid., f. 796, op. 205, d. 603, ll. 1-15.

30. SMO, vol. 4, 186-203; also see vol. 4, 116.

31. Ibid., vol. 4: 116-18, 133-36, 244-62.


35. Ibid., f. 797, op. 29, otd. 1, st. 2, d. 249, ll.2-4 ob.; f. 832, op. 1, d. 72, ll. 5-6.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., f. 796, op. 141, g. 1860, d. 2320, ll.1-6; also see OR GBL, f. 302, k. 3, d. 12, l. 1.

38. Ibid., f. 832, op. 1, d. 72, l. 43; f. 832, op. 1, d. 72, ll. 43-47; f. 797, op. 29, otd. 1, st. 2, d. 249, ll. 34-38 ob.

39. Ibid., f. 832, op. 1, d. 72, ll.41-42 ob.; f. 797, op. 29, otd. 1, st. 2, d. 249, ll.39-42 ob. According to canon law, a "white" clergyman can be married before he takes "celibate vows of ordination"; but he cannot marry after his vows. The practice of voluntarily defrocking evaded this principle, even if the person were to leave the clerical estate.

40. Please refer to endnote thirty-seven.

41. Please refer to endnote thirty-three.

43. Filaret (Drozdov). *Pis’ma Filareta, mitropolita moskovskogo i kolomenskogo, k namestniku Sv. Troitse-sergievoi lavry arkhimandrita Antoniiu, 1831-67 gg,* vol. 4 (Moscow: 1877-84), 280-81.


45. *Ibid,* f. 573, no. AI.60, ll. 17-38 ob.


47. *Ibid,* f. 797, op. 93 (1), g. 1861, d. 22, l. 27 ob.


54. For example, Metropolitan Isidor of St. Petersburg and archpriest V. B. Bazhanov agreed to Valuev's report. Valuev, P. A. *Dnevnik,* vol. 1 (Moscow: 1961), 127.

55. *SMO,* vol. 5, 173-74.


58. Ibid., f. 1282, op. 2, d. 2017, II. 4-4 ob.

59. Ibid., f. 797, op. 33, otd. 1, d. 28, l. 3.

60. Ibid., r. 3, d. 470, l. 12 ob.


64. Ibid., f. 804, op. 1, r. 1, d. 11; f. 832, op. 1, d. 88, II. 1-6; f. 804, op. 1, r. 3, d. 470, II. 9-10 ob., 86-86 ob.

65. Ibid., d. 11, II. 27-36, 141-46, 151-52.

66. Ibid., r. 1, d. 11, II.344-46.


70. For details about the zemstovs' rejection of Tolstoi's reforms, please refer to Blagovidov, F. V. *Diatel'nost' russkogo dukhovnstva v otnoseni k narodnomu obrazovaniiu v tsarvovanie imp. Alexandra II* (Kazan, 1891), 72-76.

71. For reforms in ecclesiastical education, please refer to Freeze, Gregory. *The Russian Levites: Parish Clergy in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 319-29; for the reforms on family claims to clerical position, please refer to *TsGIA SSR*, f. 1149, op. 7, g. 1867, d.. 72, II.2-7, 11-14; f. 796, op. 148, g. 1867, d. 123; and for administrative reforms, please refer to *TsGIA SSR*, r. 3, d. 472, II. 136-90 ob; r. 1, d. 18, II. 1-109.

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CHAPTER 10: PERSECUTION AND COMPETITION
(c.1917-c.1999 A.D.)

10.1 Sobornost
(1917 A.D.)

Between the collapse of the monarchy (15 March 1917) and the fall of the provisional government (17 November 1917), the Russian Orthodox Church reestablished the patriarchate. A church council was convoked on 15 August 1917 with 564 representatives that were almost equally divided between lay and clergy and that coalesced into a single movement of clerical reform. Among the reformers was the chief procurator, Kartashev, who presided over the council that would ultimately abolish his office.

Although several accounts have been offered to explain why the Church decided to restore the patriarchate, I will use Evthuov's explanation because she focuses on the internal developments within the Church, i.e., she attempts to reconstruct the structure of consciousness of the Church's leadership. According to Evthuov, the restored patriarchate was a culmination of a twenty-year debate about the principle of sobornost: the collective principle that was the basis for social organization and action. Therefore, the question that confronted the church council was how to realize this principle of sobornost in concrete action. The restoration of patriarchate was the ecclesiastical answer to this question.

The primary arguments presented at the church council for the restoration of the patriarchate were metaphysical and theological in nature. The layman A. V. Vasilev contended that because of the nature of the Trinity and the doctrine of God as logos, the Church could only fulfill its mission of God as love in the world by restoring the

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patriarchate. The statement of God as love implied the existence of the Trinity because love is not realized in itself but only by being with others; thus, God is represented as both unity and diversity within the Trinity.

The same argument is applied to the doctrine of God as logos. Since one cannot have a conversation with oneself, God is both many and one in this conversation within the Trinitarian structure. Furthermore, since man is created in God's image, which includes God as logos, he is created in an image of this conversation. Hence, the principle of sobornost is the articulation of God's unity and diversity in His love that unites individuals in one society; consequently, society, and especially the church, should be organized according to this principle. The patriarchate would function as the symbol of the unity for the Church's principle of sobornost with its monasteries, parishes, and other institutions as representative of God's diversity.²

Equally important, it was argued, for the restoration of the patriarchate was historical precedent, specifically reference to the thirty-fourth rule of the Apostles:

The bishops of any nation should recognize and acknowledge a first among them as their head, and should do nothing above their power without his consideration: each should do only that which affects his own diocese. But the first bishop must also do nothing without the counsel of all, so there shall be common agreement.³

Archimandrite Ilarion reminded members of the council that the restoration of the patriarchate was critical for the governance of the church:

We are not gathered here to reform the Russian Orthodox Church; rather, our goal is to liberate the Church from those who have imprisoned it to the state for these past two centuries.⁴

According to the thirty-fourth rule of the Apostles, individual rule should be checked by a council of bishops. V. K. Nedelskii, a lay member of the Lithuanian diocese, argued that
the essence of the rule was the unity of theological and dogmatic thought. The patriarch was the realization of this unity: "the realization of my dream of a holy symbol of humility, love, and self-denial."^5

Finally, current political circumstances came into the consideration of the restoration of the patriarchate. The provisional government proved to be a competitor with the Church for control over people's education, marriage, and divorce. A patriarchate with a strong leader, who could compete with the provisional government for the people's hearts and minds, was required.

A. F. Gorain, a lay member from the Chernigov diocese, argued at the council that the patriarchs had always defended the interests of the Church as they did under the Mongols. The Petrine reforms had altered the arrangement of symphonia between church and state: the creation of the synod instituted the era of Caesarpapism in Russia. The Church no longer could act as the ordering principle of daily life for the people under the Petrine system:

Let not forget that after Peter the Great's destruction of the patriarchate, Russians gradually lost the habit of thinking and living in the Church, since the patriarchate and the entire old, ecclesiastical structure of life was destroyed. I. N. Speranskii, a clerical member of the Novgorod diocese, reiterated this view at the church council:

Peter, perhaps unconsciously, established the principle that individuals have duties entirely unrelated to religion. This principle contains a surprising parallel in Protestant teaching, particularly those by Melanchthon, of a dual morality in the temporal and spiritual world. Now it is clear why this brilliant cleric, the first prelate Kharkov Antonii, whose learning is known both in Russia and abroad, believes the struggle against restoring the patriarchate is a Protestant ploy.\[253\]
According to Speranskii, this change in the organization of society had been required at the time because Russia had needed to catch up with the West. But now Russia was equal with the West:

We must radically change our private and public lives. We must make the eternal truths of Orthodoxy the basis of our lives: not as separate desires, as our contemporaries try to convince us, but as understood by the Holy Church that follows the Church Fathers, who reached them by experience.9

A patriarch is required for a society to be ordered on Orthodox instead of Protestant principles.

In addition to the "Protestant principle" reason, the Communists (and possibly the provisional government) was another target of the church council. The priest V. I. Vostokov observed:

We are living in an age when a mysterious and terrifying power has gathered against the cross of Jesus Christ. A world-wide, anti-Christian organization is actively striving to conquer the world and aiming to destroy Russian Orthodoxy because, despite its moral decline and sins, it still carries within itself the germ of eternal and pure truth. It is this germ that is so hateful to the servants of the Anti-Christ. A bane has been declared on the Cross of Christ and a merciless war has been raised.10

In this atmosphere of revolution – of Freemasons, Jesuits, sectarians, and atheists – the patriarch would be able to preserve Orthodoxy against her enemies. He would be the defender of the Church in this time of political and cultural crisis.

After a series of debates, the church council restored the patriarch.11 The principle of sobornost became realized in the restoration of the patriarchate. Just as important was the idea of symphonia being reincorporated back into the Church's relations with the state. The Church would no longer tolerate the existence of any antagonistic power: a position that would put the church in direct conflict with the provisional and later the Bolshevik
government. It would provide an alternative power structure to the Bolshevik regime and thereby face seventy years of state persecution for it.

10. 2 Soviet Persecution
(c.1917-c.1991 A.D.)

The newly-elected patriarch, Tikhon Belavin, Metropolitan of Moscow, faced the immediate challenge of the Bolshevik victory in November 1917. On 8 November 1917 the government nationalized all of the Church's and parish priests' lands; on 23 January 1918 Lenin decreed that all monasteries and other church property were under state control and banned religious education; on 19 February 1918 Lenin declared that the Church was deprived of the right to acquire more property; on 13 June 1921 sermons were restricted to only religious subjects; and on 27 April and 19 June 1923 church property was declared subject to government use. These rulings and decrees ran contrary to the December 1917 legislation, "On the Legal Status of the Russian Orthodox Church," which made the Russian Orthodox Church the national church of Russia and declared that the state should make no law relating to the Church without prior consultation. But, as would be found out by all parties later, the law was merely a farce.

The church council closed in September 1918 because of lack of funds. In addition to the restoration of the patriarchate, the council reclaimed the right for local councils to elect bishops and restored to monasteries their ecclesiastical autonomy. More important, the council granted the patriarchate unrestricted administrative powers in the event that the Soviet government made it impossible to convvoke another council. Finally, the council required the patriarch to compose a will with the names of three persons to
replace him as locum tenens should he perish and the Soviets prevent the convocation of another church council.  

The initial relation between the Church and the Soviet state was one of warfare. Patriarch Tikhon issued an encyclical on 19 January 1918 that admonished the Soviet government for its anti-religious activities and excommunicated all those who opposed the Church. This call for active resistance against the Soviet regime resulted in a clerical blood bath by the state that forced the patriarch to issue another encyclical on 25 September 1919 ordering the clergy to stand aloof from politics and be loyal to the civil government on the grounds of the July 1918 Soviet Constitution that separated church and state. The Church consequently would withdraw from political affairs and would remain withdrawn, even when Russia was in civil war.

The state, for its part, would not concede anything to the Church. Taking advantage of the reform and radical movements within the Church, especially within the monasteries, the state sought to supplant the Church with its own Renovationist Church. Well-known clerical radicals such as Bishop Antonin Granovsky, Archbishop Evdokim, and Alexander Vvedensky would become the leaders of this alternative ecclesiastical structure.

Recognizing this opportunity, the state soon transferred the Patriarch Church's property to the Renovationist Churches: the Living Church, the Union of Communities of Ancient Apostolic Churches, and the Union for Church Renovation. The state also placed Patriarch Tikhon under house arrest on 6 May 1922 for resisting the state confiscation of church property. However, the Renovationist Church would collapse under its own weight. The attempt to unite it under a single leader failed, in spite of the election of

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Bishop Antonin Granovsky as the nominal head of this schismatic federation of churches. This inability of the Renovationist Church to unite under a single leader was the ultimate cause of its downfall.\textsuperscript{16}

The failure of the Renovationist Church forced the government to change from its Napoleonic strategy of "divide and conquer" to a strategy of presenting and promoting a secular alternative. This opportunity arose for the government with the death of Patriarch Tikhon in April 1925. Metropolitan Peter of Polyansky was named as the patriarch's \textit{locum tenens} and continued to resist enticements from the Renovationist Church in spite of the Soviet's recognition of the Renovationist Church as the only legal Orthodox Church of Russia.\textsuperscript{17} The Renovationist Church, however, continued to decline in membership. In response to this situation, the Soviets created a new secular organization, the League of the Militant Godless. It was launched in 1925 but, like its Renovationist counterpart, would ultimately fail to convert Orthodox believers and would be defunct by the early 1940s.\textsuperscript{18}

During the 1920s, the Soviet continued its campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church: the 1924 Constitution was amended to favor only anti-religious propaganda; religious worship had been reduced to the status of a "cult" and could be therefore legally supervised by the state; a continuous work week, without rest on Sunday, was introduced into the Soviet system.\textsuperscript{19} But it was the new law on "religious associations" enacted on 9 April 1929 that dealt the final blow to the Church. The law explicitly forbade any religious activities outside the churches themselves, and it required all religious associations to apply for registration with the state. The law also forbade not only the
organization of religious association but any agreement or contract between a lay and ecclesiastical individual. 20

Stalin continued the Soviet persecution of the Church in 1929-30, 1932-34, and 1936-38. 21 The three interim administrators of the Church, as designated by Patriarch Tikhon's will, were arrested and imprisoned in succession. However, the last interim administrator, Metropolitan Peter, managed to designate Metropolitan Sergii of Nizhny Novgorod (Gorky) as deputy of the locum tenes. Metropolitan Sergii had become the de facto ruler of the Russian Orthodox Church and ultimately would be elected patriarch in 1943. 22

Metropolitan Peter was arrested because he refused to agree to the NKVD's conditions of religious registration: 1) declaration of state loyalty, 2) exclusion of certain bishops whom the government did not prefer, 3) condemnation of emigre bishops, and 4) a permanent relationship between church and state as modeled after the Petrine Holy Synod. As said previously, Peter named Sergii as leader of the locum tenes before he arrested in 1925. As the de facto leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, Sergii also was arrested but, probably after torture by the Soviets, he agreed to the conditions of the NKVD. In 1927 Peter had the Russian Orthodox Church registered with the NKVD and announced his declaration of loyalty: there was no contradiction between Christianity and communism. 23

Like the rest of Russian society, the Russian Orthodox Church suffered arrests, torture, and execution of its members throughout the 1930s. It was only the event of the Second World War that put a lull in Stalin's persecution of the Church. Instead of basing his appeal on Marxism-Leninism, Stalin used Russian nationalism to rally the Soviet state
against its German aggressors, a nationalism that included the Russian Orthodox Church.

Sergii responded to Stalin's call with a letter to the Russian people:

Our Orthodox Church has always shared the destiny of this nation . . . Together with it she has borne both trials and successes. She shall not abandon her people today. She is giving this imminent national struggle her heavenly blessings.  

In exchange for the Church's support of the state, Stalin conceded to the Church a church council on 4 September 1943 to elect Sergii as the new patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. Churches and monasteries were opened, but no social activities such as charity works were permitted by Stalin.

Patriarch Sergii died on 15 May 1944 and was succeeded by Alexis in a church council that convened from 31 January to 2 February 1945. The Church continued in its subordinate position, but relatively free from state control, until Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign of 1959-1964 that closed all churches and monasteries.  

Patriarch Alexis responded to this campaign at the Kremlin Conference of the Soviet Public for Disarmament on 16 February 1960:

Despite its aim of promoting man's well-being, Christ's Church suffers from insults and attacks. Nevertheless, she does not shirk from her duty by appealing to people to live in peace and love. The Church finds consolation in this situation for her faithful: what is the danger of man's reason to the Church? . . . Jesus Christ Himself predicted the Church's indestructibility when he said: "the gates of hell will not prevail over the Church."  

In spite of this protest, Patriarch Alexis ultimately submitted to state control by amending the Church statute on 18 July 1961 so that control of the parishes was removed from the church priest to the parish community.  

Khrushchev's fall from political power resulted in a new state policy toward the Church. Having failed to eradicate the Church in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1960s, the state
appeared to have given up in its attempt. Instead it seemed to settle on just controlling the Russian Orthodox Church through its own Holy Synod, the Council of Religious Affairs. In spite of state attempts to quash dissent within the Church, the underground push for religious freedom continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s but ultimately had little impact upon church-state relations. It would take Mikhail Gorbachev becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to make a fundamental break with the Soviet past.

Gorbachev came to power on the 11 March 1985. Under his tenure, the Russian Orthodox Church, along with other organizations in Soviet society, gradually became liberated. It was even allowed to celebrate its millennium birthday in 1988. Yet at that time it was unclear how church-state relations would evolve under a Gorbachev regime. But the rapid series of events between 1989-1991, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the Soviet Union, made the question moot. The Russian Orthodox Church would no longer face persecution from the state. The symbol of the Soviet Union, of communism, had failed to destroy the Russian Orthodox Church.

10. 3 Democratic Liberalism
(c.1991-c.1999 A.D.)

The collapse of the Soviet Union created an ideological vacuum that soon was filled with the competing symbols of liberalism, nationalism, neo-Stalinist communism, and Russian Orthodoxy. The symbol of liberalism was articulated and pursued in public policy by the Yeltsin administration. In his attempt to forge a new national identity, Yeltsin found himself restricted to western theories of civil society such as that of Ernest Gellner, whose work was popularized in Russia beginning in the late 1980s. The second symbol
that competes for Russian national identity is nationalism as articulated by Vladimir
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party, which borrows the rhetoric, if not precisely the
ideas, of Slavophiles and pan-Slavists like Danilevsky, Ilin, Solovev, and the Eurasiants, all
of whose works were republished in special collections and in newspapers like Rossiiskaya
gazeta. The third symbol of the post-Soviet period is communism, with its main
spokesmen being Zyuganov, head of the Communist Party (CPRF), and Podberezkin,
leader of the think-tank Spiritual Heritage. At times it is difficult to distinguish between
communist and nationalist rhetoric and symbols since both talk about the evil of the West,
the uniqueness and moral superiority of the Slavic people, and Russia’s eventual triumph
over the current ills she confronts. Because the nationalist and the communist symbols
are both ones of gnostic disorder, I will analyze them together as a single set.

These symbols jockey not only for political power but also for Russia’s national
ideology. Revitalized after his reelection as president, Boris Yeltsin created a commission
to give Russia a new national ideology after a history of monarchism, totalitarianism,
perestroika, and infantile democracy. But instead of engendering conditions of rational
debate, the commission served only as a lightning rod for ideological parties to accuse,
blame, and smear one another. Each ideological party blamed the other for Russia’s
current debilitating state. The collective situation, as Michael Urban describes it, is one
where the nation lacks a national identity but still requires one; and all the available
ideologies and symbols talk past one another because there is no common political
discourse. Thus, the adoption of one national ideology would be at the expense of the
others, creating a zero-sum game situation that therefore makes the chance of a single,
national ideology very unlikely to emerge.
The Russian democrats embraced the ideology of western liberalism for the newly independent Russia. Believing that an association with the West was enough to capture the public imagination, Russian democrats spoke of fruits of free-market capitalism and Lockean individualism. But in the wake of social disorientation, economic dislocation, and declining international prestige, the Russian people failed to respond. Simply put, the Russian democrats failed to offer a national purpose beyond individual material self-interest to justify the sacrifices and suffering of the post-communist world. The democrats further compounded their errors by singling out the communist state as the sole culprit for all of society’s ills. Given their high-handed Draconian policies of monetary austerity, the democrats set themselves up to be criticized for insensitivity and get-rich-quick schemes by the communists and nationalists. Thus, it was not surprising, except to themselves, that the democrats not only lost the battle of public discourse but the parliamentary elections of 1994 and 1999.

In response to these electoral loses, the democrats have begun to offer a national ideology that moved beyond western-styled liberalism. The most articulate of these thinkers is Vitalii Naishul, who speaks of a national idea that fuses Russian culture with a free-market ideology. Drawing upon Slavophile literature, Naishul argues for an elected autocrat who appoints an advisory legislature and transforms the multi-national Russian state into a “unified mass common-national culture.” Having been worked out artificially by the intelligentsia, this “unified mass common-national culture” is a mixture of popularized high culture with elements of traditional morality. Once the people have become unified on this cultural basis, Russia can begin to push forward on its path toward democratization by promoting culture, defense, and national order.
The other prominent spokesman for the Russian democrats is Igor Chubais, the elder brother of Anatolii. Like Naishul, Chubais draws upon Russia's past; however, his sources are broader than Naishul's singular reliance upon Slavophism. Surveying all of Russian history (except the communist past), Chubais locates cultural values in their particular contexts as rationales for the state to solve specific economic problems. His national ideology of liberalism is one that absorbs new features of the time to solve particular economic problems and discards old ones once their use is finished. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, Chubais dismisses historical relics that no longer correspond to present economic realities (e.g., sobornost, kollektivnost) and adopts those that are enduring and have some utilitarian value (e.g., the Russian Orthodox Church). The culmination of Chubais's study is a national ideology that contains some elements of the Russian past that are fused with free-market capitalism and political liberalism.

Although they have been able to formulate a national ideology that looks beyond the free-market, the Russian democrats' vision of a civil society suffers from serious problems. The first is the democrats' blanket dismissal of the Russian communist past (e.g., de-nomenklaturization, public confessions of crimes committed). By ignoring the recent past, the democrats expose their partisan political orientation by their articulation of Russian national identity. Furthermore, some Russians look back nostalgically upon the communist past. The impersonality of the free market with its pursuit of individual self-interest can strike one who has been raised in an era of guaranteed employment and social benefits as cold, calculating, and deceitful; or, to quote President Putin, "anyone who doesn't regret the passing of the Soviet Union has no heart." Rightly or wrongly, the
communist legacy continues to retain emotional and symbolic power for Russians, not all of which is negative.

Another problem encountering the democrats is the abstract nature of their national ideology. By relying upon too many resources – public institutions, private societies, state agencies, collective communes – the Russian democrats create an empty abstraction of procedural liberalism that neither can be realized nor concretely practiced. The disconnect between a theoretical construct and tangible reality can lead to alienation, angst, and finally to a complete rejection of the national ideology. Preoccupied with putting food on the table, the typical Russian citizen does not possess the time to support an academic theory that has no bearing on his life; rather, he recognizes the economic, social, and political chaos that exist, dimensions of reality that are pointed out and accentuated by the liberals' counterparts, the nationalists and the communists.

A third difficulty of the liberal national ideology is its reductionism. Chubais's national ideology of free-market capitalism merged with enduring Russian cultural values is a case in point. According to Chubais, the purpose of culture is not to promote the moral, spiritual, or aesthetic qualities of the individual but to help the state resolve particular economic problems: man is seen as no more than a Lockean archetype of material self-interest. But clearly, man lives on more than bread alone since he is a physical, moral, and spiritual creature. The failure to address these aspects of human nature by the democrats makes them susceptible to charges of shallowness and self-interest, charges that the communists and nationalists exploit.

Finally, the Russian democrat's conception of civil society is self-contradictory. As western liberals, Chubais conceives of civil society as a body that stands in
contradistinction to the state. However, it is only the state that could implement a national ideology of liberalism. Chubais's reply to this situation, like that of other democrats, is ambivalent at best and self-effacing at worst. How a civil society can be created by and yet remain separate from the state is a question that Russian democrats have left unanswered.

10.4 Gnostic Symbols
(c.1991-c.1999 A.D.)

In their opposition to the democrats, the communists and the nationalists essentially share the same vision of society: a pan-Slavic state that nostalgically looks back to the communist past in order to promote present nationalist sentiment. Given their similar outlook, I will analyze the rhetoric of both the nationalists and communists together. I will focus for the most part on the communist party, since it is a substantial party in parliament and has absorbed nationalist parties (e.g., the Bloc of Public and Patriotic Movement of Russia). The subject of this analysis therefore is limited to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), led by Gennadii Zyuganov and its think-tank, Spiritual Heritage, with its two most influential spokesmen Alexis Podberezkin and Viktor Aksychits.

The CPRF's national ideology is a strange hybrid of Marxist-Leninism and Russian nationalism. Claiming that Russia possesses a unique place in the world because of its moral superiority, Zyuganov and Podberezkin blame the current crisis on Russia's external and internal enemies. However, Russia eventually will defeat her enemies once she recognizes her moral superiority as demonstrated in the past. Zyuganov and Podberezkin refer to the communist period as one that began with weakness under Lenin but ultimately

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achieved greatness under Stalin’s leadership. When Russians begin to realize their inner, spiritual potential, they will create a superior civilization rooted in patriotism, religion, and a strong state. The task of the CPRF is to create a concrete state doctrine based upon these ideological beliefs. This new state-nationalist ideology will propel the CPRF into power, the end result being Russian recovery and salvation.

Whereas the Russian democrats have failed, Zyuganov and Podberezkin have succeeded in tapping into the Russian national psyche with their vision of a pan-Slavic civil society. By resurrecting symbols from the past – the Russian Orthodox Church, the Communist Red Flag – the CPRF is able to present to the Russian populace a concrete articulation of their national ideology. In contrast, the Russian democrats can propose only abstractions: the shelling of the White House in October of 1993 and the construction of a multistory shopping mall underneath Manezh Square erased two concrete symbols of liberalism. Other attempts have been met with contempt and ridicule: the Church of Christ the Savior, the statue of Peter the Great, and the new holiday of National Reconciliation and Accord. The failures of the Russian democrats to offer any concrete symbol of liberalism only reinforce Zyuganov’s and Podberezkin’s claim that the external enemies in the West and their dupes, the Russian democrats, are responsible for Russia’s spiritual and patriotic malaise. Trapped in a corner, the Russian democrats were forced to coopt some of the CPRF’s rhetoric as well as accept some of their people in the government.

The CPRF’s capitulation to positions of power as offered by the Yeltsin administration makes it difficult to determine whether the CPRF’s vision of a pan-Slavic society should be taken seriously. For example, both Akychits and Podberezkin sought positions in the government after they had criticized it. This discrepancy between action
and rhetoric has led to an explosion of parties that speak in the same vein as the CPRF’s national ideology (e.g., the Russian All-People’s Union, the Russian Communist Worker’s Party). The struggle for authentic opposition to the government accelerated when the CPRF was coopted by the Russian democrats in the “historic compromise” on several key issues. In defense of its sudden willingness to compromise, the CPRF claimed that cooperation was a necessary but only temporary stage in the Hegelian scheme of things. The revolution would ultimately succeed in the final stages of history.

If we are to take the CPRF at its word, then it is clear that the society they envision is pan-Slavic with some slight modifications. Instead of the state transformed into a church, the church would be transformed into the state with its quasi-religion of Orthodoxy, Russian nationalism, and neo-Stalinist communism. The CPRF’s response seems to indicate that at least some of its members believe in Podberezkin’s defense of its “historic compromises.” The members of the CPRF who are in the government serve only individuals rather than the regime itself or any ideology of liberalism. It is likely that these individuals speak of nationalism and neo-communism as rationales to obtain power; but it is equally likely that they actually believe what they say.

10.5 Russian Orthodoxy
(c.1991-c.1999 A.D.)

In the post-Soviet period, the Church had become legally independent of the state, though the state did support the Church indirectly. This new arrangement did not bode well for the Russian Church as it faced spiritual competition from Protestants, Catholics, Uniates, and cultists. In response to this deluge of religious revival and spiritual evangelicalism, the Russian Orthodox Church called upon the state for protection. In
September 1997 the Russian Orthodox Church was proclaimed de facto the state religion of the newly independent Russia. After seventy years of communist suppression, the Russian Orthodox Church and the newly-established Russian state seemed to have reestablished the Byzantine arrangement of symphonia between themselves.

The most striking and controversial return to symphonia was the September 1997 law of "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations." Earlier in July Yeltsin had vetoed the On Freedom of Conscience legislation after it was adopted by the Duma and approved by the Federation Council. Yeltsin cited violations of human rights as guaranteed by the Russian Constitution and Russia's international agreements as the reasons why he vetoed the legislation. In response, the law's chief architect, Viktor Zorkaltsev of the Communist Party, suggested that Yeltsin was a pawn of the U.S. Congress, and Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov, a member of the CPRF, warned of the Duma overriding Yeltsin's veto.

From the communist viewpoint, the Russian Orthodox Church fitted into their ideology of Russian nationalism and neo-Stalinist communism. The Russian Church, however, was more ambivalent about entering into an alliance with the CPRF: its main concern was spiritual competition from abroad (e.g., Protestant missionaries and the Roman Catholic Church) and within (e.g., the rise of cults). The Russian people themselves were split over the issue, with 49% supporting Yeltsin, 27% supporting the CPRF, and 14% undecided.

Yeltsin changed his position after a meeting with Patriarch Alexis II in August. The "On Freedom of Conscience" legislation was amended by both the CPRF and Russian democrats. What emerged surprised most western analysts: the new legislation did not
differ very much from the original draft. The preamble refers to the state's "respect" for different faiths other than Russian Orthodoxy, but the Russian Church still has a "special role" in the life of the state. More critical to observers' eyes is the untouched article that called for mandatory, yearly re-registration of religious associations following their formation and stipulated that those organizations that do not re-register can be dissolved by the courts. To the disappointment of liberals and to the delight to communists, President Yeltsin signed the "On Freedom of Conscience" legislation into law in September of 1997.

It still is not clear why Yeltsin capitulated to the demands of communists, nationalists, and the Russian Orthodox Church. On the one hand, Yeltsin may have been unwilling to take the political risk of opposing such a popular institution as the Russian Orthodox Church. On the other hand, he may have recognized that the Church could assist in providing legitimacy to his political regime and his national ideology of liberalism. In either case, it is unclear what type of arrangement between church and state Yeltsin envisioned for the future. Like most prominent liberals, Yeltsin was unable to portray a national picture for his countrymen other than an unrestrained free-market with limited political liberties and a free and invasive press.

Although he supported the "On Freedom of Conscience" law, Patriarch Alexis II has explicitly rejected an official state church. The purpose of the Church is to attend the spiritual and moral welfare of its flock; it is not to be an agency of the state. Patriarch Alexis II's rejection, however, does not necessarily translate into a separation between church and state. The church and state can cooperate with one another as long as each does not interfere with the other's sphere of autonomy. The state can support the church
as long as it does not intervene in the spiritual and moral welfare of the Russian people. Likewise, the church can support the state when the Patriarch deems it to be in the best interest of the country (e.g., support of Russia's war in Chechnya).

This vision of Patriarch Alexis II is a return to symphonia where both the church and state collaborate with one another in the creation of a national ideology that is an alternative to Russian nationalism, neo-Stalinist communism, and western-styled liberalism. The Russian Orthodox Church's support of the 1997 "On the Freedom of Conscience" law was not an attempt to transform the state into a church. There is no evidence that the Church directly participated in the politics of the Russian state, e.g., the formation of a clerical political party. Instead, the Russian Orthodox Church appeared to be working toward a restoration of the Byzantine symphonia ideal where the state enforces the church's doctrine, dogma, and canon law, with the state refraining from the formulation of the church's theology.

The problem with the paradigm of symphonia is twofold: 1) the conception that the leader of the state is not an agent of God but a democratically-elected representative of the people; and 2) the Russian Orthodox Church does not technically enjoy the status of the official state religion. The principles of symphonia can only work if the president is not only a baptized Orthodox Christian but understands himself as a servant of God; otherwise, the Church lacks recourse to admonish the president. Patriarch Alexis II may conceive of himself operating within this theory of symphonic society, but this theory does not correspond with the current political reality of post-communist Russia. Because of this paradigm which it operates, the Russian Orthodox Church cannot be seen as an institution that supports a democratic society.
This paradigm of symphonia was examined recently by the Russian Orthodox Church in its Bishops' Council in 2000:

The Orthodox tradition has developed an explicit ideal of church-state relations. Since church-state relations are two-way traffic, the above-mentioned ideal could emerge in history only in a state that recognizes the Orthodox Church as the greatest people's shrine, in other words, only in an Orthodox state... In their totality these principles were described as symphony between church and state. It is essentially cooperation, mutual support and mutual responsibility without one's side intruding into the exclusive domain of the other. The bishop obeys the government as a subject, not because his episcopal power comes from a government official. Similarly, a government official obeys his bishop as a member of the Church, who seeks salvation in it, not because his power comes from the power of the bishop. The state in such symphonic relationships with the Church seeks her spiritual support, prayer for itself and blessing upon its work to achieve the goal of its citizens' welfare, while the Church enjoys support from the state in creating conditions favorable for preaching and for the spiritual care of her children who are at the same time citizens of the state.74

While recognizing that in modern society the paradigm is no longer operable, the Russian Orthodox Church nonetheless does not see pluralism as the ideal basis for a new social order:

The emergence of this principle testifies that in the contemporary world, religion is turning from a social into a private affair of a person. This process in itself indicates that the spiritual value system has disintegrated and that most people in a society which affirms the freedom of conscience no longer aspire for salvation. If initially the state emerged as an instrument of asserting divine law in society, the freedom of conscience has ultimately turned the state in an exclusively temporal institute with no religious commitments.

The adoption of the freedom of conscience as legal principle points to the fact that society has lost religious goals and values and become massively apostate and actually indifferent to the task of the Church and to the overcoming of sin. However, this principle has proved to be one of the means of the Church's existence in the non-religious world, enabling her to enjoy a legal status in secular state and independence from those in society who believe differently or do not believe at all.75
By its own understanding, the Russian Orthodox Church is neither a nationalist institution nor a Gnostic political symbol. It is a symbol of right order. Although other political parties may usurp the Russian Orthodox Church for their own ideological ends, e.g., the CPRF, the Russian Orthodox Church does not conceive of itself as a political entity; rather, it sees itself strictly as a religious body that requires the state to ensure its supremacy within the religious sphere of Russian society. It conceives of itself as reestablishing a society of symphonia. The problem with this attempt is that the paradigm no longer corresponds with current political reality. In short, the Russian Orthodox Church is neither nationalist nor pro-democratic. It is stuck in its own past.

10.6 Rebuilding Russia

In addition to its commitment to the symphonic arrangement between church and state, the Russian Orthodox Church has also been compromised as a symbol of integrity and resistance against the Soviet regime with the recent accusations that some Orthodox priests acted as KGB informants during the Soviet period. Even Patriarch Alexis II has been charged of collaborating with the KGB, charges that were to some degree substantiated in 1991 by Father Gleb Yakunin, a dissent priest and a member of the Congress of People's Deputies who had gained access to KGB files.76

On 4 January 1994 Yakunin charged that important members in the church hierarchy had worked as KGB agents and that the Church had a secret fund that it extorted from its parishes. He called upon the church leaders to repent and later warned against the Russian Orthodox Church entering into an alliance with the communists and Liberal Democrats.77 The Russian Orthodox Church therefore has fared badly as a symbol of right order in the post-Soviet era. The 1997 "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Association" law and the accusations that members of the Church had worked for the KGB in the eyes of some have transformed the Church from a persecuted victim to an intimidating aggressor.78

With the Russian Orthodox Church tainted and democratic liberalism discredited, the gnostic symbols of Russian nationalism and neo-Stalinist communism appear all the more appealing to the Russian populace. The one person who has articulated a vision of right order and who has been able to retain his integrity is Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Unfortunately, his views are more respected in the West than in his own country. Despite this neglect by his own people, a brief look at Solzhenitsyn's plan to "rebuild Russia" is worth examining as an alternative vision of order for Russian society.

Solzhenitsyn is committed to a democratic regime, recognizing that a return to a tsarist monarchy is not feasible in this day and age.79 Drawing from the works of the Russian philosopher Sergei Levitsky, Solzhenitsyn argues that the essence of democracy is individual freedom and a government of laws, the latter of which derives its authority from a parliamentary system or universal suffrage.10 However, respect for individual freedom, i.e., human rights, is subordinate to national interests; and a government of laws is one that limits the state's role in society instead of expanding it.41 Democracy therefore is the imbued with a notion of the common good, specifically with a sense of a Christian responsibility and self-discipline for the individual as well as for the state.42 This idea of the common good does not necessarily mean that the state would have to promote it: private individuals and organizations can act for the common good without governmental interference.
In short, Solzhenitsyn's vision of Russia is a moral one. The individual as well as the state should act on the principle of self-limitation: to act for the common good of society. Unfortunately, this vision did not take root among the Russian populace. Instead, the symbols of Russian nationalism, neo-Stalinist communism, Russian Orthodoxy, and amoral democratic liberalism have dominated the political discourse of the 1990s.

Hence, the question still remains: how to rebuild Russia? Obviously, a number of answers to this problem exist, four of which we have briefly examined here: democratic liberalism, gnosticism, Russian Orthodoxy, and a moral democratic regime. Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to speculate which one will ultimately emerge as the symbol of order for post-Soviet Russia, the study does suggest that Russian Orthodoxy may be the best one. Gnostic symbols, nationalism and communism, are ones of disorder; and Solzhenitsyn's vision of a moral democratic regime has failed to capture the public's imagination. Consequently, in spite of its deficiencies, Russian Orthodoxy may be the best available symbol of right order for post-Russia.

10.7 Conclusion

The re-emergence of the Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of right order occurred right before the Revolution of 1917. The Church elites restored the Patriarchal Church as an independent body from the state by invoking the principle of sobornost. Unfortunately for the Church, it could not compete successfully with the symbol of communism. The Russian Orthodox Church tried to resist Soviet persecution but ultimately was unsuccessful. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, could the Russian Orthodox Church re-emerge effectively as a symbol of right order.
In the post-Soviet period, the Russian Orthodox Church competed with many other symbols of order. Like the symbol of democratic liberalism, the Russian Orthodox Church is confronted with an array of problems that its leadership is not sure how to solve, e.g., a tainted past and the possibility of a symphonic arrangement in the modern world. The Church also must compete with symbols of disorder like neo-Stalinist communism and Russian nationalism. The Church's prospects for success as the sole symbol of right order will be briefly discussed in the last chapter.

10.8 End Notes

1. There is a great debate about the nature and motive for the restoration of the patriarchate. For example, J. S. Curtiss argues that the Church restored the patriarchate because of its innate conservatism, while Roman Rössler contends that the Church was reacting against social and political threats against it. Igor Smolitsch points out that the provisional government accepted unwillingly the separation between church and state and the Bolsheviks opposed it. A. V. Kartashev argues that the leftists on the council wanted a restored patriarchate while the right did not. Catherine Evtuhov contends that the restored patriarchate was the culmination of an ecclesiastical debate about sobornost: the principle for collective social action. Finally, Soviet scholars argue that the Church was unable to adapt to revolutionary developments. J. S. Curtiss, "The Russian Orthodox Church and the Provisional Government," American Slavic and East European Review 7 (October 1948): 237-50; Rössler, Roman, Kirche und Revolution in Russland: Patriarch Tichon und der Sowjetstaat (Cologne: Böhlau, 1969); Igor Smolitsch, "Die russische Kirche in der Revolutionszeit vom März bis Oktober 1917 und das Landeskonzil 1917 bis 1918 (zur Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Kirche in Russland)," Ostrikchliche Studien (Würzburg) 14 (1965): 3-34; A. V. Kartashev, "Vremennoe pravitel'stvo i russkaia Tserkov," Sovremennye Zapiski (Paris), no. 52 (1933); Catherine Evtuhov, "The Church in the Russian Revolution: Arguments for and against Restoring the Patriarchate at the Church Council of 1917-1918," Slavic Review 50 (Fall 1991): 497-511; and Preobrazhensky, Alexander, ed. The Russian Orthodox Church 10th to 20th Centuries (Moscow: Progress, 1988).

2. Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv SSSR (Leningrad), f. 838, op. 1, d. 38, ll. 143-173 (hereafter TsGIA SSSR). Vasil'ev and others continue this argument by invoking the analogy of society as a body and a soul. The body submits to the soul for authority. Since the soul requires a leader, the restoration of the patriarchate is required.

3. Archimandrite Ioann. Opyt kursa tserkovnogo zakonovedeniia (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Fishera, 1851), 177. The rules of the Apostles are the oldest part of canon law
for both the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches and regulate the sacraments, the liturgy, ecclesiastical law, etc.

4. *Sviashchennyi sobor pravoslavnoi rossiiskoi tserkvi Deianiia* (Moscow, 1918), session 29, 23 October 1917, book 2, issue 2, 378 (hereafter *SSPR*).


7. *Ibid*.


10. *SSPR*, session 27, 19 October 1917, book 2, issue 2, 304


16. The Renovationist Church failed because 1) they were seen as colluding with the atheist regime, whereas the Patriarch Church initially resisted the Soviet regime; and 2) their persecution of bishops and priests of the Patriarch Church (*Ibid.*, 67-68). For information about the Ukrainian schism, please refer to *Ibid.*, 70-92; the churches in exile, refer to *Ibid.*, 113-62, 255-300; the Underground Church, refer to *Ibid.* 179-82; and for more about the schism on the right, the "Black Hundred" activists who favor corporatism, fascism, and anti-Semitism, please refer to *Ibid.*, 52-57.


23. Ibid., 105-12.

24. Russkaya pravoslavnaya tserkov i velikaya otechestvennaya voina (Moscow, 1943) 3-5.


26. Ibid., 209, 327-34

27. Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriakhii, no. 3 (1960), 33-5.

28. Ibid., no. 4 (1960): 50-3

29. Ellis, Jane. The Russian Orthodox Church, A Contemporary History (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 281-84.

30. Please details, please refer to Ibid., 290-447.


33. I will restrict my analysis only to the national ideologies and symbols of liberalism and communism since communism and nationalism are two different articulations of essentially the same kind of phenomenon, gnosticism; consequently, I will not examine the symbol and ideology of Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party. Please refer to Maslin, M.A., ed. Russkaya ideya (Moscow: 1992); Polyakov, L. V. Kak Rossiya nas obustraivaet (Moscow: 1996), 147-148; Rossilskaia gazeta. (Moscow) 10 September 1993; Vera Tolz, "Forging the Nation," Europe-Asia Studies 50: 1011.


42. Chubais, Igor. *Ot Russkoi idei – k idee Novoi Rossii* (Moscow: GITIS, 1996); also refer to his interview in *Knizhnoe obozrenie Knizhnoe obozrenie* (Moscow) 8 July 8, 1997.


45. Quoted in the *New York Times*. Michael Wines, "Putin Retains Soviet Discipline While Steering Towards Reform," *New York Times*, 20 February 2000. The full quote is as follows: "Anyone who doesn't regret the passing of the Soviet Union has no heart; anyone who wants it restored has no brains."


53. Pushai is quoted in Podberezkin’s Russkii put (Moscow: Dukhovnoe nasledie, 1996), 36; also see Zyuganov, G. A. Rossiya – rodina moya (Moscow: Informpechat, 1996), 218.


58. For more information about the Russian All-People’s Union, refer to Za edinuyu velikuyu Rossiyu: istoriya rossiskogo obshchenarodnogo soyuza v dokumentakh (Moscow, Novator, 1995); for information about the Russian Communists Workers’ Party, refer to Yevgenii Krasnikov, “Left Opposition Has Started to Crumbled,” Moscow News, December 1996.

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67. Yelena Tregubova, "Communists are Insulted by the President’s Veto of a Law Establishing a Monopoly for the Orthodox Church," *Kommersant-Daily*, 24 July 1997.


CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION

11.1 Evaluations and Speculations

This dissertation has examined whether the experiences of the Russian Orthodox Church's elites are ones of right order. By focusing on the structures of consciousness of Church elites, the dissertation explores whether the experiences of Church elites express themselves in symbols of order or disorder. The conclusion it reaches is that the Russian Orthodox Church has been a symbol of right order for most of its history. With a few exceptions, the Russian Orthodox Church elites have displayed a "balance of consciousness" in their participation with the divine. These experiences of right order in turn have been expressed in the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The introduction of Christianity to pagan Russia came in the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church and its paradigm of symphonia. Over time, the Russian Orthodox Church displaced the cosmological symbols of paganism as the sole symbol of right order. The Church leadership never sought to dominate the state: metropolitans usually refrained from secular affairs. The Grand Princes also accepted the symphonic paradigm in the organization of Russia. Thus, both the Kievan Rus elites of the church and of the state understood the Russian Orthodox Church to be a symbol of right order.

The collapse of Kievan Rus moved the symbols of symphonia – the Russian Orthodox Church and the Grand Prince – to Moscow. Coinciding with this transfer was the growing tension between the Churches of Moscow and Constantinople over the Councils of Ferrara and Florence. The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church and of the Muscovite state saw Constantinople as falling into heresy; consequently, they believed themselves to be the true heirs of soteriological truth. The Russian Orthodox Church's
drive toward autocephalous status, therefore, should be understood as an attempt to become the sole interpreter of soteriological truth.

The symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church as one of right order was partly diminished over its debate about the role of property in Church life under the reigns of Ivan III and Ivan IV; and it became completely derailed under the reigns of Patriarchs Philaret and Nikon with their symbol of Velikii Gossudar. However, after Philaret's and Nikon's governances, Church elites sought to cooperate rather than to dominate the state. The symphonic relation between church and state had been restored, and the Russian Orthodox Church had regained its status as a symbol of right order.

Instead of the Church, state elites sought to disrupt the arrangements of symphonia. The secular symbols of disorder, beginning with the tsar and ending with the Holy Synod, successfully displaced and later destroyed the Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of right order. The state elites also appropriated the symbols of Moscow as the Third Rome and the Universal Church for their own Gnostic ends. The symbols of the tsar, the Oprichnina, the Monastyriskii Prikaz, and the Holy Synod all were ones of disorder because they either tried to realize the divine in temporality or truncated the divine from reality.

The Petrine vision of westernization replaced the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church with the symbol of the Holy Synod. The secular policy to subordinate and to secularize the Russian Orthodox Church destroyed the symbol of the Church as of one right order. The symbol of the Church and the paradigm of symphonia had become lost. The soteriological experiences of right order remained submerged under the secular symbols of disorder.
The symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church resurfaces as a symbol of right order immediately after the Revolution of 1917. But once the communists came into power, the Russian Orthodox Church became subjected to state persecution. The Russian Orthodox Church elites tried to resist the Soviet regime but ultimately were unsuccessful. It was only the collapse of the Soviet regime itself when the Russian Orthodox Church could reemerge as a symbol of right order.

In post-Soviet Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church competed with other symbols of order. Its competitors were the gnostic symbols of neo-Stalinist communism and Russian nationalism and the symbols of right order of Solzhenitsyn and of democratic liberals. Unfortunately, the symbols of democracy appealed to no one, except for a few elites, in Russia. By default, the Russian Orthodox Church is the best available symbol of right order. Although it suffers from a tainted past and a symphonic paradigm that may be outdated, the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church is the only one that contains the experiences of soteriological truth that appeals to people in contemporary Russia.

In spite of the passage of the 1997 "On Freedom of Conscience" law which makes the Russian Orthodox Church the de facto state religion, the leadership of the Church seems willing to make concessions to current political reality in order to make the Church the symbol of right order in the context of a liberal regime that values pluralism. Instead of imposing a single symbol of right order upon an entire population, the Russian Orthodox Church seems willing to be the leading symbol of order among a variety of symbols such as democratic liberalism or Islam. While recognizing the diversity within Russia, the Church still maintains its privileged position as potentially the most prominent symbol of right order.
The Church is well-positioned to emerge in this role. Almost 72% of all Russian citizens (rossiane) describe themselves as Orthodox, with 92% of all Russians describing themselves as "believers" in God and 51% who declared themselves Orthodox. Even though most Russians are not practicing Orthodox believers, there exists the expectation that Orthodox values and identity will be the norms for Russian society. The establishment of the "Inter-Religious Council of Russia" in December 1998, which comprised Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and Jewish representatives, indicates a step in this direction. The Council announced that all members of the religious community have shared values, if not the same faith. This view was reflected in the "Final Document" that was promulgated by the Interreligious Peace Forum, which met 13-14 November 2000:

Overcoming enmity in the world and rejecting interreligious conflicts can be achieved primarily through dialogue, mutual understanding and cooperation in actions that are beneficial to the individual, society, and state. We testify that followers of traditional religions in our country are fully determined to support fellowship and cooperation. We are moved to this by the tradition of a centuries-long peaceful coexistence among the adherents of Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism in the space where we live today.

The Russian Orthodox Church does not deny the possibility that soteriological truth may exist with other symbols of right order, whether they be Islamic, Jewish, or Buddhist. By being able to appeal to a sizeable sector of the population, without becoming intolerant of other religions, the Russian Orthodox Church seems to be the best available symbol of right order for post-Soviet Russia. All other symbols of order are either gnostic or fail to inspire public confidence. For better or worse, the Russian Orthodox Church is the best symbol of right order for post-Soviet Russia.
11.2 Prospects and Questions

Like all studies, there are some questions that linger unanswered. These questions will only be asked here, since this study has focused on the single question whether the Russian Orthodox Church is a symbol of right order.

The first and most important question is why has the Russian Orthodox Church failed to displace the secular symbols of disorder when it had done so successfully in the pre-Petrine period. Is it the case that the symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church had become hypostatized; or are symbols of order inherently fragile and impossible to sustain in an ever-changing social, economic, cultural, and political climate? A deeper philosophical exploration into the nature of symbols of order and disorder, particularly those of the state, is required in order to answer this question.

The second and more relevant question is the prospect of the Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of order in the post-Soviet period. The possibility of returning to symphonia seems unrealistic; however, a "pluralist model" may be possible, as recent actions by the Russian Orthodox Church leadership seem to suggest. Essentially this model argues that some religions in Russia would be respected – Orthodoxy, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, and some sects of Christianity – in regions where these religions had been traditionally predominant. However, Russian Orthodoxy would still be given primacy as the symbol of Russian national identity. Whether this pluralist model collapses into Russian nationalism or is a re-articulation of a symbol of right order remains to be seen in the coming years of Putin's presidency.

The third question that remains unanswered is the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the various Orthodox sects and monasteries in Russia. Although
this study restricted itself to the leadership of the Patriarchal Church of Moscow, a more comprehensive account of all the Orthodox symbols – the Uniate Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Orthodox monasteries – may help explain the nature of the Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of right order and tell why it has been not able to resist the post-Petrine symbols of disorder. The study of secular symbols as well as Orthodox ones may help us answer the question of order and disorder in Russia.

Finally, an examination of other theories of symbolization and representation would enhance this study of the Russian Orthodox Church. Although Eric Voegelin's "new science" of politics is able to point out aspects of political reality that are often neglected in political science, he is not the only one to have devised a philosophy of symbolization and representation. In fact, the incorporation of the works of other philosophies of symbolization – such as those of Albert Camus, Ernst Cassirer, and Paul Ricoeur – may help us address the above and unanswered questions.⁵

This study has only scratched the surface of the symbols of order and disorder in Russian history. By focusing on only one symbol, the Russian Orthodox Church, it has been able to discover that the Russian Church is a symbol of right order and that Voegelin's "new science" of politics provides a successful way to understand political reality. A study that examines all the symbols of order and disorder in Russia is the next logical step.

11.3 End Notes


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Date of Examination:

June 12, 2001