Identifier

etd-06062013-225727

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Economics

Document Type

Dissertation

Abstract

In this dissertation, we consider the role of complementarities in contests. In most contests, there is either a single prize available, or multiple prizes whose joint value is simply the sum of the values of the individual prizes. We consider contests involving competitions for multiple objectives whose value depend on the combination of objectives won. These combinations of objectives are the basis for the complementarities we examine. We use contests consisting of multiple subcontests, with the subcontests determining the winner of each objective. The overall contest thus determines which combinations of objectives each player achieves, and thus the overall prize winner. These complementarities are first established in a game between two players who have different complementarities, such that they must win combinations of subcontests to obtain a prize. Optimal decisions are determined for the players across different structures, with what structures benefit a particular player investigated. We then investigate the play of the game experimentally, seeing how actual players may deviate from optimal play. This game is then brought back a level, where the structure of the competition is itself determined by a game. Finally, we consider a different type of complementarity, where the complementarity occurs in the subcontests themselves, rather than for the overall prize.

Date

2013

Document Availability at the Time of Submission

Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.

Committee Chair

Sarangi, Sudipta

Included in

Economics Commons

Share

COinS