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Prejudice and The New Latino Migration: The Geographic Locus of Anti-Latino Sentiment

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PREJUDICE AND THE NEW LATINO MIGRATION: THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCUS OF
ANTI-LATINO SENTIMENT

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
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requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

in

The Department of Sociology

By
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ABSTRACT

A large body of literature on the relationship between prejudice and discrimination and the size of minority populations suggests that as a minority population increases so will incidents of prejudice and/or discrimination. This school of thought is led by Hubert Blalock who contends that large minority populations generate prejudice among the majority, who view the minority as a threat to their economic and/or political standing. Minority population size has been tested and widely confirmed as a cause of anti-black prejudice and discrimination. But the corresponding research for Latinos has generally produced inconsistent and largely inconclusive findings. The reason for this confusion, according to this thesis, is that prior research has not accounted for a major turning point in the migration of Latinos. It is my contention that there are, in fact, two distinct Latino communities. One resides in the old and well-established immigrant communities that have been the destination of Latino migrants throughout the 20th century. But in recent years, Latino migrants settled in new destinations, in far-flung places, some very remote and generally lacking the social control benefits of old and well-established Latino enclaves. Thus, the link between anti-Latino sentiment and population size is more complex than previously considered. As such, my research produces four interrelated findings: 1) There is a positive relationship between percent change in the population of Latinos and resentment toward them among non-Latinos. 2) This effect exists in new Latino destinations, but not in old destinations. 3) The arrival of Latinos generates a broader resentment, not just toward Latinos specifically, but toward other minorities as well. These findings confirm the first three hypotheses. But the fourth finding does not support the final hypothesis. Specifically, my results do not confirm that anti-minority sentiment (in this case, toward Latinos) are rooted in competition over jobs. There is no significant link between the relative size of the low-skill labor market and anti-Latino prejudice. There are several implications of these findings.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Intergroup relations and racial/ethnic tension has been of interest to sociologists for some time. Extant studies generally find that the proportionate size of the minority population is positively related to prejudice (Pettigrew 1959; Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1986; Blalock 1967) and to income inequality (Blalock 1956 & 1957), school segregation (Pettigrew 1957; Harris 1968; Robey 1970), employment inequalities (Frisbie & Neidert 1977; Fosset & Kiecolt 1989; Cassirer 1996; Cohen 1998), discrimination in housing (Farley et al. 1978; Clark 1991; Bobo, Schuman & Steeh 1986), political inequality (Giles & Buckner 1993; Corzine, Creech, & Corzine 1983; Black & Black 1987;), and even violent acts towards minority members. (Reed 1972; Levine & Campbell 1972).

According to Blalock, the link between the minority population and prejudice and discrimination has its basis in the perceived threats that minorities pose to the economic interests and political power of the dominant group. This threat intensifies as the size of the minority group increases. The bulk of the research evidence comes from studies linking black population size to anti-black sentiment among the rest of the population. These studies generally support the view that a large minority population is perceived as a threat to the interests of the majority, who then feel prejudice and engage in discrimination in order to protect their interests. In short, the larger the minority, the greater the prejudice directed against them.

Majority sentiment may be especially relevant today given that Latinos are now the nation's largest minority, accounting for approximately 12.5% of the U.S. population (U.S. Census 2000 Brief), up by 57.9% from 1990 (Census Bureau 2000). However, the evidence that a large Latino population generates anti-Latino sentiment is mixed. Some scholars claim no link

(Lieberson 1980; Massey & Denton 1993; Taylor 1998; Dixon & Rosenbaum 2004) while others claim there is evidence of an association similar to that found in the black-non-black research (Espenshade & Hempstead 1996; Quillian 1995).

This mix of contradictory findings regarding the causes of anti-Latino prejudice may be because the extant research overlooks an important change in the migration history of Latinos. Traditionally, Latinos settled mainly in two border states, Texas and California, and in one Midwestern state, Illinois (Massey and Capoferro 2009). Gradually, these traditional destinations flourished into rich immigrant communities in which Spanish was widely spoken. New arrivals were greeted with a culturally familiar setting, surrounded either by fellow-Latinos, or by non-Latinos who, to varying degrees, were reconciled to the area's ethnic diversity. But starting in the mid-1990s, Latino migrants headed en masse to new destinations, including the Old South, the Midwest, and the upper states on both the East and West coast (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 2005). Indeed, hundreds of counties would have experienced a population decline were it not for the influx of Latino migrants (Lichter and Johnson 2006). This abrupt change perhaps jolted the local residents who heretofore had little or no contact with Latinos. It may have been viewed by locals as a threat to the local way of life and signaled a new wave of competition for low skill jobs (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a). In other words, new Latino migrants are settling in very different places from those of their predecessors. Thus, there may be systematic regional differences in anti-Latino sentiment. More importantly, these regional differences may suggest that anti-Latino sentiment is linked not just to the presence of Latinos, nor to the mere fact of Latino migration – as prior research suggests – but to the *types* of communities in which migrants are settling.

Using Census data as well as restricted files from the General Social Survey (GSS) for 1990 and 2000, this thesis examines whether population growth among Latinos is linked to the negative feelings towards them. The backdrop for the analysis is the national-level shift in Latino immigration and how this shift explains the potential regional differences in anti-Latino sentiment. The applicability of Blalock's framework to this problem will also be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Previous hypotheses by group conflict theorists propose that prejudice and discrimination, in the form of anti-black sentiment and violent actions, against minorities will occur more often when there are large numbers of minorities (Levine & Campbell 1972; Bobo 1988). The causal mechanism for this link, according to Blalock's (1967) "power-threat" hypothesis, (see also Tolnay, Beck & Massey 1989) asserts that as a minority population increases, the majority will perceive this as a threat to their socioeconomic and political interests. As a result, the majority will begin to view the minority negatively, which may find expression in discriminatory behavior. According to the power-threat hypothesis, prejudice among majority members is especially intense when economic resources are scarce and there is competition between majority and minority groups – leading to claims that "minorities are taking our jobs". For instance, negative attitudes among whites towards blacks would rise when more blacks enter the labor force, leading whites to perceive this as a threat to their economic interests. The same notion applies to political interests as well: As blacks make inroads in political and/or legal arenas, whites, according to this perspective, may fear a loss in their own political influence.

Blalock's power-threat hypothesis has also been described as the visibility-discrimination hypothesis in which an increase in a minority population provokes an increase in the hostile collective reaction among the majority. But regardless of the label, the idea is the same; prejudice and/or discrimination by the majority will occur if they perceive a threat to their social, political, or economic well-being as a result of an increase in minority population.

Black-White Relations

Tests of Blalock's theory confirm that black-white relations in the United States are in part driven by a power-threat dynamic. In real-world terms, larger black populations (percent black) are linked to white prejudice, and to negative practices such as school segregation, housing discrimination, employment and wage discrimination, political support for anti-black politicians, and even violence against blacks. For instance, anti-black prejudice among Southern whites is positively related to the size of the black population (Pettigrew 1959; Giles 1977). In particular, white racial policy towards blacks becomes more negative as the proportion of blacks within a county increases (Giles and Evans 1986), but the tipping point of white prejudice seems to occur when blacks reach at least 40% of the county's population, at which point the perceived threat prompts whites to socially distance themselves from blacks through discriminatory actions such as intimidation, harassment, or other extreme measures intended to rid their neighborhoods of blacks (Green, Strolovich, & Wong 1998). Blalock (1967) also predicts that the increased perception of threat of blacks towards whites will lead to discrimination of blacks through the denial of social concerns. Fosset & Kiecolt (1989) find that as the proportion of blacks in an area increased, whites felt increasingly threatened, which in turn reduced their support for racial integration. The authors also argued that percent black is likely to increase inequalities in both educational attainment and the quality of education. Fossett and Kiecolt also emphasized that whites' negative response to black numbers exists in both Southern and non-Southern regions of the United States. Extending this work, Quillian (1995) combines survey and macro-population data in a multi-level analysis to demonstrate the importance of how perceived group threat can result in the formation of prejudicial attitudes among majority members towards a minority. Specifically, Quillian also finds that a rise in black-white contact is associated with anti-black

attitudes across time and region and that “the relative size of the subordinate group and the economic situation of the particular country can strongly influence the degree of prejudice expressed by dominant group members” (Quillian 1995:606). Likewise, Taylor (1998) also finds that whites increasingly perceive blacks as an economic threat as the relative size of their population increases. In short, the evidence confirms that whites see large black populations as a threat to their relative power, and that perception can further lead to discriminatory actions.

Income Inequality

An early indicator of discriminatory behavior against blacks is income inequality. Using 1950's Census with a sample of 88 S.M.S.A.'s Blalock (1956) found a positive relationship between percent black and white/black income differentials, though the strength of this finding was rendered statistically insignificant due to simultaneous controls for region, white income, and percent employed in the manufacturing industry. However, in a follow-up study for Southern counties, Blalock (1957) found a significant link between percent non-white and income inequality. The study also links the size of the non-white population to racial inequalities in housing, income, and educational attainment.

School Segregation

School segregation has long been used as an indicator of discrimination. Pettigrew (1957) finds that enduring school segregation was most common in states where there was a large black population. Furthermore, Pettigrew and Cramer (1959) found that school segregation in Kentucky and Missouri was not random. On the contrary, efforts to reverse school segregation first occurred in border states, the mid-South, and cities—areas with low black-white ratios. They suggest that lower black-white ratios would result in less prejudicial stimuli towards blacks because there is less intergroup competition for economic resources. Harris (1968) re-examined

Pettigrew and Cramer's data and, consistent with previous research, finds that high black-white population ratios are linked to high levels of school segregation in the South. Indeed, Harris maintains that in the South, the black-white population ratio is the most important predictor of school segregation. Likewise, Robey (1970), in his study of 872 southern county school districts, determined that "the single strongest explanatory variable [*of school segregation*] is the percent of the population Negro in 1960" (Robey: 81).

Employment Inequality

Frisbie and Neidert (1977) observe that occupational inequality is greater where a high percentage of minorities is found. Their results were consistent regardless whether the minority was Mexican American or black. Similarly, Tienda and Lii (1987) find that in labor-markets flooded with high numbers of blacks, all groups of minority men had reduced earnings. In their test of the 'visibility-discrimination hypothesis' Burre, Galle, and Fosett (1991) find that despite an overall decrease in the average level of inequality in Southern metropolitan areas, regions with larger percentages of blacks had higher black-white occupational inequality. This conforms to Fosset and Kiecolt's (1989) finding that whites restrict the access of blacks to higher status occupations by controlling/restricting social, economic, and political privileges. More recently, Cassirer (1996) and Cohen (1998) observe that a large percentage of a minority population leads the majority to discriminate, as evidenced in employment and wage inequalities. Cassirer (1996) reveals an inverse relationship between the proportion black and the earnings of black males in non-Southern metropolitan areas. This relationship can be occupationally specific; Cohen (1998) finds that when blacks occupy a job niche their earnings go down while those of whites rise.

Residential Segregation

In further support, Farley et al. (1978), Clark (1991), Bobo, Schuman, and Steeh (1986) all have found evidence that whites prefer being the dominant racial class within a neighborhood. Specifically, their studies argue that whites express a desire to be part of a racially integrated neighborhood only if they remain the predominant racial group. Massey and Denton (1993) contend that one mechanism by which whites maintain control over their economic interests and their political power is to prevent blacks from entering their neighborhoods – the root cause of residential segregation (see also Massey, Gross, and Shibuya 1994, Yinger 1997). Emerson (1994) finds that residential segregation in Southern cities is highest when the black population is large. Indeed, Parker, Stults, and Rice (2005) assert that the spatial isolation of blacks to poor areas is one mechanism by which whites manage and contain this perceived threat.

Political Inequality

Discrimination against blacks is also manifested through voting anti-black or anti-black policy candidates into office. Giles and Buckner (1993) demonstrate that the independent variable percent black is positively linked to levels of white support for ex-Klu Klux Klansman David Duke. The authors assert that the effect of percent black on support for David Duke might only occur in the South. Similarly, Corzine, Creech, and Corzine (1983) maintain that white hostility towards blacks stems from a perceived political threat. When whites sense that blacks might seize political power, they express their fear at the voting booth. Specifically, a perceived political threat from blacks will prompt whites to vote for politicians who pledge to resist pro-black policies. The authors in fact find that percent black is associated with such discriminatory behaviors, and the effect exists only in the South. Indeed, black political influence in the Democratic Party may have cost the party white support in the South (Black and Black 1987;

Carmines and Stimson 1989; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Lamis 1988; Parent 1988; Sundquist 1983). For instance, in the 1984 presidential election Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989) observe that white support for Democratic Party candidates decreased as the percentage of blacks in the state's Democratic Party coalition increased (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld). Specifically, data from Louisiana parishes (1975-1990) show that increases in the proportions of blacks is linked to a rise in Republican registration and a decrease in Democratic registration among whites (Giles and Hertz 1994). Overall, Carsey (2001) asserts that "individual preferences on various issues and their voting behavior have been shown to be affected by the racial make-up of the contextual environment within which people find themselves" (Carsey: 1).

Violence

Violence is the most extreme expression of hatred toward minorities. Reed (1972) finds a positive relationship between percent black and the number of lynchings that occurred in Southern states between 1889 and 1930. Likewise, research conducted by Levine and Campbell (1972) and Bobo (1988) also finds that attacks on minorities occur more frequently when minority populations are large. Tolnay and Beck (1995) link anti-black lynching in the prewar South to the demographic changes in the black population. Specifically, as the population of blacks increased in the prewar South, there was a concomitant rise in anti-black lynching. Giles (1977) reports a positive relationship between the proportion black and white Southerner's levels of violence at the county level.

Green, Strolovich, and Wong's research on social distance between minority and majority members closely parallels Blalock's hypothesis. The majority of research on social distance (Bobo 1988; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo; Farley et al.; Clark 1991) indicates that whites indeed prefer to keep "social distance" between themselves and minority members. Green,

Strolovich, and Wong (1998) attempt to further this finding by testing the idea that “If racially motivated crime reflects whites’ stated attitudes regarding social distance, we should expect attacks to be more numerous in areas where minority populations have grown to the point at which white predominance is threatened” (Green, Strolovich, & Wong 1998: 374). True to their assumptions, Green, Strolovich and Wong (1998) find that hate crimes are more common when previously white areas are infiltrated by minority populations. Conversely, the authors find that areas that have already been integrated experience a lower number of hate crimes.

The Rise of Latinos in the United States

Although this research focuses mainly on blacks, there was always a presumption of generalizability in Blalock’s ideas, that prejudice and discrimination would be directed toward any group that threatened majority hegemony. So now that Latinos are the largest minority in the United States, the natural question is whether they face the same hostility as do black populations. Contrary to expectations, there is mixed evidence that the documented patterns of prejudice and discrimination towards blacks would be replicated for Latinos.

Both Lieberman (1980) and Massey and Denton (1993) have argued that patterns of prejudice and discrimination for blacks are not replicated for other minority group members. Similarly, Link and Oldendick’s (1996) research asserts that whites are most likely to be hostile towards blacks and less so to Latinos. This hostility towards Latinos that Link and Oldendick have noted most likely stems from whites’ assumptions of the illegality of Latino migrants and antagonism resulting from the English language barrier. Taylor (1998) finds that neither Asian nor Latino population size significantly affect whites’ views about these minority populations. However, Taylor does find that Southern whites report greater anti-Latino prejudice. Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) reveal that while an increase in the percentage of blacks lead to an increase in

anti-black stereotypes, this was not true for the Latino population. Indeed, an increase in the percentage of Latinos typically *reduced* anti-Latino stereotypes.

But there is evidence to the contrary; Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) discovered that public attitudes towards immigrants are closely related to unemployment rates. These authors find a positive relationship with the national unemployment rate and restrictionist attitudes towards immigrants. Quillian (1995) finds that county-level economic conditions along with the size of the immigrant population have an effect on attitudes towards immigrants. Also in support of Blalock's theory, Green, Strolovich, and Wong (1998) observe that anti-Latino crimes follow a similar pattern to Anti-black hate crimes. In their study, anti-Latino hate crimes occurred most often in traditionally white areas (389), but as Latino in-migration continues, the authors contend that anti-Latino hate crime should decline. Vallas, Zimmerman, and Davis (2009) test several theoretical approaches to the study of anti-immigrant sentiment and find that AIS (anti-immigrant sentiment) scores were higher in regions where the influx of immigrants was smaller. The authors suggest that this finding is due to the effect of a generalized belief system towards all immigrants rather than personal or local experience. Perhaps so, but this seems to be a rather narrow, ad-hoc explanation in a mix of confusing and inconsistent findings. The next section explains how these inconsistencies might be reconciled by accounting for changes in Latino migration patterns.

Latino Immigration in Old and New Destinations

Early Latino migrants (prior to the 1980's) often came to the United States temporarily in order to meet short-term financial goals. Once these goals were met, the majority of migrants returned to their native homes possibly to return later to repeat the two way trip (Durand and Massey 2006). However, immigration reform in the 1980's halted these circular visits due to the

increased militarization of the United State's border (Cornelius 2001). The purpose behind increased security procedures at the border was to halt the flow of Latino migrants into the United States. However, the result was not as expected. Rather than keeping out the migrants, it prompted those already here to stay for fear that they could not return. Thus, immigration reform of the 1980's, according to Massey and Capoferro (2009), contrary to its intended effect, created new permanent settlements along with a massive rise in Latino population growth.

But more importantly for this analysis, Latinos have begun settling into new destination areas. At one time, Latino migrants settled mainly in California, Texas and Illinois (Massey and Capoferro 2009). But during the 1990s, Latinos began settling in new destinations for several reasons. First, physical blockades were placed at traditional entry points in the Southwest in order to keep Latino immigrants out of the United States. But contrary to intention, these blockades simply redirected migrants away from traditional settlement areas toward new destinations around the country (Durand, Massey, & Chavret 2000). Simply put, they crossed at new entry routes through Arizona and New Mexico and moved deeper into the U.S. from there (Massey and Capoferro 2009). Second, the large magnitude of legalizations stemming from immigrant reform served to overwhelm many labor markets in traditional settlement areas, especially California. In response to the flooding of local labor markets and the over-supply of labor, Latino migrants left traditional settlement areas in search of employment in other areas of the United States (Massey and Capoferro 2009). Third, coupled with the over-supply of labor, the recession of California's economy also served as a push factor in the movement of Latino migrants away from their traditional California settlements. Finally, the passage of Proposition 187 in California led to anti-immigrant attitudes across California and sent a clear message that immigrants were no longer welcome in California (Calavita 1996).

Their arrival in new destinations had a major impact in places that heretofore had never seen a significant Latino presence. In rural areas alone, about 200 counties would have declined in population between 2000 and 2005 were it not for the immigration of Latinos (Lichter and Johnson 2006). The influx of so many Latino workers shifted the ethnic composition of low-skill labor markets. The shift displaced black workers in urban areas, resulting in a rise in black violence (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a). Likewise, in rural areas, the influx of Latinos displaced white workers, leading to a corresponding rise in white violence (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b).

There is suggestive evidence that Latinos' arrival in new destinations was not welcome. Based on a county-level analysis, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) find that Latinos in new destinations are murdered at a rate 50% higher than those in old destinations. Moreover, the same research finds that a lack of exposure to English makes Latinos in new destinations particularly vulnerable to murder. There is no such linguistic effect in traditional areas, where Latino immigrants apparently arrive into the loving arms of a well-established immigrant community in a culturally familiar setting. But in new destinations, the rapid influx of people who look "different" and speak another language would be highly conspicuous and could generate significant hostility among the local, English-only, non-Latino constituency. In other words, even though Latinos in old and new destinations share cultural traits, in terms of their macro-social contexts, they are a world apart.

Applying this to the present question, it appears that Latinos in the U.S. live in two distinct socio-cultural contexts. One is in traditional immigrant areas, well organized safe havens, where Latinos thrive without being penalized for being different, and where even non-Latinos may have reconciled the areas' long-established Latino legacy. The other is in new destinations, where Latinos might be viewed by locals as a threat to jobs and to their way of life.

Without accounting for this geographic difference, in my view, one cannot properly understand the macro-social causes of anti-Latino prejudice and discrimination. This oversight may explain the contradictory findings in previous literature and the inconsistent support for Blalock's power-threat hypothesis when applied to Latino communities.

Based on this discussion, I put forth the following hypotheses:

- 1) There will be a positive relationship between percent change in the population of Latinos and resentment toward them among non-Latinos.
- 2) This effect will exist in new Latino destinations. There will be no link in old destinations.
- 3) The arrival of Latinos will trigger a broad resentment, not just toward Latinos specifically, but toward blacks as well.
- 4) The link between Latino population and anti-Latino prejudice will be explained in part by the structure of the local labor market.

In order to pursue this line of reasoning I combine Census data from 1990 and 2000 with restricted GSS data at the county level on perceptions of minorities.

CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHODS

Data

This research is a secondary data analysis of Census data for 1990 and 2000 and of General Social Survey (GSS - NORC) data for 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 at the county level. Some of the data used in this analysis are derived from Sensitive Data Files of the GSS, obtained under special contractual arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of respondents. These data are not available from the author. Persons interested in obtaining GSS Sensitive Data Files should contact the GSS at GSS@NORC.org. County-level data from the GSS is restricted because respondents can potentially be identified. I obtained these restricted data only after I provided documentation of approval by the local Institutional Review Board (IRB), a sensitive data plan, an application for GSS geo-code information, and a signed contract for use of this special GSS extract.

This research considers the 454 counties with at least 500 Latinos that were sampled by the GSS in the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 (relevant data not available for odd years), for which 1990 and 2000 Census data were available, and for which old/traditional or new destination status was determined. In order to test my hypotheses both county and individual variables will be used.

County-level indicators are obtained from the 1990 and 2000 Census Summary Tape Files 1 and 3. Individual-level indicators are obtained from the 2000-2008 GSS cumulative file.

Measurement

Dependent Variable

The primary dependent variable measures how respondents feel toward Latinos (or other groups). Specifically, the survey asks on a 9 point scale how warm (1) or cool (9) respondents feel towards Latinos: **Feel-Latino**. I also model attitudes towards minorities in general (**Feel-Minorities**) as a way of tapping generalized anti-minority prejudice. Specifically, this is a factor reduction of attitudes towards Latinos (see above) and attitudes towards blacks.

Substantive Independent Variable

The main substantive independent variable is percent change in the Latino population in a given county from 1990 to 2000 (**Latino Population Change**).

Other Independent Variables

Individual-level control variables include **Age**, **Sex**, and **Education** (highest year of school completed) of the survey respondent. I also include several county-level variables. Given Blalock's hypothesis linking economic threat to discrimination against minorities, I include an index of **county economic deprivation** for each county. This index combines the proportion of single-headed households for the county, the proportion of residents within the county living below the poverty line, and the proportion of residents who are jobless (not unemployed, in order to capture discouraged workers). **County Education** is the percent of residents over 25 with a high school degree. I originally included this variable in the deprivation index but it did not load well with the factor, so it is included separately in the model. **Vacant housing** is the proportion of all housing units that are vacant. **Percent Latino Population** is the percent of a county's population that is comprised of Latinos in 2000 while **Percent Black Population** is the percent of a county's population that is comprised of blacks in 2000. **Percent Change in the Black**

Population measures the percentage change of blacks within each county that occurred from 1990 to 2000.

Blalock's heuristic model is hinged in part on the perceived *economic* threat posed by minorities. Thus, any test of the proposition must account for the underlying occupational or industrial structure of the area. Given the Latino success in low-skill job sectors, I include the proportion of jobs in the county that are low skilled (**Low Skill**). Low skill is defined as industrial sectors where more than 50% of individuals (age 25 and older) working in that sector lack a high school diploma. Industrial sectors (pooled) defined as low skill are Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; Transportation; Retail Trade; Accommodation and Food services; Other services; and Waste Management. I also estimate additional models that account for only the extreme lower end of the job market (**Extreme Low-Skill**). This includes four industrial sectors with the lowest level of educational attainment; Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; Mining; Construction; and Accommodation and Food services.

As per the substantive argument, the models are run separately for old and new destinations which reflects the bifurcation of Latino immigration patterns. Old/traditional destination areas, previously defined by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010), include counties in California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Arizona, and New Mexico. New destinations are counties in states that had a 50% or greater increase in the Latino population from 1990 and 2000 and include counties from North Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, South Carolina, Nevada, Alabama, Minnesota, Kentucky, Nebraska, Iowa, Mississippi, Oregon, Delaware, Utah, Indiana, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Virginia, Kansas, and Rhode Island.

The analytical method for the multivariate models is Ordinary Least Squares. Analysis reveals that multicollinearity is not a problem. None of the variance inflation factors are greater than 2.0 and no inter-correlations between the independent variables exceeds .50. If they do exceed that level, as did the deprivation variables, then I follow standard procedure and collapse them into a single index as discussed above.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

Descriptive Analysis

The descriptive results in Table 1 reinforce the expectations that populations in new destination areas will feel more coolly towards Latinos than those in old destination areas despite the overall population of Latinos, meaning that anti-Latino antagonism does not appear to grow as the Latino population increases in *all* areas. According to the results, despite the fact that Latinos are far more populous in old destinations (20.3%) than in new destinations (3.8%), respondents in new destinations are cooler toward Latinos (3.43 versus 3.91 – a higher number is cooler or more negative). So at face value, it appears that Blalock is wrong.

But this conclusion ignores the tectonic shifts in the demography of Latino communities. Note that between 1990 and 2000, Latino county populations grew by 71.4% in old destination states and by 314.9% in new areas, or more than four times as much. This hints that anti-Latino sentiment may be linked not to the mere presence or size of a particular minority, but to the social context of these communities. In short, history is important to understand prejudice. Interestingly, it may not be just linked to change, but perhaps to factors specific to the Latino community. Indeed, the results also show that despite moderate differences between old and new destinations in the population increase of blacks, attitudes towards them do not differ. (3.41 versus 3.41).

Multivariate Analysis

In this phase of the analysis, models 1-3 predict anti-Latino attitudes by using the Latino population change measures, in the presence of relevant controls. The results are presented in Table 2.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Individual and County-Level Variables for non-Latinos in Old and New Destinations, 2000

	Mean	Standard Deviation
Individual-Level Variables		
Feel-Latino	3.69 γ (3.43) δ (3.91) τ	2.08 γ (2.14) δ (2.14) τ
Feel-Black	3.44 (3.41) (3.41)	2.05 (2.15) (2.05)
Age	47.51 (47.98) (47.05)	17.23 (17.05) (17.34)
Education	13.58 (13.92) (13.27)	2.89 (2.85) (2.89)
Sex	1.55 (1.55) (1.55)	.50 (.50) (.50)
County-Level Variables		
Latino Population change	158.29 (71.38) (314.89)	21.19 (38.60) (303.75)
Vacant Housing	18693.15 (41175.34) (6030.53)	28819.84 (42005.9) (6918.22)
County Education	29.51 (25.45) (31.22)	7.07 (5.73) (6.96)
County Economic Deprivation		
<i>Poverty Rate</i>	.12 (.13) (.12)	.052 (.05) (.05)
<i>Jobless Rate</i>	.04 (.05) (.04)	.01 (.01) (.01)
<i>Single Parent Households</i>	32.22 (33.72) (31.84)	7.8 (7.23) (7.13)
Percent Latino Population	9.19 (20.31) (3.77)	11.43 (14.20) (3.12)
Percent Black Population	12.61 (10.91) (16.50)	13.74 (8.16) (14.88)

(Continued next page)

Percent Change in Black Population	33.05 (24.26) (39.0)	50.77 (37.78) (64.29)
Low skill Industry	.60 (.57) (.62)	.08 (.06) (.09)
Low Skill Extreme	.15 (.14) (.16)	.04 (.04) (.04)

N=2486; Old Destination N= 748; New Destination N=809

ϰ Total, † Old Destinations; τ New Destinations

Table 2: Linear Regression Estimates predicting Non-Latino Feelings towards Latinos, 2000

	Feel-Latino		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Individual-Level Variables			
Age	.011**(.096)	.019**(.148)	.005(.040)
Sex	-.337**(-.081)	-.474**(-.110)	-.187(-.043)
Education	.086**(-.123)	-.059**(-.083)	-.110**(-.150)
County-Level Variables			
Latino Population Change	.001**(.067)	.004(.087)	.001**(.104)
Vacant Housing	2.864(.40)	4.412*(.087)	3.036(.013)
County Education	.013(.045)	-.007(-.018)	.032**(.105)
County Economic Deprivation	.028(-.013)	.120(.050)	-.030(-.013)
Percent Latino Population	.016**(-.082)	-.022**(-.131)	-.031(-.043)
Percent Black Population	.005(.032)	-.003(-.010)	.008(.062)
Percent Change in Black Population	-.001(-.028)	.000(-.011)	-.004**(-.080)
N	2477	748	810

**p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .10

Standardized coefficients are shown in parenthesis

The first model in Table 2 predicts non-Latino feelings towards Latinos for all sampled counties. Throughout this time frame it appears that there are significant effects of percentage Latino population change on age (.011), sex (-.337), and highest year of school completed (-.086) of the respondent. This model also predicts that there is a significant effect of both the Latino population in 2000 (-.016) and the percentage Latino population change from 1990 to 2000 on feelings towards Latinos (.001). In other words, when the Latino population in 2000 is large, or when it increased in size from 1990 to 2000, feelings towards Latinos become cooler among the local non-Latino residents. This means that the model 1 results are generally supportive of Blalock's hypothesis linking minority population size/growth to anti-minority sentiment among the majority population.

But the next models reveal that the effect is geographically specific and more complex than anticipated. Model 2 predicts feelings toward Latinos only in old destinations. Results show no significant link between Latino population growth and anti-Latino sentiment. Thus, even though the Latino population grew by 71.4% (see Table 1), this growth is unrelated to anti-Latino sentiment among non-Latinos. Interestingly, model 2 also reveals that the absolute size (not change) in the Latino population is negatively related to anti-Latino sentiment. Simply put, the larger the Latino population is in old destination counties, the *warmer* non-Latinos feel toward Latinos, which is counter to the Blalock hypothesis. The implication of this finding is discussed in the conclusion.

But in new destinations, the results conform to expectations. According to model 3, increases in the percentage of the Latino population from 1990 to 2000 in new areas increase anti-Latino sentiment. In fact, the standardized coefficient (.104) suggests that enlarging the Latino population in new areas by one standard deviation, raises anti-Latino sentiment by over

10%. Thus, change is important in understanding prejudice. Yet, interestingly, the Latino population size variable (Percent Latino), the analog of the variable used in the literature on anti-black attitudes, is not significant. In sum, the first three models suggest that two things are important to understand the causes of anti-Latino sentiment; a) the history and social context of the minority population and, b) the change in the minority population, not its static size.

Also significant in this model for old destinations are: age (.019), sex (-.474, males are more negative toward Latinos), and highest year of school complete (-.059). Other significant variables in new destinations are: highest year of school complete (-.110), percent with a high school degree (.032), and black population change (.008).

In Table 3, I add a measure that controls for the structure of the low skill labor market (Low Skill Industry – the proportion of jobs that are in low skill industries).

Table 3: Linear Regression Estimates predicting Non-Latino Feelings towards Latinos, 2000

	Feel-Latino	
	Model 4	Model 5
Individual-Level Variables		
Age	.019**(.150)	.005(.040)
Sex	-.470**(-.109)	-.182(-.043)
Education	-.058**(-.082)	-.109**(-.149)
County-Level Variables		
Latino Population Change	.004(.072)	.001**(.091)
Vacant Housing	4.484**(.088)	3.787(.446)
County Education	-.014(-.039)	.024(1.208)
County Economic Deprivation	.123(.052)	-.043(-.303)
Percent Latino Population	-.025**(-.150)	-.029(-.041)
Percent Black Population	-.001(-.004)	.009(.063)
Percent Change in Black Population	.000(-.004)	-.004**(-.079)
Low Skill Industry	1.150(.036)	.896(.035)
<i>Extreme Low-Skill</i>	-.878(-.016)	.333(.135)
N	748	810

**p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .10

Standardized coefficients are shown in parenthesis

In this Table, Model 4 predicts non-Latino feelings towards Latinos in old destinations, controlling for low skill jobs. This variable is not significant in the model, and its addition changes nothing in the substantive findings of the other variables. Likewise in model 5, for *new* destinations, there is no significant link between the relative size of the low-skill labor market and the feelings towards Latinos. And still, any link between Latino population change and anti-Latino sentiment across the entire country (model 1, Table 2) is actually located in new destinations. Similarly, when the extreme low-skill is controlled for I find no significant link between the relative size of the extreme low-skill labor market and feelings towards Latinos in old or new destinations. Again, I find that the effect of anti-Latino sentiment is found only in new destinations.

In Table 4, I go beyond predicting anti-Latino sentiment to see if a rapid population increase in the Latino population translates into generalized anti-minority sentiment. In this phase of the analysis, the dependent variable predicted in the models is an index that combines feelings toward Latinos and towards blacks (among non-Latinos).

Model 6 predicts this variable for old destinations only. As with prior results, the effect of Latino population change is not significant in counties located in these old areas. The only significant county-level variables are vacant housing (1.862) and the relative size of the Latino population (-0.10).

In new areas, however, Latino population change is a significant predictor of anti-Latino sentiment (.001). This implies that when the Latino population grows in size in new destinations, the local non-Latino residents tend to feel more negative towards minorities in general – defined as both Latinos and blacks. The standardized coefficient in the model is larger than in all other models for new destinations. The resulting coefficient of .121 suggests that when the 10-year

increase in the Latino population is accelerated by one standard deviation, the generalized anti-minority sentiment among non-Latinos in new destinations rises by 12.1%. These findings are discussed in more detail below.

Table 4: Linear Regression Estimates predicting Non-Latino Feelings towards Minorities, 2000

	Feel-Minorities	
	Model 6	Model 7
Individual-Level Variables		
Age	.010**(.160)	.004**(.075)
Sex	-.304**(-.143)	-.192**(-.096)
Education	-.030**(-.084)	-.048**(-.140)
County-Level Variables		
Latino Population Change	.002(.079)	.001**(.121)
Vacant Housing	1.862*(.074)	1.867(.018)
County Education	-.002(-.009)	.012*(.086)
County Economic Deprivation	.068(.058)	.033(.030)
Percent Latino Population	-.010**(-.122)	-.018(-.055)
Percent Black Population	-.003(-.026)	-.003(-.045)
Percent Change in Black Population	8.852(.004)	-.001*(-.065)
N	748	809

**p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .10 ;# Standardized coefficients are shown in parenthesis

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Prior evidence has generally supported the Blalock proposition that large minority populations tend to make the majority feel threatened. As a result, the majority population then begins to acquire negative feelings – prejudice – toward the minority. But while studies have confirmed this as one cause of anti-black prejudice, the research on anti-Latino prejudice has, in contrast, yielded a mix of confusing findings. This confusion, my thesis suggests, is because previous studies on Latino population have missed a critical element in the demography of Latino immigration. Latinos in the United States are essentially split into two groups: those that settled in old destinations where there is a strong immigrant community and those that more recently settled in new destinations around the country. These two Latino populations live in very different social contexts and, as a result, elicit very different reactions among the local non-Latino population. As such, my research produces the following four interrelated findings: 1) There is a positive relationship between percent change in the population of Latinos and resentment toward them among non-Latinos. 2) This effect exists in new Latino destinations, but not in old destinations. 3) The arrival of Latinos generates a broader resentment, not just toward Latinos specifically, but toward other minorities as well. 4) There is no significant link between the relative size of the low-skill labor market and anti-Latino prejudice. These findings confirm the first three hypotheses. But the fourth finding does not support the final hypothesis. Specifically, my results do not confirm that anti-minority sentiment (in this case, toward Latinos) is rooted in a competition over jobs. There are several implications of these findings.

First, social context is important to consider when searching for the causes of prejudice. Prior research on anti-Latino prejudice may have construed Latino communities too broadly. In

traditional Latino areas, large Latino populations generally elicit a positive reaction among the rest of the population who over the years may have reconciled/welcomed the ethnic makeup of their community. But in new Latino settlement areas, the rapid influx of Latinos was a shock to some local residents who watched the ethnic composition of their communities change swiftly. The reaction to their new neighbors was decidedly negative. This suggests two things: 1) the history and structural context of the minority group must be considered in future tests of Blalock's hypothesis and, indeed, any research on the causes of prejudice and, 2) the context of the majority also must be considered when accounting for their reaction to minority members. For Latinos in the U.S., specifically, they may have the same roots, but they live in two distinct social worlds.

Second, prejudice is linked to the *change* in the minority population, not its relative size. Unfortunately, much of the prior research in this area models the mere size of the minority population. Perhaps that may be relevant to black prejudice, but the causes of anti-Latino sentiment are more complex. Forty years ago (about 1970) 1 in 18 residents in the U.S. was Latino, whereas by 2025, that number will be 1 in 4. That is a dramatic change by any account, one that seems to generate anti-Latino prejudice in the areas most profoundly affected.

Third, this regional difference may explain why new Latinos migrants have a greater exposure to violence. Shihadeh and Barranco (2010d) find that the victimization rate of Latinos in new destination areas is 50% greater than the corresponding rate in old and well-established Latino areas. Indeed, the Latino rate of homicide victimization in new areas is twice that of non-Latino whites and approaches that of blacks. In particular, the new migrants who were most at risk for homicide were those who knew little English. So perhaps there is a cultural basis for anti-Latino prejudice. For many years, Latinos settled in established immigrant communities

where Spanish is spoken widely, and where English is not necessary to conduct life's business. In contrast, new destinations are hardly Spanish-only environments. On the contrary, the local residents may view learning English as an immigrant's obligation to becoming an American.

Fourth, the cause of anti-Latino prejudice is not rooted in economics. There is a lively public discourse on the impact of Latino successes in agriculture, manufacturing, construction and so on. My findings show there is no link, however, between the low-skill job market and anti-Latino prejudice, casting doubt on the proposition that the majority views the minority as an economic threat. However, before economic determinants are cast aside, there is an important caveat; these county level data (and much of the opinion data) were gathered during a time of relative prosperity. During the 1990s and into the 2000s, there was a surge in demand in construction and other low-skill industries. Low-skill jobs were plentiful and the minimum wage was rendered virtually meaningless. But a tough recession in 2008 has elevated unemployment to nearly 10%. State budgets are red with ink as we enter a possibly prolonged period of austerity. During such times, anti-immigrant (read: anti-Latino) sentiment may spike, prompting non-Latinos to embrace anti-immigration policies such as those recently enacted in Arizona. Thus, a true test of the economic causes of prejudice may be possible only when the majority faces objective hardship.

Future research should expand on these findings. Specifically, there may be race- or ethnic-specific causes of prejudice. Extant research defines the "majority" as white and, for the most part, non-Latino. But there are reported tensions between blacks and Latinos over jobs. Recent evidence shows that Latinos are displacing blacks from low-skill jobs in urban areas (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a) and displacing whites in rural areas (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b). And in each of these areas, the displaced population has higher rates of homicide

offending. So there may be some purchase in disaggregating the analysis by race and ethnicity, while accounting for the differences between old and new destinations.

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